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Abstract 
The British informal empire in China is often mistakenly believed to have 
represented the British government's policies and views. The second biggest 
Chinese treaty port, Tientsin, had a different point of view to that of China (mostly 
in treaty ports) and Westminster. Tientsin's British community's main interests lay 
either within the concession or in Tientsin's hinterlands. These interests included 
its people and property. In addition the British community was proud of the British 
empire's prestige. All these created a determination in the British community that 
any attempt to jeopardise their interests would be opposed. However, the situation 
in Tientsin was rather different to that of their counterparts in Shanghai. The 
limited power of the British Municipal Council meant that the British community 
had, reluctantly, to obey British liberal policy when faced with the rise of the anti- 
imperialist movement in the mid-1920s. Under Kuomintang, the Chinese had 
launched the Northern Expedition, which led the British government to agree in 
principal to return several of its concessions to China. In Tientsin this policy met 
with opposition. Though the British community there had to accept the decision, it 
fought successfully to avoid rendition. This was not the only challenge the 
community faced: in 1929-1931 it had to fight to retain its extraterritorial rights. 
At that time several events challenged the British interests, such as the Tientsin 
Customs crisis (1930) and the disappearance of John Hay Thorburn (1931). The 
British community's attitude became more cautious when the Japanese began to 
expand their influence in North China in 1931, when they had played more 
pragmatic approach towards the Japanese because of Japan's formidable military 
power. The concession afforded sanctuary from Japanese pressure. Only from late 
1937 onwards did the Japanese challenge the British authority within the 
concession. In Tientsin's hinterlands, British interests opened up to Japanese 
pressure, and the British firms had to adopt a more neutral position towards the 
Japanese. 
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The study of Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1920s to 1930s offers an 
interesting insight into the history of imperialism in China. British concessions in 
treaty ports, of which there were many in China such as Amoy, Chinkiang, 
Hankow, Shanghai and Tientsin, are one of the issues that can be studied to explore 
British imperialism in China. My research explores the relationship between Britain 
and China from 1925 to 1937 through a case study of the British concession in 
Tientsin and its hinterlands at the time. However, this is not a study of Tientsin, as 
such, or of its municipal administration. The subjects of this study are the British 
government, the British community in Tientsin and it relations with the Chinese. 
Tientsin and its surrounding area has not previously been a focus for studies of 
Anglo-Chinese relations. Some scholars deal with it in passing, but it has not been 
a main issue in their studies. Shanghai is a more popular topic, which makes 
Tientsin interesting as a comparative study or to enrich the study of the Treaty Ports 
and their role in Sino-British relations. 
The scope of this research begins with the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925 
and ends in 1937. The focus of the study is British interest in the British 
concession in Tientsin and its hinterlands in a period which saw great changes in 
British policy as well as in the international and internal situation in China. The 
year 1926 marked the beginning of the Northern Expedition under the KMT to 
unite China. This expedition northwards from Canton was one of the important 
issues faced by the British government in China at the time. It was made clear that 
i 
the British government did not want to interfere in the civil war in China and that it 
hoped the fighting would not jeopardise British interests. However, these hopes 
were dashed by the seizure of the British concession in Hankow in January 1927. 
The Foreign Office in London realised that it should find a moderate way to build 
good relations with the KMT. This consequently shaped the renegotiation of what 
were called the `unequal treaties' - the nineteenth century treaties, on which the 
treaty port system was based - the tariff, extraterritorial rights, concessions, and 
settlements and leased territories. 
The new British policy in 1927 made several modifications to the British 
presence in China, especially with regard to its concessions and settlements there. 
The effect of the policy can be seen at the point when the British concessions in 
Chinkiang and Amoy (1930) were returned to Chinese control. On 1 October 1930, 
the lease of Weihaiwei was also formally returned to China. In other concessions 
and settlements, including Tientsin, reforms were implemented, heralding a new era 
for the foreign settlers in which they lived on a more equal footing with the Chinese 
population as opposed to the previous structure of foreign settlement in China. 
However, these reforms were not welcomed by all British settlers in China, and 
some of the British community formed a bureau to defend and protect their interests 
and privileges within the concession. Tientsin provides an excellent new case study 
for the assessment of the impact of reform on its large British population and self- 
governing British concession authority (the British Municipal Council-BMC). It 
was an important trading hub for British firms and a military base for the North 
China Command. It was also, especially after 1931, the site of growing Anglo- 
Japanese tension. This is a new study of the British concession in Tientsin that 
2 
explores the role played by the British community there in Anglo-Chinese relations 
and what this suggests about Sino-British relations more widely. 
Literature Review 
Before I focus on the literature on Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1920s and 
1930s I will first summarise the literature on these relations in the nineteenth 
century. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century researchers have generated a 
huge amount of literature on Anglo-Chinese relations. These studies start from the 
beginning of the British contact with China and cover the wars, treaties and 
developments of British relations with China. Among the scholars and writers who 
have contributed to this literature are John King Fairbank, Alain Le Pichon, 
Michael Greenberg, P. J. Marshall and J. C. Crammer-Byng. These writers agree 
that trade encouraged the British to make contact with the Chinese. ' However, 
Anglo-Chinese relations faced a problem with the Canton System, which restricted 
British trade to a select group of Chinese merchants in that city, and that city 
alone. 2 Of steadily increasing importance treaty port this trade was the opium 
trade, which damaged Anglo-Chinese relations and led to war between them in 
1839-1842 3 This conflict ended with the Nanking treaty (1842),; which began a 
' John King Fairbenk, Tirade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: the Opening of the 7Yeaty Ports 
1842-1854, Two volumes in one (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 57-73; Alain Le 
Pichon, China Trade and Einpro: Ja dine, Maheson & Co. and the Origins of British Rule in 
Hong Kong 1827-1843 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 3; Michael Greenberg, British 
Trade and the Opening of China 1800-1842 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1951), pp. 1-17; P. 
J. Marshall, `Britain and China In the Late Eighteenth Century, ' in Robert A. Bickers (ed. ), Ritual 
& D(plomacy. - The Maeartraey Missfon to china 1792-1794 (London: The British Association for 
Chinese Studies, The Wellswweep Press, 1993), p. 16; and J. C. Crammer-Byng, An Embassy to 
China Being the Journal kept by Lord Maeart»ry during his Embassy to the Emperor Chen-lud 
1793-1794 (London: L,, Gran & Co. Ltd., 1962), p. 150. 
2 Fairbenk, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, p. 52 and Greenberg, British Trade and the 
Opening of China 1800-1842, pp. 42-74; Wong Eang Cheong, Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese 
Merchants In Sino- Western Trade (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997), pp. 10S-6. 
3 Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, pp. 74-8; Greenberg. British Trade and the 
Opening of China 1800-1842, p. 198 and Pic hon, China Trade and Empir+e, pp. 11,15 and 36. 4 Fairbenk, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, pp. 102-3. 
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new chapter in Anglo-Chinese relations with the opening of British settlements in 
China. The settlements created close relations between the British and the Chinese, 
but their early establishment was beset by several problems, including the 
unwillingness of the Chinese to rent land to the British, problems with moving 
Chinese graves and language difficulties. 5 But these were not the reasons behind 
the second war between Britain and China, the Arrow War (1856-60). In his survey 
of the conflict J. W. Wong examined its origins of this war, asserting that opium 
and opening trade in the interior to the British were the main issues. However, the 
Arrow Incident was the British cases bell:! Eventually war broke out between the 
British and French armies and the Chinese in the Arrow War and other fighting in 
Peking in 1860. The crisis ended with the Tientsin Treaty (1858) and the Peking 
Convention (1860). After 1860 Anglo-Chinese relations were therefore based on 
rights enshrined in various treaties which gave the British extraterritoriality 
privileges and established British concessions, gave British ships the right to enter 
inland China and allowed the missionaries freedom to own property and operate in 
the interior. 
Some scholars take a different approach to Anglo-Chinese relations at the 
time. James L. Hevia asserts that these Anglo-Chinese wars and treaties were due 
to British Imperialism's attempt to teach the Chinese to recognise the multiple 
imperial powers! This included punishing Chinese who threatened British life and 
s Linda Cooke Johnson, Shangghai: From Markast Town to 71uoy Port 1074-1858 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 191 and 192. 6j. W. Wong, Deadly Drrams: Opium and tba Arrow War (1856-1860) irr China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 468. 
7Fairbank, Tirade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, p. 462. ' James L. Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism In Ntneteeswh-Centupy China 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 3-4,69,32-43,111 and 220-9. 
4 
property. The suppression of the Boxer Uprising (1900) is a case in point. 9 Wang 
Gungwu, on the other hand, portrays the British as adopting a policy to secure 
peace and stabilitay in China after 1860. The Qing agreed to take on several British 
advisers to help with the modernisation of the Chinese army. 1° The British were 
even willing to help the Qing in the Taiping Rebellion. " All of this literature talks 
about international relation between Britain and China. In short almost all the 
literature on Anglo-Chinese relations before 1920 show that Anglo-Chinese 
relations were dominated by crises, due to the unequal treaties in which the Chinese 
regarded the British as an imperialist power trying to dominate the Chinese 
economy and imposing its gun boat policy. This situation continued into twentieth 
century and came to a head as the anti-imperialist movement in 1920s. These 
studies offer good introductions to issues around the coming of the British to China 
and the establishment of their concessions there. However, they mainly discuss 
diplomatic and trade relations and do not go into depth about the new British 
communities that developed and the British concessions themselves, or about the 
British community's reactions to and feelings about British policy in China. This 
includes the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland, which is not well 
represented anyway in these studies. 
Now I turn to the literature on Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1920s and 
1930s and tried to look on where were Tientsin in the Anglo-Chinese relations. 
This can be divided into three themes, which I discuss below: the diplomatic 
9 ibid., p. 231. 
ºo Wang Gungwu, Anglo-Chinese Encow*irs Since 1800: War, lh7&, Science and Governance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 4 and 19. u Katherine F. Burner, John K. Fairbank and Richard J. Smith (eds. ), Entering China's Service: 
Roben Hart's Journals, 1854-1863 (Cambridge MA: The Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard 
Univesity, 1986), p. 240 and John S. Gregory, `Bddsh Intervention Against the Taiping Rebellion, ' 
The Jown d gfAsim Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Nov. 1959), p. 19. 
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history of Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1920s-1930s; studies in imperial history 
(reinvigorated by Cains and Hopkins); and recent studies relating to the treaty ports 
focussing on their social, cultural and political history. 
Anglo-Chinese Relations in the 1920s 
Work on Anglo-Chinese relations from the 1920s to the 1930s has generally 
focused on the response to the emergence of Chinese nationalism in the 1920s and 
the international crisis in East Asia in the 1930s. The literature on the 1920s is 
dense, but mostly diplomatic in focus and concentrates on Britain's aims in China 
concerning trade, 12 an interest protected by extraterritorial rights in treaty ports. 
These rights extended to the protection of Britons and their property. Sir John 
Pratt, a former China consul turned diplomat, wrote in 1943: 
In certain circles British policy in China has been described 
as imperialistic, but the one certain fact that emerges from 
the record is that Great Britain came to China for no other 
purpose than trade, that she consistently sought her own 
commercial interests in the prosperity and general welfare 
of China. '3 
In order to maintain progress in its trade, Great Britain wanted a stable China; it 
wanted to uphold its British commercial and treaty rights, defend the lives and 
property of the British community, and prevent China from being dominated by any 
single foreign power. 14 
The importance of trade may be illustrated by the level of British 
investment in China. In 1902 this represented 33 percent of total foreign investment 
in the country, rising in 1914 to 37.7 percent and falling a little in 1931 to 36.7 
IZ Sir John T. Pratt, War and Polüks in China (London, Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1943), p. 37. 13 IMd. 
14 Christopher J. Bowie, `Great Britain and the Use of Force in China, 1919 to 1931' (unpublished 
Ph. D., thesis, University of Oxford, 1983), p. 8. 
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percent. '5 However, China supplied only around five percent of Britain's imports 
between 1840 and 1870 and about three percent of the British export market in the 
same period. Between 1911 and 1937 Britain's total exports were just two to three 
percent. 16 In other words, there seemed to be an asymmetrical trade relationship. 
But in terms of strategy and security, however, it played a substantial role, because 
trade with China underpinned the British presence in East Asia with its nationals, 
properties, naval stations, colony and concessions. If the China connection 
collapsed it would allow enemies of the British, such as the Soviet Union or Japan, 
to fill the gap and threaten China's position and British prestige in Asia" In short, 
a well-organised trading lobby stridently asserted the importance of trade with 
China, but in general terms we have to look elsewhere to understand the importance 
to Britain of Anglo-Chinese relations. These studies highlight how the British 
interests were interrelated with the trade interests of the existing of the British 
community as well as imperial security issues. They help us understand then why 
the British government sought to protect its interests in concessions such as 
Tientsin. 
Trade was perhaps an excuse which provided a rationale for Britain's 
defence of its interests, which were fundamentally based on strategic 
considerations. This leads to the question of how to protect these interests. This is 
raised in the literature referring to the instability which marked China after the 
collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1911) and the death of President Yuan Shih-kai 
15 C. F. Reiner, Foreign hrcestmems in Clriws (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968), p. 76. 
16 P. J. Coin and A. G. Hopkins, British ImperlalLrn 1688-2000, Second Edition (Harlow: Pearson 
Education Limited, 1993), pp. 363 and 595. "Robert Bickan, Britain in China: Comma it, Culture and Colonialism 1900-1949 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 117 and Edmund S. K. Fung The Diplomacy of Imperial 
Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924-1931 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
p. 81. 
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(1917). As a result of these events there was no strong central government in 
China. Although Peking was recognised internationally as the central Chinese 
government, effective power was fractured and regionalised. In addition China at 
the time was disturbed by war, piracy and banditry, which to some extent also 
disrupted British trade activities in China. Such instability in China became one of 
Britain's concerns in her efforts to protect her traders' interests in China. Tientsin, 
for example, could not turn its back on this problem, and in many cases such 
disturbances had a profound impact on British interests, especially trade. The 
British trading community in Tientsin and throughout China sought stability and 
security. 
However, this instability also had some advantages for Britain. A weak 
China could not adequately protect Chinese national interests, for example. So the 
biggest challenge facing Britain in China overall was the emergence of an assertive 
and revolutionary Chinese nationalism under the KMT after 1925. The Chinese 
had long been neglected by the foreign Powers; China had received little benefit 
from the Washington Conference of which David Armstrong said "... the Powers 
would only accept a weak resolution proposed by the American delegation .. "18 
which was to protect China's sovereignty. That is to say the rejuvenation of the 
KMT had a strong impact on British interests because of the anti-British campaign 
in China, especially when the Chinese formed the United Front with the CCP for 
the Northern Expedition. 19 Edmund S. K. Fung pointed out that: 
u David Armstrong, `China's Place in the Now Pacific Order', Erik Goldstein and John Maurer 
(ads. ), The Washington Co fereme, 1921-22: Naval Rivahy. East Asim Stability and the Road to 
Pear/ Harbor (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 262. 
" In the First Congress KMT's National Congress in 1924 with influenced from the CCP had issued 
anti-imperialism propaganda. See Hu Shang, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Westport: 
Hyperion Press, Inc., 1955), pp. 28S-91. 
S 
Recognizing the rising tide of Chinese nationalism and still 
reeling from the effects of the First World War, Britain was 
no longer able to maintain the old treaty regime and War, 
was forced to conduct a strategic retreat from a position 
which was bound eventually to be untenable20 
The rise of Chinese nationalism led to a change in British policy towards China; it 
posed a problem which the British needed to deal with. At this point I present two 
headings: the problem and its resolution. 
1. Problem 
The emergence of a new force in China, the KMT, gradually altered British 
policy towards China. The rise of the KMT was not sudden: anti-foreign feelings 
had been growing since the Opium War, after which the foreign powers had gained 
many privileges in China. The Chinese state itself had unsuccessfully contested the 
power of France in war in 1884-85. Some scholars state that the victory of the 
Japanese in the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) contributed to the beginning of 
Chinese nationalism among Chinese intellectuals. 2' Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi- 
chao, for example, began to talk about the reform of the Chinese government to 
meet the foreign challenge in China. 2 But this initiative failed when the Empress 
Dowager Hzu-hsi made a coup d'dtat and returned to power in 1898. Meanwhile 
missionary activities in China had occasioned much ground-level unrest and 
`missionary cases', sometimes sparking outbreaks of violence. This type of 
situation was greatly aggravated when the Chinese in north China faced a drought, 
20 Edmund S. K. Feig, 'The Sino-British Rapprochement, 1927-1931', Modern Asia" &U, 60, 
Vol. 17, No. 1(1983), p. 104. 21 S. A. Smith, LAC Cattle and Hoses: Nationalism and Labor in Shanghai 1895-1927 (Durham 
and London: Duke University Prosa, 2002), p. 38. 22 Ibid., p. 39. 
9 
the tension from which exploded in the Boxer Uprising of 1899-1900.23 This 
uprising was a nightmare for the foreigners living in China. The British in Tientsin 
in particular had bad memories of this event. Although the uprising was subdued 
and the Boxers punished, Chinese awareness of threats to Chinese sovereignty 
remained strong. Different forms of protest developed in the decade after the 
Boxer events, including boycott movements against foreign powers, such as a 
protest against the Russians (1904) and a boycott of American goods (1905). 24 
Students and labourers were among the groups active against foreign imperialism. 
They organised associations and joined the nationalist movement in China. u 
As well as opposing foreign imperialism, Chinese leaders such Sun Yat-sen 
and others developed critiques against the Ch'ing rulers of China. Sun aimed to 
overthrow the Ch'ing Dynasty and establish a republican system. He argued in 
terms also used by others: that the Chinese had been `asleep' for a long time and 
should wake up to oppose the absolutism of Ch'ing Dynasty rule. He wanted a 
China ruled by its people, not under a monarchy. 2' Sun Yat-sen was also aware of 
the problem of anti-imperialism. He argued that the imperialists had aimed to 
control China-27 This development led him to develop a critique of imperialism in 
his struggle to provide an ideological foundation for the work of recovering 
Chinese sovereignty. His first task to realise the nationalist feeling was to try to 
organise a revolution to overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty. It was only in 1911 that this 
" Paul A. Cohen, History in Threes Keys: the Boxers as Event, Experitme, and Myth (New York: 
Columbia University Press (New York: Columbia University Press, c1997), p. 94. 24 Smith, Like Cattle and Horses, pp. 45-46. 25 Marie-Claire Bargere, Sw Yat-sen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), P. M. 26 John Fitzgerald, Awakening China Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), P. 8. 2' Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Student Protests In Twentieth-Cenlwy China: the view fron, Shard 
ýStanfad: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 39. 
Berge, Sun Yat-seat p. 75. 
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dream was achieved when a revolt broke out in Hankow. The Ch'ing abdicated in 
1912 and the Chinese people celebrated by cutting their queues, firing gun salutes, 
raising the flag with "the Republic of China" written on it and making speeches . 
29 
However, the 1911 Revolution could not create stable, democratic 
sovereignty in China, which fell under the absolutist rule of Yuan Shih-kai. Yuan's 
Reorganisation Loan and the murder of KMT leader, and Prime-minister designate 
Sung Chiao-jen in 191330 created ill feeling among the KMT. 31 This was followed 
by what was know as the `Second Revolution' (1913), which was crushed by Yuan 
Shih-kai's army. 32 However, the nationalist feeling among the Chinese did not 
subside. The issue of foreign imperialism was not resolved by the 1911 
Revolution. The anti-Japanese boycott by students, merchant and intellectuals in 
1915 against the Twenty-one Demands was a can in point 33 These demands would 
have put China under Japanese influence by appointing several Japanese advisers in 
the Chinese administration and military. The demands also related to several 
Chinese territories such as Shantung, southern Manchuria and eastern Inner 
Mongolia? Despite strong resistance from the Chinese people to these demands 5 
Yuan Shih-kai had to accept them under Japanese pressure. Only Sun Yat-sen and 
his supporters did not follow the anti-Japanese wave; he continued work with the 
29 Henrietta Harrison, 77w Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols In 
China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 20. 30 Sung Chiao-jen was Sun Ya-sen's associate and an effective leader in getting Chinese support for 
We KMT to win the Chinese election in 1912. But he was assassinated in 1913. See Norito 
Tameda, "Sung Chtao-jen and the 1911 Revolution, " Paper On Chine Vol. 12, East Asian 
Research Center, February 1968. 
31 Baggre, Sow Yat-sen pp. 236-237 and 243. 32 Ibid., pp. 243-244. 
" Wassastro n, Stu" Protests In 7wentkth-CendayChina p. 43. 
3334 BcBcrgdre, 
Swr Yat-sen p. 263. 
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Japse36 They continued to straggle to unite China with South China, but their 
effort were constantly betrayed by Chinese warlords there. 7 
In 1916 Yuan Shih-kai died and effective political power China 
disintegrated into the hands of regional and even smaller militarist forces. The 
central government in Peking was not very powerful. Three powerful warlord 
groups; the Anfu, the Chilli and the Fengtian, dominated North China and Peking. 
They were not a united group. They were constantly warring to control the central 
government in Peking. For example, in 1924 there were two wars between the 
Chili group and Fengtian group. m These wars created hardship for the Chinese. 39 
The rise of the warlords created another problem in China besides imperialism. 
The problem of foreign imperialistm remained, although the Chinese had 
demanded full sovereignty after World War I. While we now accept that the 
internationally-recognised Chinese government in Peking was more successful in 
asserting China's sovereignty than was traditionally assumed10, this was a policy 
with only limited success. Others began to articulate an even more robust policy of 
contestation of foreign power. One source of this was communism, which came 
from the success of the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) in Russia. The Bolshevik 
Revolution became a beacon of hope among some young Chinese wishing to save 
their country from foreign imperialsm. 41 The communist idea spread widely 
36 Ibid., pp. 263-264. 
37 Ibid., pp. 269-276. 
33 Arthur Waldron, From War to Nafonallsm. China's Turntag Poin4 1924-1925 (Cambridge: 
Caarbridgo University Press, 1995), p. 3. 
See Waldon, From War to Nt ionali, m. China's T n, 1 g Pob 1924-1925, pp. 141-160. 40 W. C. Kirby, `The Intenutionalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the 
Republican Era', 71w China Quarterly, No. 150, Special Issue: Reappraising Republic Chine, (Jun., 
1997), p. 443. 
41 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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among the students and intellectuals in the May Fourth period. 42 The movement, 
which attacked traditional Chinese thought and customs, opened Chinese students' 
minds to the weakness of their country. 43 Ironically, the movement began to see 
the good of western ideas compared with those of traditional Chinese philosophers 
with regard to China's future. Apart from students and intellectuals, the movement 
also made labourers aware of exploitation by their employers. « The movement, 
which started in 1915, reached its climax when Chinese students staged a protest 
against the Versailles peace treaty (1919) which proposed to transfer the German 
rights in China to the Japanese. This sparked the anger of students, intellectuals, 
labourers and merchants. 4S They decided to boycott Japanese goods and services. 
Some newspapers and magazines flourished as a result of what became 
known as the May Fourth Movement. They became one of the Chinese 
communists' tools for spreading their ideas. This was followed by the formation 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921. The CCP aimed to liberate China 
from foreign imperialism and the warlords agreed to form an alliance with the 
KMT. In 1923 several communist members joined the KMT to develop the idea of 
a United Front 46 In short the aim of the United Front was to fight the foreign 
imperialist and the warlords. In order to gain the support of the Chinese masses, 
the CCP and KMT began to organise themselves to penetrate the student and labour 
movements. As already mentioned, these two groups had participated in the 
Chinese nationalist movement against foreign powers and warlords. They 
`2Arif Dirlik, 71w Origiw of Chinese Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 105. 43 Lucian Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1971), p. 37. 
" S. A. Smith, Like Cattle and Horses, p. 123. 45 Ibid., p. 93. 
46 Baggre, Sun Yat-sen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 322. 
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organised themselves into several associations such as the Shanghai Student Union 
(SSU), the National Student's Union (NSU) and the Shanghai General Labour 
Union (GLU), and mobilised very effectively against the foreign imperialism. 
A new nationalist movement erupted in Shanghai in May 1925., Chinese 
students and labours joined to form the Union of Labour, Commerce, and 
Education (ULCE) to demonstrate against the murder of Chinese workers in a 
Japanese factory. 47 Twelve Chinese demonstrators were killed by British-led police 
in Shanghai's International Settlement on 30th May, sparking a large-scale 
nationalist movement. The CCP used this opportunity to highlight the foreign 
imperialists as China's oppressors. 48 The May Thirtieth Movement, as it became 
known, began to spread spontaneously throughout China, and there additional 
incidents, such as the Shakee Incident in Canton, boycotts of British goods in Hong 
Kong and demonstrations in Hankow, Kiukiang, Peking, Chunking and Tientsin 49 
Meanwhile the Zhejiang-Jiangsu Civil War between the warlords in 1924-25 
aggravated the chaotic situation in China. People suffered in this war from 
incidents such as warlord soldiers aggressively taking money from shops and 
seizing junks and conscripting young people for war. SO This situation created an 
opportunity for the United Front to gain new supporters. Thus the Northern 
Expedition achieved tremendous results when it was launched by the United Front 
in 1926. Nationalism grew steadily and became more organised against the 
imperialists and warlords. 
47 Nicholas R Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empüu: West. nwrs In Shanghai and the Chimw 
Revohrtion of the 19201 (Hanover. University Press of New England, 1991), p. 97. 
" S. A. Smith, A Road Is Made: Communism in Shanghai. 1920-1927 (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000), 
90. 
Cliff. d, Spoilt Children of Empi e, p. 119. 30See Waldron, From War to Naiondttm pp. 141-160. 
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However, the Bolshevik influence gradually focused the nationalists against 
the British in particular, leading to led a nationwide anti-British movement, which 
shocked British policy-makers. At this point, the British saw that they must 
address the subject of Chinese nationalism. In the 1920s it was hard for the British 
to maintain their position in China, as disturbances began to focus on British 
property and interests. William James Megginson noted that Britain was worried 
not only about the rise of Chinese nationalism, but also about growing communist 
activity, S1 as the Bolsheviks were supporting not only the KMT but also warlord 
Feng Yu-hsiang. Russia's involvement created concern among the British in China 
and in London. '2 The British Legation in China monitored Feng Yu-hsiang's 
activities in North China. M Thus the disturbance in the mid-192Os was not limited 
to south and central China but also caused problems for the British in Tientsin and 
its hinterland. 
i. Retreat 
What was the "strategic retreat" on which Great Britain embarked in dealing 
with the Chinese nationalism? David Wilson noted in 1973 that, " ... Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, 1925-1936 [Sir Victor] Wellesley's 
consistent view that Britain should be conducting a strategic withdrawal without, if 
possible, allowing it to deteriorate into a rout, was based on a good understanding 
s' William James Meggimoa, 'Britain's Response to Chinese nationalism, 1925-1927: The Foreign 
Office Search For a New Policy' (unpublished Ph. ). thesis, George Washington University, 1973), 
196. 
Ibid., p. 197. 
The British Library, IOLR, L/PS/10/1197, F1941/1941/10, Mr. Lampoon to Sir Austen 
Chamberlain - (Received March 1. ), Peking, January 10,1927. 
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of Britain's diminishing power in Asia. "M As a global power and ruler of the 
biggest empire in the world, a rout in China would be a serious setback, tarnishing 
British prestige and causing, it was feared, subsequent effects elsewhere. The fear 
was that British trade, prestige and power would be affected by a domino effect 
starting with China and expanding to the colonies. Colin Ross (1968) points out 
that, "... signs of stirring in the chaotic mass of China itself.. . could threaten not 
only the colonies in China and Malaya themselves (including Malayan rubber) but 
also the balance of security of the imperial territories of India and Australasia. "" 
The context for these concerns was also provided by grave unrest elsewhere in its 
empire, such as in Ireland and India. ' Furthermore, America which had interests in 
Japan, was moving to extend its trade into the Asia-Pacific region. At the end of 
World War I, the Americans began to increase their business in other fields in 
China such as shipping, insurance and legal services. " The war had serious 
consequences for the British empire. Britain's resources dwindled and its share of 
world trade declined, leading to the costly management of its Empire 58 In London, 
policy makers knew that the British empire faced financial difficulties, but 
remained confident that it could be maintained by the implementation of new 
54 David Clive Wilson, 'Britain and the Kamintang, 1924-28: A Study of the interaction of official 
policies and perceptions In Britain and China' (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, SOAS, University of 
London, 1973), p. 697. 
ss Collin Cross, The Fall of the British Empire 1918-1968 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), 
202. 
Deirdre McMahon, `Ireland and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1900-1948', in Judith M. Brown 
and Wm. Roger Louis (ads. ), The Oxford History of the British Empi e, Vol. IV The Twentieth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 144 and 155, Judith M. Brown, `India', in 
Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds. ), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol, IV, 
The Twentieth Centwy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 433, A. N. Porter and A. J. 
Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and Decoloniz Ion, 1938-0, Volume 1,1938-SI (Landon: 
Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 13 and Robert Johnson, British Imperialism (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), p. 164. After World War I Britain faced simultaneous disorder in Ireland, Egypt, 
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policies involving creating dominions (Canada, Australia, South Africa and New 
Zealand); `independent' countries under indirect control (such as Egypt) and self 
governed countries (such as India). " The British government handled the problem 
of Chinese nationalism in the mid-1920s differently. But British officials on the 
ground in China had their own perspective. In 1927 in China, Sir Miles Lampson, 
British Minister to China (1926-1933) and the senior naval commander, Admiral 
Tyrwhitt, Chief in Command of China Station, were concerned that an anti- 
imperialist campaign under the KMT would jeopardise interests in China. They 
agreed that British interests should be protected at all costs. They did not want the 
Hankow incident to spread to other concessions and settlements, threatening British 
trade interests. This created a dilemma for the British government about the shape 
of their response to Chinese nationalism. It needed to adopt more liberal policy in 
China, which included the return of several British concessions to the Chinese 
government. The concession in Tientsin was one of the concessions to be 
sacrificed to realise this policy. 
However the Anglo-Chinese tension subsided at the end of 1920s, 
especially after the KMT succeeded in uniting China. These issues are certainly 
discussed in the extensive literature on Anglo-Chinese relations, but where is 
Tientsin in this discussion? The British concession in Tientsin was overshadowed 
by the importance of British interests in Shanghai, Hankow and Canton. Tientsin is 
very rarely discussed; it is merely mentioned as one of the British concessions. In 
the above discussion, the disturbance in China in 1920s seems not to have affected 
Tientsin. What happened in Tientsin during these years can be divided into two 
"John Derwin, `Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy Between the Wars', 
The Historical Jowna/, Vol. 23, No. 3. (Sep., 1990), pp. 657,659.60,661,669,671 and 673-4. 
17 
categories. Firstly, Tientsin's rendition can be related to the British government's 
effort to mend relations with the Chinese. This was important because Tientsin 
would became one of places in which we can assess the responses of the British 
community in China. Another issue was the evacuation of the British community 
from Tientsin's hinterland. All these events suggest that Tientsin is a new field 
from which one may understand the British government's attitude and policy and 
the reactions of the British community in China in the mid-1920s. Tientsin was not 
the focus of any single crisis, such as at Shanghai or Hankow. In the less extreme 
atmosphere at Tientsin we might gain an insight into more considered policy 
objectives and practices. In short, the British concession in Tientsin provides a case 
study of how far the British government was able to fulfil its liberal policy and 
handle the British community's opposition to returning the concession to the 
Chinese. 
The Japanese threat in the 1930s 
In this section I discuss the main theme which shaped Anglo-Chinese 
relations in the 1930s. After facing turbulent years with the Chinese in the 1920s 
Britain was now worried about the instability in East Asia which continued until the 
1930s before climaxing in the Pacific War and World War H. Louis points out that 
during World War I the Japanese advocated "a policy aiming at political and 
commercial supremacy on the Asian Mainland, as proved by the attempt to reduce 
China to status of a `vassal State' of Japan through the Twenty-one Demands of 
1915. "60 Ann Trotter's 1975 work furthers this study, focusing on British anxiety 
about the Japanese in the 1930s. She points out that from the viewpoint of Sir John 
60 Louis, BWsh S egy in the Fir East, p. 17. 
is 
Jordan, the British Minister (1906-1920), the Japanese would create trouble in East 
Asia. The creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo by the Japanese in 1932 
placed Britain in a dilemma. Time were two bodies of opinion in the Foreign 
Office; one supported the continuation of the spirit of the 1902-1922 Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance, and the other urged Britain to take a friendly attitude towards 
the Chinese. Britain took a neutral attitude to the hostility between China and 
Japan 6! To Britain, both nations were important in the maintenance and defence of 
its interests in China. 62 But the Japanese problem was serious, not only at the 
international level but also regarding British interests in China. Tientsin, which 
was near Manchuria, was more strongly affected by the Manchurian crisis. Japan's 
ambition to extend its interests into North China challenged British interests. This 
point is part of my discussion of how the British traders reacted to the emergence of 
Japanese power in North China. 
At the international level, Britain sought cooperation from other powers to 
resolve the Manchurian crisis. But the United States, for example, adopted a 
lukewarm attitude to the world crisis, including the Manchurian troubles. Britain 
could not depend on much help from the United States in 1931-1932. Warren 
Cohen wrote in 1971 "... the President [of the United States] was resolutely 
opposed not only to the use of force but also to economic sanctions, to which Japan 
might respond in force: ' America could not risk its interests in East Asia and 
would not fight for China in the Manchurian crisis. Many in the United States, on 
61MthonY Best, `"fhe Road to Mglodapanese Confrontation, 1931-41', in Ian Nish and Yoichi 
Kibata, The History ofAnglo-Japa to Relatlo+rs, 1600-20M Volume 11. " 71w Political - Diplomatic 
Dimension, 1931-2000 (London: Macmillan Pro= Ltd., 2000), p. 37. 
62 Irving S. Friedman, British Relations with Chin: 1931-1939 (New York: Institute of Pacific 
Relations, 1940), pp. 227-8. 
Oi' Warren Cohen, America's Response to China An interpretative History of Sino-Americanr 
Relations (New York: lohn Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971), p. 129. 
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the other hand, did not trust the British, accusing them of being a selfish nation 
which just wanted to manipulate the Americans to protect its own interests. 64 The 
inter-war period, from the 1920s to the 1930s, were hostile and suspicious years. 
America was worried not only about Japan but also about Britain 65 Britain, on the 
other hand, was concerned that America's naval program would challenge it" The 
suspicious attitude among the powers made it difficult to resolve the Manchurian 
problem. Without unity between the powers to pressure the Japanese in Manchuria, 
the crisis gradually became a serious problem in North China, troubling Tientsin 
and its hinterlands. The Japanese, with little challenge from the international 
community, pressured the Chinese with smuggling activities and military activity in 
North China. These two activities develops are my discussed in my last two 
chapters. 
Notable contributions to our understanding of this period come fron 
Endicott, Bennett and Trotter, who have largely contributed to this study; all 
mention the active role of the British Treasury in easing the East Asian crisis. The 
importance of the Treasury in the making of British foreign policy lay in the 
constraints imposed on defence expenditure by the state of the British economy. 
For these reasons, the Treasury, under the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Neville 
64 Thomas H. Buckley, 'The Icarus Facto: The American Pursuit of Myth in Naval Arms Control, 
1921-36', in Erik Goldstein and John Mawr (ads. ), The Washington Coi er+ence, 1921-22: Naval 
Rivalry East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (Frank Cass: Ilford, 1994), pp. 127-8. 
This statement came after the Americans blamed the British for dragging them into World War I to 
help the British and to protect British intereats. 
65 William R. Braisted, `The Evolution of the United States Navy's Strategic Assessments in the 
Pacific, 1919-3 V, in Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (eds. ), The Washington CoPperenee, 1921-22: 
Navel Rivalry East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994) and 
Buckley, 'The Icarus Factor'. The Americans had targeted the Japanese as a prime threat but 
worried more about the combined threat from the British and the Japanese. 
"John H. Maurer, `Arms Control and the Washington Confaence', in Erik Goldstein and John 
Maurer (eds. ), The Washington Coherence 1921-22: Naval Rivalry East Asian Stability and the 
Road to Pearl Harbor (Ilford. Frank Cass, 1994), p. 286. 
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Chamberlain (1931-1937), supported by the Permanent Secretary, Sir Warren 
Fisher, advocated a non-aggression pact with Japan and dispatched the Leith-Ross 
Mission (1935-1936) to persuade the Chinese and the Japanese to join with Britain 
in developing the Chinese market. Bennett argues that the reason behind 
Chamberlain's proposal was twofold: firstly, British commercial interests in China 
should be protected, and in achieving this, its relationship with Japan would be 
mended-, 67 and second, considering the serious German threat to Europe, Britain 
should work at developing friendly relations with Japan. However the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, Sir John Simon, pointed out that the non-aggression pact would 
shock the Americans, create difficulties with Canada and, "as a condonation of 
Japanese proceedings in Manchukuo", it would create a negative view among the 
British public and at the League of Nations. " Though Chamberlain's plan was 
criticised, this was the only way that the British could protect their interest in East 
Asia. 
The dispatch of the Leith-Ross Mission to East Asia had two objectives. 
First, it would help the Chinese to rehabilitate their economy through currency 
reform. Second, it would involve the Japanese in supporting this effort. 
69 The 
mission was also initiated because Britain worried that any agreement between 
China and Japan without British participation could endanger its interests in 
China. 70 In short, the British not only wanted stability in East Asia, it would also 
not permit any attempt by other Powers to deny its interests. The British wanted to 
67 Gill Bennett, `British Policy in the For East 1933-1936: Treasury and Foreign Office', Modern 
Asian Shrdies. 26: 3 (1992), p. 547. 
" Stephan Lyon Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise. British China Policy 1933-1937, 
Ichester: Manchester University Prags, 1975), p. 65. 
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defend their Chinese interests and also those of the whole of its Empire, including 
the British Dominions. For example, Australia and New Zealand wanted peace and 
stability in the Asia-Pacific and to avoid any instability in East Asia. 7' 
However, throughout the mid-1930s this initiative did not receive a positive 
response from the Japanese. In fact the Leith-Ross Mission aggravated the East 
Asia crisis. Yakichiro Suma, Japanese Consul-General in Nanking was suspicious 
about mission. Some of the Japanese leader believed that the British had 
`encouraged' Nanking Government to adopt `anti-Japanese feeling'. 72 
Furthermore, `British policy... was obviously a challenge to the Japanese, who had 
announced their own exclusive programme for Chinas73 as outlined in the Amaru 
Statement. On the other hand, it was claimed that the British effort was opportunist 
and that they wre only interested in protecting their interests in China by using the 
Japanese to check Chinese nationalism !4 The failure of the British effort illustrates 
the strength of the Japanese threat in North China. The British in Tientsin and its 
hinterland are an interesting community to study. With the failure of the Leith- 
Ross Mission, the community had to extend its utmost effort to avoid Japanese 
interference. This is why this case is part of my study. 
" Michael Graham Fry, 'The Pacific Dominions and the Washington Conference 1921-22, in Erik 
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The cotton trade dispute between the British and Japanese aggravated the 
problem for both parties. Tension between Lancashire cotton industrialists and the 
Osaka Textile producers had begun in the early 1930s. Exports of Japanese cotton 
goods had affected the Lancashire industries, which had made several attempts to 
frustrate the Japanese export, including holding talks with Dutch cotton 
industrialists about restricting the import of Japanese goods into the Dutch East 
Indies" and pressuring the Australian government not to reduce the tariff on 
Japanese cotton textiles in trade negotiations with Japan. 76 Though it was not a 
problem in Tientsin and its hinterland, the dispute illustrated the Japanese need for 
a market for their goods and raw material for their industries. 'T'herefore the 
Japanese had to seek opportunities to expand their trade outside Japan. The 
Manchuria crisis was a case in point. The impact of Japanese efforts to expand 
trade created a problem for British trade in North China. Among the places under 
Japanese pressure was Tientsin. 
To conclude this section, the extensive literature about the 1930s focuses 
not only on Anglo-Chinese relations but also discusses Japanese action in 
Manchuria and North China. Although the literature does include North China it is 
merely concerned with the diplomatic aspect rather than the situation on the ground 
in North China, especially in Tientsin. Again, the feelings of the British 
community in Tientsin about the encroachment of the Japanese on North China are 
not discussed; even though the pressures, tensions and reactions of the British 
community in Tientsin differed from those of their government. Moreover, 
75 Ishii Osamu, 'Markets and Diplomacy: the Anglo-Japanese Rivalries over Cotton Goods Markets, 
1930-1936', in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibsta, The History of ApgloJapanese Relations 1600-2000 




neither the impact on the British community in Tientsin and its surrounding areas of 
the activities of Japanese troops in promoting the smuggling and encouraging the 
autonomy of North China have not been studied thoroughly. In addition, many of 
the important issues in China are not discussed in these studies. The seizure of the 
customs house in Tientsin in 1930, the extraterritoriality negotiations and the 
Thorbum case had a significant impact on the British community there. These 
issues had a profound impact on the British community, especially regarding their 
trade interests and extraterritoriality in China. In short: the existing literature on 
East Asia and Sino-British relations explores the world of diplomatic debate and 
high politics, but ignores places like Tientsin. Therefore my study focuses on 
Tientsin and its hinterlands, on how both the British government and the British 
community there tackled the situation in China from the growth in Chinese 
nationalism to the rise of the Japanese military's influence in North China. 
British Economic Activity 
Next I look at the literature on British imperialism and its discussion of the 
projection overseas of British power and capital. The key recent debate here is 
highlighted by P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins. First, however, I look into the British 
imperialist influence in China. It is difficult to define the imperialist presence in 
China, as the infringement of Chinese sovereignty took different forms in different 
places - parts of Chinese territory fell under wholesale colonial rule such as 
Taiwan (Japan), Hong Kong (Britain) and Jinozhou (Germany). Other forms of 
imperialist territorial domination in China included leased territories (such as 
Weihaiwei), concessions (such as in Tientsin, Hankow and Canton) and 
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international settlements (such as in Shanghai and Amoy). n In addition there was 
extraterritoriality which restricted the Chinese jurisdiction over foreign nationals, 
and the loss of sovereignty over coastal and river navigation. Chinese sovereignty 
also affected by the basing of foreign military forces in major Chinese cities such as 
Tientsin and Beijing, and the stationing of foreign gunboats on the coast and major 
rivers. 78 Although certain parts of China, such as Manchuria, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, were formally colonised, other parts, such as the eighteen Chinese provinces, 
were never subject to foreign domination, and the Chinese government controlled 
its own currency and foreign policy. 79 As Feuerwerker opines, "China's 
sovereignty might be derogated, but it never came near to being extinguished". 80 At 
this point the British presence in China was regarded as an informal empire rather 
than a colonial present. The term informal empire was introduced by John 
Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, and was intended to indicate that the Imperial 
power's `[r]efusals to annex are no proof of reluctance to control' 81 Gallagher and 
Robinson focused on the British informal empire through investment, community, 
treaty and funds (sometimes by force) in Latin America. Jürgen Osterhammel 
extended this term to include China. Britain had no territorial ambitions2 in China 
and had only one colonies (Hong Kong; Weihaiwei was a leased territory) and 
several concessions and settlements. Although these concessions and settlements 
had their own powers regarding law and taxes, Chinese sovereignty was still in 
" Jiigm Osterhammel, `Sans-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: 
Towards a Framework of Analysis', in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds. ), 
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Aficf igwr Papers br CMnese Studies, 29,197k p. 1. " John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', The Economic History 
Review, New Series, Vol-6, No. 1(1953), p. 3. 02 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, Second EdItion pp. p. 373. 
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place in terms of land ownerships (land was leased, not sold, to the British). 83 
Therefore my study will investigate how the informal empire worked and how it 
could have affected Anglo-Chinese relations. Thus the study of the British 
concession in Tientsin is a good example of how the informal British empire could 
work in China. 
Though the British community had several advantages, such as 
extraterritorial rights for British subjects, this privilege did not necessarily afford 
than an unchallenged advantage in the Chinese market, where British firms faced 
difficulties such as limited capital and resistance from local Chinese elites . 
84 The 
British firms, already felt handicapped because they could not pent rte the Chinese 
market-85 In addition, this privilege became a target for a Chinese attack on the 
unequal treaty. Tientsin and its hinterland were not excepted from the attack. For 
instance, the distribution of goods within China was controlled by Chinese 
interests. The British could only penetrate the Chinese market with the help of 
compradors. With the new wave of Chinese nationalism in China, rather than 
another outburst like the May Thirtieth Movement, British traders and Britons 
faced another problem: `official' and `popular' resistance. Popular nationalism 
took the form of effective mass action against the foreigners in the form of anti- 
° Osterhammel, `Britain and China, 1842 - 1914', in Andrew Porter, at. al.. (eds. ), The Ckf d History of the British Empire. Vol, 111, The nineteenth century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 130.1. 
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imperialist campaigns, strikes and boycotts. 86 This form of resistance, known as 
the National Product Movement, intensified greatly from the 1920s onwards with 
sufficient mass support from many Chinese consumers to have a significant impact 
on Japanese and British trade and policy discussions. " All these problems had a 
profound impact on the British traders. Their privileges could not protect their 
trade interests. The only way to settle these problems was by cooperating with the 
Chinese themselves. 
Cain and Hopkins stress the importance of finance capital and networks of 
finance and government, which they describe as Gentlemanly Capitalism and which 
played an important role in supporting British investments overseas. The existence 
of gentlemanly capitalism came about with the growth of the financial and service 
sectors in London as a tool to force the development of British investment and trade 
abroad. " In this way London's financial sector generated economic development 
in several parts of the world such as Australia, New Zealand, Cape Colony, 
Argentina and Uruguay. " In China's case, London's financial institutions had an 
`invisible influence' on the British government through loans, holding China 
together and increasing prospects for financial and commercial services in China? o 
'6 Osterhammel, `Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China', p305, C. F. 
Renter, Foreign Investments In China (New York: Howard Fertig 1968), p. 369; Edmund S. K. Fung, 
The Diplomacy of Imperial Rebrat Britain's Sogtb China Polley, 1924-1931 (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p. 50; and Megginson, 'Britain's Response to Chinese nationalism, 1925- 
1927', pp. 167 and 170. On 24 July 1925 major firms such as Jardine, Matheson and Company, the 
Asiatic Petrolea n Company, HSB and the British American Tobacco Company handed over a joint 
letter to the Foreign Office complaining that their trade was suffering. 87 Karl Ger h, China Maple: Consumer Culture and the creation of the Nation (Cambridge MA: the 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), pp. 4 and 6. " P. J. Cain and A. 0. Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas 1. The 
Old Colonial System, 1688.1850', The F. conoseic History Revkw, Now Series, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Nov., 
1986), p. 517. 
'9 P. J. Cain and A. 0. Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas 11. New 
Imperialism, 1850-1945', Ths Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 40, No. 1. (Feb., 1987), 
9.11. 
Cain and Hopkins, British Jmperia1Ism, 1688-2000, p. 380. 
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Therefore London's financial institutions and services became an important factor 
in spreading British capital outside Britain. This point led us to understand the link 
between London's business and British trade in the British empire especially in 
China. This link helped the development of British business, including those in 
Tientsin. In other words, the British in China had strong relations with their 
counterparts in London, and so were not alone in China with their grievances. This 
empowered the British community to pressure the British government to help them 
in China and gave any suggestions to the British government about changing 
British policy in China. 
Cain and Hopkins' argument has caused considerable debate, both general 
and specific. In the case of China, some critics do not agree that the British played 
the gentleman in order to invest in China. The collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty was a 
case in point. There was envy and fierce competition between the foreign powers in 
China 9' This point, as mentioned earlier, was proved when Japan expanded her 
interests into North China in 1930.92 The tension caused by this in North China 
created a problem for Britain in East Asia, and affected the British traders in 
Tientsin. 
Shunhong Zhang (2002) does not agree that gentlemanly capitalism worked 
in China, because imperialism "means war, political oppression and economic 
exploitation. " He continues; "Empire-building went virtually hand in hand with 
91 Jßrgen Osterhammel, `Britain and China, 1860s - 1850s', in R. P. T. Davenport-Hines and 
Geoffrey Jones, (eds. ), Brettsh Bvsbwsa Irr Asia Since 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), p. 199. 
92 Niels P. Peterson, 'Gentlemanly and Not-so-Gentlemanly Imperialism in China before the First 
World War', in Shigeo Akita, Gentlemanly Capitalism Imperialism and Global History (New 
York: Paigrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 114 and 115. Another example was France secretly supported 
its bank, the Banque Industrielle de Chine, in obtaining industrial concessions from China by 
offering loans. 
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numerous evils. Imperialism, no matter whether it was British, American or any 
other, was not `gentlemanly' or `gentle' at all. " The British used any means 
available to secure business concessions in China, such as introducing opium to the 
Chinese market and building railways further into the interior of China to secure 
raw materials. 94 Zhang points out that the superior British military was an 
advantage to British business progress in China 95 The use of force or the gunboat 
policy was an important tool which Britain used to protect its interests. However, 
Cain and Hopkins never ignored the fact that the British used force to penetrate the 
Chinese market to protect British interests and especially to promote free trade in 
China% This led to our understanding that the British in China created anxiety 
among the Chinese and illustrates how the arrival of the British (and other foreign 
powers) in China in the nineteenth century evolved into anti foreign sentiment, 
which later became Chinese nationalism. 
Other scholars such as Shigeru Akita (1999) agree with some of Cain and 
Hopkins' arguments; Akita emphasises that gentlemanly capitalism was important 
to Britain in investing in its colonies and dominions so the British could develop 
their industry and produce a surplus in order that they could not only to pay off 
their debts but also pay out dividends to shareholders and the interest on 
government loans.? With this connection, it demonstrated that the British in 
93 Shunhong Zhang, `British Imperialism and Decolonintion: a Chinese Perspective', in Shigeru 
Akita, (cd. ), Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), p. 126. 
" Ibid., p. 127. 
Ibid., p. 128. 
Cain and Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas 1', p. 523. 
Shlgeni Akita, `British Informal Empire in East Asia, 1880-1939: a Japanese 
Perspective', in Raymond E. Durrett (ed. ), Gentleman* Capitalism and British Imperialism, (London: Longman, 1999), p. 144 and Akita and Naoto Kagotani, 
`International Order of Asia in the 1930s', in Shigeru Akita (ed. ), Gentlemanly Capitalism, 





London also wanted stability in China to maintain their interests. This proved, as 
mentioned earlier, that the relationship between investors in London and British 
interests in China was strong. It could play an important role in London to help the 
British community in China, including Tientsin. 
To sum up this section, Osterhammel, Cain and Hopkins' work offers a new 
dimension to the study of Anglo-Chinese relations. Their work had shown the role 
of the British firms in China and the challenges they had to face from the Chinese 
and other foreigners. The drawback to all these studies is that they do not examine 
the whole of the British community in China. They are studies of British 
businessmen in China that focus on Shanghai and ignore the British communities in 
other treaty ports. Osterhammel, Cain and Hopkins point out that the British 
businessmen had a liberal attitude towards the Chinese. Could this apply to British 
businessmen in North China? 
Treaty Port Communities 
Next I turn to recent studies on Anglo-Chinese relations which concentrate 
on treaty port communities. The study of the treaty ports has increased our 
knowledge of the role of foreign communities such as other Europeans, the 
Japanese, the Americans, the Jews and others in treaty ports. 98 In his study of 
9° These studies include China Betts, 'Marginal Westerners in Shanghai: the Bagdhadi Jewish 
Community, 1845-1931'; in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds. ), New Frontiers: 
Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953 (Manchester: Manchester University 
press, 2000), pp. 38-54; Claude Markovits, `Indian Communities in China, c. 1842-1949'; in Robert 
Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds. ), New Frontiers, pp. 55-74; Frangoise Kreissler, `In search of 
identity: the German community in Shanghai, 1933-1945'; in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot 
(eds. ), New Fro fers, pp. 211-30; Christian tierviel, "Little Japan' in Shanghai: an insulated 
community, 1875-1945'; in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds. ), New Frontiers, pp. 146-69; 
Mark F. Wilkinson, 'The Shanghai American Community, 1937-1949'; in Robert Bickers and 
Christian Henriot (eds. ), New Frontiers, pp. 231-49; Marcia R. Ristaino, `The Russian Diaspora 
community in Shanghai'; in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds. ), New Frontiers, pp. 192- 
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Shanghai, James Layton Huskey points out that the American community had two 
attitudes to the treaty port in Shanghai. The majority of the American community 
was parochial and adopted the treaty port mentality. w The second, cosmopolitan 
group was in the minority. The cosmopolitans were more sympathetic towards the 
Chinese. 100 Huskey's work raises the question of whether this was also true in 
British communities in China. 
Fung comments that one of the reasons for the spread of anti-British feeling 
in China in the mid-1920s was that "[s]ocially the British communities in the treaty 
ports were arrogant, aloof, and unashamedly racist "101 This statement indicates 
that the Britons' attitudes were also parochial. Fung's opinion is based on the 
attitude of the Shanghailanders, who restricted the scope of their relations with the 
Chinese, on whom their status in Shanghai depended, because they did not see them 
as equals. The Shanghailanders were exclusively British and did not include in 
their image of themselves other British colonial settlers such as Eurasians, Indians 
or Jews or other nationalities, 102 apart from Russian Jews. 103 Only the rich Jews 
were treated as equals and allowed to join the British Shanghai club-104 
The Indians also received different treatment; those who were rich enjoyed 
a good relationship with the British while normal Indian-British relations were as 
210; and Marcia Reynders Ristaino, Port of Last Resort: The Diaspora CoeunwuVks of Shanghai 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-369. 99 James Layton Huskey, `Americans in Shanghai: Community Formation and Response to 
Revolution, 1919-1928', (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
1985), p. 43. 
'oo Ibid., p. 50. 
1o' Fung, The Diplarwcy ofI erial Retreat, p. 36. 102 Robert Bickers, `Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community 
in Shanghai 1843-1937', Past and Present, No. 159 (1998), pp. 170 and 175. 
103 Ristaino, Port of Last Resort: the Diaspora Co nities of Shanghai, p. 4. 104 Chiara Betta, 'Marginal Westerners in Shanghai', p. 49. However this did not mean that the Jews 
were free from anti-Semitism, expressions of which often appeared in the English newspaper. 
31 
servant to master, especially between Sikh police constables and British men in 
treaty port police forces. 'ÖS After the outbreak of World War I the Germans also 
had unequal status to that of the British (and the French). Their member on the 
Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) was replaced by a Japanese member, after 
which some Germans gave up their social interactions with other foreigners. 106 
The Japanese themselves also received unequal treatment from the British, their 
representation on the council being only in proportion to their population in the 
International Settlement. 107 The Shanghailanders found the Americans easiest to 
accommodate. They accepted them in the SMC and the Shanghai Volunteer 
Corps. 108 However, on some occasions, such as in the early part of World War I, 
the Americans were made uncomfortable by British criticism of the United States' 
decision not to support with Great Britain in the war. 109 
In British society itself the Shanghailanders tried to preserve their image 
from the so-called "floating population of the British poor.. . British seamen, 
discharged soldiers and discharged policemen", deporting "distressed British 
subjects" back to Britain! 10 Although they remained loyal to the British Empire, 
they regarded themselves in ways which mirror the "colonial nationalism" of 
Australians, New Zealanders or Rhodesians. Furthermore they did not want to be 
103 Markovits, 'Indian Communities in China, c. 1842-1949', p. 70. Even the relations between the 
Sikh and British constables also did not seem equal. The British constable still felt superior to the 
Sikh constable. 
106 Kreiseier, in search of identity: the German community in Shanghai, 1933-1945', p. 213. 
107 Henriot, "Little Japan' in Shanghai', p. 163. 
toi Wilkinson, 'The Shanghai American Community; 1937-1949', pp. 234 and 236. 
109 Huskey, 'Americans in Shanghai', p. 13. 
"o Bickers, `Who were the Shanghai Municipal Police, and why were they there? ', p. 173. One 
example was the British policeman Maurice Tinkler who was treated little better than the Chinese. 
Moreover the police, the fire brigade, outdoor Customs workers and their families were at the 
bottom of Shanghailander society. See Bickers, `Shanghailanders', p. 183. 
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controlled by London and tried to maintain their autonomy. "' Harumi Goto- 
Shibata (1995) points out that the Shanghailanders' attitude, and especially that of 
the North China Daily News with its anti-Chinese stance, did not foster good 
relations with the Chinese in the treaty ports. 112 The judicial inquiry formed to 
investigate the May Thirtieth Incident blamed the foreigners in Shanghai and this 
narrowed the minds of the world around them. 113 This attitude had existed since 
first-generation Shanghailanders came to China to work, uninterested in learning 
about the Chinese culture. 114 Since then the Shanghailanders had built up their own 
exclusive world, opening a British school with a British curriculum and building 
churches and libraries. A British-only club was formed. Moreover a taboo was 
instilled against marriage or open sexual contact with the Chinese. The Chinese 
were not even allowed to visit European brothels! 1-5 The Shanghailanders' attitude 
added to the British problem in China. It created unfriendly relations with the 
Chinese, with a strong negative effect on the British liberal policy of maintaining 
good relation with China. But did this also happen to the British community in 
Tientsin? Did this community also have a diehard attitude? 
The `diehards' became an obstacle to Anglo-Chinese relations, and this 
problem grew when the Chinese demanded the return of sovereignty of Chinese 
territory, the foreign holdings of which were underpinned by the tenet of 
extraterritoriality. The Shanghailanders' reluctance to adjust their attitude extended 
I" Bickers, `Shanghailanders', pp. 179 and 181. 
"Z Harumi GotO-Shibeta, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1993), p. 17. 
13 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 141. 
114 Bickers, `Shanghailanders', p. 185,186,187,188 and 190. This taboo could not prevent the 
British taking Chinese concubines, and some married Chinese women. The taboo on mixed 
marriages was not confined to the Chinese; it included Eurasians and the Russians. 
115 Ibid, pp. 186,187,188 and 190. This taboo could not prevent the British taking Chinese 
concubines, and some married Chinese women. The taboo on mixed marriages was not confined to 
the Chinese; it included Eurasians and the Russians. 
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beyond this situation to their response to the idea of pursuing a better understanding 
between themselves and the Chinese in Shanghai. Traveller and novelist W. 
Somerset Maugham noted in 1920 that the British community's attitude towards 
the Chinese was closed. ' 16 This was due to the Chinese themselves, he claimed, 
who did not mix with foreigners. ' 17 However, this seems to blame the Chinese, 
whereas in reality it was the diehard attitude of the British community that soured 
the relationship. The Shanghailanders, for example, had put several limitations 
onto their relations with the Chinese; the Huang Pu Park, in Shanghai, was case in 
point. 
The Shanghailander's attitude was challenged by the May Thirtieth 
Incident, which eventually resulted in the reform of the SMC. ' 18 Although the 
changes occurred after the incident, Clifford (1979) does not see this as a total 
victory for the Chinese: 
The direct achievements of May Thirtieth were slight by 
anyone's reckoning: the ending of the Mixed Court, the 
offer of $75,000 as a "compassionate grant. " But 
extraterritoriality was not abolished, the ending of the 
Mixed Court did not mean unconditional Chinese 
jurisdiction in the Settlement, the Chinese did not get parity 
on the Council, the extra-Settlement roads were not 
abandoned, British and Japanese gunboats were not 
withdrawn, the Municipal Police did not come under 
Chinese leadership, the Volunteer Corps was not abolished, 
and the right of workers to form unions and to strike was 
not recognized. 119 
16 W. Somerset Maughazd, On a Chinese Screen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 31-2. 
11 It is notable that Christopher Cook's interview with former workers at Butterfield & Swire in 
China in the 1920s and 1930s found that they did mix with the Chinese, and that to some extent the 
Chinese tried to avoid the foreigners in their daily life. See Christopher Cook, The Lion and the 
Dragon: British Voices fron the Chinese Coast (London: Elm Tree Books, 1985), pp. 119,131 and 
132. 
''" Clifford, Spoilt Children of Em dir, pp. 150 and 154. 
1" Nicholas R. Clifford, Shanghai, 1925: Urban Nationalism and the Def nse of Foreign Privilege 
(Michigan: Michigan papers in Chinese Studies, 1979), p. 80. 
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This passage shows that the Shanghailanders made little effort to please the 
Chinese. Was this the case in other communities as well? Were the British in 
Tientsin as `diehard' as their counterparts in Shanghai? 
Osterhammel doubts that all the British communities were parochial. Large 
companies such as Butterfield and Swire (Taikoo) and the British American 
Tobacco Corporation were aware of the waves of change happening in China and 
responded to them. 120 The willingness of these big companies to accept the 
situation increased the understanding between them and the Chinese. Their 
awareness of Chinese nationalism was due to several reasons; the emergence of 
Chinese competition such as the Yong Li Soda Company, Nanyang Brothers and 
the Minsheng shipping line; Chinese government support for Chinese businesses, 
which gave them an advantage; 12' and British companies' worries about Chinese 
boycotts and the Chinese appeal to buy national goods (guohuo). 122 For these 
reasons, Warren Swire of Butterfield & Swire made an effort to stay in touch with 
Chinese businessmen and politicians. 123 There was also a change in attitude by the 
big British firms in Tientsin, which became more open to the Chinese and avoided 
any confrontation with them. 
120 Sherman Cochran, Big Business In China: Sino-Foreign Rivdry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890- 
1930 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1930), p. 193, Osterhammel, `Imperialism in 
Transition', p. 274 and O nmel, `China', p. 655, cited from `Outport Agents' Conference, 
Shanghai, September 1931: Minutes of Discussions on Chinese Staff and General Matters, ' John 
Swire & Sons Archives, School of Oriental African Studies (London)11/2110. 
121 Wang, Anglo-Chinese Encounters Since 1800, M48,62 and 64. 
'22 Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism 1900-1949 (Manchester. 
Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 176 and 177. 
123 Ibid, p. 179. 
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Table 1.1: Foreign Investments in China, 1902,1914, and 1931, in US$m 
Year 1902 1914 1931 
Great Britain 260.3 607.5 1,189.20 
Japan 1* 219.6 1,136.90 
Russia 246.5 269.3 273.2 
United States 19.7 49.3 196.8 
France 91.1 171.4 192.4 
Germany 164.3 263.6 87 
Others 5 29.6 167 
Source: U. Y. Ketner, 1 oreign Investments in China, p. 76. 
* This figure does not include investment in Taiwan. 
Changing British attitudes were also influenced by foreign competition, 
especially from the Americans, the Japanese and the Germans. Table 1.1 shows a 
fourfold increase in American investment due to the efforts of American 
cosmopolitans to build a `special relationship' and gain strong support from 
American-trained Chinese doing business in China1? '4 British businessmen were 
concerned about the Japanese as the second biggest investors in China, and that 
their activities in Manchuria would close the Manchurian market to other Powers. 
W. J. Keswick from Jardine, Matheson and Co. complained about weak British 
policy in China, 125 saying that if this continued British companies would be pushed 
aside by the Japanese. German investment fell, but the British businessmen were 
still worried about German competition. For instance, the Germans had overtaken 
'24 Huskey, `Americas in Shanghai', p. 164. 
'" FxAcoä, Diplomacy and Enterprise: British Chino Policy 1933-1937, pp. 89-9. 
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the British as suppliers of metals and machinery to China) The figure in Table 
1.1 does not give a true representation of German investment in China because it 
also participated in bartering with the Chinese. Furthermore, the Nationalist 
government had special relations with the Germans which the Germans had 
established through Hapro, an agency which managed their trade relations with the 
Chinese. 127 Again, this pointed to the issue of foreign competition, especially from 
the Japanese, who had a big impact on British interests in Tientsin particularly from 
the 1930s onwards, when they tried to penetrate North China. Indirectly this shows 
that Tientsin was a place of competition between the foreign powers. 
Despite British awareness of the need to establish a cordial relationship with 
the Chinese, some British communities retained their parochial attitude. On this 
matter Bickers stated that 
British settlers reacted bitterly to this diplomatic offensive 
because they could see quite clearly that it signalled their 
redundancy. As indeed it did - the thrust of the diplomatic 
process was to engineer collaboration between the new 
Chinese ruling elite and its chosen British partners, thereby 
jettisoning the small treaty people. For their part, settlers' 
relentless barrage of propaganda about China maintained 
that every such concession threatened British lives. 128 
The diehards gathered in the Shanghai British Residents' Association (BRA) in 
order to discuss the protection of their rights in treaty ports. Among the major 
issues they dealt with was their opposition to the renegotiation of 
'26 Ibid., p. 43, cited from DGFP, Series C, 1933,1: 811,867; 1934,3: 761; 1936,5: 348,411,502. 
127 William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 
pp. 120,125 and 137. Hapro was a German organisation which conducted barter trading between 
Germany and China. The Germans were keen to import Chinese are which was claimed to be high 
quality. In return they agreed to supply the Chinese with a contract for arsenal, heavy industry and 
export machines to China. 
' Bickers, Britain in China, p. 146. 
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extraterritoriality. 129 As one of the diehards of a parochial mind, H. G. W. 
Woodhead, said in 1925: 
In the course of China's long and chequered history she has 
survived decades and even centuries of internal disorder. 
And inasmuch as there are no really fundamental 
differences between the Chinese, whether they come from 
North or the South, or the East or the West, it may be 
hoped that time will overcome the present disruptive 
tendencies.... No real good would be done by premature 
surrender on the part of the Treaty Powers to the present 
popular clamour. ' 
This passage exemplifies the strong opposition this group towards any modification 
of the unequal treaty. It proves that there was still resistance in the British 
community to any changes to their privileges in China. Another event - the 
disappearance of John Thorburn in 1931- sparked British protest, and in Hankow, 
Tientsin and Shanghai large gatherings were organised in protest. 131 Moreover, the 
change in Britain's policy concerning the Nationalist government brought more 
negotiations on the revision of the status of the British concessions and settlements. 
The Shanghailanders were worried about their future and wanted to preserve the 
status quo. Furthermore they wanted their government to protect their interests in 
China. 132 So the Shanghailanders' attitude was diehard. They had reason to oppose 
any changes which would jeopardise their livelihoods, which depended solely on 
the treaty ports. 133 It became important to look deeply at the society's behaviour in 
response to the changes. 
129 [bid, p. 149. 
130 H. G. W. Woodhead, The Truth about the Chinese Republic (London:, Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., 
Paternoster House, 1925), p. 271. 
131 Robert Bickers, `Death of a Young Shanghailander: The IhKrburn Case and the Defence of the 
British Treaty Ports in China in 1931', Modern Asian Studies 30: 2 (1996), p. 292. 
132 Mthur Ransomer, The Chinese Puzzle (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1927), p. 30. 
133 Bickers, `Shanghailandaro', p. 207. 
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The literature on the treaty ports shows that the Shanghailanders became 
symbols of the British communities' resistance to the reform of their interests in 
China. The echoes of their resistance would resound throughout most of the British 
concessions and settlements. In Tientsin, the situation was almost the same, but the 
power vested in the Consul General meant that the British government could 
control and monitor the British concession in Tientsin. The other important factor 
was the role played by the British traders in this concession. They were very keen 
to protect their interests and were prepared to take a more moderate approach to 
handling their problems. For example, the Kailan Mining Administration (KMA), 
which dominated the British Municipal Council (BMC) in the 1920s and 1930s, 
had to change its attitude according to the development in Chinese politics. The 
small size of the British population in Tientsin was another factor which made the 
traders more pragmatic. 134 They were willing to make changes in order to maintain 
the progress of trade in Tientsin Therefore, as Chapter 1 of this thesis will show, 
from the beginning of the twentieth century up to end of the 1920s the British in 
Tientsin were much readier to accommodate the interests of Chinese residents. In 
the next the section I discuss the importance of studying the British concession in 
Tientsin in detail. 
Significance of the Study of Tientsin 
I now consider the significance of studying the British concession and its 
hinterlands from the point of view of Anglo-Chinese relations. My review of the 
literature has shown that Anglo-Chinese relations were important to the existence 
of the British population, the strategy, security and prestige of the British empire in 
' For example, in 1925 the British population of Tientsin and Shanghai were 682 and 5879 
respectively. See Appendix 4 and Table 4, and Bickers, Britain In China, p. 125. 
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East Asia, and British trade. However, studying Anglo-Chinese relations purely at 
a diplomatic level does not provide a sufficient understanding of the relationship. 
This would neglect the importance of the study from below which had some impact 
on the British policy in China. Therefore the study of Anglo-Chinese relations has 
to be wider and cover on the ground reactions such as the British community's 
response to changes in British policy and developments in China such as the impact 
of Chinese nationalism in the 1920s. The British community in China would fight 
to protect their terms of trade and properties. Even this community could be an 
obstacle to Anglo-Chinese relations. This became more dangerous when the 
Chinese read the British communities' views in English language newspapers in 
Shanghai and Tientsin as British policy in China. 135 These arguments show that the 
British community was `bedevilled' in its Anglo-Chinese relations! 36 Why did the 
British community oppose the demands from the Chinese government? My study 
will enhance knowledge of Anglo-Chinese relations from the view of the British 
community. Study of the British community in China is still new, and so far has 
only concentrated on Shanghai. Due to this the study on the British community in 
China always overshadow by what happened in Shanghai. Therefore the study on 
other British concessions would avoid any general view that all the British 
community in China had a same attitude with the Shanghailander. 
Studying British concessions other than Shanghai, such as that in Tientsin, 
will enhance the study of British communities in treaty ports more widely. 
Furthermore this study will show the impact of the British community in Tientsin 
and its hinterland on Anglo-Chinese relations. As mentioned in the literature 
135 Ransoms, The Chinese Puzzle. p. 28. 
136 Bickers, Britain in China p. 14. 
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review, the British community in China was not a passive community; its members 
tried as far as possible to fight to prevent their interests from being jeopardised by 
the policies of Britain, the Chinese or other foreign powers, especially Japan. This 
community also took several measures to avoid any parties disturbing their 
interests. The study of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands is 
important because this community was willing to fight even though, compared with 
the community in Shanghai, British interests in Tientsin were small. Yet they 
succeeded in maintaining the British concession, in contrast with other British 
concessions in Amoy, Chinkiang, Kuikiang and Hankow, which were all returned 
to China. However, studies on Anglo-Chinese relations generally omit to mention 
the existence of British communities in China. 
Studying the role of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland 
opens up another dimension of the British mentality. Bickers' profound study of 
the Shanghailanders contributes sound knowledge of the general British mentality 
in China. Bickers saw that the Shanghailanders' diehard attitude to change not 
only affected their trade interests but also protected the British image and prestige 
in China. However, these mainly refer to Shanghai, and there is little information 
on other treaty ports. Moreover there is a tendency to consider Shanghailanders 
representative of the general attitude of the British community in China, 137 which 
is an incorrect assumption. As we know, there were many other concessions and 
settlements in China where British communities settled, lived and worked. 
Therefore the British communities' attitudes may have been the same as that of 
the Shanghailanders, but in Tientsin, controlled by the British consul general, the 
137 Ransoms, The Chinese Puzzle, p. 28. 
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small British population and different interests distinguished them from the 
Shanghailanders. Knowledge of this will contribute wider knowledge about a 
British community in China other than Shanghai. 
Tientsin was the second most important city in terms of British trade. 
According to Remer, British investment in Tientsin was £8m in 1931, second 
only to Shanghai, 138 while F. C. Jones estimates it as L9.9m. 
139 Tientsin was also 
important to the Chinese, as after Shanghai it contributed the second greatest 
amount of customs revenue. According to the Chinese Maritime Customs tax 
collection records of 1927, Tientsin and Chinwangtao contributed H1( Taets 
9,225,000 (13%) of the HK Taels 68,687,000 overall customs revenue. 140 In 1930 
thought the Tientsin custom revenue declined to 7.82% but Tientsin still became 
second contributor in custom revenue behind Shanghai (47.97%). Other port 
such as Dairen, Canton, Kiachow, Hankow and other ports contributed only 
6.85%, 5.4%, 5.08"/x, 4.15% and 23.25% respectably. 141 In addition, the big 
investment of the British community in Tientsin made the port important to 
British trade on the one hand and a lucrative source of revenue for the Chinese on 
the other. The importance of Tientsin to both the British and Chinese means that 
its study could expand our knowledge of how the British community in treaty 







139F. C. Jones, Shanghai and Tientsin With Special Reference to Foreign I, Uerests (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1940), p. 150. Furthermore, British interests, including in North China, amounted 
to E37m. 
140 The British Library, IOIR, IIPS/10/1202, P624/46/10, Sir Mites Lampson to Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, 7 February, 1928. 
'"' Donna Marne Brunero, 'Through Turbulent Waters: Foreign Administration of the Chinese 
Maritime Customs Service, 1923-1937', (unpublished Thesis, Ph. D., 2000 [Feb. ], University of 
Adelaide), p209 from Figure 7.1. 
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ports other than Shanghai handled the Chinese demand to return these ports and 
how the British community in Tientsin survived the rise of Chinese nationalism. 
The above facts show how important Tientsin is to this study. Several 
scholars and writers have written about Tientsin, including Brett Sheehan, Gail 
Hershatter, Jennifer Yang, Kwan Man Bun, Marjorie Dryburgh, S. P. Swann, and 
Ruth Rogaski. O. D. Rasmussen is one of the earlier writers on Tientsin. Two of his 
books focus on its early history before 1925, concentrating on the development of 
the foreign concessions there, and in particular the British concession. His 
narrative writing gives an overall picture of the foreigners' role in developing 
Tientsin. The more recent scholars mentioned above have carried out more 
thorough studies, although from different viewpoints. Kwan Man Bun investigates 
the importance of the salt merchants and suggests that they played an important part 
in the development of Tientsin. 142 Kwan's study helps us to understand Chinese 
business practice before the coming of Westerners to Tientsin. Brett Sheehan's 
study provides a comprehensive account of Tientsin's financial, social, and political 
history in Republican China, showing how it developed as an important trade 
centre. The development of financial institutions in the form of both foreign and 
Chinese banks created a good business environment in Tientsin. 143 Overall 
Sheehan and Kwan both highlight the importance of Tientsin in trade and banking 
systems in North Chinese history, a prominence which attracted Chinese central 
government and warlords to fight to control it. These studies show that Tientsin 
142 Kwan Man Bun, The Salt Merchants of IlanJit State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial 
China (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), pp. 94,93,99-103 and 110-3. 
143 Brett Sheehan, Trust in Troubled Times: Money, Banks, and State-Society relations in 
Republican Tianjin (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 11-13 and 53. 
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was not only a small trading port but also the centre of the banking system in North 
China, and was already a trading port before the coming of the Western Powers. 
Rogaski examines public health in Tientsin's foreign concessions and 
Chinese city. Her study is a case study of the impact of informal empire or semi- 
colonialism on the development of the city and its people in the twentieth century. 
The multiple colonialism in Tientsin noted by Rogaski, makes the study of Tientsin 
very interesting. From 1860-1943, Tientsin consisted not only of a Chinese city but 
also eight (latterly four) foreign concessions. 144 As a result of the diversity of 
foreign control, research on Tientsin is not generally focused on any single 
community such as the British. It also led to study of the interaction and sometimes 
tension between communities such as the Boxer Uprising (see Chapter One). Gail 
Hershatter furthers this study by looking at Chinese workers to examine the 
development of Tientsin. Her study also considers another important element in 
Tientsin. She does not agree that the Chinese in Tientsin responded to the rise of 
Chinese nationalism conservatively and passively. 145 The Chinese there were 
involved in big protests in 1925-1926 (and 1946-1948), which shows that it was not 
a quiescent place during the Nationalist era in China. Even before 1925 members 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organised the Tientsin workers in a labour 
union. '46 
This literature on Tientsin also discusses relationships between the 
tional powers in Tientsin. As Rogaski mentions, "Tianjin [Tientsin] fostered 
144 Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p. 3. 
'"s Gall He rshatter, The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949 (Stonford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 
pp. 210-1. 
Ibid., pp. 212-20. 
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no simple binary division between `coloniser' and `colonised', but instead gave rise 
to an unstable and contested hierarchy among many nations. "147 The imperialist 
powers with concessions in Tientsin kept their own identity, power and policy 
confined to their concessions. The unique style of architecture in every concession 
symbolised the distance each of these concessions kept from the others-148 This 
also raised animosity and clashes between them. For example, the Sino-Japanese 
crisis in the 1930s had had an impact not only on the Chinese but also on other 
foreigners. The crisis in the 1930s in relations between Japan and China extended 
to affect British interests in Tientsin. On 8 November 1931, Japan used Tientsin 
against China by supplying Chinese hooligans with arms with which to create 
trouble. 149 Although this did not have a profound impact on British trade, the 
traders were still concerned about their future when the conflict escalated in the 
mid-1930s. These two studies demonstrate the existence of imperialists in this city 
and the development of Chinese workers' grievance against the imperialist powers. 
It would be interesting to know how the small British community in Tientsin 
managed to develop its interests steadily despite the Chinese agitation and 
competition from other foreign powers. 
This is elaborated by Marjorie Dryburgh, who points out that in the 1930s 
the Japanese military tried to expand Japanese interests in North China 130 
Although Tientsin's Japanese residents seemed unwilling to support this 
147 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 194. 
148 Tess Johnston and Deke Fah, Far From Hone: Western Architecture in China's Northern Treaty 
Ports (Hong Kong: Old China Hand Press, 1996), p. 63. 
149 The Tientsin Incident: Troubles Created by Plain-clothes Men under Japanese Protection 
November 8-30, A Award of Facts (Tientsin: The Municipal Government of Tcftin, 1932), p. 1. 
130 Marjorie Dryburgh, 'Parallel Lives: the Japanese Community in 1930s Tianjin', EARC Research 
Papers 96.11, pp. 10-2. 
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initiative, 151 the Sino-Japanese conflict created problems for the British traders' 
interests. This issue is raised by both Swann and Young. Both of their studies 
examine the tension between the British and the Japanese in 1939. Swann points 
out that the existence of Chinese residents in British concessions created unforeseen 
problems, which became more overt when the Sino-Japanese tension reached a 
high peak in 1937. The Chinese used the British concessions as a hiding place or a 
centre from which to attack the Japanese, 152 causing the Sino-Japanese tension to 
spill over into Anglo-Japanese tension. 153 This study again shows that Tientsin 
was not a quiet city in the 1930s; the Japanese activity created tension in Tientsin 
and its hinterlands, and despite Japan's domination of North China in the 1930s, the 
British interests were still intact. 
After reviewing all the above studies, my postulation is that the British 
community in Tientsin and its hinterland was moderate and adaptable community 
which recognised the British liberal policy would help foster a good relation 
between British and the Chinese. In my thesis I look at the role played by the 
British traders in Tientsin and its hinterlands and Anglo-Chinese relations. As we 
know that the British traders in Tientsin and its hinterland have never been studied, 
it would also be interesting to look at this community to see how the British 
community in other parts of China (in this case in Tientsin and its hinterlands) 
reacted to the changes in China between 1925 to 1937. What factors determined 
how the British traders in Tientsin and hinterlands reacted? Did they have the same 
attitude as the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands? Was the British 
s' Ibid., p. 13. '52 S. P. Swann, 'The Tientsin Incident (1939): A Case-Study of Japan's Imperial Dilemma in 
China' (unpublished Ph. D., Thesis, the University of London, 30 November 1998), pp. 22 and 372. 'S' Jennifer Yang, `British Policy and Strategy in the Tientsin Crisis, 1939' (unpublished M. Litt 
Thesis, Oxford University, 1994), p. 79. 
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community in Tientsin and its hinterlands united against the challenges of the 
Chinese and other foreign powers? Did it also have diehards, as in Shanghai? Did 
the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands have an impact on the Anglo- 
Chinese relations? How did the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands 
manage to avoid Japanese competition in the 1930s? Lastly, how did it respond to 
Japanese activity in North China? My discussion of the British community in this 
thesis focuses mostly on the traders, because it was they who controlled the BMC. 
However, I do not neglect the rest of the British community, especially the views of 
the missionaries and the settlers. My study does not include the other communities 
in Tientsin. 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. This introduction touches on the 
objective of this thesis, the literature review, the structure of the thesis and the 
methodology. The first chapter concentrates on the development of the British 
Concession in Tientsin, from its opening until 1925. This chapter briefly discusses 
the establishment of the British concession, touching on its population and 
economic and administrative development. It highlights social interactions 
between the British and the Chinese and other communities. Several important 
events in Tientsin are discussed, especially the Tientsin Massacre (1870) and the 
Boxer Uprising (1900). These events also impacted on the concession, such as with 
the establishment of a British garrison in Tientsin after the Boxer Uprising. There 
is a brief history of Tientsin before the arrival of the Westerners and the emergence 
of other concessions. It is important to know how this city emerged and its 





Powers, notably Japan, Russia and Germany in finding a foothold in Tientsin in 
order to grasp the trade opportunities in North China, are also discussed. The 
chapter provides an empirical account of the development of the British presence, 
which is not available in the current literature, and it provides material for 
understanding the position of the Tientsin British at the onset of the Chinese 
nationalist revolution. Given the emphasis placed upon the history of some of these 
events in British communal life in Tientsin - which Bickers has pointed tol-" - it is 
also important to understand their impact on the city and the British concession. 
The second chapter is concerned with the period from 1925 to 1927, when 
Chinese nationalism began to grow in China and the British became the target of 
boycotts and resentment from the Chinese. In this chapter 1 examine the British 
communities' response to the rise of Chinese nationalism. Were they concerned 
about the situation? Were they and the British Legation prepared for any incident 
that might occur in Tientsin, such as what had happened in Hankow? How did the 
local Chinese in Tientsin react to the anti-British sentiment in China? What was 
the British community's response to the December Memorandum? These questions 
are investigated in depth. 
Chapter three considers the establishment of good relations between the 
Chinese Nationalist government and Britain, focusing on the period between 1927 
and 1929. This period is important to the future of the British communities, as both 
the Chinese and the British governments were willing to discuss the rendition of the 
British concession in Tientsin. I focus on the British community's response. Was 
'54Th1d., p. 137. 
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there any opposition to these negotiations? In addition I study the negotiations 
between the Chinese and British reptatives, the demands of the Chinese and 
the British reaction. Also discussed in this chapter is the preparation of the British 
Legation to protect the British concession in case of Chinese troops coming into 
north China. Owing to, this chapter has to cover 1927, the year of the negotiations 
about rendition. 
Chapter four covers the period between 1930 and 1933, when both the 
Chinese and the British governments agreed to discuss extraterritoriality. It 
examines the response of the British community in Tientsin to this and to the 
Thorburn case. However, the invasion of Manchuria by Japan disturbed the 
negotiation process. In these circumstances, what did the British community think 
about the Manchurian Crisis? The chapter also investigates the seizure of the 
Chinese Maritime Customs (CMC) in Tientsin and the response of the British 
community and government to this episode. 
Chapter five highlights events between 1933 and 1937, a time of truce 
between China and Japan. Through these events I look upon Britain's China policy 
and the attitude of the Tientsin British community towards China and Japan. 
Where did the British communities stand regarding the tension between both 
countries? Was Tientsin and its hinterland also affected by this tension? To what 
extent could the British authority in Tientsin stay neutral in this crisis? The main 
issues discussed in this chapter are the smuggling activities, the Japanese puppet 
government and the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Lastly the thesis ends with my 
conclusions, including the significance of Tientsin and its hinterlands in Anglo- 
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Chinese relations, and lastly some suggestions on how my study could be 
expanded. 
Sources 
Documentary material on the British presence in Tientsin is vast. There are 
abundant Foreign Office (FO) files regarding the British Concession in the National 
Archives in Kew Garden, London. Amongst these is FO 228, the Peking legation 
files, which included material on activities in Tientsin. These files include letters 
from and to London, to the British Minister in Peking and the British Consul 
General in Tientsin, and other letters sent by the British community in Tientsin to 
London, the British Legation in Peking and the Consul Office in Tientsin. Other 
than the FO 228 files, I also look into other files such as FO 656: Supreme Court 
files, FO 674: Tientsin consular files and F0371: Political Departments' files, 
which also contain important papers regarding Tientsin. 
I also look at material in the records of the Chinese Maritime Chinese 
Service in the Second Archives of China in Nanjing, which contain many 
documents relating to Tientsin. Amongst the materials are files on the seizure of 
Tientsin Customs, which forms part of my research. Other interesting files are 
concerned with the smuggling in Tientsin and its hinterlands, which were 
significant events in Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-Chinese relations. 
The Tientsin British Committee of Information Memoranda, 1926-1933 (in 
School of Oriental and African Studies) is important to my study, as it demonstrates 
the attitude of the British community in Tientsin to British liberal policy in China. 
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The memoranda became a tool of the TBCI through which they voiced their 
opinions, not only on their government's policy but also their responses to 
situations in China. These memoranda provide me with a comprehensive view of 
the Tientsin British community's attitudes. 
Another source which I explore is newspapers and magazine. Several 
English newspapers and magazines are important to my study. The North China 
Herald, the Chinese Times, the Celestial Empire, Oriental Affairs and The China 
Express and Telegraph were published in China at the time and bring more light to 
my study. These newspapers not only covered the news in China but also 
expressed their own opinions on what was happening. These opinions became part 
of the British community's views in Tientsin. I could not locate a full collection of 
The Peking and Tientsin Times in any library or archive. However, I managed to 
retrieve some of its news from other materials, especially in Foreign Office files. In 
addition this thesis also uses other Chinese and Japanese newspapers or magazines 
such as News Bulletin, Chinese Affairs, China Weekly Chronicle, the China Critic 
and The Japan Weekly Chronicle. 
Abundant documentation exists from major British firms with a presence in 
Tientsin, notably the Kaifan Mining Administration, Jardine Matheson & Co., 
Butterfield & Swire and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. The British 
missionary society was also a prominent feature in settlement, cultural in 
educational activities. All these documents can be found in archives and libraries 
in London, Oxford and Cambridge. I also look into reports published by the British 
Municipal Council in Tientsin (in the Shanghai Municipal Archive). From these 
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reports I learnt of the activities of this Council relating to its economic, social and 
political municipal development. This research was not able to use material kept in 
the Tianjin (Tientsin) archives, as material on the concession was not accessible 
during the period of my research. However, this did not compromise my research; 
the materials mentioned above have given me enough information to produce this 
study. This study does not focus on the BMC administration or local history as 
such. It concentrates only on the extent to which the British community in Tientsin 
and its hinterlands influenced and had impacted on Anglo-Chinese relations. 
Therefore the materials to be found in English archives were sufficient for my 
study. 
My secondary sources are books, theses and articles, although the literature 
on Tientsin in the period of 1920s and 1930s is limited. Some of these books, such 
as Ruth Rogaski's Hygienic Modernity, have enriched my understanding of 
Tientsin and the informal British empire in China. I also used books relating to 
British policy in China, the history of modem China and the Japanese presence in 
China. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the study of Anglo-Chinese relations has been approached by 
many scholars. Early writings on Anglo-Chinese relations focus on diplomatic 
matters. The literature on the diplomatic theme has come from a diplomatic point 
of view, looking at relations from the top down. These studies create a general view 
of British activity in China. The size of China means that there were a variety of 
responses and therefore impacts on events there. These themes gradually change to 
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focus on the problems of British trade activities in China linked to the imperialist 
theme. The British imperialist theme takes a different approach by looking at the 
relationship with British imperial and economic history in China. They agree that 
Great Britain's position was weak in the 1920s and the old privileges could not 
support it at the time of the Chinese anti-British campaign. However, their 
argument covers only part of the British community, its traders. 
Recent studies have opened up a wider perspective on Anglo-Chinese 
relations. This study concentrates on British community life in China. It is 
important to examine this component of history because it provides greater 
understanding of Anglo-Chinese relations. The British communities regarded the 
treaty port as their livelihood and would not accept the imposition of policy from 
London without protest or comment. This study of the British concession at 
Tientsin and its hinterland therefore considers these responses. The communities 
not only demanded that their livelihood be protected but also acted to influence 
government policy. The tension between the Chinese and Japanese also presented 
these communities with a substantial challenge, as any action which inclined to 
either party would lead to retaliation by the other. 
All in all, the study of the British concession in Tientsin is essential for an 
understanding of the community's view of the situation in China in an era of 
disturbance and war in the 1920s and 1930s. It offers a good view of their opinions 
and reactions, including relations between British and other communities. The 
British community's reaction also determined the success of British policy in 
China. In other words this study brings another British voice to what is known 
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about Anglo-Chinese relations at the time and fills a vacuum in the history of 
community interaction in Anglo-Chinese relations. 155 So far we know about the 
Shanghailanders, but we know little about other British community views in other 
ports. Did they have homogeneous attitudes and reactions? Did the British 
community in Tientsin and the Shanghailander have any connection? Furthermore, 
the study of Tientsin has become important because it has been so little studied. It 
contributes another valuable study, not just of the British community in China but 
also of Anglo-Chinese relations. 
issWIuiam Kirby, `The Internationalization of China', p. 456. 
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Chapter One 
The Development of Foreign Concessions in Tientsin (1861-1925) 
Introduction 
Before this thesis looks more deeply into Sino-British relations in Tientsin, 
this chapter explores the early development of the concession between 1860 and 
1925 in order that we can understand what was at stake - in British terms - in the 
age of assertive Chinese nationalism. ' Three main themes are explored in this 
chapter. Firstly, it sketches out the history of the opening of Tientsin as a treaty 
port and the development of foreign concessions in the city. The second issue is 
the early relationship between Chinese and foreigners in the city, up to 1900. This 
section discusses the tensions which escalated into the Tientsin Massacre of 1870, 
and the Boxer Uprising of 1900. The last section considers the development of 
Tientsin in the twentieth century with particular reference to the British concession. 
The discussion concentrates on British interests, especially those of the British 
traders, in Tientsin and the surrounding area. This section also includes other 
developments such as other foreign concessions, the Chinese City and the 
development of trade in Tientsin. In order to understand why Tientsin was 
important for trade it is necessary to begin briefly with the general history of 
Tientsin before the western Powers arrived in China. Aside from Ruth Rogaski and 
Hershatter's survey, there has been no account of the British concession and its 
neighbours since 1925, and Rogaski and Hershatter's book, of course, does not 
have the concession as its focus. An updated survey is therefore even more 
relevant than might usually be the case. 
I However the discussion also would include the period beyond 1925 to see progress such as trade 
figure and population. 
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Location and Early History 
Tientsin is located in northeast China and connected to Peking by the Hai 
Ho, which runs through Tientsin to Taku and the Gulf of Pohai (see Map 2.1). To 
the north of the city are Manchuria and Mongolia. Today, Tientsin is under a 
separate authority from that of Hopei Province, but previously it had been part of 
what was formerly Chihli province. The change in Tientsin's status began when 
the Nationalists took over the city in 1928 and created a Tientsin Special Area 
Municipality. 2 The city developed gradually from a small fishing and agricultural 
village in the Hai Ho valley to An important trading centre in the nineteenth 
century. Two events influenced this development. The first was the opening of the 
Grand Canal during the Sui Dynasty (581-618), which connected Tientsin via this 
inland waterway with the middle and southern parts of China. The Grand Canal 
was used to maintain food supplies to the northern frontier and the capital area, 
Loyang. 3 The second was when the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) established Peking 
as the capital city and Tientsin became the centre of goods supplied to this city via 
the canal. As a result Tientsin developed steadily throughout the mid-fifteenth 
century as a grain distribution centre 4 The Imperial Court paid a great deal of 
attention to maintaining and developing the Grand Canal 5 and these efforts 
brought many vessels to Tientsin and prosperity to the city. 
2 PRO F0371/13171, Tientsin Special Area Municipality by Vice Consul Pelham, 25 July, 1928. 
3 Bun, The Salt Merchants of Tianjin, p. 13 and John King Fairbank, China: A New History 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 77-8. 
Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
1996), p. 371, and Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic 
Interpretation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), p. 139. 
S U. S. - Government Translation of Tientsin, Pao Chiao-n, l g and He Tz'w-ch'ing Moscow 
(Research & New York: Microfilms Publications, 1960), pp. 43-6. 
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December 2006. 
During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), a guard unit was installed in 
Tientsin to protect the grain traffic. " At this point Tientsin became an army 
garrison, and in 1404 a wall was built around the city. 7 This was when the city 
got its name, which means Ford of Heaven. 8 Another development which made 
Tientsin an important city to the Chinese government was salt mining. The 
mining of salt in Tientsin can be traced back to the Spring and Autumn period 
(770-476 B. C. ) in China .9 Foreigners visiting Tientsin before 1860 witnessed its 
6 Edward L. Farmer, Early Ming Government: the Evolution of Dual Capita! (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard East Asian monographs, 1976), p. 156. 
7 Bun, The Salt Merchants of Tianjin, pp. 13 and 29, and Peking, North China, South Manchuria and 
Korea: With Maps, Plans and Illustrations, Firth Edition (London: Thos. Cook & Son., 1924), p. 96. $ Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 51. 
9 Bun, The Salt Merchants of Tianjin, p. 16 cite from Guan. i (1920), juan 22, la-2b. 
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importance as a salt distribution centre. t° Overall, the importance of Tientsin in 
North China after 1860 was not new. The Chinese had used this port for several 
functions, beginning as a small farming village and growing to a trade centre and 
fortress to protect central government in Peking. This historical narrative shows 
that Tientsin offered a good environment in which foreigners open the port. Thus 
the foreigners wanted to make Tientsin one of the treaty ports in China. Before this 
discussion focuses more specifically on the importance of Tientsin, it is useful to 
widerstand how the part Was opened to foreign try. 
The Opening of Tientsin 
After the ratification of the Nanking treaty (1842)11, the ill-feeling between 
China and the western countries was still not resolved. The westerners made Three 
main demands of China. The first concerned trade, which was still limited to 
coastal areas. Western traders wanted more ports opened, especially in the 
Yangtze Valley. Second was the need to establish diplomatic relations. The 
Western governments wanted equal status between themselves and the Chinese and 
to establish direct relations with Peking rather than with the provincial 
governments. 12 Third was the need. for free access for the Christian missions in 
China. To achieve these objectives, Britain, France and America went to Peking in 
1854 to negotiate with the Chinese Court, but were rejected. 13 Meanwhile several 
incidents led the westerners to accuse China of Violating the Nanking Treaty. One 
"oO. D. Rasmussen, Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History (Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, Ltd., 
1925), p. 33 and N. B. Denys, The Treaty Ports of China and Japan: A Complete Guide to the Open 
Ports of those Counties, together with Peking Yedo, Hongkong and Macao (San Francisco: Chinese 
Materials Center, Inc., 1977), p. 473. 
" This treaty was signed to end the Opium War (1840-1842) between Britain and China. 
12 Hevia, English Lessons, P. 34, and Masataka Banno, China and the West, 1858-1861 (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 15-7. 
" Douglas Hurd, The Arrow Wir: An Anglo-Chinese Co> isiat 1856-1860 (Landon: Collide, St 
James's Place, 1967), pp. 26-7. 
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was the reluctance of the Chinese provincial authorities to open Canton city to 
westerners, even though the Nanking Treaty specified Canton as one of five ports 
to be opened up to trade. 14 Then came the murder of a French missionary in 
Kwangsi (1856), which caused the French to ally with the British in the war. ' 5 
Finally the Arrow Incident led to a second bloody war. The seizure of the `Arrow', 
a Chinese-owned ship registered In Hong Kong as British, sparked protest from the 
British. 16 In this conflict, known as the Arrow War, China faced the combined 
Anglo-French armies. The conflict lasted four years, and Was finally re$ölved With 
the 1858 treaty of Tientsin and in the 1860 Peking Convention. Tientsin was one 
of the new treaty ports opened to foreign trade and residence as a result. 
Overall the opening up of Tientsin made it one of the places of importance 
to the British (and other powers) in establishing and extending their trade interests 
in China. The foreign powers' choice of Tientsin as one of their trade centres 
demonstrates that Tientsin had a trade value as important as that of other Chinese 
ports such as Shanghai. But the foreigners' coercive manner in opening up 
Tientsin and other treaty ports caused ill-feeling among the Chinese, who saw them 
as a challenge to Chinese sovereignty. These two points, the trade interests of the 
foreigners and the animosity created by the foreign forces regarding Chinese 
sovereignty, developed side by side and created tension in China, which manifested 
first in an anti-imperialist movement and then in a more organised nationalist 
movement in the twentieth century. Before looking more deeply into the clash 
14 G. F. Bartle, Sir John Bowri, and the Arrow War in China (Manchester. The John Rylands 
Library, 1961), p. 298 and Hurd, The Arrow War, p. 19. 
15 John F. Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1967), p. 162. 
16 Hevia, English Lessons, p. 33. 
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between the foreigners in Tientsin and the Chinese, it I will show how Tientsin 
developed and benefited the foreign powers, especially the British. 
Fairly Development of Tienfsin 
In order to operate their trade interests smoothly, France, America and 
Britain established concessions in Tientsin under the terms of the Peking 
Convention. Two of the concessions (the British and the French) were situated at 
Tzu Chu Lin, (Purple Bamboo Grove), on the west side of the Hai Ho. '7 The 
British concession was established in 1860. The French concession was 
established in June 186118 occupying 360 mou, 19 or about 60 acres, on a triangular 
piece of land to the south-east of the Chinese city. Below it was the British 
concession on a narrow strip of land on the bend of the Hai Ho (See Map 2.2). 
Although the Americans were given land below the British concession near the 
bank of the Hai Ho, their concession never acquired the same status as the others 
because it had no municipal administration as the French and the British 
concessions did. The other two concessions developed steadily and well. The area 
of the British concession was 460 mou, and the agreement was for a 99-year 
Crown lease. Colonel Charles George Gordon took the initiative and led the 
British community in dividing this land, which contained vegetable gardens, docks, 
fishermen's hovels and huts, 20 into several plots which were auctioned to the 
British traders, With some land reserved för new roads, Wharves, a blind and a 
godown. With these developments, shops, houses and company buildings began to 
grow steadily. The early development of the British and French concessions 
" Rasmussen, ? Yentsin p. 36. 
'$ `Special Articles: Tientsin's Foreign Concessions', Oriental Affairs, 10: 4, October, 1938, p. 195. 
19 A mou is roughly equivalent to 0.2 acres. 
20 The Chinese 77mes, 3 November 1888, p. 705. 
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illustrates the serious intent of these two powers to strengthen their position in 
North China. Owing to this development, the foreign population began to 
increasingly seize opportunities for trade and found jobs in the service and 
administration sectors in the concessions. Christian missionaries also came to 
Tientsin and its hinterlands. However, the majority of the early foreign residents 
were traders. 
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In 1861, the foreign population, excluding the allied troops, numbered only 
thirteen, of which twelve were British consular staff, traders and missionaries21 and 
the thirteenth was the American missionary. The fact that half of this number was 
British traders demonstrates how quickly traders took up this opportunity to 
operate their businesses in North China. This trading group controlled the British 
Concession in Tientsin right from its inception. Therefore the earliest 
infrastructures to appear in these concessions were trade facilities as mentioned 
above. Building on the model of the Municipal Council at Shanghai, the trading 
21 Rasmussen, Tientsin, pp. 39. 
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community collectively created the British Municipal Council (BMC) in 1862 to 
help with the development and running of the concession. Although it came to look 
very much like the body which administered the International Settlement at 
Shanghai, the Tientsin Council, as we shall see, lacked the same degree of 
autonomy from British diplomatic and consular control. This became the 
distinctive difference between the municipalities, and which had a profound impact 
on the BMC in the mid-1920s. Vast power was held by the British consul-general 
to monitor the BMC's adherence to British policy and avoid tension with the 
Chinese. 22 As we shall see, The British community had to follow much of the 
British government's policy, and this made the British concession in Tientsin 
behave more moderately towards the Chinese. Owing to this situation the diehard 
attitude of British communities in China did not prevail in Tientsin and its 
hinterlands, so the British government had little trouble in implementing British 
liberal policy in Tientsin in the mid-1920. 
The first council consisted of three members: E. Waller, the chairman, from 
Phillips & Moore (he later became an agent for Smith, Kennedy & Co. ); J. 
Henderson, the honorary treasurer, an agent for Lindsay & Co; and J. Hanna, an 
agent for Dent & Co. When the number of councillors increased British traders still 
dominated. For example, in 1874 when the B'MC had five members all were 
traders. A few customs officers managed to get appointed to this council, for 
example G. Detring, who was chairman from 1878 to 1981 and 1885 to 1893. W. 
Jackson of the acting municipal police (although even he was also a British trader), 
served as a council member in 1875. From 1887-1889 and in 1894, Dr. A. Irwin, a 
22 F. C. Jones, ShangbW and 77eascin. with special tiefemnce to foreign imerests (Loridow Oxford 
University Press, 1940), hlm. 121. 
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medical practitioner, was a member - though he too owned a firm (Frazer and 
Irwin, medical practitioners) in Tientsin. For details of BMC members see 
Appendix 1. 
As Tientsin's British population was still small the BMC had to open its 
doors to other nationalities for help with running the municipality. This practice is 
evidence in the election of a German, G. Detring, as well as a Russian, A. D. 
Startseft as honorary treasurer from 1887 to 1889, and an Indian Sephardic Jew, 
D. Ezekiel, as honorary treasurer from 1879 to 1880. The land renters chose these 
members quarterly. The earliest information regarding the administration of the 
BIM shows that the BIM's administration staff was small. For example on 
January 1875, it was administered by a Chairman, and an Honorary Secretary. The 
BMC also had a Superintendent of Roads and Police with a police sergeant and a 
constable serving below him. 24 
In the spring of 1862 the British population of Tientsin numbered fewer 
than fifty, u but the foreign population there increased year by year. For example, 
in 1877 there were 175 foreigners in Tientsin, increasing to 262 in 1879,612 in 
1890,700 in 1896 and 2206 in 1900.26 The growth of the foreign population 
demonstrates how Tientsin gradually developed as an important trading centre in 
North China. Concurrently with the development of trade in Tientsin and its 
hinterland, the number of foreign fines, of which only three were British in 1861, 
2' Desk Hong List; A General and Business Dbuctory for Shanghai, Northern and River Part 
Japan Jwinwy 1875 (Shanghai: The North-China Herald Office, 1975), p. 111. u Desk Hong List; A General and Business Directory for Shanghai, Northern and River Ports 
Japasi Jariary 1878 (Shanghai: The North-China Herald Office, 1879), p. 121. 5 Rogasld, Hygienic Modernity, p. 95. 
26 Shang Keqing and Liu Haiyan, T injin Zajie Shehid Ym fiu (Research on society in the Tianjin 
foreign ce scions) (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1996), p. 160 from CMC Trade Reports. 
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also grew to 19 in 1863.27 In 1874 there were 33, including an insurance company 
and a private doctor's surgery, 28 and this figure increased again to 61 (including 
Anglo-Chinese firms) in 188929 and to 71 in 1895.3° All in all the increase in the 
foreign community and its property illustrates the growing importance of Tientsin 
as a centre for investment in North China. The increase of trade interests caused 
the foreign communities to seek greater progress in their trade and they were keen 
to protect these interests from any challenges from China. The British and other 
foreign communities were prepared to fight for their interests if these were 
threatened. 
The increase in the foreign population led the BMC to create a more 
conducive environment in the concession, with several basic public facilities. Only 
after the 1880s did other public facilities appear in the British and French 
concessions. In the British concession the first library was set up (circa 1880). 31 
On 21 June 1887, Victoria Park was opened to mark the fiftieth anniversary of 
Queen Victoria. In 1890, a Town Hall was built in the British concession and 
named Gordon Hall in commemoration of Colonel Gordon (see figure 2.1 ). 32 At 
the end of the 1890s, the Queen Victoria Diamond Jubilee Memorial Hospital was 
opened. 3 To accommodate guests coming to Tientsin, the Queen and Astor Hotels 
(1886) were built on the British bund M 
27 Rasmussen, Tientsin, p. 39 and The China Directoryfor 1863, p. 52. 
29 The China Directory for 1874, fourth annual publication, New Series (Taipei: reprinted by 
Ch'eng Wen Publishing Company, 1971), p. p1. 
Z9 The Hongkong Directory and Hong List for the Far East for 1889, pp. 320-3. 
30 The Hongkong Directory and Hong List for the Far East for 1895, pp. 439-42. 
31 An Old Hand, `Memories of Tientsin', Oriental Affairs, VI, No. 3, September 1936, p. 175. 
32 Rasmussen, Tientsin p. 63. 
33 Ibid., p. 105. 
34 `List of 160 Significant Historic Buildings in Tianjin-l', 
http: -, vv vý v\. \\ aý ahroad. cum tiara ji n tcyt tc\t4'. htm\O. 29 December 2006. 
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Figure 2.1: The Gordon Hall 
Source: Pennell, W. V., Tientsin North China. the Port, Its History, Trade, Industry and Community 
Life (Tientsin: the Tientsin Press, 1934), p. 18. 
After 40 years the British concession still lacked several essential facilities 
necessary to meet the demand of the increasing population. The British 
municipality had not yet developed sanitation facilities such as underground drains 
and a water supply. 35 The nightsoil carrier still played an important role in 
collecting wastewater from households. The British community relied on water 
from the Hai Ho, although its cleanness was dubious. 6 Another, cleaner source of 
water was the southern branch of the Grand Canal. The water carrier collected 
water from the Canal and supplied it to the British households in Tientsin. 37 
Around 1897 a private firm, the Tientsin Waterworks Company, embarked on a 
waterworks project for the British concession using Hai Ho water and completed in 
15 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 133. 
36 imperial maritime Customs, //. Special Series: No. 2, Medical Reports, for the Half-year ended 
3(/h September 1897,5r Issue (Shanghai: the Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of 
Customs, 1898), p. 27. 
37 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 209. 
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1899 that supplied the foreign community with clean water 38 after which the 
British community installed indoor water pipes. But another water problem arose; 
the BMC still did not have a proper sewerage system and continued to hire a 
Chinese water-carrier to carry away waste. 9 These developments in the British 
and French concessions show how the British concession was not only a place of 
trade but also one for settling down, living and working. The British community 
became embedded in the daily life of the concession and felt it to be their own 
town. The concession, which had been built in accordance with imperial culture, 
especially regarding its customs and architecture, encouraged colonial aspirations 
amongst some residents-40 In short, with the foreign look of the city the foreign 
concession helped foster a diehard group in the British community in Tientsin and 
its hinterlands. The imperial mentality of this diehard group was very concerned to 
protect the British image and prestige in China. This group played a major role in 
upholding British interests and privileges in Tientsin and its hinterland, as 
discussed in following chapters. 
The `scramble for concessions' in the mid-1890s changed the landscape in 
Tientsin. On 30 October 1895, Germany was given 1,034 mou of land, situated 
near the riverbank and south east of the British concession. The Japanese 
concession was 1,667 mou and northwest of the French concession. The Japanese 
acquired their concession after the Shimonoseki Treaty on 17 April 1895, and the 
311 Imperial Maritime Custow, ! 1. -Special Series: No. 2, Medical Reports, for the Half-, year ended 
30" September 1899, S8* Issue (Shanghai: the Statistical Department of the Inspectorate te General of 
Custorns, 1898), p. 24. 
39 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 212. 
40 Robert Bickers, Britain in China (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 76. 
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Sino-Japanese Protocols in October 1896 were signed. "' However, the Japanese 
did not acquire land in Tientsin immediately the protocols were signed. It took 
them almost two years to claim i02 In 1897 the British received another 1,630 
mou of land from the Chinese Taotai. The new area was named the British 
Municipal Extension and was administered by a separate municipality from the 
original concession. 43 This separation was created because the BMC did not want 
to use its bond revenue to maintain the British Municipal Extension. 44 This 
municipality consisted of nine members with their own authority under the Land 
Regulations, which came into effect in March 1899.45 The new municipality was 
also dominated by British traders (see Appendix 1). France also demanded new 
extension land, but the outbreak of the Boxer Uprising delayed their negotiations 
with the Chinese. After the uprising; the two governments resumed their talks and 
in December 1900 the French concession received another 1,380 mou of land46 
stretching from Taku Road to the Weitze Creek. 
Disturbance 
Although the prosperity of the foreign concessions grew and Westerners 
enjoyed the privileges afforded them by the unequal treaties, that presence did not 
remain uncontested by Chinese, and Tientsin was the site of two iconic episodes of 
11 Merk R. Peattie, `Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937' in Peter Duus, Ramon 
H. Myers, and Mark R. Pesüie (eds. ), The Japanese Informal Empire In China 1895-1937 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 172. This treaty was signed between the Japanese 
and the Chinese due to the defeat of the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). 
' Peattie, `Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-19371, p. 178. '3 Rasmussen, Tien nrsin p. 95. 
µ PRO F067411981 train }LE Fu11l, d to C. R.. Morlin& Tientsin, 2 February 1919. 
'5 F. C. Jones, Shanghai and Tientsin: With Special Reference to Fwefgn Interests (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1940), p. 122, and Twentieth Century impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and 
other Treaty Ports of China p. 729. 
46 'Special Articles: Tientsin's Foreign Concessions', p. 194. 
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Sino-foreign conflict: the Tientsin Massacre on 21 June 1870 and the Boxer 
Uprising, as described below. 
The Tientsin Massacre of 1870 
The Tientsin Massacre can be linked to tension among the local Chinese 
concerning the Christian missions. After 1860 the missionaries had the right to 
carry out their activities, travel, and rent land inland. However, the mission 
protected Chinese converts from Chinese law. 47 These circumstances inflamed the 
Chinese with anger at the mission, which anger erupted in several incidents 
involving injury, murder and damage to properties. ' The massacre was also 
linked to the conversion of the Imperial Palace to the French Consulate in 1870 and 
of Buddhist temple land to Notre Dame des Victoires. 49 The French mission, the 
Sisterhood of Mercy, adopted deserted and orphaned Chinese children to be taken 
care of by the church, offering a reward to whoever brought these children to them. 
Then came a rumour that accused the mission of kidnapping the children for their 
eyes and hearts. The rumour quickly spread around Chinese society in Tientsin, 
creating fear and anxiety among the Chinese 50 
With no action being taken to control this situation, things grew ugly and 
the cathedral was attacked. All French properties came under attack, including the 
41 Ibid., p. 85. 
48 At Nanchang in 1862 the Catholic orphanage and several Chinese Christian shops and houses 
were destroyed by a Chinese crowd. Then, in August 1868, Chinese raided and burned the 
missionary station in Yangchow. In Tientsin the activities of the missionaries also became a target 
for the Chinese. The agitation against the missionary was fiuther+ed by the rumour that missionaries 
were involved in the kidnapping of children. Owing to the spread of this rumour the Chinese 
became frightened and angry. See Paul A. Cohen, China and Christianity: The Missionmy and the 
Growth of Chinese Ant foreignism, 1860-1870 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 
p. 88 and George Thin, The Tientsin Massacre: 77w Cause of the Late Disturbances in China and 
How To Secure Permanent Peace (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1870), pp. 45-6. 
49 See 0. D. Rasniossen, T7ensiA, p. 46. 
S0 Rasmussen, Thmsii pp-46-9 and The North China Herat4 7 July 1870, p. 4. 
68 
French Consulate. Twenty-one foreigners were killed, mostly French, including 
the French consul M. Fontainer. 5' Three Russians were also killed. The British 
concession was spared the attack; no British person was reported molested or killed 
in this massscre. 52 The massacre was put down when foreign gunboats arrived. 
The foreigners demanded redress and punishment for the rioters. In the end, Li 
Hung-chang and the French agreed on payment of compensation and punishment 
for the Tientsin prefect and magistrate. 
Did this massacre have an impact on the BMC? The British concession had 
never been harmed by the Chinese. This did not have a profound impact on the 
British, who merely sympathised with the French. Furthermore the British still had 
faith in the Chinese; for example, the election of the first Chinese member (1878) 
to the BIM suggests that the British did not harbour ill-feelings towards the 
Chinese after the massacre. On other hand this massacre indicated a challenge that 
could potentially affect the British and other foreign interests in Tientsin and its 
hinterland, such missionary incidents' happened elsewhere in China also. Tientsin 
was spread further outbreak, but it played a central role in the 1900 Boxer rising 
and war. 
Tientsin under siege, 1900 
The Boxer Uprising began in Shantung and spread to northern China. The 
causes of this crisis were varied; the Sino-Japanese war (18941895), drought and 
51 J. K. Fairbank, `Pam Behind The Tientsin Massacre', Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 
Vol. 20, No. 3/4. (Dec., 1937), p. 480. 
52 FO17/607 Telegram from Sir Thomas Francis Ward, Peking, 25 July 1870. 
3 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern Chine Sb A Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), p. 303 and O. D. Rasmussen, Tientsin, pp. 50-2. 
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floods in the Shantung, Henan and Kiangsu provinces, and missionary activities-", 
all combined to create a tense situation. As violence erupted across north China in 
the winter of 1899 and spring of 1900, Tientsin became a site of conflict. A grave 
situation began in the mid-June 1900.55 Boxers used the Chinese city as a centre 
from which to attack foreign concessions, where about 2,000 foreign troops were 
brought in to defend foreign lives and properties. 
The Boxers used Chinese cannon to bombard the foreign concessions and 
lay siege to them. The shelling began on 17 June 1900. The shells caused great 
damage And fire in the French concessions. The British concession was not 
directly hit by shells and suffered little damage. After several days' fighting the 
death toll was high, with many bodies in the street and floating in the river, where 
between 50 and 100 dead bodies were counted The situation on 21 June 1900 
became graver when the Ching Court officially declared war on the foreign 
Powers. Chinese reinforcements came daily to support the Boxers, 57 while foreign 
ammunition stocks steadily decreased. Faced with this situation, the foreign 
officers worried about the possibility of the Chinese capturing the settlement, and 
sent for help. 58 This task was carried out by James Watts, who went to Taku with 
three Cossacks. 59 The arrival of Watts led the Allied Powers to send troops to the 
defence of the foreigners in Tientsin. The arrival of relief troops on 11 July 1900 
" For account see Lanxin Xiang, The Origins of the Boxer War (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 
p. 37 and Joseph W. Esherick, 77w Origins of the Boxer Uprising (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987), pp. 114,114,183 and 198-200. 
ss or gs of the Banter Uprising, P. 298 and Paul A. Cohen, History in Three Keys: 
The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p271. 
56 The North China Herald 18 July 1900, p. 141. 
57 O Gipps; The Fighting in Nerth Ching rye to the M! of Them,! ', Gary (L don: Sampson bow & 
Co., 1901). p. 39. 
" Ibid., p. 53, and O'Connor, The Baser Rebellion p. 108. 
59 CornsPonnienoe respecting the Disturbances in China (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center 
Inc., 1975), p. 150. 
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brought new hope to the foreigners in Tientsin. On 13 July 1900, after a tough 
battle the Chinese city was captured. The scene in the Chinese City after it was 
captured was of many dead bodies, and houses ruined by fire 60 
As a result of the defeat of the Boxers, in September 1901 the Chinese 
Court and the Allied Powers signed the Boxer Protocol. In Tientsin, the 27 days of 
Boxer shelling had caused considerable damage to the foreign concessions. 
Among the buildings which were partly damaged either outside or inside were the 
Taku Tug and Lighter Company offices, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the 
Chartered Bank, Astor House Hotel, the British Consulate and several houses. 
Gordon Hall remained intact with minor damage to the tower walls. 61 
Unfordwately, Butterfield and Swire's and Mackenzie & Co. 's godowns were 
destroyed by shelling and fire `2 After the defeat of the Boxers the Chinese city 
and its surroundings (apart from the foreign concessions) were put under the 
foreign Powers' control. 63 A new administration was set up and named the 
Tientsin Provisional Government (TPG), which had several functions, as shown 
below: 
(1) To reinstate order and security to the city 
(2) To improve hygiene and prevent the spread of infectious diseases 
(3) To make sure that the Allied forces continued to receive supplies 
(4) To protect and record properties belonging to the Chinese government 
and private individuals 
60 Bun, The Salt Merchants of Tiffin, pp. 108 and 138, and Chino's Millions, London, October 
1900, p. 156. 
61 Other buildings received slight damage, such as the club Concordia, Carlowitz's, the Tientsin 
Gas Works, entsin Water Works and the Jardine Matheson building. 
62 Rasmussen, Tientsin pp. 218-9. 
a' Thomas P. Bernstein, `After and Fall: Tianjin under Foreign Occupation, 1900-1902', in Robert 
Bickers and Tiedenann, R. G. (eds) The Boxers China and the world (Plymouth: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007), P. 4. 
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(5) To prevent a food shortage amongst local Chinese. " 
One important task of the TPG was to restore Tientsin to how it was before 
the Boxer Uprising, the aftermath of which had destroyed much of its 
infrastructure, with looted banks and shops, danger of disease and pitiful living 
conditions. The TPG encouraged business, cleaned the city, constructed new 
roads, built a drainage system and eliminated begging. 
6S With this encouragement 
Tientsin gradually returned to its pre-1900 state. The TPG's administration ended 
on 15 August 1902, when it was handed back to the Chinese" 
The Boxer Uprising raised British anger towards the Chinese. The newly 
created British Municipal Extension Council (BMEC) which had portrayed a 
liberal attitude towards the Chinese by appointing a Chinese councillor did not 
renew this position after 1900. The Boxer Uprising was seen as showing the 
inability of the western Powers to control the Chinese. Samuel Lavington Hart, a 
London Missionary Society (LMS) worker who had arrived in Tientsin in 1900, 
felt that Chinese-western relations could be mended by offering young Chinese 
people a western education. Therefore the Tientsin Anglo-Chinese Colleges 
(TACC) was established in 1902,61 showing that not all the British in Tientsin felt 
that the Chinese should be punished. 
Meantime, a new strand of opposition to foreign encroachment and Ch'ing 
weakness, developed. The emergence of educated Chinese leaders such as Sun 
64 Rasmussen, Tiemsin, p. 221. 
65Bernstein, `After and Fall', pp. 6,7,9,11 and 15, and Rc id, Hygienic Modernity, p. 173. 
66 Rasmussen, Tientsi; pp. 225,226,227 and 229. 
67 A. P. Cullen, Lavingfon Hart of Tkntsin (London: The Livingstone press, 1947), pp. 15,20-21 
and 25-6. 
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Yat-sen, Huang Xing, Zhang Binglin and Hu Hanmin continued the Chinese 
struggle to recover Chinese sovereignty by seeking to awaken the Chinese to the 
idea of rebuilding the nation under nationalism. This movement posed a strong 
challenge to the British and other foreigners at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. As mentioned in the introduction, the Chinese organised strikes and 
boycotts as new weapons against foreign imperialism and later against the Chinese 
warlords. Students and workers also joined the nationalist movement on several 
occasions, such as against the Russians in southern Manchuria (1903), at the 
renewal of America's Exclusion Act (1905), Japan's Twenty-one Demands (1915) 
and the May the Fourth Movement (1919). All these movements were part of a 
continuous wave against imperialism and became a considerable threat in the mid- 
1920s. Tientsin did not escape Chinese nationalism. Before discussing the impact 
of Chinese nationalists, it is useful to see how the development of foreign 
imperialist created competition among the foreign powers to open concessions and 
then to expand their trade interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands. 
Develöpmego in the Twen Century 
After the Boxer Uprising the foreign powers demanded to be allowed to 
extend and open new concessions in Tientsin. For example, Russia was allowed to 
occupy 5,971 mou, in November 1900, on the right east side of the Hai Ho facing 
the French and British concessions. In February 1901 the Italian government was 
given about 722 mou of land above the Russian concession. One year later, on 1 
February 1902, Belgium obtained an area covering 1,427 mou just below the 
Russian concession as its concession. Japan extended its concession to the South 
Wall Street of the Chinese city and added another strip below the German 
73 
concession. The last power which took the opportunity to establish a settlement 
was Austria-Hungary, which rented land above the Italian concession and opposite 
the Chinese city. The agreement was signed in 1902 " Britain received another 
portion of land in 1900 which became known as the British Extra-mural Area, 
covered 3,928 mou and was situated to the south west of the British Extension 
Area. The American cöricession had been returned to China in 1880, with the 
option of taking it back if they wanted to. The Americans took it back after the 
Bözer Uprising in order to induce it to become an International Settlement. 
However, this scheme failed, and finally in October 1902 America transferred its 
administration to the British concession, and it was renamed the Southern 
Concession 69 
This development illustrated competition amongst the foreign powers for 
trade opportunities in Tientsin and its hinterlands. The spread of foreign 
imperialism in Tientsin added to the grievances of the Chinese about the weakness 
of their country. The growing foreign trade interests and the rise of Chinese 
nationalism were concurrent. This situation of conflict had a profound impact on 
the British and other foreigners in middle 1920s. The next section elaborates on 
how the foreign concessions achieved prosperity with the progress of trade in 
Tientsin and its hinterlands. 
(A Lee Chinyun, `Trieste and Aust ro-Chinese Trade from 1869 to 1918' (unpublished Ph. D., thesis, 
Ljubljana University, 2002), p. 3. 
Special Articles: Tientsin's Foreign Concessiort, pp. 194-196 and Rasmussen, Tlentain, pp. 237 
and 244. 
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The British Area 
Altogether the British had the biggest concession, covering 6149 mou. 
However, it still had two separate administrations (BMC and BMEC), while the 
British Extra-mural Area was left without administration. The BMC, which had 
developed since 1862, had a more advanced administration system than the BMEC. 
In 1903 the BMC had a secretary, an engineer, a police inspector, an interpreter 
and an accountant. The BMEC had to get the BMC's staff to support the 
administration of the BMEC. 70 The original plan to amalgamate these concessions 
came about in 1897 after Britain acquired the extension area which the Chinese 
Taotai allowed under the British Municipal Council. However the new Consul, 
B. C. G. Scott, made no effort to accomplish this. 7' In 1917 the matter was 
addressed again in the form of a petition from British residents, following which 
the British Minister instructed the Consul-General to hold a conference and draft 
regulations on the amalgamation of the concessions. A joint committee of the 
Concession and Extension Councils was set up to look into the matter. The meeting 
produced a draft of new Land Regulations to be applied to all the British 
concessions. On 1 January 1919, with the promulgation of the regulations, 72 the 
British concession finally achieved a single municipal council which functioned 
until 1943. The effort to merge the British concessions in Tientsin took so long 
because most of the traders in the BMC opposed it. They did not want the BMC's 
revenue used to support the administration of the new BMEC. This indicates that 
the British community had the power to delay the amalgamation, although the 
British consul general could eventually overrule them. In other words this scenario 
70 The Dost Hong List; A General and Business Dlrsctory for Shanghai and the Northern and Rtwr 
Ports, &c, 1903 (Shanghai: the Office of the North-China Herald, 1903), p. 173. 
'! PRO F. O. 674/198 Letter fron Cons'/ General, H. F. Fi4jord to Chair. of BMC, Tientsin, C. R. 
MÖtling, Tientsin, February 2,1916. 
72 Jones, Shanghai and 7lertsln p. 122. 
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saw the British community voicing their opposition to any decision by the British 
government which would affect the British community's interests in Tientsin and 
its hinterlands. It was not a passive community and would fight for its interests, as 
further discussed in Chapter 3. 
after the amalgamation the BMC consisted of at lead five but no more than 
nine members. The chairman and five of its members had to be British subjects, 
and one had to be it citizen of the United States but could be replaced by another 
nationality if no such candidate was available. 73 Another sign of significant 
progress in the membership of the council was the appointment of one Chinese 
representative (1919). In 1927 the number of Chinese representatives on the 
council increased to three 74 The appointment of the Chinese representatives was a 
sign of the awareness of the BMC administration that it should treat its Chinese 
ratepayers fairly. But this did not mean that the British community was liberal. It 
should be understood that all the Chinese were businessmen. For example, K. H. 
Chun, a member of the BMC from 1919 to 1929, was assistant director in China 
Merchants' Steam Navigation Co. (later in the 1930s he became director of the 
Land Investment Company)'s Therefore these Chinese businesses could help the 
British traders to expand their interests n North China. 
'3 Land Regulations for the British Municipal Area of Tientsin (Tientsin: 1919), p. 6. 
" PRO F0229/3179 Report of the China Association, Tientsin Branch, and the Tientsin British 
Chamber of Commerce, 7 February, 1927. 
" See The Directory and Chronick China, Japai Core ! ndo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay 
States. Stand Netherlands India Boing the Philippine, etc., with which are incorporated "The 
China Directory" and "The Hongkong Directory and Honglist for the For East"for the year 1926, 
Sixty-fowrth year of publication (Hong Kong: The Hongkong Daily Press, Ltd., MDCCCCXXVI), 
p. 597 and China Hong List 1934 (Shanghai: the North-China Daily News & Herald, Ltd., 1935), 
p. 713. 
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There were also British representatives from the traders' community, such 
as W. Forbes (1874-1875), who was engaged at William Forbes and Company76; E. 
C. Peters (1920-1936), firstly as an agent for Jardine, Matheson & Co., Ltd. and 
later representing his own company, E. C. Peters; and James Turner (1924-1927, 
1934-35) from the Eastern Engineering Works, Ltd. 77 Such traders, as mentioned 
above, dominated the council from the concession's establishment until the 
twentieth century, the big British firms which among them being KMA, Jardine, 
Matheson & Co., Peter & Co. And Tipper & Co. (see Appendix 2). However, not 
all the British firms in Tientsin had decision-making power. Some of the firms 
listed in Appendix 3 did not have it place participated in the BMC and had to voice 
their opinions through the British Chamber of Commerce and the China 
Association, as discussed in the trade and business section. These bodies had links 
with their counterparts not only in China but in Britain. Therefore any important 
problems affecting the British community in China were channeled to their 
counterparts in London to be addressed by the British government. The roles of the 
BMC, the British Chamber of Commerce and the China Association in conveying 
their interests are discussed in following chapters. 
The power of the 8MC in the twentieth century did not change. Tientsin's 
British Consul General had the power to check the BMC's activities and policy in 
the concessions. 78 For example any byelaws issued by the council had to be 
submitted to him for approval. The Council could bring any matter to the British 
Minister for appeal in Peeking for a final decision if the Consul-General still did not 
76 The Desk Hong List. A General And Business Directoryfor Shanghai and the Northern & River 
Ports, japan & c., January 1875 (The North-China Herald: Shanghai, 1875), p. 110. 
n China Hong List 1934, p. 689. 
I Land Regulation for the flu sb Munlcfpa! Area of 7ients1, p. 2. 
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approve it. 79 The Council had full powers to develop, maintain and control 
everyday life in the concession, such as by increasing the number of men in the 
municipal police; enrolling into and maintaining the fire brigade and volunteer 
corps; issuing licenses to hawkers, taverns and shops. 
$0 This was how it differed 
from the SMC, over whose council the British Consul-General had no power. The 
SMC only had responsibility to their ratepayers 8' 
This difference made it profoümd impact on the British concession in 
Tientsin because it led to the understanding that the British community in Tientsin 
had limited power to oppose the modification. But as mentioned earlier, the British 
community wanted to protect their interests. As mentioned, the BMC members 
were traders, who had big interests in Tientsin and its hinterland. For this reason 
the British community fought to safeguard its interests before any decision of their 
government could be implemented. If they could not stop the decision, the British 
traders would aim to delay or modify any British policy in China towards the 
British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands. This happened for example in 
the British government's effort to amalgamate the British concessions in Tientsin. 
The same tactics were also used when the British community could not fight the 
British liberal policy in the mid-1920s by delaying the process in order to modify 
British liberal policy to reflect British community's interests more, as discussed in 
Chapters 3. 
After the amalgamation the BMC had important responsibilities in the 
larger British concession. It created new administrative departments. For example, 
79 Ibid., p. 8. 
80 See Land Regulation jor the British Municipal Area of Tientsin, pp. 9-1 S. 
91 Robert Bickers, Britain in China, p. 127. 
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in 1926 it had two important departments: the secretariat and the accounts 
department. The secretariat had a secretary and two assistant secretaries, while the 
accounts department consisted of an accountant, an assistant accountant, a stores 
accountant and an assistant stores accountant. The responsibility of the BMC to its 
taxpayers meant that it had to provide residents with facilities including roads, 
buildings, parks and gardens and flood and bund control, all of which came under 
the Public Works Department which was staffed by an engineer, two deputy 
engineers, assistant engineers and two engineering assistants. 82 But the BMC's 
responsibilities increased year by year and its staff expanded accordingly. (see 
Appendix 4) 
In 1920, with the support of the municipality, the Electric Department, a 
private company, was established, an example of the BMC's progress. The 
Electric Department not only gave a service in the BMA, it also provided electric 
power to the No. 1 Special Area the former German concession. g3 The Water 
Department was established after it took over the expired franchise of the private 
water company in 1922. " This department also developed a new source of water 
from Artesian Wells !s 
The Municipal Police was among the most important bodies in Tientsin. 
This department was usually under the control of former military officers and was 
headed by a superintendent and two inspectors. The force numbered 229 in 1920, 
a The Directory and Clronicle Ching J Corea, Indo-China, Straps Settleonem ... , p. 603. ei PRO F022ß/3179 Report of the China Association, Tientsin Branch, and the Tientsin British 
Chamber of Commerce, 7 February, 1927, p. 4. 
TM PRO F0228/3110 Report of the China Association, 7 February, 1927. 
85 Rasm Growth of Tierdsin (Tientsin: Tientsin Press Ltd., 1924), pp. 15 and 17. 
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which increased to 338 in 1924 and about 700 in 1940.86 Along with this, the 
Council also set up a small Concession Volunteer Corps. This paramilitary squad 
had experienced the Boxer Uprising and was supported by British soldiers in 
Tientsin as permitted under the Boxer Protocol. The need for a proper fire-fighting 
force led to the formation of the Tientsin British Volunteer Fire Brigade on 6 
December 1902. The BMC also had two hospitals; the main Victoria Hospital Arid 
the Isolation Hospital, a seclusion ward for the control of contagious disease. 87 
Appendix 3 shows the number of BMAs employees at the BMC. Owing to the 
lack of pre-1926 data, this table only covers from 1926 onwards. 
In the field of education, the Tientsin Grammar School was opened in 
Recreation Road in 1905 by The Tientsin Grammar School Association. The 
school enrolled increasing numbers of students, growing from 63 in 1915 to 250 in 
1925. In 1918 it was put under BMC authority, which added new buildings in the 
Extra-mural Area. " It served children of all nationalities from six to sixteen years 
old and prepared its students to take the Cambridge syndicate examinations abroad. 
The foreign communities also set up several clubs in Tientsin. The Tientsin Race 
Club was the wealthiest club in Tientsin. The Tientsin Club was another club 
opened to all nationalities but not to the Chinese. Under the influence of the 
Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, the Union Jack Club was formed in 1924. 
This club was an important tool for the British community to lobby for British 
86 Rasmussen, The Growth of Tienbio, pp. 53-4 and Jones, Shanghai and Tknrsin, p. 124. 
"Rasmussen, Tientsin p. 280. 
" SOAS, the John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, The Story of the Tientsin School. 
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troops to stay put in North China. The existence of this club depended on public 
support. 89 
The LMS was an important Christian missionary body in Tientsin. 
Established in Tientsin in 1861, its activities embraced health and education work 
as well as evangelisation. In Tientsin the LMS had two churches, one on Taku 
Road and one west of Drum Tower in the Chinese city. 90 As mentioned, early in 
1902 the LMS founded the TACC. This college became their base for training the 
Chinese as preachers and Chinese officers. 91 The LMS also operated in the 
hinterlands of Tientsin. At southern Tientsin, it had two stations, one at 
Tsangchow and one at Siaochang, which together covered 5,050 sq. miles. 92 
Another British mission active in Tientsin and its surroundings was the United 
Methodist Mission, which opened in Tientsin in 1861. In order to expand its 
missionary work it built a Theological College in 1861 on Taku Road 
The physical appearance of the BMA developed greatly with the erection of 
many houses and commercial buildings, and great progress was made in the public 
infrastructure. Old buildings still standing in Tientsin such as Gordon Hall were 
used for the police station, law office, BMC office and as an assembly place for 
meetings and concerts? The Tientsin Club moved to a new building in 1905. In 
" HSBC Group Archives, SHG 1147 Letter fron R. C. Rice to C. I. Cookes, Tientsin, 28 February, 
1931. 
90 SOAS, the CWM North China Reports Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report for 1934 from 
W. F. Dawson, Tientsin, January 22,1935. 
91 Ap. Cullen, Making China's men (London: Livingstone Press, 1936), p. 16. 
92 The Christian Occupation of China A General Su wy of the Numerical Strength and 
Geographical Distribution of the Christian Forces in China meine by the Special Committee Swwy 
and Occupation, China Continuation Committee, 1918-1921 (Shanghai: China Continuation 
Committee, 1922), p. 59. 
93 Frederick Brown, Religion in Tientsin (Shanghai: Methodist Publishing House, 1909), p. 46. 
" Brian Power, The Ford of Heaven (New York: Michael Kesend Publishing, UAL, 1984), p. 21. 
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addition to this, new buildings such as KMA (0919-1921), the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank (HSB) building (1924) and the Empire Theatre (1922) emerged as 
handsome and massive structures. 95 The macadam streets and roads in the 
concession were replaced by asphalted concrete 96 
Figure 2.2: The Tientsin Club Building 
IT I . eA lot 
Source: Pennell, W. V., Tientsin North China, p. 21. 
Figure 2.3 : The KMA building at Meadows Road 
Source: Pennell, W. V., Tientsin North China, p. 21. 
95 `List of 160 Significant Historic Buildings in Tianjin-1', http: //www. The Gordon Hall 
wayabroad. com/tianjin/text/text45. htmNO, 26 December 2006. 
96 Allister Macmillan, Seaports of the Far East: historical and Descriptive Commercial and 
Industrial Facts, Figures, & Resources, Second Edition (London: W. H. & L. Collingridge, 148 & 
149,1925), p. 122, and Rasmussen, The Growth of Tientsin, p. 14. 
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Within this comfortable and prosperous atmosphere the British population began to 
increase (see Appendix 5). The size of the foreign population of Tientsin and its 
hinterlands cannot be traced year by year. Statistics are available from a variety of 
sources, but the information differs according to its geographic territory. For 
example the foreign population in 1913 for Tientsin was 3,945 strong. Six hundred 
and thirty-four of these were British. The Japanese community was the largest, at 
2,175. The rest of the foreign population numbered 405 Germans, 149 French, 145 
American and 140 Russians. 97 According to Julean Arnold, an American 
Commercial Attach6 at the US Department of Commerce, in 1917 the British 
living in the Tientsin district numbered 1,371 out of a total foreign population of 
8,951.98 In 1925 Tientsin contained around 11,000 foreigners. The largest foreign 
communities were the Japanese, with 5,200 people, and the British, with 1,300Y 
Another source put the number of British living in the concession in 1927 at about 
650. Overall figures for British nationals registered with the British Consul 
General in 1927 and living in and surrounding Tientsin District reached 2,137,10° 
not significantly different from the figures in Appendix 5. Apart from the figures 
in Appendix 5, other sources show that the number of foreigners, including British, 
living in the British concession decreased from 1,970 in 1906 to 857 in 1913. In 
1925 this figure increased to 2,045. In 1934 and 1938 the foreign population 
totaled 4,045 and 4,728 respectively. '0' 
97 H. G. W. Woodhead and H. T. Montague (eds. ), The China Year Book 1914, (London: Routledge 
& Sons, Limited), p. 658. 
98 Julean Arnold, Convnencial Handbook of Ching Volume I (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1919), 00321-2. 
99 Rasmussen, Tientsin p. 263. 
100 PRO F0228/3936 Enclosure No. 1 in COnsui-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's dispatch No. 5 of 
January 20,192& 
101 Siang and Liu, Ta 'in zsyie shehW yanjby p. 166. 
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There was also a growing British Indian population. They worked in the 
BMC Police Department and were sometimes employed as watchmen by large 
foreign companies. Some of the Indians were involved in the silk business; for 
example Abdulla & Co. 's, 102 Indian Silk Shop103, Khathuria, R. S. 104 and M. 
Tarachand. 105 Other British protected subjects such as the Persians were also 
involved in business, such as Talati Bros. Co., which owned property in Tientsin 
and Peking. 106 Apart from these communities, the BMC was also home to other 
nationalities. The largest community was the Chinese, of course who made up 
almost 90 percent of the whole of the BMC. 107 Other communities were the 
various Europeans, the Russians, the Jews (mostly refugees from Russia), 
Americans, Japanese and several small communities from Asia and Latin America. 
Overall the British concession had been developing steadily since the 
ninetieth century. Several disturbances by the Chinese opposition seemed not to 
deter this. The concession continued to develop and people kept settling in 
Tientsin to seek jobs and business opportunities. This increased the diehard 
attitude among the British, who began to regard the BMC in Tientsin as a symbol 
of British colonial power which should be protected. 
102 The North-China Desk Hong List 1922: A General and Business Directoryfor Shanghai and the 
Northern and River Ports, Etc. (Shanghai: The North-China Herald, 1922), p. 520. 
101 HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, 
International Acceptance Bank, Inc. Tientsin, January 6th, 1930. 
104 China Hong List 1934, p-699- 
105 PRO F067811938 Letter from Kent-Mousey to the Register, H. B. M. Court, 28 April 1931. 
106 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 1147 Letter from C. R. Rice to J. E. B. de Courcy, Tientsin, 18 
December, 1929. 
107 For example in the mid-1920s in the British, Belgian, Japanese, Italian and French concessions 
there were 98,544 Chinese. There were t erefore 8,969 foreign nationals. China in Chaos: A Brief 
Outline of the Foreign Concessio with Examples of China's Disruption and Failure to Observe 
Her Obligations due to Civil War, Bolshevist Propaganda and Mob Law (Shanghai: North-China 
Daily News & Herald, Ltd., 1927), pp. 6-7. 
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Other Concessions 
Concurrently with the progress in the BMC, other concessions also 
developed rapidly. For example the French concession became a major area in 
which new traders established their offices, particularly Americans, who found no 
accommodation in the BIM. The French municipal authorities constructed a plan 
to supply water to residents and build a sewerage system to prevent flooding in the 
area. 108 The French municipality had 250 police in 1920. In 1923 this number 
increased to 283.109 
The Italian concession had a problem with its low lying ground. A young 
lieutenant Marines, Captain Filed, took on the task of reclaiming the swamp with 
mud and by 1917 its level had risen by five feet, after which a road was built. 
Filed continued his task, setting up public utilities, a police department, a hospital, 
a fire department, gardens, a club and a domestic market. ' t' In 1920 the peace and 
order in this concession were under the control of an Italian inspector and 60 
Chinese policemen. "1 The Russian concession had similar problems with 
swampy land. Efforts were made to reclaim the land using river mud, after which 
the land was surveyed and roads, parks, a sewerage system and residential houses 
were built! 12 
10S Rasmussen, The Growth of Thms1n pp. 20-1. 
1°9 Ibid., p. 54. 
110 Tamagna, Italy's Interests and Policies In the Far East (New York: InstjUde of Pacific Relations, 
1941), p. 74 and O. D. Rasmussen, 71k Growth of Tientsin, pp. 25 and 26. 
111 Rasmussen, The Growth of Tiaitsig pp. 54. 
112 Ibid., pp. 28,32 and 33. 
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Map 2.3: The Foreign Concessions in Tientsin 
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The Japanese concession began its extensive development after the Boxer 
Uprising under the Japanese Consul-General, who was responsible for monitoring 
its development and welfare, 13 although it was administered by the Japanese 
Residents' Association. 114 The Tokyo Building Company designed and built a 
beautiful bund with broad parallel streets and several commercial and office 
buildings. ' 15 The development of the Belgian concession began later because of 
lack of interest from the Belgian government until 1913. The first task the 
concession's authorities undertook was to rebuild the bund to accommodate a 
landing place for steamers and then to extend the railway line in order to provide 
113 Barbara J. Brooks, Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China 1895- 
1938 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), p. 102. 
114 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 263. 
15 As with the Russian concession, the Japanese concession had to obtain its water and electricity 
supply from the Tientsin Native City Water Works and the French Electric Light Works. Mark R. 
Peattie, `Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937, pp. 178 and 180 and Rasmussen, 
The Growth of Tientsin, pp. 36-7. 
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convenient facilities for transshipment of commodities onto trains. 16 However 
after 21 years of existence the concession was: 
... almost completely derelict and except that the river bank had been bunded and lined with trees it was entirely undeveloped and 
contained only one foreign-style house - the residence and offices 
of the small administrative staff - and a few small native houses, 
lumber and boat repairing yards. ' 17 
Against this situation the Belgian owned one of Tientsin's big companies. The 
Belgian Campagnie de Tramways at Eclairage de Tientsin, or Belgian Tramways, 
was known for its electricity service to all residents in Tientsin excepting the 
British, French, and Japanese. Belgian Tramways was also famous for providing 
trams in Belgian concession. "8 
The German concession was mainly developed as a residential area, as 
many Germans had established their commercial and banking interests in the 
BMC. "9 The most unfavorable concession in Tientsin was the Austrian, due to the 
influence of more progressive concessions and its location to the north of the other 
concessions, which brought no significant progress in trade. This concession was 
under the administration of the Austrian Municipal Council, which consisted of 
eight to ten members. 120 
Appendix 6 shows the sizes of the populations of several foreign 
concessions in selected years. In 1917, the Chinese government declared war on 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and took over their concessions, which were 
116 Rasmussen, TAW Growth j77erts3 PP-40 OW 4 1. 
117 PRO F0228/4015 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin, 22ed June, 
1929, p. 2. 
"I Hershatter, The Waters of Tianjin 1900-1949, p. 28. 
nusscti, The Growth of Tie*si* p. 42. 
120 Lee Chinyun, `Trieste and Austro-Chinese Trade fron 1869 to 1918', pp. 5-6. 
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administered by Chinese as the First Special Area. 121 In Russia the political system 
changed in 1917 when the communists toppled the Russian monarch, and after this, 
the new government offered a `good will' proposal to the Chinese government. As 
result of the Karakan Manifesto of 1919, Russian returned all its concessions to the 
Chinese. However the Diplomatic Body in Peking wanted the status quo of the 
concession to be recognised by the Chinese Government 122 This hope was dashed 
when, in 1920, the Chinese government took drastic action to seize back the 
concession following a withdrawal of recognition of the new government in 
Moscow. The next concession to go was the Belgium Concession. The take over 
of this concession took peaceful steps when both governments agreed to take part 
in negotiations between themselves. Finally, both-of them ratified an agreement on 
the retrocession of the Belgian Concession in 1928.123 
The modernisation of the Chinese city was accompanied by the growth of 
the concessions. The walled city was demolished to make room for a growing 
population and extra facilities. Roads were widened and a modern tram system 
installed. After the TPG returned power to the Chinese the city fell under the 
responsibility of the Provincial Government. The water was supplied by Tientsin 
Native City Water Works. This department was under British management and 
121 Xu Guogi, China and the Great War: China's pursait of a new National idemity and 
InternvtioJization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 169 and Rasmussen, The 
Growth of Tientsin, pp-42 and 48. 
'"Rogaski, Hygienk Modernity, p. 221 and O. D. Rasmussen, The Growth of Tlenah , p. 29. ý23 PRO FO229/4015 Agreement between Belgian and China for the retention of Belgian 
Concession in Tienstin. 
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had made lot of revenue. 124 This firm was established in 1901 and pumped water 
from the Grand Canal. 125 
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In conclusion, the development of the foreign concessions illustrated the 
positive environment of Tientsin as a trading centre. Although some of the 
concessions had problems and others no longer existed, Tientsin remained a main 
attraction for traders in twentieth century. Trade in Tientsin steadily increased year 
by year. As with the British community, other foreigners had embedded their lives 
in their concessions and regarded them as their properties. Only by force could the 
Chinese, with support from other powers, regain these concessions (the German 
124 HSBC Group, SHG Q 510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, Banque Franco-Chinoise, 
Tientsin, November 25", 1932. 
125 Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 216-8. 
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and Austria concessions). In addition the development of the foreign concessions 
not only indicated the progress of trade but also raised competition between the 
foreign traders to grab opportunities for big business in North China. The next 
section discusses the progress and variety of foreign firms in Tientsin. 
Trade und Business 
Although Tientsin experienced disturbances in the late nineteenth century, 
these did not halt the progress of its trade. The importance of Tientsin as a trading 
centre, Sir Miles Lampson pointed out, made it `the Shanghai of North China'. '26 
This situation was the result of the needs of the businesses surrounding Tientsin 
such as those in Kansu, Shansi, Shensi, Mongolia, Manchuria and Chihli to, gain 
access to a market for their goods, internally or abroad. Lampson also called 
Tientsin `the business heart of North China and Mongolia'. 127 These regions were 
rich in natural resources and agricultural produce. Kaiping and Lanchow were rich 
in coal. Kansu, Shansi, Shensi and Mongolia produced valuable animal skins 
which they imported as raw materials or for use in the carpet industries in Tientsin. 
Three provinces in Manchuria had vast areas of agricultural land which produced 
grains and soybeans. Manchuria also had big reserves of fossil fuels and other 
Minerals. 128 All of these products came to be in great demand locally and 
internationally. However, this was not a one way trade. The great demand for 
China's modernisation made Tientsin a center for imported machinery and 
engineering tools for distribution in north China. This shows that Tientsin and its 
126 PRO F022813179 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Pddng, 23rd 
March 1927. 
127 Ibid. 
12g Ramon H. Myers, `Creating a Modern Enclave Economy: The Economic Integration of Japan, 
Manchuria, and North China, 1932-1945', in Peter Dour, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark It Peattie 
(ads. ), The Japanese Wartime F. mnpIre 1931-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
p. 142. 
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hinterland had great economic potential to expand and became a centre from which 
to distribute Chinese goods overseas. 
Appendix 7 show Tientsin's trade progressing on an upward path. It cannot 
be denied that it experienced several hiccups, especially in the immediate aftermath 
of the Boxer Uprising, when the value of trade dropped sharply. After this 
disturbance Tientsin returned to a healthier condition. This led to progress in the 
trading activities in Tientsin in twentieth century, once again showing that the 
foreign traders still believed that Tientsin had trade potential after the Boxer 
Uprising. Tientsin still offered it centre for export of Chinese goods from inland 
North China such as straw braid, red and black dates, camel and sheep wool, 
marmot and fox furs, peanuts shelled, unshelled and ground, almonds, walnuts, 
beans and peas, rhubarb and coal. The imported goods were also varied, including 
arms, tea, sugar, matches, cotton piece goods, iron, flour, typewriters, machinery, 
wines, motor cars, printing paper and mineral oil. Parallel to the development of 
trade, manufacture in Tientsin began to grow modestly. Among the industries that 
flourished in Tientsin were cotton-yarn spinning mills, match, soap, and egg- 
product factories, carpet factories, oil mills, and ice and cold storage plants. 129 
This development was supported by the emergence of financial institutions in 
Tientsin, 130 which became the financial centre of North China with both foreign 
and Chinese banks flourishing there. 131 All of these business activities gradually 
caused Tientsin to grow from a small trading port to an international trading and 
'29 SQAS, the PP MS 2 Confidential Letters, Etc. of Sir Frederick Niste Vol. 1,1900a28. See also 
Macmillan, Seaports of the Far East, p. 118. 
10 Brett Sheehan, `Urban Identity and Urban Networks in Cosmopolitan Cities: Banks and Bankers 
in Tiagjin, 1900-1937', Joseph W. Esherick, Remaking the Chinese City. Modernity mrd National 
Identity, 1900-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), p. 47. 
131 See Brett Sheehan, Trust in Troubled lines, p. 53. 
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industrial centre in North China, and increased the interests of foreigners in 
protecting their trade interests. This made British concession in Tientsin less easy 
to be surrendered in 1925, because many of the British traders were not ready to 
agree to British liberal policy. 
Business äctivity in Tientsin and ifs hinterland became livelier with the 
development of transportation in the area. As mentioned, the Hai Ho was the most 
important route for transportation of goods. Owing to the importance of this route, 
the foreign Powers and the Chinese authorities always took care of the river, and in 
1901 the Hai Ho Conservancy Commission was established. Tientsin also 
developed other means of communications such as by railway, road and channel. 
The two railways in Tientsin gradually developed as an important means of 
transportation. The first was the Peking-Makden Railway (1884), 132 which 
connected Tientsin with north China and Hankow, and with, Tongshan and 
Chinwangtao, which was a coalmine area. The line also connected with Tangku, 
which provided a landline to Taku Bar where facilities for ocean steamships at 
anchor were handled. The second was the Tientsin-Pukow Railway (19121 133 
which connected Tientsin with lower Yangtze. At Pukow, a train ferry connected 
this line to Nanking, from where it connected with the Shanghai Nanking 
Railway. l34 
132 -Tun Zea Sun, `The pattern of Railway Development in China', The For Eastern Q"** 
Vol. 14, No. 2. (Feb., 1955), p. 180. 
º33 Crow, Carl, Handbook for China with an irxrodxcdon by HJ. Lethbrk* Lethbrid 
Introduction O Oxford Wiersify Priese Fksf Issued with per#gUlon and with the dr tion of an 
introduction by Oxford University Press (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 22. 
134 Louis Beale and 0. Clinton Pelham, Trade and Fxonomic Conditions in China 1931-33 report 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp. 18 and 19 and F. C. Jones, Shanghai and 
7"ientah% p. 135. 
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Several big British companies invested their capital and established their 
branches in Tientsin with a huge interest in Tientsin trade. In 1917 81 of the 357 
foreign firms established in Tientsin were British. 135 Appendix 2 shows several of 
the British firms in Tientsin and its hinterland in 1927. In 1928 there were 85 
British firms, not including doctors and dentists, in the Tientsin British concession, 
with another 13 British firms established in other concessions. Four or five firms 
had their properties outside the concessions! 36 Around 1939, the number of British 
firms in Tientsin had increased to 117.137 These firms can be categorised into two 
types. First, the big firms which operated not only in the British concession but 
also had interests in Tientsin's hinterland (see Appendix 2). For example, KMA 
had headquarters in Tientsin but operated coal mines in Tongshan and Linsi. Other 
British firms which operated their business in Tientsin and its hinterland were 
Jardine, Matheson and Co., and Butterfield and Swire, which operated exports, 
imports and shipping, and owned several properties in Tientsin. 
These firms' representatives were elected members of the BMC almost 
every year. For example Butterfield & Swire had a member in the BMC in 1894- 
1895,1897-1899,1901-1904,1907-1917,1919-1925 and 1935-1938. KMA had 
a member in the BMC from 1919-1938 and Jardine Matheson & Son in 1866, 
1872-1873,1876-1893,1895-1897,1899-1901,1905-1917,1920-1926 and 
1929-1932. Apart from these firms British banks also participated in the BMC, as 
such HSB and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. 't'hese banks had 
to protect firms which had loans from them from the consequences of any threat in 
"s Julean Arnold, Coerfiwncia/ Handbook of China, p322. 
' PRO F0228/3836 Enclosure No. 1 in Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's dispatch No. 5 of 
January 2016,1928. 
'" Irving S. Friedman, `Britain's Large Tangible Stake in Tientsin', For Eastern Sw veey, Vo1.8, 
No. 14 (Jul. 5,1939), p. 166. 
93 
North China. (For more details see Appendix 1) They used the BMC to manage 
the concession and to concentrate on efforts to protect their interests. A second 
category of British firms played little or no part in the BMC. They operated within 
the concession with little interest in the hinterland of Tientsin and included small 
companies involved in supplying food and drink, such as Caldbeck Macgregor & 
Co. Ltd., Crystal Ltd., E. Pennell & Co., Edward Evans & Sons Ltd. and Hall & 
Holtz, Ltd (see Appendix 3). Comparison between the first and second category of 
British firms shows that the fast category dominated the BMC. For example, in 
1923 KMA, with several British import and export firms, Butterfield and Swire, 
Fairchild and Son, Hatch, Carter and Co., Jardine, Matheson & Co., controlled the 
BMC. Other firms involved were the insurance firm Tipper and Co. and Chinese 
and American firms. Appendices 1 and 2 show that the BMC had always been 
controlled by these prominent and influencial firms. 
In short the first category of British firms played an important role in 
resisting changes to the British position in North China that would affect their 
interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands. With big interests in and outside Tientsin, 
the big British firms mentioned were cautious about the British liberal policy in 
1920s. Their opposition to it merely showed their concern that their interests 
would not be protected. These firms continuously tried to find ways to safeguard 
their interests under British liberal policy in the mid-1920s. 
Foreign countries such as Japan, the United States, Germany and Russia 
were among the biggest competitors for British business in Tientsin. Firms from 
these countries followed the British firms in operating their businesses and 
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commercial activities in Tientsin and its hinterlands. For example, besides the 
HSB, the sole bank in the concession in 1881, other foreign banks such as the 
Deutsch Asiatische Bank (1890), the Russo-Chinese bank (1897), and the 
Yokohama Specie Bank (1899) established branches there. 139 This illustrates the 
competition between the British and other foreign nationalities. Although America, 
as an emerging industrial state, had the potential to undermine British interests, the 
Americans could not compete with the British in Tientsin and its hinterland, where 
there were only 27 American firms compared with the 81 British ones in 1917.139 
The American position in the 1930s even declined, as shown by the decrease of its 
population in the British concession in Tientsin from 273 in 1929 to 253 in 1934 
and 185 in 1938 (see Appendix 6) due to the rise of Japanese traders in the 1930s 
who tried to drive out other foreign firms from Tientsin and its hinterlands. The 
Americans did not seem keen to continue trading in the atmosphere of animosity 
between the Japanese and the Chinese. 
The Germans, trying to recover from the losses incurred by their defeat in 
World war I, made tremendous progress in increasing their investment and trade 
with the Chinese. The good relationship between the Chinese and the Germans 
following the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928 improved trade 
relations between these countries. The increase in German trade interests could be 
seen in the increasing numbers of Germans in the British concession, rising from 
85 in 1934 to 111 in 1938 (see Appendix 6). The reemerging of the German 
traders in china caused the British some alarm because the Nationalist government 
138 Lord Charles Beresford, The Break-Up of Chia With an Account of Its Present Commerce 
Cun envy, Waterways Armies, Railways, Politics and Future Prospects (New York: Harper & 
Brothers P.. I, f ha% 1899), p. 16 and Twentieth Centwy Imprmions of HongKong, Shanghai, and 
other Treaty Ports of China p. 734. 
139 Juleen Arnold, Commercial Handbook of China p. 322. 
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tried to get advisors from Germany and mending close the trade relations between 
China and Germany. 140 
The Russians were envious of the British success and used their influence 
in Mongolia to threaten British trade between Tientsin and Mongolia. Both the 
Russians were able to divert trade in Mongolia and Manchuria to Vladivostock. 14' 
Russian interest in trade grew, as can be seen with the tremendous increase in its 
population in the concession from the beginning of the twentieth century, as 
illustrated in Appendix 6, growing from 43 in 1913 to 1,527 in 1929 and 2,323 in 
1938. This was part of Russia's increasing interests in Mongolia to North China. 
Other foreign firms also had interests in Tientsin, many involving the export import 
trade. These foreign firms were J. Mansouk & Co. (Belgian), J. Furer & Co. 
(Swiss), Chihli Import & Export Co. (Austrian and Greek), M. P. Altamira & Co. 
(Spanish), Two Stars Trading Co. (Italian), P. Jarno & Co. (French) and China 
Netherlands Produce (Dutch). 142 In short the British traders had to try to keep or 
maintain their position against the challenges of new and established foreign 
traders. 
'40 William C. Kirby, Germany & Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 
64. 
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The biggest threat to the British traders' interests was the Japanese, who 
had a strong interest not only in Tientsin but also in southern Manchuria. In 
Tientsin and its hinterlands, they already had 357 firms in 1917 compared with 81 
British firms. Concurrently with the growth of Japanese trade interests in Tientsin 
and its hinterland, the Japanese population, at 4,752, made up half of the total 
foreign population of Tientsin and its hinterland in 1917.143 When the Japanese 
expanded their influence in the 1930s, their trade interests also increased, as shown 
by the increase in the Japanese and foreign population in the Japanese concession 
in Tientsin from 5,104 in 1926 to 6,700 in 1932 and 19,252 in 1938 (see Appendix 
7), while in the British concession the Japanese population increased from 89 in 
1934 to 294 in 1938 (see Appendix 5). This shows the large number of Japanese 
administrative jobs in the industrial and service sectors following the development 
of Japanese interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands, and demonstrates how the 
expanded Japanese interests challenged British interests. At the same time 
competition from Italian interests also increased with a sudden rise of the foreign 
population in the Italian concession from 373 in 1937 to 739 in 1938 (see 
Appendix 7). As we know, Italy was an ally of Japan. 
British traders had to be cautious about the rise of Japanese encroachment 
in North China. The British government could do little to help the British 
community in China because it was preoccupied with the Genpan threat in Europe 
in 1930s. This was a dilemma for the British traders in facing the challenge of the 
Japanese encroachment of North China, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
143 Julean Arnold, Commercial Handbook of China p. 322. 
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Lastly, the Chinese become a strong challenge to the British. Until the 
1920s the British traders were not able to penetrate the interior directly, as the 
Chinese compradors and businessmen still effectively held the keys to opening up 
this market themselves. Therefore British traders could only operate effectively in 
and around the treaty port. Competition intensified in the 1920s with the rise of 
Chinese nationalism, which manifested not only in political struggle but also in a 
campaign to buy Chinese goods. This is discussed in the following chapters. In 
short the British traders had to try to keep or maintain their position against the 
challenges of new and established foreign and Chinese traders. 
Relations among the people 
Tientsin was not owned by a single nationality. Chinese of course formed 
the majority population this city. After 1900 Chinese nationalist activists did not 
seriously challenge the foreigners again until the mid-1920s. The diversity of 
Tientsin's population, different administrations and growing numbers of residents 
also created tension between the foreigners themselves. In 1903 the Austrian 
concession conflicted with the local Chinese there. The area which the Chinese 
authority had leased to the Austrians had been occupied by Chinese owners, and 
the Austrians took over their land. Chinese residents complained that the Austrians 
had not paid them compensation. However, this conflict did not create a big issue 
between them. '« In 1913, French gendarmes entered the Japanese concession, 
which brought protests from Japanese residents and led to serious fighting between 
both parties. '45 Further tension arose on March 1919 when Japanese troops 
attacked Americans. The origin of this incident was a quarrel in a brothel in the 
"' Lee Mayo% `Trieste and Austno-Chinese Trade ftm 1869 to 1918', P. S. 
145 Brooks, Japan's Imperial Diplomacy, pp. 103.4. 
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Japanese concession between an inebriated American and some Japanese soldiers. 
Angry Japanese soldiers and civilians chased the American into the French 
concession. 146 Although this fighting did not involve the British, they were 
concerned that it could spread to the British concession. i47 In addition, some 
Japanese had tried to attack some British people passing by in the French 
concession. 148 This incident illustrates how the multi-racial mix of people and 
diversity of administrations did not prevent animosity among the different cultures 
and backgrounds of its people. The British so far were not harbouring ill feeling 
which might have triggered the incident in Tientsin. 
In Tientsin, the Englishman was allegedly noted for his 
`... conservativeness, and his insularity in order to set up a miniature replica of his 
tight little island home. He might even have been excused by critical brethren if he 
had turned his concession into a fortress of national aloofness and exclusiveness. ' 
This view enunciated here by Allister Macmillan writing in 1920s, who criticised it 
stating that the British did not dominate any club, school or public property. 149 He 
agreed that certain of the British were still conservative and insular and wanted to 
uphold British prestige, especially in business. 1S° For example, the Japanese 
attempt to build the Fakumen Railway Extension from Manchuria to North China 
was opposed because it would affect Britain's economic dominance in North 
China. '5' But the discrimination was more tangible between the British and the 
16 PRO F06741207 Peking and Tientsin 73mes, Friday, March 14,1919. 
'47 PRO F0674/207 Letter from J. N. Jordan to the Japanese Minister, Peking, March 15t, 1919. 
"0 PRO F0674/207 Letter from L. F. Smith to H. B. M. Consul General, Tientein, 15* March 1919. 
149 Macmillan, Seaports of the For Bag p. 123. 
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Chinese. Most Britons were not interested in learning Chinese, since they could 
hire interpreters, 152 and some even spoke English with their servants. 153 The 
British saw the Chinese as a "lower-class society" with an unhygienic lifestyle. 
They forced them to apply for a pass to enter Elgin and Victoria Parks. ' m 
However, after 1900 British-Chinese relations began to grow more 
cordial iss Signs of formal discrimination began to disappear from the 1920s 
onwards' owing to the growing importance of the Chinese in the concession. 
Chinese-British relations can be classified in two main categories. Firstly as 
between `master and servant' with the British as master and the Chinese, whether 
as labourer, amah, cook, pilots or guards, as servant. The second main relationship 
was collaboration as partners. At this stage there was cooperation between the 
Chinese and British in business, with the Chinese either as partner or as 
compradores. Both these relationships were important elements in the progress of 
the British community in Tientsin, which the small number of British there could 
not achieve alone. Apart from this, the importance of this relationship was to 
penetrate the Chinese market and secure the support of the Chinese government. 
For example, the establishment of the KMA was important to ending the rivalry 
between the Chinese and British coal companies. '" Other British firms still needed 
'52 Robert Bickers, `Citizenship by correspondence in the Shanghai International Settlement, 1919- 
43', unpublished article, forthcoming in Yves Chevrier, Alain Roux et Xiaohong Xiao-Planes (eds), 
Cltadins et cilo ens dears to Chine du XXe sikle, Melanges en 1'honneur de Mark-Claire Ber r+e 
(Paris: EHESS/MSH, 2008), p. 4. 
153 I'his was the mentality not only of the British but of almost all foreigners in the concession. See 
Isabelle Maynard, China Dreams: Growing up Jewish in Tkntsin (University of Iowa Press, Iowa 
City, 1996), p. 79. 
154 Handbook of Municipal Iriformatlon (Tientsin: Tientsin Press Ltd., 1922? ), pp. 45 and 92 and 
Power, The Ford of Heaven p20. 
iss Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 186. 
1S6Ibid., p. 204. 
157Tim Wright, Coal Mining in China Economy and Society, 1895-1937, pp. 123 and 149. 
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the help of Chinese compradores to penetrate the Chinese market inland, 158 as, for 
example, William Forbes and Company, who established a longstanding 
relationship with a Chinese compradore. '59 
The awareness of the British community of the importance of the Chinese, 
especially the wealthiest, can be traced to the election of the first Chinese 
councillor in 1878, and of a further two in 1919.160 Next the British traders 
proposed that their staff learn Chinese. 161 The American-British-Chinese Club 
(1919) was established to further relations with Chinese politicians and 
businessmen. 162 The progress and survival of British interests in Tientsin and its 
hinterland made the British aware that good relations with the Chinese should be 
cultivated. The KMA, for example, set the fostering of good relations with its 
Chinese counterparts as a priority, in order to protect its interests. Thus the 
mentality of the British in Tientsin can be seen to have become less antagonistic 
towards the Chinese, even though they had come under their attack in 1900. Even 
the Chinese population (see Appendix 6) had increased in the British concession 
from 15,946 in 1913 to 33,172 in 1925 and 36,029 In 1929. However, this did not 
mean that the British had a liberal attitude towards the Chinese. The nightmare of 
bloody fighting in the Boxer Uprising kept some of the British cautious in dealing 
with disturbances in China. Therefore the British often referred any disturbances 
and disabilities in China as `Boxer' alike "anti-foreign" movements. The 
developing anti-imperialist feelings of many Chinese climaxed in the rise of 
use Osterhammel, `Sari-Colonial and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China', p. 305. 159Rasmussen, Tientsin, p260. 
160 P. H. B. Kent, The Twentieth Centiay in the Far East (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1937), 
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p. 233. 
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Chinese nationalism, threatening British interests as discussed in the next chapter. 
Apart from the challenge from Chinese nationalism, in the 1930s relations between 
the multi-racial communities in Tientsin brought further challenges to the British 
concession. The increase of the Chinese population in the British concession (see 
Appendix 6) from 36,029 in 1929 to 72,087 in 1938 increased the BMC's 
responsibility to maintain peace and order in the concession, particularly regarding 
clashes between the Chinese against the Japanese on the eve of the rise of Japanese 
aggression in the 1930s. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, Tientsin had gradually developed before the arrival of the 
Europeans, due to its strategic location not only for settlement but also as a centre 
for trade. Then came the war and the treaty with the Western Powers and China in 
1860 which opened Tientsin as a treaty porL163 At this point the British (and other 
foreign powers) began to develop their influence and establish their powers in 
North China. The concessions in Tientsin were a case in point. Their power in 
Tientsin began to grow steadily as a small replica of Western (and Japanese) cities 
and cultures. To develop trade, the bund was built on the banks of the British 
concession following the establishment of several British and foreign firms in 
Tientsin. British interest not only concentrated on Tientsin but also spread to its 
hinterlands, and British missions such as the LMS began expanding their influence 
further south. British traders, especially the KMA, established themselves in 
Tongshan and surrounding areas. All in all what was important to Britain in 
Tientsin was its trade, its subjects, its properties, its Christian missions and its 
163 Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern Chiron; T Ind Edition, p. 190 
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prestige. The development of the British concession on the one hand brought 
prosperity and wealth to the British community, while on the other it also brought a 
strong need for protection from any challenges from China. These are the factors 
which the British government had to consider in handling Anglo-Chinese relations. 
The establishment of the BMC symbolised the British Informal Empire in 
China. The BMC was an administrative body totally dominated by the British 
community, especially by its traders. These traders (as listed in Appendix 2) 
played an important role in maneuvering the British concession in line with their 
interests. The emergence of bunds and godowns as the first structures built in this 
concession showed the British traders' eagerness to establish trade in Tientsin. The 
development of other infrastructure and institutions created a British ghetto in 
which all aspects of British life were evident in the names of streets, buildings, 
theatres and sports facilities. Restrictions were imposed on the Chinese entering 
parks, and the Tientsin Club became exclusively British. With development 
thriving in the concession, the British community began to regard it as `Little 
London'. As R. C. V. Bodley, a traveler, noted: 
Were it not for the rickshas [rickshaws], the Victoria and Race 
Course Roads, which are the principal thoroughfares in Tientsin, 
might be any streets in a London suburb, for not only are the shops 
of the same type as in England, but the semi-detached residences 
and the villas might have been transplanted direct from Greater 
London. IM 
I" R. C. V. Bodley, `Tientsin', in Chris Elder (od. ), China 's Treaty Parts: Hal/Love and Half HWe 
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At this point the some of British community seemed to regard the 
concession as one of Britian's Asian colonies. The community seemed to forget 
that the concession was on land leased from the Chinese. The Shanghailanders had 
a similar attitude, regarding land in Shanghai as `owned' rather then leased. 165 
Therefore some Chinese critics regarded the British (and other foreign) 
concessions as foreign imperialist `controllers' in China. Although the Chinese 
were in the majority in the British concession, they did not have an equal footing in 
the BMC. In short, the environment of the concession, with its European 
architecture, British administration and English style of living encouraged the 
growth of conservative sentiment among the British, increasing the some of the 
British community's focus on their imperial culture and refusal to accept any 
change which could affect the status of the concession or their privileges. 
At this point (before 1925) it seems that the British community in Tientsin 
was similar to the Shanghailanders. The difference was the formal structure of 
power in the concession. If in the SMC the Shanghailanders (and the Americans) 
enjoyed the ability to make decisions about their municipality, this was not the case 
in the BMC in Tientsin. The British Consul General had formal power over the 
BMC, unlike his counterpart in Shanghai, who did not have such power over the 
Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC). The British community only could make 
applications to the British minister, and the British concession was under the 
British government's influence. For example, the SMC was able to purchase land 
I65 Johrsoo, Shanghai, p. )92. 
104 
outside their settlement to build a road. 166 In Tientsin, when the BMC tried to 
purchase land outside the concession it met with a veto from the British Consul 
General. 167 
Within the limitations of the BMC's power, the British concession in 
Tientsin witnessed overall a history of a more liberal policy towards the Chinese. 
This included the gradual abolition of discrimination against the Chinese there. In 
fact this came about for trade purposes, with the British traders controlling the 
BMC adopting a pragmatic approach by agreeing to open good relations with their 
Chinese business counterparts, illustrating that not all in the British community 
were diehards. The British traders agreed to cooperate with the Chinese in the 
cause of British interests. The rich Chinese benefited from this relationship, 
although the lower strata of Chinese were still ignored. When other groups - 
especially the farmers - was affected by hardships such as a long drought, they 
blamed the foreigners for all their difficulties. '" More importantly, the Tientsin 
Massacre and the Boxer Rebellion were examples of Chinese anti-foreign feeling 
at the time. But in the twentieth century new Chinese critiques of the foreign 
presence developed, and adopted a range of powerful new tactics: boycotts, mass 
political activism and new diplomatic pressure. The foreign community in China 
was not at fast aware that the Chinese had begun to fight for their sovereignty. 
The nationalist movement developed gradually and was intent on recovering 
Chinese sovereignty under the banner of nationalism. As nationalism developed, 
166Meng Yue, Shanghai and the Edges of Empires (Minneapolis: university of Minnesota Press, 
2006), 173. 
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Tientsin did not escape from their demand that the foreign concessions be returned 
to them. 
Even before this movement reached its peak the British community had felt 
t neatened. The fear of a repeat of the Boxer Uprising lingered in foreign residents' 
minds. The some of British community even regarded the Chinese civil war in the 
1920s as another `Boxer' rising. 169 This was a challenging time for the British 
Government, British Legation and British community in China. The British 
concession, which had been established with modem facilities and new buildings, 
now had to face the Chinese challenge. It is interesting to see on how the British 
and other foreign nationalists with considerable interests in Tientsin and its 
hinterland would clash with the rising of the Chinese Nationalism. So how did the 
British react to the nationalist movement? Were they ready to face the demands of 
the Chinese nationalists, which grew throughout the mid-1920s? Could the British 
save their interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands? How did the cordial relations 
which the Chinese and British had developed help in avoiding negative 
repercussions on British interests? These questions are addressed in the following 
chapters. 
169 SOAS, the Sir Aiwyne George Neville Ogden's Papers, PP MS 47, File 4, Box 1, Letter from 
Jessie to Ogden, Tientsin, 16 July 1920. 
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Chapter Two 
Turbulent years: Cause, impact and reaction, 1925-1927 
Introduction 
Nationalist activism marked the mid-1920s in China as the KMT launched the 
Northern Expedition in its campaign for national unification. It was a period of 
violence and insecurity. During the drive to unite the country and restore Chinese 
sovereignty various incidents occurred which badly damaged British and Japanese 
interests. This chapter describes the impact of these events on British interests 
(especially those of the traders) in north China in general and in Tientsin in particular. 
The discussion addresses two main issues. Firstly, it highlights and discusses the 
impact of the disturbances in China on British interests. Although the anti-imperialist 
movement mainly centered on south and central China (1925-1927), the KMT and 
communist agents had tried to start the activity in Tientsin. However, the British were 
undeterred by this action because the May Thirtieth Incident had alerted them to the 
need for early preparation to Void any anti-imperialist propaganda circulating in the 
British concession. Tight control by other foreign concessions had prevented all 
Chinese attempts at agitation. The failure of these moves also resulted from the fact 
that the Northern government did not support anti-imperialist agitation. 
The last part of this chapter discusses the attitudes and responses of the British 
community to Chinese activism and to the implementation of a more liberal British 
policy that aimed to open negotiations with the Chinese government about the 
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`unequal treaties', especially on the retrocession of the British concession. At this 
point my focus on the British community is the British traders and missionaries. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the key British traders had strong financial interests in 
Tientsin and its surroundings, and the missions operated in Tientsin and surrounding 
area. The community saw what happened in Shanghai and other parts of China as a 
serious threat to British interests and was mobilised to act against the Chinese 
activism. This chapter does not go deeply into the rendition of the Tientsin 
Concession. At this stage it discusses only the response of the British community to 
changing government policy. In order to understand all these three points, it is 
essential to look the nature and cause of the British government's anxiety regarding its 
interests in China, and the concern of the British subjects in Tientsin regarding British 
policy and the situation in China. Therefore this chapter begins by focusing on how 
Chinese nationalism evolved and became focused on the British, and the impact of this 
anti-British feeling on British interests in China. The section below illustrates why the 
British government adopted a liberal policy towards the Chinese. 
The impact of Chinese nationalism on British interests 
As discussed in the introduction, a new Chinese nationalist movement 
developed in the early twentieth century. The Chinese showed their patriotic spirit in 
several ways, such as by boycotting American goods (1905), demonstrating against the 
Twenty-One Demands (1915) and the May Fourth Movement (1919). In the 1920s 
Chinese nationalism became more active and united against foreign imperialism. 
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But in the 1920s Chinese nationalists began to attack the British as `brutal 
imperialists'. ' This happened when Chinese activists were killed in the Thirtieth May 
Incident in 1925. Although began at a Japanese factory the incident, the killing by 
SMC police of number of Chinese demonstrators in the international settlement 
inflamed the Chinese activists against the British. Almost all the British interests 
came under attack. Even Hong Kong suffered a boycott and strike from July 1925 to 9 
October 1926.2 Then Chinese anger towards the British (and the Japanese) spread 
throughout the Yangtze Valley. The British Consulate in Hankow was attacked; the 
Acting Consul General, E. G. Jamieson was beaten in Chinkiang; the Chinese press in 
Kiukiang attacked British Imperialism in China; British subjects in Chungking were 
warned not to appear in the street, and in Amoy British and American Tobacco Co., 
(BAT) cigarette stocks were burnt by Chinese students 3 The British in China and 
British domestic opinion were shocked by these events. The British government 
considered several possible responses. The Foreign Office began to see that its old 
method, the gun boat policy, no longer deterred the Chinese. 
During this time, foreigners, especially British interests, were in danger. British 
merchants in China worried about their property in inland China. 4 Many missionaries 
left the interior for coastal areas. They looked to their government to act to prevent 
' Wm. Roger Louis, British Strategy in the Far Eas. 1919-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 126 
and P. Cavendish, "Anti-Imperialism in the Kuomintang 1923, " Jerome Ch'en and Nicholas Tailing, 
Studies in the Social History of China and South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 
34. 
2 John Fitzgerald, Awakening China Politios, Culture and Class in the Nationalist Revolution 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 248-9. 
' Megginson, `Britain's Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1925-1927', (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, 
George Washington University, 1973), pp. 83-5,88 and 90. 
4 Richard W. Rigby, The May 30 Movement: Events and Themes (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1980), pp. 143-S. 
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further damage to their property and businesses. The biggest challenge for the British 
was the spontaneous seizure of the concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang in January 
1927 by a Chinese crowd acting without direction from either communist or KMT 
leadership. 5 Though the British government offered the `December Memorandum' 
(December 1926), in which it outlined its readiness to negotiate with the Chinese 
authorities regarding its interests in China, it did not receive a positive response from 
the KMT. Several Chinese newspapers in the KMT area had denounced this 
declaration as a hypocritical ruse to defend the British position. 6 The Willingness of 
the British government to pay customs surtaxes to China was interpreted by the 
Canton Gazette as benefiting Chang Tso-lin's government. But the Peking 
government also believed that the memorandum was aimed not at them but at the 
KMT. 7 On the other hand, the British-owned North China Herald condemned the 
Chinese and demanded that the government re-occupy the concessions. 8 During the 
KMT's occupation of Nanking (1927), foreign residents were attacked, leading to 
some loss of life. The American and British forces responded to the incident by 
bombarding the Chinese army in Nanking. This was another reason for the KMT to 
accuse the foreigners, especially Britain, of siding with the northern government and 
participating in the Chinese Civil War. 
s Harold R. Isaac, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 
p. 124 and Lee En-han, `China's Recovery of the British Hankow and Kiukiwg Concessions in 1927', 
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Before the December Memorandum was announced the KMT had been 
continuing their campaign to damage the British image by accusing Britain of agreeing 
to support Chang Tso-lin's attack on them. Although they believed this to be a 
rumour, they still accused the British of advancing giving half of their loan of fifty 
million dollars to Chang Tso-lin's government. 9 In 1926 Chang Tso-lin and Sun 
Chuang-fang had approached British consulate and legation officials to seek financial 
aid to suppress the KMT in the south. 10 However the British government reiterated 
that they never approved such a loan and British policy remained neutral. The 
indictment went on to point out that Britain had supplied Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan- 
fang with ammunition)' Apart from this the KMT also condemned the British 
authorities in Hong Kong for the suppression of Chinese nationalism there. 12 
In conclusion, Chinese nationalism caused the British community and its 
government great alarm because the British felt the strong pressure against their 
staying put in business in China. Therefore the British government had to find 
moderate ways of opposing Chinese nationalism and it offered to renegotiate what 
Chinese critics termed the unequal treaties and, in principle, returned British 
concessions to Chinese control. Little of the literature discusses what happened in 
Tientsin at the time of these disturbances in China in the 1920s. It seems that anti- 
British agitation never happened in North China. Therefore with this background of 
9 News Bu1Ied the Chinese News Service, Series 1, No. 1, December 16,1926, p. 9. HSBC Group 
Archives, SHG H 25, Letter from an agent of the Hong Kong Banking Corporation to P. C. Young, 
Tientsin 17th September, 1926. 
10 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 1 125, Letter from an agent of the Hong Kong Banking Corporation to 
P. C. Young, Tientsin 1716 September, 1926. 
't News Bulletin, The Chinese News Service, Series 1, No. IX, December 27,1927, p. 6. 12 Ibid., p. 4. 
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Chinese nationalism and its impact on Chinese interests, the next section looks into the 
detail of what actually happened in Tienstin and its hinterlands with the rise of 
Chinese nationalism. Did the British community also suffer from the Chinese 
activists? 
The Situation in the North 
North China was not affected by the nationalist movement so much as by the 
civil war between the Northern warlords, especially between Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso- 
Jiang and Feng Yu-hsiang, each of whom was fighting for the control of central 
government in Peking. Figure 3.1 shows Sapajo's caricature in the North China 
Herald illustrating foreign perceptions of the situation in the civil war in China (1926). 
The North was an occasional battleground. Sporadic warfare, from the late 1910s until 
the mid 1920s, had affected rail services because the armies had seized, for example, 
the trains for army transportation. 13 These problems were more due to technical 
problems than to the anti-imperialist agitation that was occurring in central and 
southern China 14 Generally the foreigners in the north were fine from assault or attack 
by Chinese soldiers. Therefore the train delays were more an indirect consequence. 
Apart from delays, the disruption to the train service hampered missionary work in the 
interior and brought trade in Tientsin to an occasional standstill, causing heavy losses 
to traders. 15 
13 See Waldron, From war to nafkmdisxk pp. 110,149,150 and 151. 
'4 SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 9,1922-1927, Report 1926 by J. D. Liddell, December 31, 
1926, p. 2. 
is SOAS, CHAS/MCP/31 China Association: Circular No. 348-359,1925, Letter from W. Wolferrs 
Chairman of Tientsin General Chamber of Commerce to W. P. Ker, the British Consul General in 
Tientsin, 23'd January, 1925, p. l. 
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WHERE THE CARCASE IS, THITHER WILL THE EAGLES 
BE GATHERED TOGETHER 
Source: The North China Herald 6 February 1926, p. 221. 
The impact of large-scale conflict between Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu in 
1925 put trade in the north in great difficulties. 
Supply of raw produce from the interior received during the week 
has been almost negligible. The continued control of all the 
northern Railways by the military parties and the consequent chaos 
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I- 
added to the complete cessation of all water traffic because of ice, 
is responsible for the shortage. 16 
Although this was an indirect problem, it made it difficult for the traders to fulfill 
demand from abroad, especially from Europe and the United States. As Chapter 1 and 
Appendix 2 illustrate, almost all the big British firms had strong interests in collecting 
and exporting raw Chinese materials from inland North China, and the continuation of 
the disturbance had an impact on this. 
The Chinese themselves suffered badly because the warlord government 
imposed a heavy tax, some peasants' property was looted and carts and mules seized, 
which paralysed the peasants' transport system for carrying the harvest to market. 
'? 
At Chinwangtao, Chinese people described what had happened to them during the war 
between Feng Yu-shiang and Chang Tso-lin at the end of 1925: 
With the first movement of troops, when General Kuo Sung 
Ling effected his coup d'etat last November, large number[s] of 
troops poured into Chinwangtao and villages in the vicinity, 
billeting in private homes and shops, forcing the people to supply 
provisions to their men passing through the Chinwangtao station 
on way to the front; and, at same time, looted all shops and even 
burned the buildings. We were, consequently, thrown into utter 
panic. is 
In short what happened in North China was different to when the civil war was the 
main problem in 1925 and 1926. 
16 IISBC Group Archives SHG 1128 Letter from Agents, HSB to A. E. Baker, Tientsin 51k January 
1925. 
17 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9,1922-1927, Letter from Eithel S. Livens to Mr. Hawkins, 
Siaochang, 13 February 1926. 
'= PRO F0228l2942 Letter from Merchants and residents of Chiwangtao to Sir Ronald Macleay, 
pding, 14* May 1926. 
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Tight security and order in the British concession (and other foreign 
concessions) also helped it safe from disturbance from the anti-imperialists in 
Tientsin. 19 The lives of foreigners in Tientsin hinterlands were relatively unaffected 
by civil war. Only bandit activity frightened the missionaries. 20 Anti-imperialist (and 
particularly anti-British) activities in north China were on a small scale, because the 
north was not dominated by KMT troops. Generally the life of the British in north 
China was pleasant and peaceful, free from the troubles suffered in other parts in 
China. Life in the British concession continued as normal. Reports emphasised how 
the streets were busy with cars and pedestrians, people were enjoying the peaceful 
conditions, young people were freely playing their games and the Christmas 
celebrations were proceeding uninterrupted21 
This does not mean that evidence of nationalist sentiment can not be seen in 
North China; northern Chinese clearly shared the feelings of their compatriots in 
central and south China. Nationalistic feelings among the North Chinese can be traced 
to as early in 1905 when there was a boycott of American goods because the United 
States government was trying to restrict Chinese immigration 22 Apart from that the 
nationalist activists in Tientsin also formed a women's awareness movement. The role 
played by the Women's Patriotic Comrades in 1920 is a case in point. This 
association had tried to bring sense of awakening regarding the weakness of the 
1913MU Sheehan, ? Yost in Troubled rimes, p. 47. 
20 SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25,1926-1927, Folder 1, Letter from 
A. H. Jowett Murray to Hawkins, Tssngchow, 14* May 1926. 
21 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9,1922-1927, Report of C. H. B. Longman, Tienlsin, 1925. 
22 Kwan Man Bun, The Salt Merchants of YTanj , pp. 127-8. 
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Chinese to the Chinese peasants. Therefore these movements to some extent 
contributed to the nationalist movement in Tientsin Y When news of the Shameen 
Incident (1925) and the May Thirtieth Incident broke, it catalysed nationalist sentiment 
amongst the Chinese, especially the students. 24 In Tientsin the students began 
agitating on 1 June 1925. They distributed leaflets after the May Thirtieth incident 
containing news about events in Shanghai, tried to organise demonstrations, and urged 
Chinese workers to strike? From 8 August 1925 Chinese workers at Pao Cheng Mill 
and the Sino-Japanese Yu Ta cotton mill, 26 both of which were located outside 
Tientsin, demanded a wage rise. At the same time, British Steamship Company 
seamen held a strike. Several tens of thousands of people later joined the mass 
demonstration in the Chinese city to protest against the may Thirtieth Incident. The 
demonstrators shouted anti-imperialist slogans and denounced the unequal treaties. 27 
The British community viewed this situation with great alarm, afraid that their 
lives could be in danger, and the British Legation took precautionary action, sending 
400 troops to Tientsin from Shanhaikuan and Chinwangtao. Efforts were also made to 
23 Fitzgerald, Awakening China p. 31. 
u As early as the 1920s, the communists had operated by establishing wo*w schools in the vicinity of 
mills in Tientsin. The students were their agents in building relations with the workers. Here the 
yenta gave free tuition and lectures about the importance of forming a union. Further seeds of the 
patriodc movement had been sown by representatives of Sun Yat-sen who visited Tientsin on 28 
December 1924. His chief speaker told Chinese students to rise up against foreign imperialism, 
especially against Britain, which had caused China to si fl from its unequal treats nL With Chinese 
nationalism running high in 1925, the students started to agitate, influencing the Chinese masses and 
especially the workers. Hershatter, The Workers of Tiffin, 1900-1949, pp. 212 and 213 and SOAS, 
CWM North China Reports Box 9,1922-1927, Report for the year 1924 by Laving, Tientsin. 
25 Waldron, From war to nationalism, p. 252 and The 7bm, August 13,1925, p. 10. 
26 PRO F0371/10949 Enclosure, No. 1, Letter from W. P. Kerr to Michael Palairet, Tientsin, 15 August 
1925. 
27 Heishatt r, The Workers of Tianyin, 1900.1949, p. 214. 
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talk with Chang Tso-lin to control the situation in Tientsin. 28 However, the anti- 
imperialist movement in Tientsin did not escalate into a major incident for several 
reasons. Firstly, the student agitation failed to spread the nationalist propaganda. The 
Chinese workers only wanted better pay and benefits from their employees. P. H. B. 
Kent said that Tientsin was fortunate because it did not have any of the extreme 
Chinese groups that prevailed in other parts of China. " 
The most interesting point, reported in the Celestial Empire, was that; "... [a]s 
far as is known there was no attempt to turn the strike into an anti-British movement, 
the matter being entirely a labour dispute pure and simple, but the activity of the 
students does not make for comfort". 3° This passage suggests that the British had little 
reason to be concerned about the labour strike in Tientsin. This is confirmed by E. C. 
Peter, the Jardine's agent in Tientsin, in a message to Brooke Smith; "... I regret to 
hear the serious situation which has arisen in Shanghai and I confirm my telegram 
advising you that I do not anticipate serious trouble here. »31 The Chinese 
demonstration was a nominal situation between the employers and employees. 
Nationalism was not the main cause of the workers' struggle. Therefore the strike 
would gradually We away once the demands were met, and the disturbance caused by 
the Chinese workers in Tientsin did not cause a great deal of concern among the 
British. The British were glad that this strike would not last long or become part of the 
Chinese nationalist movement. 
29 Waldron, From war to nas'Ionalism, p260. 
"P. H. B. Kent, M Twentieth Centwry in the Far East, p207. 
30 The Celestial Empire 15 August 1925, p. 120. 
31 CjL, Jardine Matheson Archive, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, Letter firm E. C. Peter to Brooke Smith, 
Tientsin, 10th June 1925. 
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The second factor which contributed to the lack of strong feeling in the 
Chinese in Tientsin was Chinese business interests. These Circles were worried by 
what had happened in south and central China. Though they shared the same patriotic 
feelings as the Chinese there, their priority was protecting their business from further 
damage. Therefore they took a pragmatic approach, secretly simultaneously supporting 
the KMT and making loans to the Chang regime. 32 The British had made a sound 
decision in appointing Chinese business to the BMC council, as they helped to keep 
the Chinese community peaceful compared with other such communities in China 
For example, local Chinese notables stopped Chinese students from distributing anti- 
imperialist leaflets in foreign concessions when the Chinese rickshaw peddlers, with 
the support of the Chinese local authority and Chinese traders, stopped students trying 
to distribute propaganda leaflets. They blocked the students and turned them over to 
the French authority. In the British concession BMC police stopped Chinese students 
33 from distributing anti-imperialist leaflets? 
The third and deciding factor adding to the relief of Tientsin's British 
community was the lack of northern government support for the Chinese students' 
agitation. The key factor which diminished the agitation in north China generally and 
in Tientsin particularly was the northern government under Chang Tso-lin, which 
opposed the KMT. They opposed "anti-imperialist" sentiment because it was clearly 
seem to be part of part of the KMT and communists' strategy to undermine the 
32 gam, Trust in Troubled TImes, pp. 1274. 
33 The Celestial Empire, 8 August 1925, p. 73. 
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northern warlords in the north. General Li Chang-ling, the Chihli Governor, ordered 
the closure of all centres of activism such as the Union of All Classes of People, 
Students Union, Association of Mill Hands and the Cantonese Guild. All these 
associations and unions were in the Chinese city. The other unions, which operated in 
the French Concession, were under close watch by the Chinese and French police. 34 
Most of the labour leaders were put in jail. The Chinese authorities banned the 
holding of public meetings without police permission, and processions were 
prohibited. 5 As a result, the labour activism was paralysed in August 1925 
36 Before 
that, General Li Chang-ling's troops had raided the ex-Russian and ex-German 
Concessions and arrested nearly 100 people. This raid was made to counter Bolshevik 
activities in Tientsin. 37 As LMS missionary, A. H. Jowett Murray pointed out in the 
middle of 1925, "we are benefiting from Chang Tso-lin's censorship ... "38 
Another report, by the British Consulate, also supported this opinion, 
mentioning that: 
Tientsin has been singularly fortunate during this period of 
strikes and disorders it having been the only important commercial 
centre which has remained peaceful and quiet. The reasons for this are 
twofold, firstly that as far as local conditions are concerned the Chinese 
have no particular grievances against foreigners, and secondly that 
Marshal Chang Tso Lin made it clear from the outset that so far as the 
districts over which he had direct control were concerned no outrages 
would be countenanced. He feared the possibility of a riot in the 
concession which might result in a clash with the British Police and / or 
34 The North China Herald 22 August 1925, p. 202. 
35 PRO F0371/10949 Encloses No. 1, letter from W. P. Kor to Michael Palais, Tientsin, 15 August 
1925. 
36 Hershatter, The Workers of Timyir, 1900-1949, p. 218. 
37 The North China Herald 4 July 1925, p. 509- 
38 SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 24,1924 -1925, Folder 3, Letter fivm A. 
H. Jowett Murray to Hawkins, Tientsin, 15 June 1925. 
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military and would lead to a situation which he might not be able to 
contro139 
In addition the BMC took several precautionary measures to counter anti-imperialist 
elements in the area. This is the fourth factor that contributed to the failure of the 
Chinese activists' demonstration against the British. 
The BMC supported the effort to preserve peace and order in the concession. 
BMC police were ordered to guard against and control any subversive elements which 
could upset the concession, including the KMT, the activities of which were 
suppressed with the approval of the British Consul General on receiving information 
from the Chinese local authority. The KMT headquarters were raided and 14 KMT 
members arrested when literature relating to the anti-imperialist movement and the 
northern government was found. 
40 The British authority in the concession believed 
that these KMT members had intended to create problems in the British concession. 41 
All the KMT members were handed over to Chang Tso-lin's army on 24 November 
1926. The fate of these KMT members is uncertain, but we can safely assume, from 
other episodes of the time, that most did not survive the experience. 42 
On the other hand, the above case could also show that both the British 
Minister and the BMC had learnt from the May Thirtieth Incident. By gaining the 
support of Chang Tso-lin, the concession's British authority could avoid the 
39 PRO F0228/3285 Tientsin Political Report for the quarter ended 3O June 1925. 
40 PRO F0371/11663 Telegram from Mr. O'Malley, Tientsin, 11th December, 1926. 
41 The Times, November 29,1926, p. 12. 
42 Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in Ching 1923-1928, p. 104. 
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responsibility for killing any demonstrators. Therefore only Chinese local authorities 
prevented the strike and demonstrations in Tientsin. 43 The Chinese demonstrators were 
thus unable to inflame Chinese anger against the British in China. Early preparation as 
mentioned above and cooperation with the Chinese local authority and other foreign 
concessions had prevented Chinese anti-imperialist feeling from exploding into a 
bloody incident At the time of the war between the KMT and the Northern 
government under Chang Tso-lin, who controlled the Chinese authority in Tientsin, 
there was a strict rule by the Chang Tso-lin's administration against KMT activism in 
Tientsin. Therefore, Chang Tso-lin were willing to stop the Chinese activists under 
the aegis of the KMT. The KMT, on the other hand, used the arrest of some its 
members in Tientsin to accuse the British of siding with the Northern government « 
The missionary schools and colleges did not entirely escape the student unrest, 
which had spread to almost all parts of China, at the time of the June 1925 
demonstration in Tientsin and the arrest of the KMT members in November 1925. 
They supported the revolution staged by the KMT. 45 Some of these students also 
supported the proposal of the Anti-Christian Federation to continue the movement 
against Christians and mission schools 46 This circumstance worried the missionaries. 
They were concerned about their students' activities in 1925 because the Chinese 
4' Waldron, From war to nationalism, pp. 260-1 and Osterhammel, `Imperialism in Transition', China 
ý, No. 98, June 1984, p. 278. 
New Balletin, The Chinese News Service, Series 1, No. l, December 16,1926, p. 10. However the 
Foreign office warned the British Legation timt the BMC action had been iUessl, and would N 
problems on the British themselves. See PRO F0371/11661 Telegram from Foreign Ofce, 3 
December, 1926. 
45 john Israel, Student Nationalism in Chia 1927-1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 19661 
12-3. 
Wen-Han Kiang, The Chinese Student Movement (New York: King's Crown press, 1948), pp. 94-5. 
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students began to join the demonstration, refusing to the classes, boycotting annual 
examinations and threatening to open a new school. 47 This happened in TACC in the 
middle of 1925 when their students responded to the anti-imperialist movement in 
China. However, it took eight days for these students to react after several of their 
fellow students influenced them. At first they boycotted classes. 48 They accused the 
British of moving into China uninvited and demanded that all relations with them must 
be cut off. 49 Next propaganda was circulated, spreading news of alleged British 
`cruelties' in Shanghai and warning shopkeepers not to sell British goods. Attacks on 
the TACC continued, with a small group of its own students opening an office in the 
native city to organise propaganda activities that pointed to the TACC as a British 
imperialist institution, and pledging not to study in that college anymore. 5° 
However, the impact of the student activists in the TACC was not serious, and 
the British missionaries took a moderate approach to handling the student agitation. 
They did not oppose students joining the demonstrations. This did not mean that they 
supported them, but in this case they did not want to interfere. From this moderate 
approach it is clear that the missionaries had also learnt that the Chinese students could 
not be opposed by harsh action, the May Thirtieth Incident in Shanghai being a case in 
point. Therefore the impact on the missionaries was slight, and the only matter of 
concern to them was the future of their activities, which would be jeopardised by the 
" Ka-che yip, `Nationalism and Revolution: the Nature and Comm of Student Activism in the 1920s', 
in F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas H. Etzold (ads. ) China in the 1920s: Nationalism and Revolution (New 
York: A Division of Franklin Watts, 1976), p. 104. 
4S SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9,1922-1927, Report for the year 1925 by S. Lavington 
Hart, Tientsin. 
49 Ibid. 
30 SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 24,1924 - 1925, Folder 4, eater from S. 
Lavingtson Hart to Hawkins, Tientsin, September 4,1925. 
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rise of Chinese nationalism. This worry slowly subsided, because at the end of 1925, 
the TACC was still receiving many applications from Chinese to enlist in the 
colleges' When they opened the TACC on 15 September 1926, they took in 300 
pupils, increasing again to 500 in March 1927. This meant that the TACC still did not 
suffer much from the anti-imperialist movement organised by students. 52 Overall, 
between 1925 and early 1927, the missionaries did not have to worry much about the 
war or the anti-imperialist propaganda. All their work went on as usual. 53 Only the 
Nanking Incident interrupted their work, when orders came from the British Minister 
in Peking to prepare to evacuate. 
To conclude, what happened in Tientsin on in the aftermath of the May 
Thirtieth Incident had little impact on the British community there, which was, 
however, worried about the situation in China. Some were afraid the Boxer Uprising 
would be repeated in Tientsin. They therefore prepared themselves against any trouble 
from the Chinese. The foreign community had always had a bad perception of the 
Chinese and the anti-foreign character of the Boxers was used as a symbol of the 
Chinese nationalist attack on the foreign interests. M However, the so-called `New 
Boxer Rising' never happened. ss The three factors outlined above show that the 
British were in a safe position. These factors can be summarised as the nature of the 
disturbance focusing on labour and economic issues; the good relationship between the 
51 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9,1922-1927, Reimt for the year 1925 by & Lvington 
Hart, Tientsin. 
52 SPAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9,1922-1927, Report of C. H. B. Longman, 1925. 
" SPAS, CWM North China Repots Box 9,1922-1927, Report for the year of 1926 by J. D. Liddell, 
Tientsin, December 31,1926. 
" Paul A. Cohen, History in l7 ree Keys: The Boxers as Every Experience, and Myth (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), p253. 
um Celestial Empire 22 August 1925, p. 163 and Cohen, History in u nee Keys, p. 252. 
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British and Chinese in the concession; and the early suppression of the strikes. What 
happened in Tientsin was a sideshow which did not evolve into greater disturbances 
(such as those in Shanghai in 1925) happening elsewhere in China, particularly in the 
centre and the south. 
Evacuation 
As described above, it seemed that Tientsin was now under control and the 
student activism had been suppressed by 1925. However, the British government was 
still concerned about the impact both of the civil war and of the anti-imperialist 
movement in Tientsin's hinterlands. British interests were under attack in the Yangtze 
Valley (1925-1927). Britain lost its two concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. The 
news of the seizures warned the British in China to prepare to counter further 
problems caused by the Northern Expedition of the KMT armies. It was their first 
alarm, warning them to stand by to evacuate from the interior if anything worse 
happened. 56 The British government was frustrated that it had offered to ameliorate 
the situation in the December Memorandum to no avail and decided that the time had 
come to counter the Chinese reaction and save British interests in China. In the case of 
the Nanking Incident, the British government in London agreed to demand a written 
apology from the Commander-in-Chief of the KIM forces, Chiang Kai-shek, and the 
punishment of all those responsible for killing and injuring foreigners and the 
destruction of foreign properties, with full reparations. 57 At this stage they also felt 
that the security, lives and property of British people were at stake. Apart from the 
M SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9,1922-1927, Letter fivm Edith S, Murray to friends, 
Tsangohow, February Y°, 1927. 
57 Wilson, 'Britain and the Ku niintm 1924-28, p. 559. 
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Nanking Incident, the northern government under Chang Tso-lin also had problems 
holding its position in Peking. A rumour had spread that Chang Tso-lin would retreat 
to Manchuria, and the British Legation feared that the situation would become perilous 
when KMT troops reached the north. 58 The British community in Tientsin feared a 
repetition of the Nanking events and this greatly worried the British in both China and 
London. At this point, the British Minister in Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, requested 
that the British Government dispatch another 500 men to strengthen the existing 
British troops available in Tientsin. However, this suggestion was rejected, as the 
small numbers of British troops available would not be able to counter larger Chinese 
forces. They suggested that at least two or three fill divisions were required to defend 
British interests in both Tientsin and Peking from any Chinese attack, but all this 
depended on the willingness of other Powers to join hands with the British troops to 
protect both cities. If this scheme failed, the alternative would be evacuation-59 
In the north the missionaries had established their stations in the interior to 
develop social work and propagate Christianity in China The LMS had two 
outstations in the north, in Tsangchow and Siaochang (both situated south of Tientsin). 
Tientsin became the headquarters of the LMS. The LMS also had workers on the 
outskirts of Peking. When news of the disturbance in south and central China came 
(1925), the north was still engulfed in the civil war. Tientsin did not escape the 
fighting. The Kuominchun Army under Feng Yu-hsiang began its attack on the city 
so Kane, `Sir Miles Lampson at the Peking Legation 1926-1933, p. 73. 
59 Bowie, 'Great Britain and the Use of Force in China, 1919 to 1931', pp291-2. 
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on 22 December 1925.60 In a few days the Kuominchun successfully captured 
Tientsin. General Li Ching-lin, a supporter of Chang Tso-lin, fled to the Japanese 
Concession and moved his army to Shantung. 61 Before the defeated army retreated 
from the city, they looted it. At this point the foreign volunteers and troops in foreign 
concessions stood ready to protect the concessions. To prevent aggression from this 
army, they built barricades. There was a small incident when Italian guards guarding 
the electric works killed two Chinese soldiers; however, there was no retaliation from 
the Chinese. 62 
The civil war had little effect on the missionaries except for the emergence of 
bandits in the north. Neither army disturbed the missionary workers or their 
properties, although some fighting took place close to churches or schools. The war 
kept the missionaries busy with the refugees who came to them seeking shelter. Most 
of the refugees were women and children. The civil war in the north put great pressure 
on the Chinese peasants in the interior. Their lives were threatened not only by the 
danger of war but also by Chinese forces who took their food and animals. These 
circumstances made their lives dangerous and difficult, and the only places that the 
army did not touch were the missionary churches and schools. 
However, news of the Nanking Incident gave the foreigners cause to consider 
their safety in the case of a similar incident happening to theta The British 
60 Sheridan, Chinese Warlord the Cover of Feng Yu-hsiang p. 184. War between Feng Yu-hsisng and 
Chang Tso-lin. began when both Fang Yu-hsiang and Kuo Sung-fin demanded Chang Tso-lin to resign. 
Both of &= had cooperated to attack the Chang Tso-lie's troops in North China 
61 The North China Herald 20 December 1925, p. 552. 
« ? gee North China Herold 2'a February 1926, p. 2. 
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government ordered all British subjects in the interior to evacuate to Tientsin (April, 
1927). In addition, the British government prepared an ultimatum to the Chinese to 
comply with their demands concerning the Nanking Incident. 63 At this point the 
British government seemed likely to choose to go to war with the Chinese, which was 
another reason why the British government wanted to evacuate its subjects. " 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the missionaries, who had big interests in terms of 
workers and several properties, had differences of opinion regarding the evacuation. 
Some did not think that the measure was justified, since the north was now at peace, 
and found the order to evacuate `very premature' and disturbing to their missionary 
work in the interior-65 They did not feel that the situation would cause any trouble, as 
the KNET troops had already pulled back from the north. In addition the northern 
warlords had full control of the situation there 66 Other missionaries worried that this 
decision would affect their work in the interior. After the evacuation their work would 
not be the same. They feared that their `anti-imperialist' activists would invade their 
stations and loot everything, stopping their missionary work. 67 As A. Christiansen, 
one of the Missionary workers said: - 
Then we were not really sure the Chinese truly wanted us back 
again and there were times when one was tempted to ask if it was 
worth while making so much effort to try to help people who 
63 SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 9,1922-1927, Report of 1927 by Evan E. Bryant, 
Tsangchow. 
" Wilson, `Britain and the Kuomintang, 1924-28', pp-559 - 60. A memorandum prepared by the Chief 
of Staff suggested that Yangtze River and Canton should be blockaded. 
65 SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Comesýondencý Box 25,1926-1927, Folder 3, Letter from 
A. H. Jowett Murray to Mr. Hawkins, Tientsin, 16 May 1927. 
" SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25,1926-1927, Letter from Stuckey to 
Folic, Tientsin, 24 April 1927. 
67 SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 9,1922-1927, Report for 1927 by Arnold G, Bryson, 
Tsangchow. 
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apparently did not want us, not that we had much evidence locally 
to feel that our colleagues were not our friends, but there was so 
much communistic propaganda, and all Chinese are easily 
influenced. 69 
Although some of the missionaries were reluctant to follow the evacuation order, 
doubting that the situation was really perilous, they had to obey. 69 The situation in 
Siaochang became more dangerous when the arsenal in Techow was seized by the 
army and communication with Siaochang was cut. The missionaries in Siaochang 
were advised to move fast because it would be unsafe if anything happened there. 
Furthermore, the British government told them that the Powers had prepared strong 
action against the KMT government if it did not comply with their ultimatum after the 
Nanking Incident 70 Therefore the missionaries had to obey the evacuation order to 
avoid any unexpected attack from the Chinese. 
In the early spring of 1927 the British Minister ordered the Consul General in 
Tientsin to call all British subjects to Tientsin and other treaty ports. 71 The evacuation 
to Tientsin began in April 1927, and involved not only British missionaries, but also 
other nationals. n In Tientsin the situation was peaceful, with no sign of danger 
whatsoever in the foreign concessions. When almost all of the refugees had entered 
Tientsin, the situation became crowded and uncomfortable. As one LMS missionary, 
Evan E. Bryant wrote;... " [a]s summer came on a serious problem loomed up. Many 
6$ SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 9,1922-1927, Report for 1927 by A. Christiansen, 
Tsamgchow. 
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of the refugees were living in very unsanitary circumstances, and roughing it in the 
most cramped and ill-furnish quarters, while at Petaiho were many empty well 
ßunished houses tenantless owing to the troubles. "73 As a result missionary 
representatives met the British Consul General about the issue (1927). 74 Lampson 
agreed to let the British go to Peitaiho with adequate protection" He added that the 
congestion of refugees in Tientsin would create a health problem. 76 
Lampson brought this matter to Chamberlain. Chamberlain also agreed that 
the British should be allowed to take holidays in Peitaiho. 77 He shared Lampson's 
view, afraid that the situation in Tientsin, which was full of refugees, would invite an 
epidemic which would especially hit the women and children. 78 To avoid any incident 
in Peitaiho, the British government sent a gunboat, H. M. S. Magnolia, to stand by in 
case of an emergency. In addition, two British battalions in Peitaiho and Chinwangtao 
were ready to take on the evacuation of Peitaiho if the situation necessited. 79 If the 
situation in the north became critical, the British troops had a contingency plan to 
move British subjects to Chinwangtao before evacuating them to Shanghai. 80 In order 
to get the other Powers' support to protect the lives and property of foreigners, the 
73 Ibid. 
74 peitaiho (Beidaihe) was a popular holiday beach place where the foreigners took their break in 
summer time. It was 240 miles north of Tientsin, and had several holiday hotels which only opened 
during tue season. Here also the visitors could rent cottages. This beach could be reached by the 
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Lethbridge Introduction 0 Oxford University Press First issued with permission and with the addition 
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312 and 313. 
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British Legation had a meeting with the American Legation. The Americans also had a 
small detachment of troops and their cruiser `Marblehead' stationed in the vicinity of 
Peitaiho. After this decision was reached they let the British subjects move to 
Peitaiho, and hundreds of them went. Throughout their stay there the situation 
remained peaceful and without incident. 
In central China the Northern Expedition was at a lull at this point. Chiang 
Kai-shek had turned on the communists and their sympathisers in Shanghai in April 
1927.81 The implications of this led to the KMT split. In Hankow, the KMT was led 
by Wang Ching-wei, still supported by the KMT-Communist alliance, but in Nanking, 
Chiang Kai-shek opposed any cooperation with the communists. 82 As a result the 
Wuhan government launched an expedition against the Nanking government, which 
provided an opportunity for the Northern Allies to launch a counter offensive. 83 The 
lull allowed the missionaries to move back to their stations in north China In 
September 1927 the missionaries moved gradually back. They moved at their own 
risk, because the British government did not permit any move to the interior for at 
least the next six months. " After they returned to their station they found the situation 
m Supplement to the China Express and Telegrap#. 14 April 1927, p. 84, The North-China Daily News, 
2 May 1927, p. 7 and Smith, A Road is Made, pp. 201-2. 
12 Tien-wei Wu, `A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: the Kuomintang-Communist Split of 1927, The 
jow"d afAsian Studies, Vol. 29, No.!. (Nov., 19691 pp. 126-7 and Smith, A Road is made, pp204-5. 
p On 25 July 1927, the Nord n Allies, composed of Chang Tso-Wn, Sun Chuan-fing and Chang 
Ts'ung-chang had succeeded regaining Hsuchow from the KMT. See martin Wilbur, `Tie Nationalist 
Revolution: from Canton to Nanking, 1923-28, in John K. Faubank, The Cambridge History of China 
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peaceful. The Chinese Christians who had taken over their jobs were also unharmed, 
and had continued the regular work of the mission. 85 
In conclusion, the British government faced a challenging responsibility had a 
great responsibility to protect its nationals scattered as they were in the treaty ports and 
inland China. In addition, the missionaries' reluctance to evacuate Tientsin's 
hinterland illustrated that they, like the British traders, wanted to stay in China in the 
long term. This situation laid great responsibility on the British government to make 
sure that its nationals were safe from disturbances. It had to formulate a moderate 
(liberal) policy to protect not only the missionaries but also the British traders and 
other British nationals who wanted to stay. This policy, as mentioned earlier, created a 
dilemma in the British community as to whether the government could protect them or 
not because the majority of the British community doubted that the British liberal 
policy would succeed. The doubts of the British community are discussed below. 
British Retbdiation 
When talking about British reaction to the disturbance in China, after May 
Thirtieth, British commercial voices in Tientsin had their own opinions about the 
likely impact on their affairs, as E. C. Peter, Jardine, s agent in Tientsin put it: 
As regards business, I think the position very serious indeed, unless 
some compromise is arrived at on the Dolitical situation in Shanghai. 
All our information points to the probability of a boycott of everything 
British. There is a tremendous propaganda going on throughout North 
China, and it is the opinion of leading Chinese, and also of leading 
"s SOAS, CWM North China Repots Box 9,1922-1927, Report of 1927 by Evan E. Bryant, 
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British business men here, that the British should do something to 
counteract it 96 
The KMT took this opportunity to use the boycott to put pressure on foreign 
imperialists. " Even the Chinese were urged to show their nationalist spirit by buying 
Chinese goods. 88 This pressure was brought directly to bear on British traders in 
China, who were relieved that the BMC had taken the precaution of cooperating with 
the Chinese authorities and so prevented a boycott in Tientsin. 
Another event that raised concerns for the British was the announcement of the 
more liberal British policy, by which the British government intended to lighten the 
burden of maintaining the unequal treaty system. The British could not afford the 
amount of commitment needed to retain this system as Chinese nationalism increased. 
The announcement was heralded by the December Memorandum at the end of 1926, 
which opened a new space for the British and Chinese governments to settle anomalies 
in their relationship. The British government had agreed to negotiate "... on treaty 
revision and all other outstanding questions... " which the Chinese government wanted 
to settle. 89 This included two major issues: extraterritorial rights to be resolved in the 
near future; and the return of all British concessions and settlements in China to the 
Chinese authorities. The policy was received with mixed feelings in Tientsin. This 
reaction can be described in two parts; firstly, British traders and community in the 
06 CUL, Jardine Matheson Archive, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, Letter from E. C. Peter to A. Brooke Smith, 
Tientsin, 16 June 1925. 
87 Karl Gerth, China Made: Coramxer Culture and the creation of the Nation (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Asia Center, 2003), pp. 176-7. 
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concessions' feelings about the liberal policy; and secondly, the missionaries' point of 
view. These two views are discussed in the following sections. 
The Publicity Bureau 
The British across China, including those in Tientsin, shared the same feelings 
about events as they unfolded. In Tientsin, the British were shocked and sympathetic 
about what had happened to other British subjects in China after the May Thirtieth 
Incident in Shanghai. The Nanking Incident increased their fear and worry greatly. 
Then in early 1927 came news condemning the BMC for discriminating against 
Chinese entering Victoria Park. 90 This inflamed the Chinese Nationalists' spirit in 
Tientsin. As we know, the "Chinese and dogs" sign in Shanghai had become a big 
issue from which attacks were made on the British image in Shanghai. 91 As a result 
Chinese regarded that the British community in Tientsin was alike their cousin in 
Shanghai. So the British community in Tientsin was unable to escape in the same 
lights from the Chinese anger. 
Like other British subjects in China, they wanted the British government to 
take sterner action to counter Chinese nationalism. However, this hope was dashed by 
the December Memorandum. The government's agreement to negotiate on the 
rendition of the British Concession in Tientsin further shocked the community. They 
did not believe that the time was right to return the concessions. Furthermore, they did 
not believe that Chinese law could protect them in China. In order to counter the 
90 SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, "Memorandum No. 19, A 
Mischievous Slander". 
91 See Fitzgerald, Awakening China, p. 123. 
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Chinese attack on British interests, the British community established in July 1925 a 
bureau through which to channel its views on the problems in China. 92 This illustrates 
how the British community in Tientsin was worried about the disturbance in China and 
wanted to protect its interests. 
This would become the Tientsin British Committee of Information (TBCI), 
which would disseminate news of China to the British public. It stated that "[p]eople 
at Home need to be educated on Chinese affairs, and on the affairs of British interest in 
China. The ignorance at Home is lamentable and at a time like this likely to be shewn 
[shown] and correspondingly felt out here. "93 One of their targets was to secure the 
support they would need from their home country to justify their case that China was 
still not ready to administer the lives of foreign residents. On the other hand, this 
bureau would become a pressure group to influence the British government to abandon 
the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China and the return of the Tientsin concession 
to the Chinese authorities. Apart from this, the Bureau monitored the British press for 
attacks on British communities in China. " In China, the Bureau would act as a counter 
measure against Chinese agitation. It would: 
... collect, examine and 
file all the mischief making leaflets, 
pamphlets, posters, and important Chinese newspapers throughout 
the land. By this means it will be possible to know just what 
poison is at work and direction and colour will be given to the 
counter attack. Newspapers in English will be gathered in [the] 
same way, and articles containing the right kind of propaganda will 
be translated into Chinese and distributed. Arrangements will be 
92 Bickers, Britain in Ching p. 146. 
93 SPAS, CHAS/MCP/31 China Association: Circular No. 348-359,1925, Memorandum by China 
Association, Tientsin, July 10°, 1925. 
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made to reach all classes of the Chinese community with the kind 
of propaganda that will be most effective. 95 
According to this statement, the Bureau had two strategies. As mentioned earlier, on 
one hand the target would be the British public, and on the other the Bureau would 
serve to give information to the Chinese themselves. All information would be 
gathered from British traders, missionary workers in the interior, the Consulate and 
also several British travelers in China% The bureau was formed after the May 
Thirtieth Incident in Shanghai as the Tientsin British Committee of Information 
(TBCI). 97 It was run by a small group headed by P. H. B. Kent, a prominent British 
lawyers in Tientsin and jointly owned the firm Kent and Mounsey - leading British 
solicitors in Tientsin. 
After the TBCI was formed, it started to spread its own news to its colleagues, 
friends and the public in Britain. The first Bureau news came as two memoranda, No. 
1: `Foreign Settlements and Concessions in China and No. 2: `The Protocol of 1901 in 
relation to Railways'. British business circles supported the establishment of the 
TBCI, which was also supported by the China Association, which advanced money for 
its operation. Other leading British firms were willing to give further funds to this 
bureau. 98 The establishment of the TBCI had also been approved by the British 
" SOAS, CHAS/MCP/31 China Association: Circular No. 348-359,1925, Memorandum by China 
Association, Tientsin, July 1U'ß, 1925. 
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Legation in Peking. The Foreign Office sent a letter of appreciation to the TBCI 
because it helped them to get news from China. Other British communities in China 
also welcomed the establishment of this committee. This brought other British 
representatives from Shanghai to Tientsin to learn more about the committee and to 
urge the Bureau to help them in countering the problem in Shanghai 
The comments in the memoranda relate to different issues and problems in 
China, from the chaotic political situation to the misery of the Chinese people. These 
memoranda illustrate the mentality of the British community in Tientsin and its 
hinterlands as they made argued that the Chinese would be unable to administer 
foreigners. To the memorandum authors what was happening in China was due solely 
to small groups of people who tried to force the Chinese to join with them to launch 
anti-British movements. 100 The Bureau pointed out that the British communities were 
being victimised, and doubted that the Chinese could run China freely including 
resumed jurisdiction over the foreigners. It asserted that the Chinese could not 
manage their own country. In addition the militarists were freely using government 
transportation such as railways. This not only affected the foreign bondholders but 
also caused trade to grind to a standstill. '0' The British community alleged that the 
Chinese justice and police systems still had weaknesses. According to the Bureau, 
practices such as corporal punishment to obtain evidence were still used in China. 
to A. Brooke Smith, Tientsin, 21 July 1925 and CUT, Jardine Matheson Archive, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, 
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Secretary of the China Association, Tientsin, 3e September, 1926. 
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Furthermore, few judges in China were independent from the Chinese authorities. 102 
Added to this the chaotic situation in China, with " ... political assassinations, rapine, 
loot and devastating disorganisation consequent upon civil war, but there has been 
increasing growth on the part of those authorities in the direction of the disregard of 
law and order... spread all over China. "103 In order to safeguard foreigners, the TBCI 
suggested that the abolition of the extraterritorial jurisdiction must follow several steps 
such as: - 
1. Chinese Laws (approved by the Treaty Powers) administered in foreign cases by 
Foreign Judges, with Chinese Judges as spectators. 
2. Foreign and Chinese Judges jointly trying such cases with equal powers, in 
accordance with Chinese Law. 
3. Chinese Judges trying such cases, with Foreign Judges acting as Assessors. 104 
From this point of view, it seemed that the British in Tientsin were concerned about 
their future. However the establishment of the TBCI cannot be interpreted as meaning 
that the British community mostly the traders were totally diehard. A better 
description would be that they were in shock and not ready to face any drastic changes 
to their rights in China. They were afraid that this continued attack on their interests 
would damage their image in China and in the world. They felt it better to make their 
own stand against the Chinese and Communist agitation. Therefore the TBCI was 
102 SPAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of InUmmOtiooal Affairs, Box 7, "Memorandum No. 13, `Extra- 




formed not only as a vehicle to fight against the erosion of rights but also to clear their 
image in China and the world. 
Missionaries' Views 
Missionaries did not have clear or united views on the demands of the Chinese 
to abolish extraterritoriality and return the British Tientsin Concession to the Chinese. 
They did not form societies or issue memoranda on their thoughts about the matter. 
One memorandum, said to be produced by the LMS in Tientsin, pointed out that the 
missionaries in Tientsin supported the abolition of extraterritoriality and the reversion 
of the treaty in force between the British and the Chinese governments. 
105 However, 
the LMS in Tientsin denied issuing any such statement, making clear that the LMS in 
Tientsin wished to avoid causing trouble by siding with any of the groups in China. 106 
The missionaries had personal views, but did not present any opinion as a group. One 
of these personal views was from Dr. E. J. Stuckey, who did not agree at all to the 
opposition of British diehards to object the negotiation of the rendition of British 
concession. However his stand was midway between the Chinese rights and sympathy 
towards his own people. On one side, he agreed that the negotiations should be 
proceed. He also agreed that the forces could not remain in China forever to protect 
British interests, as they would not be able to hold off the Chinese Nationalists for 
long. It was necessary to negotiate with the Chinese about what they wanted. 107 
105 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/32 Circulars No. 360-373,1926, Letter ä om J. A. Andrew, Secretary of China 
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On the other hand, Dr. Stuckey understood that this would have an adverse 
effect on the British traders, rather than on the missionaries. In addition, he argued 
China did not have a central government with which to negotiate, so it was useless to 
make them any proposition. He also doubted whether the new government under the 
Nationalists could legally be the sole government when it was split between Hankow 
and Nanking. 108 In addition Evan E. Bryant said: 
If those who talk of the abolition of `extrality' and of the 
retrocession of the Concessions, and the putting of missionaries 
under laws administered other than by their own consuls, would 
only open their eyes, and open the eyes of the Britain and America 
to the daily injustice and brutal cruelty rampant in countless towns 
and villages to-day, worse far now than under the Manchu Empire; 
to the utter disregard not only for property but for life itself under 
the "`Republic'"; and to the fact that the treatment of Chinese by 
Chinese over and over again would give points to those who 
wrought the Congo atrocities: .... 
109 
He did not think it wise to surrender these privileges because they protected not only 
themselves but also of Chinese. He argued: 
We who live inland know the time is not yet. The distant roar of 
military trains at this moment emphasises my words, "the time is 
not yet". The groans of wounded farmers cry out, "the time is not 
yet"! The fact that the foreign mission compounds and the 
Concession are the only safe places in large parts of China today 
where Chinese men and women can live other than in daily terror 
demands their repetition. 110 
log Ibid. 




These views reflect the fact that the missionaries did not have unified position.! " 
The main worry of the missionaries was the developing anti-Christian 
movement in China. This was not new in China, as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
But it gradually became more organised when, in 1922, students formed the Anti- 
Christian Student Federation in Shanghai. At its sixth Congress in August 1924, the 
National Students' Union urged that the missionary schools be closed because the 
Christian Mission had `denationalised' its Chinese students, 112meaning that the school 
had converted the Chinese students to Christianity, isolating them from the Chinese 
Nationalist Movement. The students published two anti-Christian magazines, Anti- 
Christianity Weekly and Anti-Christianity. 113 The actions of the young Chinese against 
the missionary movements in China created grievances among the LMS workers. For 
example in 1924, S. Lavington Hart showed his irritation, saying: 
Stem demands for yielding no more to the Foreign aggression are 
made by the young Chinese, and a crying out for the abolition of 
Extraterritorial rights. No thought is allowed as to the weakness of 
China or the incapacity of any of her rulers to rule: but all the fault 
is laid at our doors. Young Christians are quite strong on all this. 
I have felt that Great Britain must not pour its money, together 
with the money from America and especially Russia, in to these 
Chinese schools and Colleges. It will be worse than thrown 
away. 
114 
Such statements were very common among the British in China. The Chinese students 
had been branded, by the British community, as agents of destruction towards British 
III Ning J. Chang, `Tension within the Church: British Missionaries in Wuhan, 1913-28', Modern Asian 
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interests, ' 1S This statement also shows that some of the British missionaries were 
diehards who not accept the new wave of the Chinese patriotic movement against the 
foreign imperialism. 116 
However, the missionaries could not oppose the Chinese nationalists. The 
young Chinese were fighting fiercely for Chinese sovereignty and condemned all 
`imperialist' elements in China, including the mission schools. For example, in 1925 
some young Chinese educators condemned the missionaries' teaching methods and 
proposed to the Board of Education that religious instruction such as worship in 
schools should be prohibited. 
"? This young Chinese faction injected nationalist policy 
into Chinese education and put pressure on the missions. The missions had no choice 
but to acquiesce to the new era in China by accepting the orders and regulations of the 
Chinese government 
The LMS faced a dilemma in continuing its work in China. It would not pull 
out from China; and so could only achieve its aims by changing its attitude to Chinese 
nationalism. The missionaries were non-provocative and willing to obey the orders of 
the Chinese government, because the sinification process was part of their long-term 
aim of giving the Chinese the opportunity to run the missions. ''' Furthermore the 
lack of funds also encouraged the LMS to implement sinification. Cheaper Chinese 
us W. Somerset Maugham, On a Chinese Screen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 24. 
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labour would benefit the LMS in their operations in Tientsin and its hinterland. ' 19 The 
vast operation of the LMS, not only in Tientsin but also in its surroundings, needed 
many employees not only for evangelical work, but also in education and medicine. 
The process of employing the Chinese had been carried out by the LMS when they 
were active in employing Chinese teachers, doctors and priests in by 1931.120 
Their willingness to change according to the Chinese education ministry 
directives had put two of their schools in Peking under the Chinese Church. 12' The 
modifications required to meet the new Chinese education policy were discussed with 
an attitude open to accepting any changes required in order to allow the missionary 
schools to continue: - 
By proving their willingness to abide by government regulations, 
too, they hope to disarm the fears that are seriously entertained of 
foreign aggressiveness and to open the way for more liberal 
treatment, since the Government's desire to regulate the schools is 
due not a little [to] such fear. 122 
According to these aims, in 1927 the TACC's constitution was amended to follow the 
new Chinese education policy which required schools and colleges in China not to be 
under the administration of foreign missions. In that year, the LMS had transferred 
authority in the TACC to a Court of Governors, elected from among prominent British 
and Chinese citizens. Its executive power lay with a Board of Managers, with a 
119 Robert Bickers, `"To serve and not to rile": British Protestant Missionaries and Chinese 
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Chinese majority. 123 The Chinese majority on the board was another condition 
imposed by the new education regulations. 
All in all, the LMS and other Protestant movements seemed to fall in with the 
requests of the Chinese nationalists. Missionary work would be impossible without the 
support of the Chinese government. Moreover the fact that their work was directed at 
the public made the situation more complicated and dangerous. The Tientsin 
Massacre and the Boxer Uprising illustrated that they needed the trust of the Chinese 
in order to have a chance of converting them to Christianity. In addition the safety of 
the missionaries and their property was among the missionaries' concerns. The anti- 
Christian attacks on several mission stations such as the one in Fujian brought about 
fear in the missionaries of a "Boxer resurgence" in China. The communists' role as 
agitators inflaming the Chinese students to attack the mission stations added to their 
worries. 124 Therefore the LMS missionaries always hoped that the situation in China 
would return to normal, and that the KMT armies, and especially Chiang Kai-shek, 
would modify their extreme attitude when they reached the north-125 However, the 
missionaries had a long term idea of the sinification of their institution. Therefore the 
transfer of their schools into Chinese hands was not a problem. This transfer was 
important to the survival of the missionaries in China, and included transferring any 
mission staff not suited to the Chinese environment. New staff, more capable in the 
"' SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9,1922-1927, Report of A. P. Cullen, Tientsin, North 
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Stuckey to Hawkins, Tientsin, 17 June 1927. 
143 
Chinese language and culture, were employed. 126 The year 1927 was the starting point 
from which the missionaries transformed their institutions in the sinification process 
towards the Chinese social environment127 
Conclusion 
So did the British in north China suffer? Generally, they did not suffer as 
much as their counterparts in south and central China. As there was no real anti- 
British movement, so the strikes, demonstrations and disturbances never became big 
incidents in Tientsin. During Lampson's visit to the KMA's coal mines in Tongshan, 
he mentioned that: - 
At a time when the great majority of the industrial undertakings of 
China are suffering from strikes, boycotts, loss of trade, and even 
actual destruction, as the result of the deplorable state of the 
country, it is refreshing to come into actual contact with a British- 
controlled organisation which is still comparatively unmolested, 
and which is operated in a manner and with results which bear 
comparison with the most successful enterprises of its type 
throughout the 128 
Lampson's view illustrates how the impact of the disturbance to British control and 
power in the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland differed from that felt in 
other treaty ports in the Yangtze Valley. 
The rise of Chinese nationalism in the middle 1920s also threatened the British 
presence in Tientsin and its hinterlands. As in the Yangtze Valley, the rise of 
nationalism caused the British community great concern. Chinese student activists 
126 BickCTs, Britain in China, p. 201. 
'27 John King Fairbank, he Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985 (London: Pan Book, 1988), p. 194. 
129 PRO F0228/3595 From Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Peking, 25th October 1927. 
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brought about strikes in several foreign factories, organised demonstrations in Tientsin 
and boycotted the mission schools. This disturbance (apart from at the mission 
school) happened just near the foreign concessions. The civil war in North China 
affected the progress of trade in Tientsin's hinterlands. The British could do nothing 
to stop these disturbances in Tientsin or to prevent the disruption caused by the civil 
war. 
After the mass demonstration in Shanghai in 1925, the `gun boat policy' no 
longer deterred the Chinese. Therefore the British concession in Tientsin became a 
testing ground for the British government's good relations with the Chinese 
authorities, particularly with the Fengtian group under Chang Tso-lin. The British 
needed to adopt a moderate approach in order to avoid repercussions from Chinese 
activists. Owing to his animosity against the KMT, Chang Tso-lin was willing to help 
to suppress subversive activities by the KMT and communists in Tientsin. This 
approach to keeping peace and order in Tientsin succeeded. The Chinese activist 
propaganda and labour unions were suppressed by the Chinese local authorities. Some 
Chinese activists were killed. By relying on the Chinese themselves to suppress the 
activism the British succeeded in avoiding incidents which might have jeopardised 
their interests. 
However, the British were still in a fragile position because they needed to 
protect not only the concession in Tientsin but also their interests in its hinterland. 
Missions and the KMA were still open to a Chinese attack. At this point the solution 
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was to evacuate the British community from the hinterland to Tientsin, where the 
entire British community could be protected. Apart from the BMC police, British 
troops were called in as a precautionary measure to safeguard the concession. 
All decisions regarding the security of the Tientsin British community and its 
hinterlands were taken by the British Minister and Consul General. The BMC was not 
able to act independently. It even had to get approval from the British Minister and 
Consul-General before it could take action against the KMT activists within the 
concession. Here lay another difference between the BMC, with its limited power to 
decide on security measures, and the SMC. The British government's control over the 
BMC was strong, but the British government could not completely control the British 
community in Tientsin. For example, as mentioned above, when the refugees came to 
Tientsinl leading to unhealthy condition in the British concession. These refugees had 
made a request to the British Consul General to go to more relaxed place, Peitaiho. 
The British minister was reluctant to allow them to go to Peitaiho because of security 
reason. But the pressure from the British community had led Lampson to agree to give 
permission for this. This is a small example of the resilience of the British 
community. 
The members of the British community in Tientsin responded to the situation 
in China and to the British government's policy in different ways. The British traders 
were very concerned about their position in Tientsin and China as the continuation of 
the Chinese attacks put their interests at stake. To avoid prolonging the Chinese 
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attacks the British traders had to establish their own weapon; therefore the TBCI was 
formed. The formation of this bureau served as a defensive strategy to counter-attack 
Chinese propaganda and to influence British government policy. This bureau became a 
tool of the British in Tientsin to attack Chinese nationalism. Through it they claimed 
that Chinese nationalism resulted purely from the after made of the Russian 
communists on the Chinese to attack the British interests in China. "' 
At the same time the British government adopted the more liberal policy 
outlined in the December Memorandum, which offered much to ameliorate Britain's 
relationship with China; the return of their concession in Tientsin and extraterritorial 
rights. The TBCI was their only hope as a voice to protect their rights in Tientsin. 
They believed that their business interests would suffer if they were deprived of their 
rights. Thus, the TBCI would help in correcting negative views towards them in 
China and would enlighten the British government to secure a proposition to safeguard 
British interests. 
Another group in the British community in north China was the missionaries, 
who had no clear view regarding the new British policy. Some favoured the policy, 
and others opposed it. To the missionaries, the prime aim of the missions was not to 
seek profit but to convert the Chinese; they catered to the Chinese people rather than 
the Chinese markets. However the missionaries still had negative view of the Chinese. 
I" SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, "Memorandum No. 12, 
Memwandum Dealing with events in Swatow and District since 1925 and with the situation that 
development out of the anti-British movement which began in June in Shanghai and later spread to 
south". 
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Some of them still branded the Chinese jelly-fish' and criticised than for having a 
`topsy-turvy' nature 130 At this time the missionaries still believed in the privileges of 
foreigners as inviolable and as such they considered themselves protected from 
Chinese attack. When the British did come under attack from the Chinese in the mid- 
1920s the missionaries began to talk about modifying their methods and operations in 
China. Owing to this they needed to change their rules and regulations. They had to 
amend their constitution and obey the Chinese government's order. Whether the 
Chinese dominated their schools did not matter. They wanted to avoid any criticism 
towards them as British Imperialists. Furthermore, this was part of their liberal 
attitude towards the sinification process in their Church institutions in China. All in all, 
it was not the control of the British concession that was a problem for the British 
government but how to control how the British community's responses to the 
changing political situation. This is discussed in the following chapter. 
130 Bickers, '"To serve and not to nile ", p. 212. 
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Chapter Three 
'Let Sleeping Dogs Lie': The New Proposal (1927-1929) 
Introduction 
The year 1928 was very tense for the British in north China. The KMT had 
begun the second phase of their Northern Expedition in 1928 after a lull the 
previous year. Although Chiang Kai-shek had purged the Communists, this was no 
guarantee that British interests would not be attacked. The British Legation was 
also unsure whether news of the KMT and Communist split would bring about in 
Tientsin a repeat of the Hankow seizure or the Nanking Incident. Furthermore, the 
Tsinan incident (3 May 1928) between KNIT (Nationalist) and Japanese troops 
illustrated another uncertainty about their fate when the KMT arrived in the north. 
So the British Legation had to evacuate its subjects from the interior to Tientsin, 
triggering another panic among Tientsin's British community, which was alarmed 
by the seriousness of this move by their government. 
This chapter examines two points related to British interests and the above 
events. Firstly it discusses the responses of the legation and the British 
commandant to the advance of the KMT army and the retreat of Chang Tso-lin. 
The previous chapter described how the British community seemed pleased with 
the way Chang's government maintained peace and order in north China. 
However, as Chang's troops were gradually defeated by the Nationalist troops the 
situation became uncertain. This chapter looks at the different viewpoints of the 
British Legation and the British commander about the preparations to protect 
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British interests, the British evacuation from Tientsin's hinterland and the situation 
in the KMA mine as Chang's troops retreated to Manchuria. The second point of 
this chapter is the implementation of the new liberal policy in Tientsin, focusing on 
discussion over the rendition of the concession. This was part of the British 
government's offer to ameliorate Anglo-Chinese relations. This section also 
examines the British community's response to this offer and its efforts to influence 
the government. My discussion at this point concentrates mostly on the British 
traders' point of view. This important group dominated the BMC and guided the 
concession in line with British policy and the changes in China. Before looking 
into these points, I summarise the advance of the KMT into north China in 1928 
which from the background to the later stage of the rendition discussions. 
The Nationalist Advance 
On 7 April 1928, after a long lull, the Nationalist government launched the 
second phase of its Northern Expedition. ' Chiang Kai-stick had emerged as the 
dominant figure in the Nationalist camp and allied himself with two northern 
warlords, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. On the northern side (known as the 
`Fengtian' or `Ankuochun' forces), Chang Tso-lin had made an alliance with 
Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang, both based in Shantung. The second 
phase of the Northern Expedition saw the KMT restructure their approach to 
dealing with the foreign powers. However, their main objective, to abrogate the 
unequal treaties, was still on the agenda. Their approach was to avoid any 
confrontation with the powers and in doing so Chiang Kai-shek expressed his 
' Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928, pp. 173-5 and Iriyc, fiter Imperialism, 
p. 193. 
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willingness to respect foreign lives and property. 2 Furthermore, the Central 
Executive Committee of the KMT had agreed that the struggle against the 
foreigners should concentrate more on diplomatic measures. 3 This pledge was 
repeated by Feng Yu-hsiang, who said on the eve of the Northern Expedition that 
he was willing to protect the foreign interests. 4 
This promise, however, could not guarantee foreigners protection from the 
indirect impact of war on normal life in north China. The war, as before, affected 
transportation, telegraph and telephone services and missionary works, and 
hampered trade in the area. The situation is illustrated by comments from S. Evan 
Meech, an LMS missionary worker 
Since Chang [Tso-lin]'s departure the railway service has been 
stopped, the cars being wholly in the hands of the retreating 
troops. As a consequence we have had only three deliveries of 
mail from outside in these ten days. But a daily delivery is 
promised by road. 5 
There were relatively minor and by now familiar inconveniences. The most serious 
event in this war was the 3 May 1928 Tsinan Incident when the Japanese troops, 
trying to protect Japanese interests in Tsinan, clashed with Nationalist forces, 
sparking alarm once more among foreigners. One of these described how: 
... Tsinanfu 
had fallen to the Southerners and it was reported 
that Techow had fallen. The murder of Dr. Seymour at Tsining 
and the trouble between the Chinese and the Japanese at Tsinan 
2 Mye, After Imperialism, pp. 193-4. 
3 P. Cavendish, `Anti-Imperialism in the Kuomintang 1923, ' Jerome Ch'en and Nicholas Tarling 
(eds. ), Studies in the Social History of China and S *Uii-East Asia (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1970), pp. 42-3. 
4 PRO F0371/13231 Translation of letter from Feng Yu-hsiang to H. M. Minister, I May 1928. 
5 SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 26,1928-1929 I, Letter from S. Evans 
Meech to F. H. Hawkins, Pddng, 13 June 1928. 
6 lriye, After ImperialiSIN pp. 199-204. 
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with accompanying looting of Japanese houses and the murders 
of Japanese civilians ... 
Memories of the bloody incident in Nanking increased concerns about the safety of 
Tientsin. 











THE ROAD HOG 
Source: The North China Herald May 12,1928, p. 213. 
Figure 4.1: Sapajou's caricature of the news from Shanghai was clearly also the 
view from Tientsin about the advance of Chinese troops to north China. Around 
1927-1928 the British community were very anxious about their fate as the 
7 SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 26,1928-1929 1, Letter from M. F. 
Dawson to F. H. Hawkins, Peking, 16 May 1928. 
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Chinese advanced on Tientsin. One by one, incidents in China were occurring, 
starting with the Shameen Incident (Canton), the May Thirtieth Incident 
(Shanghai), the Hankow Incident, the Nanking Incident and the Tsinan Incident, all 
of which involved foreigners under attack. The Chen-O'Malley agreement 
regarding the Chinese takeover of the British Hankow concession had not yet 
improved the British position in China$ The cartoon clearly links the trouble at 
Nanking with Tsinan. The Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek also 
used the Tsinan Incident to mobilise the masses, especially the students, against 
Japanese imperialism! Owing to this, the British in Tientsin feared that the next 
place to be endangered would be Tientsin, where the memory of the Boxer 
Uprising began to haunt them, leading them to call on their government for 
protection. 1° 
There were concerns that unless precautionary measures were implemented 
similar danger to that which faced Shanghai in spring 1927 would threaten 
Tientsin. " At this point the BMC was able to do little to protect the British 
concession as it needed the approval of the British minister and the Consul 
General. Therefore these measures were dealt with by the British government. 
The British community's worries increased and they turned to the British 
government for help. The British government endeavoured to secure its interests 
by adopting two actions. Firstly, they decided to evacuate all foreigners from the 
Louis, British Strategy in the Far Fast, p. 160. 
9 Jeffrey N. WassersU m, Student Protests in Twentieth-Cenfivy China: the view from Shanghai 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), PP-157-8- 
10 SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, "Memorandum No. 26, The 
Treaty Port of Tientsin". 
II Louis, British Strategy in the Far East, p. 131. 
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interior to Tientsin, and second, to defend Tientsin and routes from Peking to the 
sea. The first action urged the missionaries to retreat to Tientsin. 
Missions in the interior seemed to adopt a different view of the situation in 
spring 1928. In 1927, they had appeared determined not to evacuate, but in 1928 
the missionaries believed that the advance of Nationalist troops could be 
problematic. The news from Tsinan, the killing of two American nationals - Dr. 
Seymour in Tsining and Mrs. Hobart by bandits in Taian - and the kidnapping of a 
Dr. Osborn by an unknown group (possibly bandit) had greatly alarmed them. To 
avoid trouble from the advancing troops, they decided that the situation was 
serious. The British Consul General in Tientsin had also ordered that evacuation 
was necessary in advance of the arrival of Nationalist troops in the north. 12 
When this telegram was conveyed to the missionaries in Tsangchow, they 
moved in spring 1928 with haste and without complaint. 13 The missionaries in 
Siochang also took this advice and began to move from their station in May 1928. 
Tientsin became the centre of their evacuation. 14 As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Chang Tso-lin was regarded as the `protector of the foreigners'. When the 
Nationalist troops succeeded in defeating the Northerners, the fate of the inland 
missionaries became uncertain. The repeated defeat of the Northern Troops in 
Shantung, beginning in April 1928, signalled that evacuation was imperative, and 
12 PRO F0371/13231 Letter from Sir E. Howard to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Enclosure No. 1, 
Washington, 24 May 1928 and SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 26, 
1928-1929 I, North China Executive Committee Minutes, Tientsin, 11 May 1928. 
" SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 10, Report for 1928-1931, Report by Edith Murry, 
Tsangchow, 19 February 1928. 
14 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 10, Report for 1928-1931, Report by Ethel S. Livens, 
Sisochang, January 25 1929. 
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the missionaries believed that it would be dangerous to remain at their station. '-5 
Their journey to Tientsin was completed without problems, although the Peking- 
Pukow railway was not running properly and Northern troops were still lingering 
in the interior. 
Disagreement over the Defence Plan 
The second action, as mentioned earlier, was to defend British interests in 
Tientsin and its hinterlands. However, this option created a divergent view 
between the British Legation and the British Commandant. The British Legation 
and its colleagues in Peking disagreed about their commandant's plan. The British 
Commandant, Colonel Ronald Heath, favoured the opinion of General Arai, the 
Japanese commander, regarding the defence of the foreign concessions in Tientsin. 
According to Heath, this step was necessary and correct in order to prevent another 
Tsinan Incident. 16 Heath still believed that the Chinese could be controlled through 
a `gunboat' policy. His option was to strengthen and uphold the Boxer Protocol in 
defence of British interests, and he proposed imposing a 20 li radius zone around 
Tientsin. The imposition of this zone would allow foreign troops to guard foreign 
interests, while Chinese troops, whether Northerner or Nationalist, would not be 
allowed to enter the zone. It is uncertain whether Heath's decision was influenced 
by the BMC as there are few sources on the BMC's thoughts about the advance of 
the Northern Expedition to North China. Certainly the nationalist movement 
caused great concern in Tientsin. In short, Heath's view challenged the British 
's SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Bolt 26,1928 - 1929 i, Latter from C. E. 
Busby to H. F. Hawkins, Siaochang, 13 July 1928. 
16 PRO F0228/3785 Telegram fron O. C. Troops, Tientsin Area to G. O. C. North China Command, 
Shanghai, 8 May 1928. 
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government to mend its good relationship with the Chinese. This was a big task 
for the Foreign Office and the British Legation, but was necessary in order to avoid 
any incident with the Chinese which could ignite anti-British movement in North 
China. 
Sir Austen Chamberlain was worried by this plan. First, he would not 
allow the British to become involved in any Japanese scheme which could damage 
Britain's image. '7 The Foreign Office saw this incident as a serious case which had 
to be handled with great care to avoid further destruction of British interests. In 
facing this problem, Chamberlain did not want Lampson and Heath adopting a 
policy which would create trouble for the British not only in the north but also in 
the whole of China-18 Chamberlain did not want a repeat of the May Thirtieth 
Incident in 1925. Although that originated as a Japanese problem, it eventually also 
became a major problem for the British. 19 In the end, the military's plan was 
unacceptable to the foreign Ministers in Peking. The Japanese Minister himself 
would not back it. The French Charge d'Affairs took the same attitude and ordered 
the French commander not to adopt any plan without approval from the Diplomatic 
Body. The Americans had stated their opposition on this matter. The Japanese 
Minister still had to think about precautions after the Tsinan Incident which led 
him to have reservations about the plan. At this point the British Legation seemed 
inclined not to support Japan. 20 Furthermore, Lampson's suggested solution was to 
offer passive defence to the Chinese troops by only defending the concession, and, 
17 PRO F0228/3785 Telegram from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Miles Lampoon, 9 May 1928. 
1° St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 10 May 1928, Kille am Diaries and PRO F0229/3785 
Telegram from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Miles Lampeon, 12 May 1928. 
19 Nicholas R. Clifford, Spoilt Chlkfen of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese 
Revolution of die 1920s (Hanover. University Press of New England, 1991), p. 100. 
20 PRO F0228/3785 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, 12 May, 1928. 
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if the Chinese troops became bolder, to put up a fence around its border. He did 
not want provocative measures taken which would cause more damage than good 
to the foreigners. 21 In other words, Lampson was very cautious about every step 
taken by the British Legation to protect British interests. Any move or action by 
the British Legation in Tientsin and its hinterlands had to avoid confrontation with 
the Chinese. 
After failing to convince the Diplomatic Body, the foreign Commandants 
proposed another plan. According to them, they had agreed to establish restricted 
areas in Tientsin which the Chinese troops could not enter. 22 Heath gave the 
reasoning behind this plan: "... [i]t was considered essential to issue this notice 
now, so that in the event of a general withdrawal of the Fengtien forces, the 
Concessions should not be in danger by [firm] disorganized retreating soldiers. "23 
This indicates that Heath still wanted to employ military action to deter the Chinese 
activists in Tientsin. In response to this, Lampson stressed that the plan had come 
from a purely military perspective and did not consider the political situation, 
which would endanger not only them but all foreign interests in China. 24 The 
American Commander, General Castner, after discussion with the American 
Consul-General in Tientsin, Mr. Gauss, declared that they would not comply with 
the notification. 23 Owing to this opposition, the notification plan was also dropped. 
21 PRO F0228/3785 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampoon to Foreign office, 15 May, 1928. 
' PRO F022813785 Telegram from Sir James Jameison to Peking, No. 20,20 May 1928 and 
Telegram Office' Commanding, H. B. M's Troops, Tientsin Area to H. B. M. 's Minister for China, 
Tientsin, 22 May, 1928. 
PRO F022813785 Telegram Officer Commanding, H. B. M's Troops, Tientsin Area to H. B. M. 's 
Minister for China, Tientsin, 22 May, 1928. 
24 PRO F0228/3785 Confidential fives Sir Miles Lsmpson, 23 May 1928. 
25 PRO F022813785 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, 23 May 1928. 
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The disagreement between the military commander, the Legation and the 
Consul General was wide-ranging. Heath, with his military plan, wanted more 
precautions taken. On one occasion he suggested the occupation of Nankai 
University, which was located very near to the British Concession, as a preventive 
measure. ' Heath's plan was supported by the British Municipal Council (BMC). 
They argued that it was necessary to occupy the buildings to avoid disorder from 
the Chinese troops. ' In response to this, Consul General Jamieson opposed any 
attempt to send notification to occupy the university. The occupation of the 
university would undoubtedly harm the British, because it was the centre of 
Chinese student activity in Tientsin. 28 The BMC and Health had clearly learnt 
nothing from student disturbances in Shanghai. In short, both the BMC and 
Heath's actions and views contradicted the British liberal policy, which aimed to 
mend relations with the Chinese. The British Legation succeeded in overruling 
Heath's plan for military action. 
Under the Nationalist Troops 
However, the actual transition in Tientsin was generally peaceful. There 
was only some minor fighting in the vicinity and in the Chinese city. Northern 
troops began their evacuation on 4 June 1928 after defeats in Shantung and 
Hope? The transition took place on 12 June 1928, when Chang Tsung-chang 
agreed to give up his power to Yen Hsi-shan's representative Fu Tzo-yi in his 
I PRO F0228/3786 Enclosure No. I to Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamleson's dispatch No. 54 of the 
26 May 1928 to H. M. Minister, Peking. 
27 PRO F0228/3786 Enclosure No. 2 to Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's dispatch No. 54 of the 
26 May 1928 to H. M. M nister, Peking. 
" PRO F0228/3786 Latter from Sir J. Jamieson to Sir Miles Leunpeon, Tientsin, 17 May 1928. 
29 PRO F0371/13194 Letter from Sir Miles L. amPson to Lord Cushendun, Enclosure No. 1, 
Peking, 10 August 1928 (260) After the Nationalist troops captured Chihii, the province was 
renamed Hopei. 
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capacity of Garrison Commander. In addition, Fu Tzo-yi's power was supported 
by General Chang Chi-ying, Chief of the Tientsin Police Bureau. 30 On Fu Tzo-yi's 
appointment, he had expressed a friendly attitude towards the foreigners and 
pledged to restore trade in the city. 
31 However, the Chinese city was in a bad state 
when, on the night of 12 June 1928, looting forced shopkeepers to close their 
shops. This chaotic situation was caused by so-called `plain-clothes men' who had 
the city under a reign of terror. 32 The foreign concessions also took precautionary 
measures as a result. 33 
When Peking and Tientsin were deemed safe, Lampson worried about the 
KMA plant and mines at Tongshan M By the end of April 1928 the defeated 
Chihli-Shantung troops (the Fengtian allies) had dominated the area. The route 
from Tongshan to Kuyeh on the Peking-Mukden Railway, and goods and 
passengers, were at a standstill. The defeated Chinese troops were undisciplined 
and disorganised. The KMA made proactive attempts to avoid disturbances. 
Because the British government would not commit to taking military action in 
order to nurture good relations with the Chinese, the KMA had to act moderately 
with the Chinese troops _It provided the troops with food, although this could not 
guarantee their safety because food supplies were steadily in decline 33 Things 
were made worse by Chang Tsung-chang's threat that he would attack the mines if 
30 The North China Herald 16 June 1928, p. 450. 
" PRO F0371/13171 Enclosure to Peking dispatch No. 721 of 2 July 1928 Consul-General Sir J. W. 
Jamieson to H. M. Miinister, Peking. 
32 Ibid. Sources regarding the plain-clothes men are still unclear in terms of who they belonged to; 
whether the Nationalist, Communist or Northerners. However they could have been the remaining 
Northern troops, who had been defeated. 
33 PRO F0371/13231 Enclosure to Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's dispatch No. 98 of the 26 
June, 1928 to H. M. Minister, Peking. 
34 Bowie, `Great Britain and the Use of Force in China, 1919 to 1931', p. 300. 
35 PRO F0228/3787 Telegram to Foreign Office, No. 645 of 21 June 1928. 
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the KMA did not pay him. 6 The British staff in KMA were worried that there 
would be danger unless British troops were dispatched to Tongshan. They felt that 
the evacuation option was not wise at this point because evacuation would - in 
their eyes - lead to loss of property, prestige and cooperation with Chinese traders. 
Therefore they felt it was necessary for the British government to dispatch troops 
to Tongshan. 37 At the same time, in early June 1928, American troops stationed at 
Tongshan withdrew. 38 Owing to this situation and to avoid causing problems for 
the KMA mines and their employees, on 23 June 1928 British troops were 
dispatched from Weihaiwei 39 They managed to control and protect foreign lives 
and property in Tongshan. Then in early September 1928 the arrival of Kwangsi 
troops under General Pai Chung-hsi (Nationalist allies) to disarm the remaining 
northern troops settled the problem. There was some fighting between both troops 
in the mining area, but the foreigners were largely unharmed., 0 
Another challenge to British liberal policy was the communist threat. The 
communists, who had targeted British interests, might make it difficult for the 
British to mend Anglo-Chinese relations. The communists also tried to stage a 
disturbance by encouraging the emergence of several labour trade unions in the 
Tientsin district, but the Nationalist government's anti-communist policy 
undermined the existence of such unions. 41 Luckily the Nationalist authority in 
36 Bowie, `Great Britain and the Use of Force in China, 1919 to 1931', p. 301. Cite fmni Sir K 
Lempson, H. M. Minister, Peking, to Foreign Office; 5 June 1928. F2848/2496, PRO F0371/13232. 
37 PRO F0228/3787 Telegram to Foreign Office, No. 645 of 21 June 1928. 
-" British Library, IOLR, L/PS/1011202, F3299/2255/10, Extract fran the "United States Daily" of 
June 6,1928. 
" PRO F0371/13184 Letter f Olfs Sir J. Jamieson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Enclosure No. 1, 
T cutsin, 2 July 1928. 
40 PRO F0371/13184 Tientsin Political Report for Quarter ended 30 September 1928. 
41 Ibid. 
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North China suppressed the communist movement. To bring about peace and order 
after the capture of Tientsin, Fu Tso-yi arrested 300 to 400 agitators, beheading 60 
to 70 of them. 42 He was helped by Sun Chia Nai, head of the General Affairs 
Department in the Police Office, who had suppressed the plain-clothes' activity in 
the Chinese City. 43 Another problem arose concerning against British interests in 
the TACC, where Chinese students tried to cause problems for the administrators 
by boycotting classes and examinations. However, with help from their Chinese 
staff the college managed to control the situation. The student agitation failed to 
persuade other Chinese students to boycott the college. 44 The main reason that the 
Chinese students backed down was that the local Chinese authority suppressed 
nationalist activism. The real threat of capital punishment for anybody involved in 
such activities halted Chinese activism in Tientsin. 
The general situation in North China is described in J. D. Liddell's report 
below: 
North China has not suffered at all from "Red" propaganda as 
the South, and there has not been anything in the nature of 
massacre, confiscation of property, or even occupation of 
property by the Armies, and forcible possession of foreign 
premises, as was the case in the South. None of the horrors of a 
Hankow, or a Nanking were experienced, and up till now there 
has been very little interference with the normal life of either 
Chinese or Foreigners. 45 
'o PRO F0371/13231 Enciosurt to Ccs sul-Gent ai Sir J. W. Jamidon's dispatch No. 98 of the 26 
June 1928 to H. M. Minister, Peking. 
"3 Ibid. 
µ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 10,1928, Report of A. P. Cullen, Tientsin, North China, 
23 February 1928. 
45 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 10,1928, Report of 1928 by J. D. Liddell, Tientsin, 
North China. 
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This statement illustrates that the Nationalist Troops under Chiang Kai-shek 
seriously wanted to avoid confrontation with the foreigners and took diplomatic 
measures to settle their relations with foreign powers. 46 In short, the second phase 
of the Northern Expedition created little trouble for the British interests. The 
missionaries were also glad to find the situation normal after they moved back to 
their station at the end of August 1928.47 Overall the British Legation and 
Consulate at Tientsin succeeded in preventing the British community, especially 
the BMC, from taking action which could damage Anglo-Chinese relations. 
The successful occupation of Peking (6 June 1928) and Tientsin (12 June 
1928) did not mean that the Chinese challenge was over. The new regime 
continued to demand the abrogation of foreign privileges " Concurrently with this 
effort, the Nationalist government implemented it takeover of the Chinese 
municipal administration in Tientsin, beginning with the health office. Before 
1928, especially in Yuan Shih-kai's era, both Chinese and foreigners were 
employed in the Chinese department. The KMT began to employ only Chinese in 
the health department and the Nationalist government planned a hospital to cater 
for its people, who until then had depended on the missionary hospital. 49 This was 
a challenge to the British community to recognise the reality of the new Chinese 
government. Before the KMT army occupied Tientsin, negotiations for the 
rendition of the British concession were under way. In this section I have shared 
the basic contours of the situation in 1927 - 1928 and the real and perceived threats 
46 Cavendish, `Anti-Imperialism in the Kuomintang 1923', pp. 41-3. 
47 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 10,1928, Report of 1928 by W. F. Rowland, Slaochang. 
45 Lee En-hon, `China's Recovery of the British Hankow and Kiukiang Concessions in 1927', 
Occasional Paper No. 6, August 1980 (University of Western Australia, Centre for East Asian 
Studies), pp. 23-4. 
49 Rogaski, Hygienk Modendty, pp. 188.9 and 234-5. 
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to Tientsin and British interests in its hinterland cause by the phase of the 
nationalist revolution. During this period an intense political and diplomatic 
debate over rendition had also taken place, and to this we now turn. 
The Rendition Issue, 1927 
Against the backdrop of civil war and Sino-Japanese tension in the north, 
discussion of treaty revision had commenced. The previous chapter describes the 
British community's reactions to the new British China policy. One of the steps 
taken under this policy was discussion of the return of the British concession in 
Tientsin to the Chinese authorities. This policy was proclaimed in the second 
memorandum on 27 January, 1927: 
His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss and enter 
arrangements, according to particular circumstances at each 
port concerned, for the modification of Municipal 
Administration of British concessions, so as to bring than into 
line with the administrations of Special Chinese 
Administrations set up in former Concessions, or for their 
amalgamation with former Concessions not under Chinese 
control or for the transfer of police control of Concession Areas 
to the Chinese Authorities 30 
The above statement was clearly a shock to the majority of the British community, 
whose rights in the concession never been questioned before. As a consequence, 
the community tried to show how this news affected business confidence. A fall in 
Tientsin land values and municipal debentures in 1927 was a case in point. The 
banks would not facilitate the lending of money to the municipality, and investors 
50 PRO F0674/241 A Mcnxarandwn on the History of the Negotiations for Retrocession of the 
British Concession of Tientsin, from Febvary, 1927 to August, 1928 and The North China Herdd 
12 February 1927, p. 218. 
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waited for further developments before deciding on investing in the concession " 
This worried certain of the British residents, and one comment regarding this was 
highlighted by R C. Allen, Manager of the local branch of the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank. He noted that: 
The fears expressed in my telegram of 25th January, that the 
declaration would cause a serious fall in the values of property 
and local securities here were only too fully justified when the 
terms of the offer were made public. Within two days no 
buyers could be found for British Municipal Bonds which up 
till then had a ready sale at par.... Since the declaration, 
dealings inland have been practically at a standstill, though 
cases have been reported of land in the extra mural area 
changing hands at something like one third of its value as 
estimated immediately before the declaration, such transactions 
clearly indicating apprehension on one side and speculation on 
the other. 52 
This fall in value also affected other property values, including the bank's own 
properties. This was recorded by Allen in his letter, saying that the buyers seemed 
to be awaiting further developments before dealing with the bank after the British 
government declared their policy. 53 However, Chamberlain doubted that the fall in 
land values and municipal debentures were caused by British policy. He pointed 
out that the falls were due to the seizure of the Hankow concession. M Lampson, 
though, still believed that these falls were related to the announcement of British 
liberal policy on 24 January 1927.55 
51 HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 427 Managerial Cartspondumv, Letter from A. B. Lowson to 
R. C. Allen, Shanghai, 27 January 1927 and PRO F0228/3179 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson 
to Foreign Office, Peking, 26 February 1927. 
52 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 1146 Letter ßom R. C. Allen to A. B. Lowson, 16 March 1927. 
53 Ibid. 
54 PRO F0229/3179 Teegram from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Wiles Lampson, 3 March 1927. 
11 PRO F0228/3179 Telegram from Sir Milos Lampoon to Foreign Office, Peking, 7 March 1927. 
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The BMC also voiced its opposition to Chamberlain's opinion that it was 
not the news of the British government's plan in principle to return the British 
concession in Tientsin that had caused the fall in value. The Vice Chairman of the 
BMC, W. J. Warmsley, reinforced this point, and clamed that land values in other 
concessions had remained the same, and in fact the demand for land in the Italian 
concessions had increased, as there was no change of status to this concession. His 
statement went further: "... the effect of disturbance elsewhere in China has 
hitherto been precisely contrary to what H. M. Secretary of State "56 At 
this point Warmsley stressed that, "[d]isturbance elsewhere has invariably had the 
effect of increasing the demand for land in the British Concession and so 
enhancing the market price". 57 This was because the instability in China had led 
the Chinese businessmen and politicians to secure their interests by keeping their 
money in foreign banks and buying land in the concession. " 
Whatever the reason behind the decline, the British community in Tientsin 
was in shock at the drastic decision of its government to return the concession. " 
Allen's letter to A. B. Lowson shows that the British government's decision also 
affected Tientsin's Chinese community: 
There is something rather ironical in the situation when 
the British Government consider that they are making a most 
generous offer (incidentally of their national interest and assets) 
to the Chinese, to find that while the so called Peking 
Government and their military masters may welcome the 
under-lying possibility of getting their hands on the Municipal 
56 PRO F0228/3179 Enclosure to Consul-Genwal Sir J. W. Jamieson's dispatch No. 28, of 19 
March 1927, to H. M. Minister, Pelting. 
57 Ibid. 
Te Times, June 9,1927, p. 13. 
5' PRO F022813179 Report of a Joint Meeting of the China Association, Tientsin Branch, and the 
Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce and other British Subjects Interested Held in the Gordon 
Hall at 5.15 P. M. on Friday 8 April 1927. 
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Revenues and being in a position to extort money from 
foreigners, the Chinese community of Tientsin, or at any rate 
the property owning and business class, regard the offer with 
undisguised consternation. Some are even reported as saying 
that the British Government's action is a betrayal of trust in the 
case of those Chinese who showed their confidence in the 
security of a British Concession rather than in the 
administration of their own people, whether that of the so- 
called Chinese Government or the district military rulers 60 
Allen remarks that neither the British community nor the Chinese living in the 
British concession would benefit from this rendition! ' This was another of the 
British community's statements to show that the status quo of the concession 
should be retained because the British administration was a good model which 
protected not only the foreigners but also the Chinese in the concession. 
Nevertheless at this juncture the British subjects' attitude in Tientsin could 
be described as "... in strong disagreement, [but] bound in loyalty to H. M. 
government to accept the decision. " P. H. B. Kent, makes it clear here that the 
majority of the British community was strongly in opposition to the more liberal 
British. However, the community could not totally reject the British government 
because "... the decision of H. M. Government in this matter was irrevocable and 
any attempt to alter it would be firtile. "63 As mentioned in Chapters One and Two, 
the British Minister and Consul General controlled the BMC, unlike the SMC, 
where the power largely on vested on their electorate 64 In these circumstances the 
60 HSBC Group Archives, SHO H 46 Letter fimn R C. Allen to A. B. L, owson, 16 March 1927. 
61 As Roßaski stated that ". .- Western medicines do the best job for all bodies [the Chinese). " This 
statement tried to show that only the Westerners could help the Chinese in many aspects such as in 
medication to development in Chine. See Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, pp. 227-33. 
62 PRO, FO 228/3646, Letter from P. H. B. Kent, Chairman, Advisory Committee to Sir James 
Jamieson, the British Consul-General in Tientsin, 10 November 1927. 
61 Ibid. 
64 Robert Bickers, Britain to China, p. 127. 
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`loyalty' of the British community was called upon to accept the changes to the 
BMC. Therefore instead of opposing it strongly, the majority of the British 
community had to seek other avenues which would ensure that they would avoid 
losing the majority of their interests. This view came mostly from the big British 
firms, especially those listed in Appendix 2, which did not want their interests 
jeopardised and wanted British policy to support them in staying in Tientsin and its 
hinterland. 
The British communities in Tientsin took dual action. The first measure 
has been highlighted as their effort to establish the TBCI (see chapter 2), which 
became their voice in protecting their rights in China. In addition they used 
newspapers and pamphlets to bring their case to public and government attention. 
The second approach was to participate with any associations and committees 
involved in rendition negotiations, to avoid any disappointment to than if the 
rendition actually took place. The British in Tientsin realised that their 
government's decision was irrevocable and any attempt to oppose it would be 
futile. So if the rendition finally happened they would not lose all they had in 
Tientsin and its surroundings if they took part in the negotiations. The British in 
Tientsin feared a similar situation to that which had happened to the Hankow 
concession, which had put all the power within its Council into the hands of the 
Chinese authorities, thus undermining the Council's independence 65 In short, the 
big British traders were fast learners and took the Hankow agreement as proof that 
they could not continue to ignore the changes happening in China. They agreed 
65 cuL, The Manuscripts Reading Room, MS im 329/1-7, JMA, Copy of telegram Tientsin to 
L*ndon Despatched 21 March 1927. 
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that they should participate in any agreement with the Chinese in order to avoid big 
business losses. 
At this point Consul General Sir James Jamieson tried to enlist the support 
of the British community by asking several liberal Britons, especially those from 
the big British firms, to form a committee which would give the British community 
the opportunity to voice its opinion on rendition. " Jamieson understood that 
approaching these big firms would make the British policy easier to implement. 
The British firms, aware that Chinese nationalism could jeopardise their interests, 
were willing to make great efforts to mend any loopholes between themselves and 
the Chinese in order to avoid more Chinese attacks on their interests, not only in 
Tientsin, but also in other parts of China. 67 
The rendition issue was brought to the attention of all British residents in 
Tientsin in early 1927. A meeting was held on 7 February 1927, attended by 282 
people, including not only British subjects but also the Tientsin branch of the 
China Association and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce. " This meeting 
emphasised that the British community had to unite and find a collective way to 
protect its interests. It was agreed that government policy should be followed to 
modify the British concession in Tientsin. In order to look after their interests, the 
meeting came to the conclusion that it would approve the formation of a 14-strong 
Advisory Committee. These men were R. C. Allen (HSB), J. M. Dickinson 
66 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11 46 Letter from R. C. Allen to A. B. L. owson, 16 March 1927. 
67 J{ g Osterhummi, `Imperialism in Transition', p. 282. 
68 PRO F0674/241, 'A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for Retrocession of the 
British Concession of Tientsin, from February 1927 to August 1928'. 
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(William Forbes and Co. ), A. H. George (unknown), W. M. Howell (Butterfield & 
Swire), P. H. B. Kent (Kent & Mounsey), H. W. Matheson (unknown), Howard 
Payne (Collins & Co. ), E. C. Peters (Peter & Co. ), R. K. Rodger (Butterfield & 
Swire), James Turner (Eastern Engineering Work, Ltd. ), D. B. Walker (unknown), 
W. J. Warmsley (Arnold, Karberg & Co. ), P. C. Young (KMA) and J. R. Lyness 
(unknown). 69 The members of this committee came from the big British firms 
such as KMA, Butterfield & Swire and Collins & Co., most of which had 
considerable interests locally. In brief this committee's task was to: 
... prepare a statement setting forth the manifold dangers 
against which it was necessary to guard, to formulate definite 
proposals regarding the future municipal government of the 
British Municipal Area, and to communicate the result of their 
labours to His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for the 
consideration of H. B. M. Government 70 
From this statement it is clear that the Advisory Committee, which represented the 
British community, had stated their real reaction towards the new British policy, 
which was that they wanted their rights to be safeguarded. One of the British 
subjects who attended the meeting mentioned that "... we want the Committee to 
feel that any agreement has got [to] be agreeable not only to the Chinese but to 
us. "" The above illustrates the British trader community's desire for a win win 
solution to discussions about rendition. In addition, the Advisory Committee 
would become the united voice of the British community in protecting their 
interests and rights in the Sino-British negotiations and became the medium of 
communication between the British communities and the British government. This 
0 PRO F022813179, `Minutes of a Joint Meeting of the China Association (Tientsin Branch) and 
the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce. Tientsin, 7 February 1927'. 
70 PRO F0674/241, `A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for Retrocession of the 
British Concession of Tientsin, from February 1927 to August 1928'. 
" PRO F0228/3179, `Minutes of a Joint Meeting of the China Association (Tientsin Branch) and 
the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, Tientsin, 7 February 1927'. 
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meant that the committee had a duty to recommend any plan which could protect 
British interests in Tientsin. M 
Negotiation 
Before the British residents' meeting above, on 28 January 1927, the British 
Minister handed the treaty revision programme to the Waichiaopu (Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Northern Government). Owing to the protest of 
the Chinese government regarding British troops in Shanghai, further discussion 
was delayed. It was only on 1 March 1927 that the Peking authorities informed the 
British Legation of the appointment of three of their delegates, 73 although this 
created problems with faction groups in Peking. On 2 April 1927, the Fengtian 
Group sent a letter requesting to send three of its representatives. 74 Thus the 
Fengtian group sent Hu Shih-tse, E. Dzau and Van Ho Fang to Tientsin. Then Jen 
Chih-shang and Chuang Ching-k'o from the Governor of Chihli Province (Chuang 
Ching-k'o also represented the Waichiaopu) also came down to participate in the 
negotiations. " This caused several delays to the negotiations in April 1927. 
However, on the British side there was no problem in selecting delegates. The 
delegation was led by Sir James W. Jamieson, the British Consul-General in 
Tientsin. Two other delegates were Kent, 76 Chairman of the local branch of the 
n Ibid. 
'3 The British Library, IOLR, L/PS/10/1197, F5333/1872/10 Letter from Sir Miles Lamps to Sir 
Austen Chamberlain, Peking. 8 June 1927. 
74 PRO F0228/3179 Letter from Sir Miles LarnpsOn to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Tientsin, 23 April 
1927. 
's PRO F0228/3179 Enclosure No. 2 in Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's Despatch No. 48 of 16 
April 1927, Notes of Meeting held on Monday 11 April 1927. 
76 HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from G. H. Hankinson to the Manager, ne Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd., Joh bug, Tientsin, 18 June 1934. 
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China Association, and P. C. Young, n the BMC Chairman. 78 Kent and Young were 
both members of the Advisory Committee. These nine men formed a Joint 
Commission to discuss various issues regarding finance, police, trust deeds, 
franchises and the administration of the municipality. 
Discussion of rendition can be divided into three points. First, the Chinese 
authorities wanted more power and to recover sovereignty in Tientsin from the 
British administration. Additionally, the Northern government wanted to show 
that it also had nationalist feelings79 to counter the Nationalist government, which 
had succeeded in reclaiming the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. 
They were very dominant in discussions among the Chinese delegation. They 
began to put the issue of Chinese power and sovereignty at the head of their 
discussion, and in the negotiations they wanted to create a President as the sole 
power in the municipality. In their eyes, the President ought to have veto powers 
and the same position as the Chairman of the municipality. Furthermore, an 
official Chinese Executive Secretary should be appointed to help the President. 
The Chinese Executive Secretary would officiate over municipal decisions and 
coordinate the work of all municipal departments. s° Tsao wanted five Chinese 
nationals to be appointed among the nine members of the Council. He added that 
other nationalities apart f om Britons and Americans should not be allowed to sit 
" Young was a General Manager of KMA. See Carol Lunt, The China Who's Who 1927 
(For+eign): A Biographical Dictionary (London: Walter Judd, Ltd., 1927), p. 283. 
PRO F0674/241 A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for Retrocession of the 
British Concession of Tientsin, from February 1927 to August 1928. PRO F0674/241 A 
Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for Retrocession of the British Concession of 
Tientsin, from February 1927 to August 1928. 
7' Waldron, From war to nadoiadbw pp. 234 and 273. 
80 PRO F0228/3179 Enclosure No. 1. in Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's Despatch No. 50 of 18 
April 1927, Tuesday -12 April 1927. 
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on the Council 81 According to him, the arrangement of the members of the 
council should be five Chinese, three British and one American. The Chairman 
would be elected by the councillors. 82 The Fengtian group went further in their 
attempt to restore sovereignty, denying other nationalities, except for the British, 
any franchise in the new administration. Under this suggestion foreign nationals 
would have the right to live in the concession and pay taxes, but not to vote 83 
Finally the Chinese delegation pointed out that they wanted the Municipal Police to 
become a part of the City Police of Tientsin. 
The British seemed taken aback by the Chinese demands. They were 
worried about the independence of the Council" and about how the President 
having the final say and the majority of the councillors being Chinese would affect 
their own position in the municipality. In order to avoid being dominated by the 
Chinese authorities, the British proposed equality and a limit to the President's 
powers. They agreed to accept the Presidential position, but without any power in 
the municipality, and argued it must be kept away from Council authorities and 
meetings. 85 This point furthers Young's statement, which opposed any interference 
in municipal administration such as the introduction of a President. He echoed the 
Gettysburg Address by Abraham Lincoln, saying that the British concession in 
Tientsin should be "... the government of this Area by the people of the Area for 
81 PRO F022813179 Enclosure No. 1 in Consul-General Sir J. W. Jmnieson's Despatch No. 50 of 18 
April 1927, Thursday - 14 April 1927. a PRO F0228/3179 Enclosure No-1 in Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamleson's Despatch No. 50 of 18 
April 1927, Friday - 13 April 1927. 
83 PRO F0228/3179 Enclosure No. 3 in Consul-Genua' Sir J. W. Jamieson's Despatch No. 48 of 16 
April 1927. 
84 TC(A,, TU Manuscripts Reading Roast, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, Copy of telegram Tientsin to 
London Despatched 21 March 1927. 
" PRO F0228/3179 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin, 14 April 1927. 
in 
the people of the Area, without any nominee or anyone associated with the 
Executive coming from outside ..: 'ss The British used this claim that they were 
upholding the principles of democracy to try to prevent Chinese domination of the 
BMC. To convince the British delegation, Tsao said that the President would not 
interfere in any executive power in the municipality, but would function as a 
monitor to prevent the municipality from committing any violation of Chinese law, 
contravention of their customs or infringement of China's sovereignty. However, 
the British would still not accept the Chinese delegation's argument. The British 
only agreed to put the President in the same position as the British Consul General, 
outside the municipal executive power. They did not want the President to interfere 
in the Council's daily work or to have the power to vote at municipal meetings. "' 
Regarding the composition of the members of the Municipal Council, the 
British representatives suggested equal members. Young suggested that the 
arrangement should be five Chinese, four British and one American. Although this 
simple arithmetic gave the Chinese a simple majority (but not if the Americans and 
the British combined), Tsao rejected it and wanted more Chinese, his suggestion 
being that of the eleven members of the Council, there should be six Chinese and 
five British or Americans. He added that a Chinese should be elected as Chairman 
of the Council, and that the President should be the Chairman. Young put his point 
that the election of a Chinese as Chairman was not a problem, but to make the 
96 PRO F0228/3179 Report of a Joint l ing of the China Association, and the Tientsin British 
Chamber of Commerce and other British Subjects Interested Held in the Goldon Hall at 5.15 pm on 
Friday 8 April 1927. 
87 PRO F0228/3179 Enclosure No. 3 in Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamleson's Despatch No. 48 of 16 
April 1927. 
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President Chairman with a casting vote would not be acceptable. U For the British 
delegation to give the Chinese a majority and the chairmanship would they argued, 
not instil confidence in investors. " The Chinese delegation thought that this was 
not a serious matter, and that the British had brought it up more as a face-saving 
tactic. At this point, Kent suggested that the Chinese could have the chairmanship 
with a casting vote, but that they should be a minority in the Council. This 
suggestion was not supported by the Chinese delegation, which thought that if it 
were to be accepted no Chinese would want to accept the Chairmanship. Finally 
the meeting on 15 April 1927 put this matter to a compromise solution with the 
proposals following: 
The Council shall consist of ten electors of whom five 
shall be Chinese, four British and one American, or British if 
no American is nominated. 
At their first meeting the new Council shall elect a 
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, the senior member by service on 
the Council being Chairman for the purpose of such election. 
The Chairman of the Council shall be a Chinese if any 
Chinese Councillor is willing to act in this capacity ... At all meetings of the Council the Chairman of the 
meeting shall have a second or casting vote 90 
Another issue that the British community felt threatened by was the effort of the 
Chinese to deny the rights of other foreigners to vote. Given that the Chinese 
population was around 90 percent and the British only between 1- 2 percent in the 
concession, it was unwise not include other nationals. This was because the British 
and other nationals had a close relationship. Therefore the British delegation 
accused the effort as undemocratic and "... in bad faith and unfriendly towards the 
a PRO F0228/3179 Enclosure No. 1 in Consul-Gral Sir J. W. Jamieson's Despatch No. 50 of 18 
April 1927, Friday -15 April 1927. 
"PRO F022813179 Enclosure No. 2 in Consul-Genmal Sir J. W. Jamleso's DespoJch No. SO of 18 
April 1927. 
90 PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No. 1 in Consul-Genaal Sir J. W. Jamieson's Despatch No. 50 of 18 
April 1927, Friday -1S April 1927. 
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foreign residents in the area... "91 However, the Chinese argued that the suggestion 
was made to try to avoid any misunderstanding among the Chinese public to give 
back the Germans and the Russian privileges as they had been deprived before. ' 
Jamieson opposed this suggestion because non-extraterritorial nationals such as the 
Germans had contributed much to the development of the concession. To other 
extraterritorial nationals, this suggestion was seen as "... extremely discourteous to 
deprive them of rights which they hitherto enjoyed and which they have exercised 
with due loyalty. "93 The British community was playing a strategic game to avoid 
the Chinese ousting them from power. But Tsao still wanted the other nationals not 
to have a vote in the concession. From this point Tsao mentioned that there were 
two reasons for this proposal; firstly to protect the sovereignty of China, which did 
not allow foreign nationals to vote, and secondly to allow the British to vote 
because the concession was British and they had special rights to it. 4 Tsao's 
proposal shows that the Northern delegation had a nationalist agenda. Though they 
allowed the British to vote, by denying it to other foreign nationals (especially non- 
extraterritorial nations) they could engineer a Chinese majority. However, the 
British delegation still could not accept it, and forwarded the question to be settled 
by the British Minister. Later in the day, Tsao considered that only nationals with 
extraterritorial rights could vote, but he still opposed giving the same rights to 
other nationals who did not have extraterritorial rights. 95 
91 PRO F022813179 Enclosure No. 3 in Consuldiene al Sir J. W. Jamieson's Despatch No. 48 of 16 
April 1927. 
92 Ibid. 
90 PRO F0228/3179 Letter frone Sir James Jamieson to Sir Milos Lampoon, 16 April 1927. 
" PRO F0228/3179 Enclosise No. 1 in Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's Despatch No. 5O of 18 
April 1927, Thursday - 14 April 1927. 
PRO F0228/3179 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampoon, Tientsin, 20 April 1927. 
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On the police matter, the British delegation had no objections but wanted a 
small modification. They proposed that the police in the concession maintain its 
separate identity, and at the same time cooperate with the Chinese police. This 
point was agreed by the Waichiaopu, which added the suggestion that the same 
uniform as the Chinese police wore be introduced but with a distinctively different 
badge. % At this point the British were willing to accept several changes to the 
Police Department but not its independence. The Chinese wanted the police under 
the President rather than the Council. This suggestion was to prevent political 
offenders finding a `safe haven' in the British concession. They did not want the 
Council to be a countersignatory of all arrest warrants, thus slowing the process. 
They wanted the President to have the power to order warrants. Young suggested 
that the endorsement of warrants should be referred back to the President and 
Consul-General. However, the Chinese delegation saw this suggestion as upsetting 
Chinese dignity, as they were trying to prevent foreign interference. w This was 
another matter in which the British did not want the Chinese authorities to have 
total control. Concerned that the Chinese authorities would `interfere' in British 
affairs and interests, the British wanted the British Consul-General to form another 
party to control the Police Department and safeguard British interests. 
Another point which worried the British concerned concession 
bondholders. This was an important matter stressed by the British communities 
represented by Young and Kent. After the fall of municipal debenture values, the 
% PRO F022813179 Enclosure No. 2 in Consuldidkral Sir J. W. Jamieson's Despatch No. 48 of 16 
April 1927, Notes of Meeting held on Monday 11 April 1927. 
97 PRO F0228/3179 Enclosure No. 2 in Consul-General Sir J. W. JA's dispatch No. 50 of 18 
April 1927. 
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bondholders opposed any attempt by the British government to transfer municipal 
assets under Chinese control. 9S The bondholders tried to take legal action against 
any attempt to change the debtor to a third party. 99 The British Municipal Council 
raised cash from bank loans and bond issues. Municipal properties and assets such 
as the Electric and Water Departments and wharves were part of the mortgage to 
secure any loans or bonds. Therefore the bondholders had a right, they argued, to 
decide the future of the concession. This matter also became part of the discussion 
between the delegations. Young explained to the Chinese delegation that some 
security should be imposed not only to gain the confidence of the present 
bondholders but also to get further loans for the new Administration. 100 Therefore, 
it was agreed that a Board of Trust should be established which would consist of 
the British government, the Chinese government and bondholder representatives, to 
take care of the interests of the bondholders. In addition the Electric Department, 
the Water Department and Municipal Bund and Wharves would serve as mortgage 
for the bonds. '0' 
In the end several points were agreed, while uncertain issues such as the 
power of presidents and the franchise remained unsettled. The problem with some 
of these issues, as noted above, was the conflict between the idea of Chinese 
nationalism and opposition to any effort by the Chinese to control the British 
concession. This shows that the British adopted the latter stance, which illustrates 
96 PRO FO228/3179 Letter from Sir Niles Lampoon to the Foreign Office, Peking. 16 April 1927. 
" PRO F0228/3179 Report of a Joint Meeting of the China Association, and the Tientsin British 
Chamber of Commerce and other British Subjects Interested held in the Goldon Hall at 3.15 pm on 
Friday 8 April 1927. 
PRO F0228ß179 Enclosure No. 1 in Consul-Genaal Sir J. W. Jamieson's Despatch No. 50 of 18 
April 1927. 
10 PRO FO674/241A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for the Retrocession of the 
British Concession of Tientsin, from February 1927 to August 1928. 
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how the British community could not suddenly and totally accept the Chinese 
demands. But at the same time, the Nanking Incident put the negotiations at a 
crossroads. The British communities in Tientsin were shocked by the incident, and 
this affected the continuation of the negotiations. Indeed, there were differences of 
opinion as to whether to continue the negotiations at all. 
Diehards vs. Moderates 
In the middle of the negotiations some grievances emerged amongst the 
British community regarding the situation in Hankow and Nanking. In April 1927 
British community diehards saw the Hankow agreement (19 February 1927) as a 
total failure. This group consisted mostly of settlers engaged in business and other 
work in Tientsin (see Appendix 3) whose interests were confined to Tientsin. They 
were only concerned with extraterritorial rights and defended the British 
concession against Chinese control. The group produced several influential 
publications such as the Peking and Tientsin rimes through which they could 
convey their views. The Peking and Tientsin Times described the situation in the 
following terms in April: 
The Hankow agreement, the signature of which, it is 
amazing to remember, was greeted with loud cheers in the 
House of Commons... The safeguards it should have contained, 
and the guarantees that should have been exacted, are lacking, 
with the result that there is nothing to prevent Tom Mann, the 
British Communist, or Roy, the notorious Indian seditionist, 
being nominated and elected, as British members of the 
Council, when the first council is actually elected. 
Relinquishment of foreign control over the police has resulted 
in the virtual withdrawal of police protection, so for as British 
residents are concerned. British residents have recently been 
driven from the streets at the point of the bayonet. [The] 
British bank, the British newspaper, and British factories, have 
been compelled to close down by barefaced intimidation. 
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Strike pickets enter foreign homes and intimidate the 
This statement is the diehards' description of the British community's shock at the 
events in Hankow. The article continued: " ... any modification in the status of 
other British areas should be accompanied by safeguards which will not, as at 
Hankow, prove wholly illusory. " 03 On 24 March 1927 there was further shocking 
news came from Nanking. The Nationalist army had entered the city, attacked 
foreign consulates and killed some foreigners! " In short, this group tried to 
discredit Chinese nationalism, saying that it was inspired by the Russians rather 
than being a spontaneous Chinese patriotic movement. Their depiction of Chinese 
nationalism as "mob action"; "barbarous"; "anti-foreign"; "hideous" and 
"disgusting savagery" created a fearful atmosphere in the British community. tos 
The diehards considered that the British community was not ready to accept 
any drastic changes to its concession, as they felt that the Chinese were not sincere 
about upholding the Hankow Agreement and thus would not respect British Liberal 
policy. 106 The diehards' efforts to convince the British community succeeded in 
persuading the Advisory Committee that the situation in China did not permit any 
agreement with the Chinese. Therefore the Advisory Committee agreed that for 
the time being no agreement should be concluded regarding modification of the 
British Municipal Area in Tientsin. The Advisory Committee did not want British 
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interests in Tientsin to be `gambled' with in the unstable conditions in China with 
war, disturbance, killing and looting happening in most of the country. 107 Lampson 
did not agree to suspend negotiations. He was aware that the situation in Hankow 
was not favourable to safeguarding British interests, but he reminded the 
committee that changing British government policy was not an option. Lampson 
urged that it was important to satisfy Chinese aspirations by offering to return the 
concession. To suspend negotiations would impact negatively on the Chinese, and 
especially lend momentum to Chinese agitation against the Britlsh. 108 
However, some of the British firms did not agree to suspension of the 
negotiations. At the British community's meeting on 8 April 1927, Young spoke 
on the negotiations. His speech touched on whether or not to stop the talks. As a 
prominent KMA manager, he had experience in dealing with the Chinese and held 
a different opinion to that of the rest of the British community, particularly the 
diehards, who saw the disturbance in China as a reason to call a halt to the 
rendition negotiations. Young commented that it would be unwise to break off 
negotiations with Chang Tso-lin at that point because he was a trusted authority in 
the north and he alone would be able to establish peace and order. Furthermore, 
Chang Tso-lin was friendly towards the foreigners. Young, as Chairman of the 
BMC, worried that the KMA would be exposed to danger if negotiations were 
terminated. He used the BMC as a tool to stress his point that the British 
concession would also be in danger if negotiations ceased. 
107 PRO F0228/3179 Letter from P. C. Young to the British Consul-General in Tientsin, 6 April 
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The basis of Young's worries was the outcome of the Nanking Incident in 
1927. The British government in London was considering adopting a `strike-back' 
policy in retaliation for this incident. 109 A meeting of the foreign powers was held 
in Peking and Lampson proposed imposing sanctions on the Nationalist 
government and China. "" At this crucial moment Young was afraid of the 
situation deteriorating if sanctions came into effect and negotiations on rendition 
broke down. The impact on the KMA would be very negative. In such a critical 
situation Young was afraid that breaking off negotiations would cause Chang Tso- 
lin to join the Nationalists in launching an anti-imperialist movement. Therefore 
he stressed that the foreign troops in the north were few and would take a long time 
to reach Tientsin. "` E. S. Little, agent for Imperial Chemical Industries, felt that 
the military impact was not as important as the impact on the future of the 
concession if rendition proceeded, stressing: 
The vile outrages in Nanking are well known to all of you... 
The Southern Party [the KMT] has been there several months 
and have [has] had ample time to settle down and establish 
their authority, yet the only result of our policy of conciliation 
is renewed insults and attacks and the need for complete 
evacuation; in fact, the complete breakdown of all 
arrangements. Hankow is the headquarters of the Nationalists 
and Eugene Chen, in whom so much confidence was reposed, 
is resident there, yet no finger is lifted to protect foreigners but, 
on the other hand, the situation gets steadily worse. 112 
Little used the Nanking Incident and the Hankow agreement to justify his case for 
the British government to avoid gambling Tientsin, another of its prestigious 
interests, in China. Little also pointed out that Chang Tso-lin's troops could not 
109 Megginson, `Britain's Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1923-192T, pp. 618-26. 
110 Kane, 'Sir Hiles Lampson at the Peking L, egadon 1926-1933', pp. 88-94. 
I PRO F022813179, `Report of a Joint Meeting of the China Association, and the Tientsin British 
Chamber of Commerce and other British Subjects Interested, B April 1927. 
112 Ibid. 
181 
protect foreign interests. He said that although Chang Tso-lin had done his very 
best to establish peace and order in the north, the evacuation of the foreigners from 
the interior exemplified that the Powers still did not believe in Chang Tso-lin's 
ability to protect foreign nationals. Hence this situation illustrated that Chang Tso- 
lin was not a fit person to deal with the British delegation on the rendition of the 
concession. 113 
... the Chinese [are] 
incapable of proper civil government and 
protest now may be of some use - after we have given the 
concession away it will certainly be too late. 
It might be as well to remember that though we at 
present live here in peace and quietness in the past in Tientsin 
and Chihli Province have occurred [a] most ferocious massacre 
of foreigners and any weakening of our position might invite a 
repetition of this. 14 
This statement pointed out that some of the British community were not 
comfortable with what was happening to British interests in China. This statement 
also illustrates that past massacres such as had happened in Tientsin during the 
Boxer Uprising, were a salient point for the British community when reconsidering 
whether it could accept Chinese rule. 11,5 
Little's strong rejection of the negotiations for this reason was supported by 
others. H. G. W. Woodhead, well-known as a diehard, agreed that at this stage 
negotiations should not be resumed. With this attitude he pitied the Hankow 
community which had not been consulted about the return of the concession in the 
first place. He continued that not only had British interests in the Hankow 
113 Ibid. 
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agreement not been safeguarded; but that the return of the concession also 
encouraged the extremist element in the Nationalist government to fiuther its 
activities in attacking British interests in China. He did not believe that the 
Chinese government could be relied upon. ' 16 Woodhead did not want the British 
government merely to keep giving its word of assurance about the safety of its 
subjects and how it would protect their interests in China, as these assurances had 
proved valueless in Hankow and Nanking. "7 Woodhead and Little's view was the 
general view of the foreign community in China at this point. This diehard group 
considered Chinese nationalism a sickness which should be settled not by 
conciliation but by a Western military force. ' 18 
But some of the British community did not consider Little and Woodhead's 
view as a good option. A. P. Richards (agent of the Asiatic Petroleum Company) 
wanted negotiations to continue, because as Lampson had said earlier, the 
breakdown of negotiations would be a slap in Chang Tso-lin's face, which would 
jeopardise the security and peaceful conditions in the north. " Young added to his 
argument by highlighting several dangers which would occur if the negotiations 
were broken off. 
We know that Kuo Min Tang agents are at work all over this 
area and we have every reason to believe that a plot is hatching 
directed against Foreigners and against de facto Government in 
Peking. That is a danger from which, for six weeks, only 
Marshal Chang Tso-lin can protect us. Is it wise to say to him 
now, in spite of our promise, we are going to do nothing? .... We know Chang Tsung Chang's troops have been defeated, 
and we know the Southern troops are making their way up the 
16 PRO F0228/3179 Report of it Joint Moiling ... 8 Apri11927. "' Ibid 
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Tientsin-Pukow railway. That is a threat to Chang Tso-lin's 
communications. His troops are in Honan. As soon as Tientsin 
is threatened by an attack from the South, Marshal Chang will 
have to beat a hasty retreat. That will mean the passing through 
Tientsin of a defeated Chinese rabble. 120 
Young's statement again stresses the danger of the British abandoning 
negotiations. As a businessman, he was concerned that the danger from both the 
north and the south was real. 
This is why Young stated that "... [w]hat the Committee recommended to 
you they recommend with a full knowledge of what is taking place, and because 
they believe that what they advise will save us from a repetition of such 
horrors. "'2' His next point clearly tried to convince the British community that by 
showing a liberal attitude further Chinese attacks on British interests would be 
avoided. In addition it would dampen down the Chinese pressure from attack by a 
British concession in Tientsin. At this juncture there were two groups with 
different views regarding whether to urge for suspension of the negotiations or 
otherwise. The debate between these two groups was put to the vote. Finally the 
suggestion by Little and Woodhead to urge for the suspension of the negotiations 
was defeated by a majority supporting Richards' argument 122 In other words, the 
diehards were defeated by expatriates, led by the APC. 
120 Ibid. 
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Delays in the Negotiations 
However the diehards never gave up their fight. The diehard group 
continued to put forward another resolution at the end of July 1927, which stated 
that it would be "... profoundly sceptical in regard both to the willingness and the 
capacity of any Chinese authorities at the present time to fulfil the terms of any 
agreement reached in pursuance of the policy which H. M. government initiated at 
Hankow. "'23 The statement was conveyed to the China Committee, which also 
supported this idea and urged that negotiations should be postponed owing to 
instabilities in China and objections to the Hankow agreement. ' 24 They argued that 
they chose to be attacked rather than to conclude any agreement regarding 
Tientsin. 125 This statement illustrates how the diehards were adamant about not 
returning the British concessions to the Chinese; they would continue to fight any 
attempt to any disturb their interests in China. Further action they took was to 
release a resolution with the British in Shanghai during the winter of 1927 to urge 
the retaking of the Hankow concession and to show no compromise in letting go of 
treaty rights or other special privileges. In addition they urged a halt to 
negotiations on the British Tientsin concession. ' However, the Foreign Office 
would not retreat from their liberal policy and would fulfil their promises to any 
Chinese government. 127 In an effort to influence the British government, 
Woodhead met with Lampson and urged him to halt the negotiations. Lampson, 
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however, could not agree with Woodhead for fear of creating ill feeling towards 
the British government. 128 Furthermore, after Chiang Kai-shek purged the 
communist members from the KMT on 12 April 1927 the British attitude towards 
the KMT softened. '29 
However, the diehard group were never quiet. They seized any opportunity 
to attack British liberal policy - for example during a Conference of Chambers of 
Commerce, the China Association and China Committees in China and Hong Kong 
was held on 6 -7 March, 1928 to discuss the situation in China. In this conference 
the Tientsin delegation pointed out their worries about British trade interest 
wanting: 
1. To impress upon His Majesty's Government the necessity of 
arresting for the present the execution of the proposals 
communicated simultaneously to the Chinese Authorities at 
Peking and at Hankow on January 27th, 1927, believing as they 
do that these proposals, if carried through under present 
conditions, will result in the destruction of British trade in 
China. 
2. To outline briefly those immediate measures which they 
consider essential to the preservation of British Trade interest, 
and which they consider would pave the way to cooperation 
with another Power or other Powers, for the restoration of 
political and economic stability in this country. 130 
This passage illustrates the diehards' attempt to present British opinion in Tientsin 
to the entire British community in China. The wording of the statement from 
Tientsin came solely from this group, urging that: 
121 St. Anthony College, Lamps Diaries, 12 October 1927, Killearn Papers. 
'29 Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1971), pp. 56-7 and Megginson, `Britain's Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1925-1927', 
p. 635. 
130 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/35 China Association, Tientsin Statement, Tientsln 14 January 1928. 
186 
The practical steps advocated above would amount to 
calling a halt, giving the time necessary for a revision of the 
policy [of) H. M. Government in the light of the events of the 
past twelve months. Such steps would also pave the way for 
co-operation with some other Power or Powers, with a view to 
the restoration of political and economic stability in this 
country. 
Whilst in general sympathy with the liberal spirit of 
H. M. Government's declaration of December 18th, 1926, it is 
our opinion that the execution of the Proposals of January 27d', 
1927, is impracticable under existing conditions in China and 
would be disastrous to British trade interests. 131 
This statement challenged the British government's liberal policy as unable to 
ameliorate the situation over a year after it had been introduced. Chinese attacks 
on British interests were still occurring, and several indirect disturbances to trading 
in China such as illegal taxes, worries about the Hankow concession and the 
stagnation of the railway services added to their anxieties about their future in 
China. 
Alternative 
Between the end of 1927 and early 1928, Young worried about the 
diehards' strong resistance to British liberal policy. He was very concerned that 
the continuing opposition was not good for the KMA. However, continuing 
disturbances from the anti-imperialist movement also threatened British interests. 
Young took the middle way to settle this problem. As p resentative of the 
moderate group he had to find a way to stall British liberal policy, save their 
business interests and secure the support of the diehards and a satisfactory outcome 
for the Chinese-132 In order to realise this objective he teamed up with Kent to 
131 Ibid. 
132 Osterhammel, `China', p. 655. 
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devise a new plan that would balance the ideas of the diehards against those of the 
British government. 
This hope was related to new developments in late 1927, with the proposal 
by the local Chinese representative in the BMC urging the elimination of any 
discrimination against the Chinese in the municipality and the giving to the 
Chinese a greater role in the administration of the municipality. "' The BMC 
rejected this proposal, giving the financial difficulties of the municipality as an 
excuse. IM However, more important was the pressure exerted by the diehards 
against the implementation of this proposal. The moderates saw the Chinese 
proposal as an alternative way to satisfy the Chinese and to delay rendition. This 
was the liberal attitude of KMA leaders such as Young, who agreed that the 
Chinese should be given the opportunity to be involved in the BMA's reform. This 
was supported by Kent as a way to liberalise the BMC. 135 He added that rather 
than giving everything to the Chinese, it was better to support the suggestion. '36 At 
the Advisory Committee, Committee of China Association and British Chamber of 
Commerce meeting on 14 December 1927, the supporters of this proposal, Young 
and Kent, saw that this proposal had a threefold objective. First, it would bring 
goodwill between the British communities and the Chinese. Secondly, it would 
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bring benefits to those who wanted to delay the rendition negotiations. 137 Thirdly, 
they regarded the proposal as being in line with British liberal policy. 
However, Young's proposal met opposition from D. B. Walker and 
Richards, who argued that it would show weakness on the part of the British and 
encourage further demands from the Chinese government. Furthermore, it would 
lead to bad faith with their counterparts in Shanghai, because the British (and other 
foreigners) had resolved such reforms there. They also said that the proposal 
would confuse the British community in Tientsin, and would be construed as 
conflicting with the original view of the British policy. 138 
The hot debate regarding this matter was decided by a vote in the 14 
December 1927 meeting. The first resolution was that: 
This joint meeting records its view that under existing 
circumstances it is politic to take steps to amend the existing 
Municipal Regulations with a view to the elimination, as far as 
practicable of discriminatory features. '39 
This resolution was deemed too lenient and generous and was therefore 
defeated, illustrating that the British diehards were not happy with the idea of 
reform in Tientsin. Young and other moderates could see that the great opposition 
had altered the resolution, which stated that: 
This meeting disapproves of any change in the status of the 
British Municipal British Area but if assured that it will assist 
His Majesty's Government in postponing the present 
negotiations regarding the modification of the status of the area, 
137 St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 7 March 1928, Killearn Papers. 
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is prepared to recommend the alteration of the existing 
Municipal Regulations on the lines of the draft [from the 
British community in Tientsin] submitted to it and authorises 
the Chairman to communicate this resolution to His Majesty's 
Minister. 140 
This resolution was passed in favour (by I1 to 6) of modifying the Land 
Regulations if the British government was willing to postpone negotiations on the 
concession. 
141 
The first task of the moderate group seemed to have successfully captured 
support from the British community. Its second task was to get support from the 
British government and the Chinese in order to delay the negotiations. 142 The 
moderate strategy seemed to be working, although reactions to the proposal from 
the Legation, the Consul General in Tientsin and the Foreign Office were diverse. 
Lampson and Jamieson "seemed to be parallel" with the British communities. 
According to Lampson, after 1927 the Chinese had not made any attempt to 
continue the negotiations. Lampson furthered his idea by suggesting that the 
dormancy of the negotiations be allowed to continue while he tried to promote the 
new plan to satisfy the Chinese as adopted by the resolution above. Moreover the 
situation in China was still uncertain with the continuation of the civil war, and it 
was not clear who controlled Tientsin. 143 Chamberlain also seemed to have given 
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the British communities the green light to carry on the scheme of eliminating 
discrimination against the Chinese in the municipality. On one point he agreed that 
the British should not press the negotiation issue while the Chinese were still not 
interested, or as Lampson said, to "... let sleeping dogs lie... -44 But Chamberlain 
did not agree to alter the original plan to return the concession. The issue of 
disturbance and stable government in China were not the issue that prompted 
Chamberlain to reconsider the January 1927 offer. 145 He added that: 
We are, therefore, in my opinion as much committed 
now as we have been at any time since last January to continue 
negotiations in principle and it would be generally regarded as 
a breach of faith on our part to endeavour to go back on that 
obligation. The most we can do is to refrain from pressing on 
actively with the negotiations so long as the Chinese 
themselves remain quiescent. " 
Regarding the proposal by the British Communities, Chamberlain 
suggested two points of action that the British should take: 
1. Undertake the amendment of the Land Regulations to suit the Chinese 
councillors' demands. However he stressed that the action should be regarded as a 
"... step towards and not an alternative to rendition ... "147 
2. Give the Chinese an opportunity to participate in the executive in municipal 
administration. In addition, without a formal procedure to modify the Land 
144 PRO F0228/3937 Telegram from Foreign Office to H. M. Minister, 7 February 1928, p. 1 and 
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Regulations, they also been suggested to remove any discrimination against the 
Chinese. '48 
At this point the Foreign Office had the support of the British communities in 
continuing the proposal in amendment, while the Foreign Office would support the 
British communities by not pressing the negotiation issue on the Chinese 
government. In short, this development shows that the moderates managed to 
engage the support of the British government. 
The Last Ditch Proposal 
With this encouragement, the British communities, led by Young, followed 
Chamberlain's suggestions. Young's next step was to draft a new regulation to deal 
with future negotiations with the Chinese government. The moderate group once 
again won the support of the majority at the meeting of all British communities in 
Tientsin on 22 March 1928, for their proposals for several changes to be made to 
the municipality's Land Regulations, such as: 
1) To eliminate discrimination on qualification. This would change 
Regulations 6,7,8 and 9. The implication of the amendment was that it 
gave more votes to the British communities. 
2) On the membership of the municipal council, the British 
communities agreed to amend Regulation 13, giving an equal number of 
British and Chinese members on the council, i. e. five each. 
148 Ibid. 
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3) This amendment continued with the suggestion to eliminate 
Paragraph 2 of Regulation 13, which gave only persons who could speak 
English the right to become members. 149 
The new draft of the regulation was similar in that it tried to get support from three 
groups i. e. the British government, the Chinese and the diehards. The British 
moderate group had to make several compromises with the diehards owing to their 
protests about the `misgovernance' of the Chinese government in the former 
Austrian, German and Russian concessions. '" 
Next the proposal was brought to the Annual General meeting of Electors 
of the BMC on 11 April 1928 just after the KMT's Northern Expedition moved 
into the new phase. There the moderate group once more received huge support 
from electors in the BMC for an amendment regarding discrimination against the 
Chinese. '5' In another development the moderate group had to make a plan for 
dealing with the Chinese government in future rendition negotiations. Kent's 
statement pointed out that 
The committee earnestly draws attention to the considerations 
urged in its dispatch of the 14th April last which inspired the 
plan of dual control. It trusts that the only circumstance which 
would be held to justify reversion to last year's draft are the 
emergence of a Government in China which would exercise 
effective control over the country, and which had given proof 
that it would honour its international engagements. It desires 
respectfully to emphasise once more the absence of such a 
government and the intolerable conditions of areas under 
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Chinese administration, in the face of which the relinquishment 
of British control beyond that contemplated in the draft of 14th 
April last could only involve in the opinion of the Committee 
the most disastrous consequences. 152 
This statement did not mean that the moderate group had no faith in the Chinese 
government; it was presented to illustrate that the moderate group wanted their 
interests protected. Therefore a new version of the modification furthered the 
earlier suggestion, as stated below: 
The municipality would be named as Tzu Chu Lin municipality. 
1. The regulation also named the Chinese government as the 
government responsible for the municipality. 
2. In order to recognise Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese flag would 
be hoisted together with the British flag on Gordon Hall. 
3. The municipal police would be under the Tientsin City Police but 
maintaining independent organisation under the municipal office. The 
police would have the same uniforms as the Chinese police but with a 
purple hatband. 
4. Article 23 (3) gave the chance to the Chinese to be either head or 
deputy head of municipal departments. 
5. Chinese characters would be used alongside English on every 
municipal notice. 
152 SOAS, CHAS/MCPI35 China Association, Letter from P. H. B. Kent to Sir James Jamieson, 
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6. Article 42 empowered both the Chinese and British governments to 
sanction any modification of the Land Regulations. 153 
7. Equal numbers of Chinese and British members to be appointed in 
the ten-member Municipal Council. ' 54 
This proposal, called the `Last Ditch' proposal, was drafted on 14 April 1928. The 
new draft dropped the position of President agreed in early negotiations between 
the Chinese and British in 1927. However, it stipulated that the administration of 
the municipality would be on joint veto by the British Consul-General and the 
Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs. ' 55 In short the Last Ditch proposal 
could be examined as a new offer which gave diarchic rule, with both governments 
involved as equal partners in municipal membership. Kent justified this, saying 
that: 
... the Committee 
has reached the conclusion that it should 
advise the community, as a matter of practical politics, to 
support the scheme of joint control, since it provides certain 
safeguards, offers reasonable hope of a workable solution of an 
embarrassing problem, and provides tangible evidence of 
British sympathy with Chinese aspirations. '5 
This statement illustrates that the Last Ditch proposal was the final proposal which 
would be offered to the Chinese government if negotiations were resumed. '57 
153 PRO FO228/3838 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin 17April 1928. 
154 PRO F022813838 Minutes of the Annual Meeting of Electors of the British Municipal Area held 
in the Gordon Hall on Wednesday 11 April 1928, at 3.30 p. m. 
Iss pRO F0228/3838 Explanatory Note, p. 10. 
'-56 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/35 China Association, Letter from P. H. B. Kent to Sir James Jamieson, 
Tientsin, 4 July 1928. 
197 PRO F0674/241A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for the Retrocession of the 
British Concession at Tientsin from February 1927 to August 1928. 
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The new draft of the Land Regulations was gladly accepted by Lampson. 
He supported the idea as part of the effort to bring down critics of the British 
liberal policy, and it also opened a way to satisfy the Chinese. 158 Chamberlain 
responded with sympathy to the British communities' efforts to make amendments 
to the regulation, and was concerned only about dropping the position of President 
in the new regulation, as he felt that it was bad faith to drop this point which had 
already been agreed by both parties. He accepted the Last Ditch proposal for 
future negotiation with the Chinese government. '" In short, Chamberlain 
expressed his sympathy towards British nationals in Tientsin by playing the `let 
sleeping dogs lie' policy. In order to `play slow' he moved to implement their 
policy while the Chinese were engulfed with their own problems (as the KMT was 
marching north) and anti-British sentiment was less overt, at the end of 1920s. 160 
At the time of the debate on the Last Ditch proposal in spring and summer 
1928 the KMT troops had succeeded defeat the Northern army. The Northern 
troops gradually retreated and the KMT began to establish its power in North 
China. But the British community had taken steps towards the successful reform 
of the BMC to cope with change. 
This reform further changed and modified the BMC's rules and regulations, 
implementing several provisions that would eliminate grounds for existing Chinese 
grievances against discrimination in the concession. This change was in 
159 St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 18 April 1928, Killearn Papers and PRO F0228/3838 
Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Peking, 23 April 1928. 
'sq PRO F022813838 Telegram from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Miles Lampson, 24 June 1928. 
160 Fung, The Diplomacy of Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924-1931, p. 170. 
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accordance with the suggestion of the Foreign Office, which wanted to make minor 
changes in the draft Land Regulations, especially regarding Article 38 and 47 on 
municipal employees and registration of land, without waiting to negotiate with the 
Chinese. 161 In 1927, for the first time in its history, the annual general meeting 
report could be found in Chinese. On the 1 September 1927, the Tientsin Kung 
Hsueh Chinese School was opened. 162 In 1929 the school had an acting 
headmaster and 17 assistant teachers. The local Chinese supported it, as indicated 
by the increasing numbers of Chinese students. The school opened with 46 
pupils, rising to 219 in 1928 and 337 in 1929. The BMC also agreed to form two 
trusts, to maintain the English Grammar School and the Chinese Kung Hsueh 
School, thus treating both schools equally-163 In order to continue the reform, 
several suggestions in the Last Ditch proposal were implemented, especially the 
abolition of discrimination regarding electors' qualifications; enlarging the Council 
from nine members to ten, of which five were to be Chinese; eliminating the 
provision which stipulated that only persons fully conversant in English could be 
members of the Council; eliminating regulations which demanded that only 
Chinese clubs should be registered so that now all clubs should be registered; and 
stipulating that all municipal publications and notifications were to be published in 
both English and Chinese. 160 
161 PRO F0674/241A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for the Retrocmion of the 
British Concession at Tientsin from February 1927 to August 1928. 
'62 PRO F0228/3838 Minutes of the Annual of the British Municipal Area held in the Gordon Hall 
on Wednesday 11 April 1928, at 330 p. m. 
'63 BMC, T Idas Report of the Council for tiw year 1929 (Tientsin: Tientsin Press Ltd., 1930), 
fs85.6. . 
PRO F0228/3838 Minutes of the Annual of the British Municipal Area held in the Gordon Hall 
on Wednesday 11 April 1928, at 3.30 p. m. 
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In 1929 the number of members of the Municipal Council was enlarged, 
with five Chinese members appointed alongside five British members. In that year 
also the Police Department was reorganised and the Chinese Assistant 
Superintendent position was created. 165 A Chinese Deputy Secretary was also 
appointed. It had been further decided to appoint a Chinese Assistant Waterworks 
Engineer. 166 In 1928 the Chinese responded to the efforts to reform the BMC by 
giving a Sino-British banquet as a sign of the Chinese residents' and business 
community's gratitude for the reform. Dr. W. W. Yen (a former Chinese Prime 
Minister) gave a speech saying that among the reasons for this gathering was "... to 
show Chinese appreciation of what the British ratepayers and authorities had done 
with regard to the rights and privileges of Chinese ratepayers in this Municipality 
(BMC). "167 J. S. Chwang (a Chinese councillor) also praised British efforts to 
reform the BMC, starting with opening Victoria Park to the Chinese in 1926 and 
increasing Chinese representation in the BMC. He hoped that this reform would 
continue in the future. For the British, Jamieson, representing the British 
government, praised the long tradition of the British community in Tientsin for 
maintaining good relations with the Chinese throughout the reform. On Young's 
speech, he touched on the reforms to the BMC should not be revolutionary or 
drastic but a gradual evolution. " Young aimed to protect British interests and 
avoid damage to them from disturbances caused by Chinese nationalism. 
165 PRO F0228/4015 Letts from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Mlles Lampoon, Tientsin, 13 May 
1929. 
166 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/35 China Association, Letter from P. H. B. Kent to Sir James Jamieson, 
Tientsin, 4 July 1928. 
167 PRO F022813838 Enclosure to Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's despatch No. 313 of the 14$ 
December, 1928 to H. M. Minister, Peking. 
168 Ibid. 
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In 1929, the British community organised a Second Sino-British dinner 
attended by many distinguished British and Chinese leaders. Here the Chinese and 
British flags were displayed together in the Grammar School Hall, and Chinese and 
British songs were played by the Royal Scots band. Several British and Chinese 
leaders made speeches. Jamieson, as representative of the British government, 
began his speech by making it clear that the British government would help the 
Chinese government to meet their aspiration to regain Chinese sovereignty. Two 
Chinese speakers, Liang Ming-ting (former Chinese Foreign Minister) and K. C. 
Tu (a merchant), praised the reforms in Tientsin, which had created better relations 
between both nations. They agreed that further efforts were needed to eliminate 
any differences in the BMC and increase their friendship and mutual 
understanding. Z. S. Bien, manager of the Bank of China and newly-elected BMC 
councillor, stated: 
Let us hope that the date is not very far when Tientsin 
will become one real city instead of a combination of small 
cities, in which every able-bodied and able-minded citizen can 
have equal opportunity to share the responsibility of city affairs 
and also the desired equitable protection to life and property. It 
is our common 169 
This speech illustrates how the Chinese still wanted more than modification: they 
wanted the full return of the foreign concession. This means that there were still 
hopes for further efforts to restore Chinese sovereignty. Bien's speech represented 
the Chinese people's nationalist aspiration to regain the Chinese sovereignty in 
China. 
169 PRO F0228/4015 Enclosure to Consul-General Sir James Jamieson's dispatch No. 28 of the 9 
April, 1929 to H. M. Minister, Peking. 
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Young, on other hand, tried to protect the interests of British firms in his 
speech: 
It is true that we have not adopted the principle of "one man - 
one vote" ... We have frankly adopted the principle that the 
municipality should be governed by the people who have a 
financial stake in the prosperity of the area irrespective of their 
nationality. 170 
Woodhead's speech was `friendlier' and was concerned with the Sino-British 
relationship, saying that the British community had given many opportunities to 
the Chinese in the BMC and furthered their prosperity and peace. 17' In other 
words, Woodhead suggested that the concession should be preserved as it was, 
without many changes. 
The Nationalist government which took over the Chinese government in 
1928 was to some extent satisfied with what the British communities had done. 
Dr. Wang Cheng-ting, the Chinese Foreign Minister, expressed his intention not to 
press for negotiations on the British concession for the time being as a result of this 
modification. He would first deal with the other concessions, especially those of 
France and Japan. He hoped that progress would be achieved with the other 
concessions before focusing on the British concession again. In short, his idea was 
to settle all these issues in order to unite the concessions as one city. IM However, 
his idea was overshadowed by his effort to tackle the issue of extraterritoriality in 
late 1920s. This was because one month after his appointment as Foreign Minister 
he focused Chinese foreign policy on the abrogation of the unequal treaties with 
'm Ibid. 
71 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, pp. 249 and 253. 
ýn PRO F0228/4015 Telegram from H. M. Minister at Nanking (by wireless) to H. M. Minister, 3 
June, 1929. 
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Foreign Powers. 173 In addition to this reason, the Nationalist government was still 
concentrating on destroying the communists, and for this reason it allowed the 
foreign concessions to continue as they were. ' 74 
Against this background the situation in the British concession was normal, 
although the incidence of armed robbery was quite high, fluctuating between 17 in 
1927 to 37 in 1928 and 21 in 1929. In 1929 the Waterworks Department 
completed building a pump house at Parkes Road Station. In the same year 
electricity consumption decreased due to the depression in trade and the departure 
of large numbers of foreign troops. The Public Works was busy paving roads, 
constructing bricks for the Kung Hsueh building, lighting the streets and clearing 
snow. One of the interesting events in the concession that year was the Annual 
Memorial service for the foreign soldiers and sailors of the allied Expedition of 
1900.175 Ironically, this event seemed to be in opposition to the British 
government's efforts to mend relations with the Chinese, as the British community 
in Tientsin continued to remember the clash with the Chinese at the time of the 
Boxer Uprising. In other words, the majority of the British community still 
ignored the reality of Chinese Nationalism and opposed efforts to abolish 
extraterritoriality, as is discussed in the next chapter. 
All in all the BMC had succeeded in dealing with the problems of Chinese 
nationalism. In contrast to Shanghai, no serious disturbances had occurred such as 
173 Edmund S. K. Fung, `Nationalist Foreign Policy, 1928-1937', in David Pong and Edmund S. K. 
Fung, (eds. ), Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern Ching 1860-1949 
(Lanham: University of America, Inc., 1985), pp. 190-1. 
'74 Wasserst+om, Student Protests in 7 ventieth-Centwy China, pp. 151 and 136-157. 
"s BMC, Tientsin, Report of the Council for the year ended December 31,1929, pp. 45,47,64,70 
and 90. 
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the Thirtieth May Incident. The close cooperation between the British Consul 
General and moderate groups had created peace in Tientsin's British concession. 
The British liberal policy seemed to have achieved its target of good relations with 
the Chinese. 
Conclusion 
The years 1927 and 1928 were crucial for the British communities in 
Tientsin. They witnessed the advance of Nationalist troops on the north, signalling 
concern to the British community. This concern was twofold. First, the danger of 
open attack by the Chinese on British interests. The British could no longer protect 
their informal empire using the gun boat policy. The Foreign Office was very 
cautious in dealing with the British community's demand for protection. As stated 
in the conclusion to Chapter Two, the BMC was powerless when it came to 
security. The British government controlled all decisions about how to protect the 
British community. But the British Commander and some of the British 
community in Tientsin and its hinterlands seemed to believe that the Chinese could 
be controlled by force. This was a challenge to the British government's effort to 
avoid further confrontation with the Chinese. Eventually the British legation 
succeeded in avoiding British involvement in a big military plan to defend 
Tientsin. 
The second concern of the British regarded their future in north China. 
They were anxious and opposed to British liberal policy and challenged the British 
government about how it would be implemented in China i. e., principally through 
rendition of British concessions. The British concession in Tientsin became one of 
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the tests to recover cordial Anglo-Chinese relations in the turbulent years of the 
mid-1920s. Though the British government controlled the BMC, the British 
community criticised the rendition proposal, and the British government could not 
implement this policy without the involvement of the community. The British 
government, through its Consul General, had to get the cooperation of influential 
British community leaders. This was not because the British government could not 
implement the policy unilaterally because it wanted to achieve this policy with the 
support of its nationals. The continuing of opposition from the British community 
would disturb the British effort to create the good relationships with the Chinese. 
This was because Chinese nationalists or the communists would regard the British 
community's opposition as official view from the British govetnment. 
'76 
This meant that the British community had some influence in determining 
the success of British liberal policy and the future of Anglo-Chinese relations. 
Influential leaders, mainly British traders, were very concerned the future of their 
interests. As the British government policy was a fait accompli, so the traders (the 
moderates) had to accept this policy in order to avoid damaging their interests. 
This moderate group adopted a pragmatic approach to all the changes in China and 
in British liberal policy. It recognised the changes in China but did not take 
extreme action, agreeing to all aspects of the British liberal policy. Another group 
in the British community adopted the diehard approach. They did not believe that 
a liberal policy could alter the situation in China. They considered China 
'barbarous' and the Chinese unlikely to respect foreign interests. 
I" Bickers, Britain in China p. 151. 
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These were the obstacles faced by the British government in its effort to 
restore Anglo-Chinese relations. From 1927 to 1929 the British community had 
shown their ability to alter British liberal policy. The pragmatic approach of the 
moderate group resulted in the introduction of the Last Ditch proposal. The 
moderates considered that losing a little was better than losing everything, and in 
this way they retained the concession and regained the support of the Chinese. 
Both the Chinese Nationalist government and the Chinese leaders in the concession 
welcomed this result by holding the Sino-British Banquet in 1928. This effort was 
part of the big British fines' awareness that they could no longer stop Chinese 
nationalism. '" 
While in Shanghai E. Finley Johnson headed a judicial enquiry into the 
blame for the May Thirtieth Incident, which was laid on foreigners (especially 
Shanghailanders), 178 it was different in Tientsin, where the British community were 
enjoying friendly relations 
with the Chinese. The moderate group did not want a repeat at Tientsin of what 
had happened in Shanghai and Hankow. Learning from both incidents, the 
moderates opened up a middle road to protect British interests and please the 
Chinese. As a result, the Chinese did not see the British community as trouble, as 
they saw the Shanghailanders. The common sense of this group had pacified the 
situation in Tientsin after the Nationalist government took control of this city. 
Though the Chinese still regarded the British concession in Tientsin as a fortress of 
imperialism, the seizure of the British concession never happened as it had in 
'n Wasserstrom, Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China, p. 150. 
178 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p. 139. 
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Hankow. The early application of the British to mending relations with the 
Chinese had calmed Chinese envy of the British concession in Tientsin. 
Another striking difference between the British communities in Tientsin 
and Shanghai was that the BMC was controlled by moderates. Young, the General 
Manager of KMA, used his position as chairman of the BMC to lead the British 
community towards a more liberal approach. He knew that it was important that 
British interests were protected against the Chinese activists. The diehards tried to 
gain support by telling inciting news about Chinese activists and Chinese 
authorities. With support from the British Minister and the Consul General, the 
moderate group succeeded in preventing this group from making the British 
concession in Tientsin similar to the International Settlement in Shanghai. For 
example the Thirtieth May Incident. 
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Chapter Four 
The Transition Period: Chinese Challenges and the Coming of the 
Japanese (1929-1933) 
Introduction 
Between 1930 and 1933 Anglo-Chinese relations entered a new phase. It 
was a new beginning after the long and bitter relationship which had endured since 
the early 1920s, as mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, and saw the emergence of a new 
crisis in China throughout the 1930s and 1940s which gradually transferred the 
focus of nationalist sentiment from the British to the Japanese. Before the anti- 
Japanese movement became overt, the new Nationalist government of China had 
demanded the abolition of the `unequal' treaties - the extraterritorial rights and 
concessions in China. To do so it had to face tough negotiations with the foreign 
Powers. The diehard British community in China was stunned by the fact that 
Lampson went to negotiated and appeased to have reached agreement in 1931. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, they retaliated against what they saw as a threat to protect 
their privileges. Several minor issues such as the Thorburn case (1931) were used 
by the British community to buttress arguments about the Nationalists' alleged 
`incompetence' and the unsuitability of giving them a free hand to manage foreign 
interests, especially where extraterritorial rights were concerned. ' The moderate 
group was more cautious in its response to the Chinese demand for the abrogation 
of extraterritoriality. 
Robert A. Bickers, `Death of a Young S6anghsilsndu; The T'horburn Can and the Defence of the 
British Treaty Ports in China in 1931', Modern Asian , wes 30,2 (1996), p. 290. 
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Before this issue could be settled, China under Chiang Kai-shek, faced 
further disunity when several of his supporters turned against him. One of these 
opposition moves came from Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-span, who formed an 
alliance with other anti-Chiang forces (the Kwangsi clique, the Reorganisationist 
clique and the Western Hills faction) in 1930. The revolt against the Nanking 
government under Chiang Kai-shek came to the attention of the foreign Powers 
when the Chinese customs house in Tientsin was seized in what seemed to be a 
familiar version of the old story of warlord civil war. However, the Manchurian 
crisis in autumn 1931 opened the door to a new crisis in China, which had an 
impact on British interests. The crisis continued and gradually escalated into a 
broader conflict when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour at the end of 1941. 
This chapter examines three key issues regarding the British community in 
Tientsin in particular and north China in general during this period. The first was 
the seizure of the customs house in Tientsin by Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan 
in 1930. What was interesting about this incident was that it involved a British 
national, Bertram Lennox Simpson, appointed as Customs Commissioner by the 
rebel Peking government. At this point Tientsin came into the limelight of Anglo- 
Chinese history. In addition this section discusses how the British community 
(especially the traders) responded to this crisis. The community worried that the 
crisis would affect their trade. The second issue was the response of the British 
community in Tientsin to negotiations over extraterritorial rights in China. The 
2 Lloyd E. Eastman, `Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, 1927-1937' in Lloyd E. 
Eagn an, Jerome, (etal), The Nationalist Era irr China 1927-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 12. 
3Basanan, `Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, 1927-193r, p. 12 and Hans J. Van de 
Ven, War and Nationalism in China 1923-1945 (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 139-8. 
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previous chapter highlighted the extensive effort made by the British community to 
prevent the concession from falling under the control of the Chinese government. 
Although for the time being this effort had succeeded, the community's fight to 
retain its privileges continued, and it opposed the proposed abrogation of 
extraterritoriality. As with negotiations over the concession, it showed strong 
opposition. This chapter also considers the reaction of the British community in 
Tientsin to the Thorburn case relating to extraterritorial rights, and the tools they 
used to tackle these problems. The last issue in this section is the link between the 
Manchurian crisis and the response of the British community in Tientsin. This 
crisis overshadowed negotiations over extraterritorial rights, attracting Chinese 
attention there instead. The last part of the chapter considers how the British 
community reacted to the Manchurian Crisis. 
The Customs Crisis, 1930 
The Tientsin Customs Crisis originated from the crisis between Feng Yu- 
hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan (the Northern Coalition) on the one hand, and Chiang 
Kai-shek on the other. The capture of Peking in 1928 by the Northern Expedition 
had cemented the victory of the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek, who led the KMT, had 
established the National government in Nanking and wanted to unite and control 
all Chinese administration. In doing so, he had to deal with several of his 
supporters such as Feng Yu-hsiang, whose ambition to control Shantung led him to 
confront Chiang Kai-shek in order to get control over this province. Chiang's 
efforts to eliminate Feng worried Yen Hsi-shan, who joined forces with Feng to 
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confront him. 4 In Peking, Yen Hsi-shan had established another government made 
up of Chinese leaders who were all opposed to Chiang Kai-shek. s In order to avoid 
Customs revenues from Tientsin being used in Chiang's military campaign against 
them, Yen Hsi-shan asked the Commissioner, Colonel Francis Hayley-Bell, to 
retain tax revenues in the Bank of Communications in Tientsin until the dispute 
was Settled .6 As Yen expected, Hayley-Bell refused. Yen then acted on his final 
option, which was to seize the Tientsin customs house, causing anxiety among the 
traders, including the British. Hayley-Bell was dismissed on 16 June 1930 and 
replaced by Bertram Lenox Simpson. 
The British traders (particularly the firms listed in Appendix 2) which had 
big interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands were concerned that this crisis would 
disturb their business.? The British concern became reality when Hayley-Bell 
closed customs houses and instructed all staff to cease works In retaliation, 
Simpson who had served in the Customs from 1896-1910, reopened the customs 
house and urged all staff to continue their routine work. Workers who ignored this 
order would be dismissed and punished, although the form of punishment was not 
4 James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord the Career of Feng YtaMlang (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1966), p. 264 cited from Ma, p. 138 and Donald G. Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan In 
Shansi Province 1911-1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 111 and 112 cited 
fi+mn Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, op. cit.. p. 102, and Fairfield, p. 2. 
s Akira Iriya, After hnperialism, p. 269. 
6 Donna Marne Brunero, Britain s Imperial Cornerstone in China: the Chinese maritime customs 
service, 1854-1949, (New York: Routledge, 2006), P. 121. 
7 SHAC, 676(1), 17761, Assumption of Charge: by Mr. B. Lenox Simpson, Commissioner, 
informing, 4254,16 June 1930 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG 47, Letter from Mr. B. Lennox 
Simpson to the Manager, Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., Tientsin, June 16,1930. 
8L. C. Arlington, Tbrongh the Dragon's Eyes (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1931), p. 255 and 
SHAC, 676 (1), 17761, Copy of Express issued on 20 June by Mr. F. H. Bell, Commissioner of 
Customs; Tientsin. 
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specified .9 Some sources accused 
Simpson of planning to any Chinese workers 
who disobeyed these orders shot-10 To encourage staff to return, Simpson 
announced a month's bonus, and by 23 June 1930 the customs house in Tientsin 
was once more fully operational. " This crisis put a great deal of pressure on 
Hayley-Bell. He was given leave and all his duties, including monitoring the 
development of the custom crisis, 12 were taken over by his deputy commissioner R. 
C. Grierson. 13 
The impact of this incident on Tientsin trade was twofold. Firstly, the 
merchants wanted the administration of the Customs to be quickly and fully 
restored. At the time that Hayley-Bell was removed from the customs house, the 
Customs service was dysfunctional and creating confusion in shipping. 14 The 
merchants were worried about the outcome of this seizure, but their concern 
gradually subsided when they saw that Simpson's administration had brought 
about a quick recovery of the service-15 The first day of the reopening of the 
customs house was reported by The North-China Herald. ".... the Customs to-day 
appeared to be working at full blast, though their methods were necessarily most 
slipshod with a large army of newly engaged Chinese and a number of foreign 
supervisors styled `emergency officers'". 16 The article shows that although 
9SHAC, 676(1), 17761, 'Copy of Notification issued on 21 June 1930 at Tientsin by the Mayor, the 
Garrison Commander, and the Superintendent of Custom'. 
10 PRO F0676159 Telegram from Sir Miles Lempson to Mr. Ingram, No. 158, PekIn&, 18 June 1930 
and 676 (1) 768 Letter from Mr. Hayley-Bell to Sir Frederic Maze, Tientsin, 28 September 1930. 
11 SHAC, 679(l), 17761, Circular No. 2656,23 June 1930 and SHAC, 676(1), 768 Letter from Mr. 
Hayley Bell to Sir Frederic Maze, Tientsin, 28 September 1930. 
12 SHAC, 679(1), 767, Telegram fivm I. G., 1 July 1930. 
13 Ibid. 
'4 BW, TYennin: Report ojthe CoancUfor the year J930 (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, 1931), p. 48. 
's SHAC, 676(1), 768 Tientsin N. C. Despatch No. 1704/I. G. of 1930: 'Report on Seizure of 
Tientsin Customs by Marshal Yen Hsi-Shan for period July 2 to October 2,1930'. 
16 The North-China Herald June 24,1930, p. 482. 
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Simpson had had little time to reopen the customs house and had lost many of the 
former staff, he had managed to resume the service with emergency staff. Another 
comment on Simpson's administration stated that: 
At the first the Customs procedure was hopelessly slow under the 
new regime, and that meant longer office hours for the Wharfage 
Dues Office as well, a rather unwelcome occurrence, especially 
during the trying summer season. Otherwise there was no 
inconvenience or unpleasantness experienced during this 
emergency regime which terminated with the reinstatement of the 
regular staff on October Yd. 17 
This comment indicates that Sampson's administration had weaknesses, which did 
not, however, hinder the progress of trade in Tientsin. At this point the Tientsin 
community, especially the British traders, wanted the crisis settled to avoid 
hindrance to trade. The business community was not opposed to administrative 
changes as long as trade was not disturbed. 
The business community remained neutral: their only concern was that the 
crisis should end immediately in order that free trade could continue in China 
without interference from political disputes. However the impact from the crisis 
had made the British traders very concerned such as double taxes. The British 
traders tried to alert the British government to the issue of double taxes, which had 
come about because Maze, the Inspector General of Customs, had instructed that 
all foreign and local traders should redirect their trade to other ports (Dairen and 
Tsingtao), where duties normally paid at Tientsin would be collected. '$ 
I' BMC, ThnLcI Report of the Council for th year 1930, p. 48. 
13 The TYmes, 21 June 1930, p. 12. 
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However, foreign traders still recognised Simpson's customs house as ade 
facto establishment and were willing to resume trade relations, despite Maze's 
order to close the port. As a result, two Butterfield and Swire ships were taxed 
twice, once in Tientsin and once in Shanghai. 19 Owing to the serious impact of this 
crisis, especially such double taxation, the British Chamber of Commerce held a 
meeting and agreed to urge the British Legation to take action 2° The British 
Legation and Consul-General in Tientsin took a passive approach, but were most 
concerned about the integrity of the customs house and British trade interests. 
Lampson saw this crisis as a challenge to British trade interests in China. He said 
that the integrity of the customs should be restored to avoid any consequences 
which might harm their interests. There was no support for Simpson. 21 Lampson 
approached him to advise him that he should avoid involvement in the crisis. 
However, Simpson declined to follow his advice without discussing it first with 
Yen Hsi-shan 22 
At this stage, Lampson said that the crisis was out of the Legation's control 
and that maze could do little to settle it owing to his position as a Chinese civil 
servant who did not have quasi-independence in this case? Lampson had no 
communication with Maze, his close involvement with the Inspector-General's 
succession a few years earlier having strained relations with him. u Moreover the 
19 SOAS, CHASJMCP/36 Letter from Butterfield & Swire, Shanghai, June 27,1930. 
20 St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 30 June 1930, the Kille=rn Papers. 
21 PRO FO 676/59, Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Arthur Henderson, Peking. 24' October 1930. 
22 St. Anthony College, Lampson Dairies, 13 May 1930, the Kilearn Papers. 
b St. Anthony College, Lampson Dairies, 7 May 1930, the Killearn Papers. 
21 Martyn Atkins, hifo mal Empire in Crisis: British Diplomacy and the Chinese Custom 
Si essio1L 1927-1929 (Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1995), pp. 37-9. Lampion 
had supported A. H. F. Edwards' succession as Inspector General of Chinese Maritime Customs but 
the Chinese Government favoured the selection of Maze. 
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British government adopted a neutral approach. 25 It took more collective action 
with assistance from other Powers to settle the crisis. As result the Diplomatic 
Body agreed to submit letters of protest to both parties, at the same time agreeing 
to adopt a neutral attitude in the crisis 26 However, to ensure the continuation of 
trade in Tientsin the Consular Body recognised Simpson's de facto administration, 
because the Powers could not formulate a definitive policy in which Chinese 
groups would be real winners in this crisis. The British Legation admitted that it 
had little power to settle the problem because the British government's policy was 
not to intervene in the crisis. 7 
Another point which concerned the British traders was that the crisis would 
become serious if the British government did not handle it carefully. Therefore the 
traders advised their government not to recognise any groups in this civil war in 
order to avoid damaging their trade interests. They also pointed out that the 
consequences of this crisis were profound: 
The precedent set at Tientsin is a most dangerous one, 
inasmuch as upstarts such as Lennox Simpson - and there are 
unfortunately more than one in China - may be encouraged to 
influence the militarists to follow the example set by the North 
in provinces where allegiance to Nanking in certain cases is 
doubtful. Needless to say, further action of this sort will in time 
result in chaos and finally must not only mean a break-up of the 
Customs service itself but also of the attendant services 
controlled thereby, such as Coast and River Lights, 
Conservancy, Pilotage, quarantine, etc. etc. 28 
2 SHAC, 679(1), 17761, Tientsin N. C. Despatch No. 1704/1. G. of 1930, `Report on Seizure of 
Tientsin Customs by Marshal Yen Hsi-shah for period 2°d July to 2°d October 1930'. 
26 St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 23 June -1 July 1930, the Killearn Papers. Z' PRO FO 676/59, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, No. 237, Peking, 
July 19 1930. 
28SOAS, CHAS/MCP/36 Letter from Butterfield & Swire to Messrs. John Swire & Sons Ltd., 
Shanghai, June 28,1930. 
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This passage put Tientsin on the Chinese political map; the impact of the seizure 
was serious, as it could act as a model for other Chinese militarists to follow, which 
would be disastrous for Chinese revenue, loan payments and the progress of free 
trade in China. In addition, the break-up of the Chinese Maritime Customs would 
affect the port services mentioned in the passage above. As a result these traders 
wanted the British Legation to protect the integrity of the Chinese Maritime 
Customs, thereby also protecting British shipping interests in China. 9 However, 
this statement was the British traders' emphatic account of the seriousness of the 
issue, which could have an impact on British interests everywhere in China. 
The BMC did mention this crisis in their annual report, as stated above. Its 
main concern seemed to be that this crisis would affect the progress of trade in 
Tientsin. The BMC wanted the crisis resolved as quickly as possible because the 
majority of its members were traders who wanted protection. Disturbances in 
China such as the seizure of the Chinese Maritime Customs' house in Tientsin 
could jeopardise the development of Tientsin. In short, not only were British 
interests outside the treaty port exposed to the impact of such disturbances, but also 
the British concession, always regarded as a `safe' place in the British informal 
empire, became vulnerable when trade was threatened by the disturbance. 
Because the Tientsin customs house was not located in the British but in the 
French Concession, the crisis had little direct impact on developments in the 
British concession itself. In 1930 affairs in the British concession were 
29 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/36, Letter from E. M. Gull to an Membem of the China Association 
Committee, London, August 15,1930, pp. 4 and 5. 
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unexceptional. The BMC's daily tasks were more concerned with public health. 
The quality of water taken from the Hai Ho was poor, according to the annual 
municipal report. As it was one of the concession's water sources the British were 
concerned that this might affect the health of the community. 30 In another 
development, the Electricity Department planned to make the concession a 
`Smokeless City', and in 1930 neon-lighted advertisements were introduced. 31 The 
murder of a Chinese BMC constable in the concession was highlighted in the 
annual report. 32 Such developments suggest that the British concession was under 
control and operating as normal. 
However, Britain's problem was not only its trade interests in Tientsin; the 
seizure of the customs house had put Tientsin at the centre of Anglo-Chinese 
relations. Some of the British nationals, including Simpson, challenged the British 
government's efforts to mend relations with China, and used this opportunity to 
join his administration 33 Apart from Britons there was also one United States, 
German and French national. Ext atelritoriality seemed to offer them protection as 
they joined the Simpson's administration. Although this was a small group, to 
some extent it irritated the Chinese government. 
30 BMC, Tientsin: Report of the Council for the year ended 1930, p. 2. 
31 Ibid., p. 28. 
32 Ibid., p. 36. 
33 Among the British involved in the Simpson's administration were G. S. Woods, Boat Officer at 
Taku, John Anthony Grandon, Examiner A at Parcel Department of Head Office (Ex-customs, 
dismissed 1922), C. A. E. Carr, Examiner, J. V. Mouland, Examiner, J. R. Stewart, Examiner, H. 
W. M. Taylor, Examiner, Patrick Murray, Examiner and W. Sheppard-Graham, Examiner. The 
North-China Herald 8 July 1930, p. 43. 
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Simpson's involvement had brought protests from the Chinese government, 
which urged the British to take stem action. 34 The Chinese political magazine The 
China Critic criticised the misuse of extraterritoriality by Simpson, who had 
interfered in the Chinese civil war. The magazine also criticised the British 
government for not taking action to stop him 35 Another Chinese magazine, China 
Affairs, reacted in the same way, feeling very frustrated by extraterritoriality and 
by how the British government had handled the case. Simpson, according to China 
Affairs, was not only free of Chinese law because of his privileges, but also was not 
convicted under British law. 6 All these comments put Tientsin on the map where 
big issues in Anglo-Chinese relations - specifically extraterritoriality - were 
contested, as discussed in the next section. 
The Chinese government in Nanking was irritated by Lampson's adamant 
refusal to take action over Simpson. Lampson tried to handle this crisis with 
caution. As mentioned above, he had doubts about the stability of the Nationalist 
government. His scepticism stemmed from his belief that almost all the Chinese 
governments since the collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty had not survived for long. 
He also had had his doubts about Chiang Kai-shek's government since its 
establishment in Nanking in 1927.37 After almost five years it was losing its unity. 
There were many factions in the government, each with its own interests, such as 
the CC clique, the Political Study clique and the Whampoa clique 38 Furthermore, 
as a government leader Chiang Kai-shek had political enemies such as Hu Han-min 
34 The North China Herald 9 April 1930, p. 193 and The North China Herald 2 September 1930, 
342. ýs 
The China Critic, July 24,1930, p. 706. 
Chinese Affairs: Weekly Swvey of leºportam Events, No. 86-87, June 30,1930, p. 4. 
37 David Clive Wilson, `Britain and the Kuomintang, 1924-28', p. 627. 
30 Fastmann, `Nationalist China during the Nanking decade ..... pp. 26-32. 
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and Wang Ching-wei. Another problem faced by this government was the threat 
from the communists and rebel provinces such as in south China, 39 with the 
warlord factions making matters still worse. For this reason the British 
government kept its legation in Peking rather than in the new Chinese capital, 
Nanking. Regarding the Tientsin customs crisis, by not punishing Simpson, 
Lampson seemed to be playing neutral so as not to offend Yen Hsi-shan 40 
But Lampson was seriously concerned about the involvement of British 
nationals in this crisis, especially when he heard that Simpson had apparently 
threatened to have Chinese employees who would not serve in his administration 
shot. Lampson ordered the Consul-General in Tientsin to intervene in this 
matter 41 The Vice Consul met Simpson and advised him to avoid hostility, which 
could only make matters worse 42 However, Grierson denied that Simpson would 
shoot Chinese staff who refused to resume their duties, adding that such workers 
would be punished according to Chinese law. 43 The Chinese government's request 
that Simpson should be deported from Tientsin was not granted. Privately, 
Lampson said that in fact the British Legation could not agree that the National 
government in Nanking represented a Chinese government. If the Nationalist 
government was the true government of China, Simpson's action could be claimed 
39 Donald G. Gitlin, 'Problems of Centralization in Republican Chins: The Case of Ch'en Ch'eng 
and the Kuomintang, The Joan al of Asian Stiles, Vo1.29, No. 4. (Aug, 1970). p. 837. 
'0 PRO F0676/59 Telegram to Ingram at Nanking, Peking, 16 June 1930. 
41 PRO FO 676/59, Telegram fiom Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, No. 158, Pektn. 
June 18,1930. 
42 PRO FO 676/59, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampoon to Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, No. 171, Peking, 
June 23,1930. 
43 SHAC, 679(1), 768, Seizure of the Tientsin Custom House: Statement by Mr. R. C. Orierson, 
Deputy Commissioner. 
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to be helping the rebel government and he could be prosecuted . 
44 The inability of 
the Nanking government to control China would make such a prosecution 
useless. 45 This caused a problem in Anglo-Chinese relations, because the Chinese 
government accused the British government of approving Simpson's action. To 
avoid any misunderstanding, Lampson clarified that the British government had no 
such intention. 46 
In the revolt against the Nationalist goverment, the Manchurian warlord 
Chang Hsueh-liang became an important figure from whom both hostile parties 
tried to gain support. 47 In the war Chiang Kai-shek's troops were victorious against 
the Feng-Yen Coalition. To avoid setbacks from either side both parties tried to 
gain Chang's support. 49 Therefore Simpson went to Manchuria to negotiate with 
Chang Hsueh-liang, and has been accused of trying to bribe Chang to allow him to 
retain his position as Commissioner of Customs. This accusation was still 
unproven, because the letter he wrote was not clear. 49 However, Simpson failed to 
get support from Chang, who had given his support to Chiang Kai-shek in 
Nanking. So Chang Hsueh-liang's force quickly occupied and gained control of 
the Peking-Tientsin area. 50 The crisis then drew to a close; Yen Hsi-shan had to 
obey Chang Hsueh-liang's order to evacuate north China and retreat to Shansi. In 
44 PRO FO 676/59 Telegram from Sir Miles Latnpaon to Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, No. 187, Peking, 
June 27 1930. 
45 PRO FO 676/59 Letter from Sir Miles Lempson to Mr. Arthur Henderson, Peking, October 24 
1930. 
46 PRO FO 676/59 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, No. 188, Peking, 
June 27 1930. 
47 Rana Mitter, The Manchurkin Myth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 53. 
48 Eastman, `Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, .. . ', p. 12 49 PRO F0676/59 Letter from Mr. J. F. Brenn to Sir M. Lampson, Shanghai, 14 October, 1930. 
50 Eastman, `Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, .. . ', p. 13. 
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Tientsin, Simpson was fatally wounded by gunmen at his house. 51 His killers were 
never identified, and mystery still surrounds the question of why and by whom he 
was killed. Maze gave three possible reasons for his murder. The first was that he 
had tried to blackmail Chang Hsueh-liang. The second charge was that Sampson 
had tried to negotiate with Chang, who seemed to be offended by Yen Hsi-shan 
and Feng Yu-hsiang; and the third, that he had been involved in trafficking drugs in 
Tientsin. 52 At the end of the crisis, all the employees who had served under 
Simpson were dismissed except for workers in the Marine Department 53 The 
Tientsin Customs were reopened under the control of the Nanking government on 
3 October 1930, with Grierson appointed Acting Commissioner. 
All in all this crisis shows that the British community could do little to 
protect their trade interests except by mending relations with the Chinese. It was 
hard for the British government to protect Anglo-Chinese relations because the 
involvement in the crisis of Simpson and others threatened its efforts. The next 
section elaborates further about the British community's attitude towards the 
abolition of extraterritoriality. 
In Defence of Extraterritoriality 
The next item on the Nationalist government's agenda after the end of the 
Northern Expedition was to regain China's sovereignty. From 1929 onward they 
s' PRO F0656/204 Letter from Tientsin Consul Genaal to Judge Sir Peter Grain, Tientsin, 10 
November 1930. 
52 Brunero, Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China, p. 130. 
53 SHAC, 679(1), 17761, Letter from Chief Secretary to Mr. Chiang Hui, General No. 9059, 
October 16,1930. 
219 
had struggled towards this. M On 27th April 1929 the Chinese Foreign Ministry sent 
a note to all the foreign Powers in China, urging them to open negotiations on 
abrogating extraterritorial rights. Implicitly this note demonstrated the Nationalist 
government's hope that all the foreign countries who had extraterritorial rights 
would agree to abrogate them on 1 January 1930.55 The British government 
seemed to agree to this request, but many British policy-makers wanted the 
abolition to be gradual, safeguarding British nationals' interests, and they also 
wanted the Chinese government to rule China without interference from other 
parties such as the military. '6 
Opposition 
However, the Chinese government's call for negotiations on the abrogation 
of extraterritoriality met with opposition from the British community in China, 
which saw the move as degrading their status and privileges. They still believed 
China to be unstable, and the protection of the Chinese authorities was not enough 
for than. In Tientsin, they had already experienced a most challenging time when 
the British government had been willing to surrender the British concession. This 
had shocked them, but they had gradually managed to control the situation by 
giving certain equality to the Chinese, which had prevented rendition. The next 
and greatest challenge was the Chinese government's call for the foreign powers to 
relinquish extraterritorial rights. This lay at the core of the British informal 
presence in China. If it was abrogated, all other privileges, such as the British 
54 Fung, `Nationalist Foreign Policy, 1928-1937', p. 190, Malay Mail, 9 July 1928, p. 9 and The 
Strait Times, July, 101928, p. 9. 
ss Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, p201. 
 Ibid, pp. 203 and 204. 
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Municipal Administration in Tientsin, would also be lost. " In addition, the British 
community felt betrayed by its own government's willingness to consider 
relinquishing this right. For almost 70 years, from 1860 to 1930, they had built up 
the British Municipal Council and its trade interests in Tientsin and the 
surrounding area, and they saw this achievement as threatened by their own 
government's effort to negotiate with the Chinese. 
Following the announcement by the Chinese government that it wanted to 
abolish extraterritoriality, the British community in Tientsin gathered to discuss the 
matter. Two memoranda from the TBCI were released after the Chinese 
government sent its note to the foreign Powers. The first pointed out that the 
British community had tried to show that Chinese law and its judiciary were still 
not capable of protecting and safeguarding foreign nationals. Among the 
comments in the memorandum, one noted that:. 
There are some Modern Courts and prisons, but even 
in Shanghai, where there Courts function in the full glare of 
publicity, the judiciary are under political control. The Civil 
Code has not yet been completed and the revised Criminal 
Code is a dead letter where the accused are members of the 
Kuomintang, or are able to enlist the support that Party. sa 
The key point in this passage is the accusation by the British community that 
Chinese law and its judiciary would not accord them true justice. In addition, the 
British community in Tientsin continued to blame Chinese politicians for using 
their position and power to undermine the law. This explanation was a useful tool 
for eliciting sympathy from London's public. 
57 p nmcl, 'China', p. 653. 
58 SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institote of International Affairs, Box 7, `Manorandum No. 27, The 
Abolition of Extraterritoriality: How the Law is administered in China'. 
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However, the eagerness of the Chinese government to abolish 
extraterritoriality alarmed the British community in Tientsin. The Chinese 
Minister of Justice, Dr. Wang Chung-hui, who was despatched abroad on a mission 
to explain the modernisation of Chinese judicial codes and to seek the end of 
foreign extraterritoriality in 1929, became an irritation to the British community in 
Tientsin. In order to counter the Chinese campaign to abolish extraterritoriality, 
the British community in Tientsin, via the TBCI, condemned Dr. Wang Chung 
bui's explanation as concealing the true story in China, where Chinese law was not 
working well. The Chinese authorities, according to the British community, did 
not dare to enforce the law in China, where criminals always got away without 
trial. 59 At this point the British community in Tientsin seemed relentless in its 
opposition to the Chinese government's efforts to attack their interests. Every 
effort by the Chinese to attack extraterritoriality met with a counterattack from the 
British community. 
Memorandum 28 illustrates the belief of the British community in Tientsin 
that the Chinese demand for the abrogation of extraterritoriality rights was 
unnecessary, as these rights had been beneficial, a point illustrated in this 
statement 
The economic fabric built up upon the foundation of the so- 
called unequal treaties, - which considerations of Chinese 
Government revenue, the trade requirements of the country, 
the prosperity of the great Chinese merchant class, the 
maintenance of British Trade in one of the world's potentially 
greatest markets, and Justice to foreign vested interests, all 
demand shall be conserved - is seriously jeopardised. 
59 Ibid. 
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Chinese politicians demand change. Yet as everywhere the 
economic is ultimately the dominating factor. The problem 
becomes in fact one of how to effect political change without 
economic disaster. 60 
This statement lists the ways in which its defenders believed that extraterritoriality 
promoted progress in China. Moreover, the British community stressed that it had 
no feelings of racism against the Chinese. It added that the Chinese government's 
effort to abolish the rights was merely in its own interests: 
Would it not even be a crime against the Chinese People, since 
the delicate fabric of foreign trade laboriously constructed 
during the past 80 years and supported by the very influences 
and safeguards which Chinese officialdom desires to see 
abolished, would crash to the ground with disastrous results to 
millions of Chinese 61 
This paragraph comes from another appeal by the British community in Tientsin to 
avoid any change in their status. This statement tries to broaden the 
extraterritoriality issue to show that it was not only for the benefit of the British, 
since the Chinese also enjoyed prosperity created by the existence of this right. 
However, the appeal did not stop the British government from negotiating with the 
Chinese early in 1930.62 
On 31 May 193 1, in the middle of these negotiations, John Hay Thorburn, a 
19-year-old British boy, was reported missing in central China. He was said to 
have set out adventuring and it was confirmed that he had some "hare-brained" 
scheme including going to central China to fight the communists 63 However, his 
60 SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, 'Memorandum No28, 
Problem of the Extra-territorial Privileges in China'. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retrea4 p. 209. 
63 Bickers, `Death of a Young Shanghailander', p. 273. 
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fate after he left Shanghai was unknown. His disappearance sparked anger 
amongst the British community in Shanghai. In Tientsin, the case became another 
important factor in their opposition to the abrogation of extraterritoriality. " On 15 
September 1931 the British community called a meeting to discuss the Thorburn 
case, extraterritoriality and the rendition issue. A telegram they sent to The Times 
stated that: 
A mass meeting of British residents in Tientsin on the 16th 
[September 1931? ] passed a Resolution recording their 
indignation at the continued failure of the Chinese Government 
to deal satisfactorily with [the] Thorburn case. The Thorburn 
case affords a tragic illustration of the inability of the Chinese 
Government to exercise the normal functions of government 
even close to its own capital, and of the contempt of the 
requirements of the law by the military, who are the real rulers 
of the country. 65 
The above passage exemplifies the deep sadness and anger of British community in 
Tientsin about what had happened to Thorburn. At this point they condemned the 
Nationalist government as incapable of preventing tragic incidents happening to 
British nationals, and if they could not do this, how would they manage if 
extraterritoriality rights were relinquished? The outcome, to the British mind, 
would be trouble, and their lives and properties would be jeopardised by what had 
happened to Thorburn. 66 In short, the British community used Thorburn's case as 
another reason why the Chinese authority could not be trusted. 
At this meeting the British community meted its claim about the 
incompetence of the Chinese government, stressing: 
64 SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Allairs, Box 7, `Memorandum No. 32, `Tile 
Avarage Foreigner Looks at China'. 
`o SOAS, CHAS/MCP/37 Copy of telegram to the Times from its Shanghai Corresponds t, dated, 
Shanghai, the 181h September, 1931. 
66 Bickers, `Death of a Young Shanghailander', p. 290. 
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(a) "THAT the spirit of personnel of Chinese administration is not such 
that it can yet be entrusted with the control and protection of British 
persons and property; 
(b) "THAT the security of the persons and property of British subjects 
at Tientsin and the due protection of the economic essentials of trade 
relations in North China demand the continued maintenance of existing 
conditions at Tientsin; 
(c) "THAT if and when negotiations are resumed the conditions 
accorded to Tientsin should in no wise differ from those agreed to in 
respect of Shanghai, to which its position is analogous, the conclusions of 
the Feetham report no less applicable. 
(d) `THAT the period of exclusion of Tientsin and Shanghai and any 
other Treaty Port from the operation of any new treaty shall not be limited 
by means of terms of years but by the test of the realities of the situation. "67 
The above illustrates how the British community in Tientsin organised and 
presented their protests systematically. Points (a) and (b) had been stressed before 
in frustration over the incompetence of the Chinese government to settle the 
Thorburn case. 
Presenting these points, the British community in Tientsin demanded that 
its government should not resume negotiations on extraterritoriality with the 
67 SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Information, 
`Memorandum No. 3 1, The Tientsin Resolution'. 
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Chinese until the Thorburn case was settled and the Chinese government could rule 
efficiently and exercise its authority over the whole of China. The British 
community in Tientsin supported the British government's proposal to settle the 
Thorbum case by any means, including putting pressure on the Chinese 
government. " One of the speakers at the meeting, Howard Payne (from Collin and 
Co. ), criticised the British liberal policy, claiming: 
When I first arrived in Tientsin, just thirty years ago, the British 
Municipal Area could be said to be bounded on the west by 
what is now Gordon Road, and we had very few of the 
amenities of civilization which you now enjoy. The wonderful 
development in the interim is entirely due to the enterprise of 
British residents, principally merchants, but since the British 
Government's declaration of January 1927, this development 
has been greatly retarded and there is a general lack of 
confidence and security which has restricted building 
programmes to essential needs without any attempt as hitherto 
at anticipating future requirements. 69 
The above passage gives another of the reasons which the British community used 
to try to pressure and elicit sympathy from the British government and the public in 
London. It attempted to show the incapability of the Chinese government to 
develop or rule the foreign concession. 
At this juncture the British liked to compare the high British standard of 
living with, as they claimed, the `cruel and uncivilised' Chinese. The British 
community pointed out that the British (and other Westerners) had the ability to 
rule and administer. Payne argued that: 
6` PRO F0371/15464, Extraterritoriality in China, Teichman, 16/8/1931 and PRO F0371/15464, 
Extraterritoriality in China, Teichmau, 23/8/1931. 
69 SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Infonnetlon, 
`Memorandum NO 1, The Tientsin Resolution'. 
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Since the promulgation in 1928 of the revised Land Regulations 
for the administration of the British Municipal Area of Tientsin, 
... the Chinese Residents of this area enjoy more and greater 
privileges than in any other place or city in China. Not only 
have they the advantages of living under conditions which 
compare very favourably with any city in Europe or America ... 
, but they have voting rights which give them equal 
representation on [the] Municipal Council and freedom of 
speech on matters affecting municipal administration, and 
finance which they do not, as many you know, hesitate to 
exercise at the Annual Meetings of Electors. " 
Payne's statement illustrates his view that British leadership was necessary to 
protect the Chinese and assist their progress. Payne also pointed out that the 
facilities in the British Tientsin Municipality were better than those of the Chinese 
city and other Special Areas in Tientsin. He added that freedom of speech was not 
practised in the Chinese areas. 7' His condemnation continued, criticising the 
weakness of the Chinese government's administration, judiciary and municipality. 
Payne's statement reflects the British feeling that the Chinese police could not be 
trusted and were easily bribed? Another claim, made by Munro-Faure, claimed 
that the `anti-foreign' feelings of the Chinese never died down and would arise in 
any incident, however big or small. Munro-Faure referred to what had happened in 
Hankow (September 1931), where foreigners present when two rickshaws collided 
had been insulted, as an example of the failure of the Chinese government to do 
anything to curb Chinese hostility to foreigners. 73 
All these claims suggest that the British community tried to avoid any effort 
to put them under Chinese rule. Munro-Faure reminded his audience that their fate 
70 Ibid. 
71 Fun& The Diplomacy of Irnperid Rem p. 200. 
72 SOAS, john Emmett Woodall Papas, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Infonmedon, 
'Meanorandum No. 3 1, The Tientsin Resolution'. 
73 Ibid. 
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would be the same as that of the Russians when they were deprived of their 
extraterritoriality rights, with the consequence that they were treated like 'dirt'. 4 
Munro-Faure's statement illustrates the feeling that the British community's image 
should be protected and that the Chinese should not be allowed to rule them. The 
British community was still proud of the British image as a world power and did 
not realise that this power had been challenged by the Chinese people. The narrow 
minds of many British community regarded extraterritoriality as able to protect 
them and they had closed their minds to the development of Chinese nationalism. 
In reality, extraterritoriality had isolated them from the real picture in China and 
they still thought the British superior to the Chinese, therefore they feared that the 
loss of this right would mean loss of British dignity. 
Points (c) and (d) at the 15th September meeting represented new arguments 
which Tientsin's British community used to highlight the fact that it was not ready 
to relinquish extraterritoriality or return the concession to the Chinese; in this they 
acted in parallel with other British communities in China. When the Feetham 
report on Shanghai was published in 1931 the British community in Tientsin used 
it to support their own case. The report on the governance of the international 
settlement was conducted by a South African Judge, Richard Feetham. The British 
community in Tientsin saw it as providing concrete evidence with which to oppose 
further rendition of the concession. The tone of the report suggested that it shared 
the anxieties of the British community in Tientsin, which condemned rendition as a 
premature move. The British community was satisfied that the report 
" SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Information, 
`Memorandum No31, The Tientsin Resolution' and Marcia R. Ristaino, The Russian diasporas 
community in Shanghai', p. 193. 
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acknowledged its view of the inability of the Chinese administration to govern 
foreigners. 75 The reason given was that Chinese control of the settlement could 
easily be influenced by politicians or the Chinese authorities. The British 
community in Tientsin stressed that this would happen in Tientsin if the Chinese 
controlled the BMC. 76 
The Feetham report was another major boost for the British community's 
opposition to negotiations over extraterritorial rights as discussed by both Lampson 
and the Chinese Foreign Minister, C. T. Wang. 77 At this juncture the British 
community in Tientsin wanted the British government to follow the example of 
other nations such as Japan, France and the United States, which were not yet 
willing to give up their extraterritorial rights as related to Consular Jurisdiction. 78 
The Chinese, though, regarded the reasons the British gave for their opposition as a 
travesty and just another effort to underestimate the Chinese and tighten British 
control in Tientsin and the rest of China. 79 
Two Groups 
The discussion above illustrates the general feeling of the British 
community in Tientsin in late 1931. However, there were differing degrees of 
opposition to the change. As explained in the previous chapter, opinions about 
rendition were divided between moderate and diehard. The moderate opposition 
75 SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Information, 
, Memorandum No. 31, The Tientsin Resolution'. 
76 Ibid. 
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79 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p245. 
229 
was willing to relinquish some small privileges in order to avoid the total 
abrogation of their privileges in China. As mentioned in Chapters Two and Three 
this group formed the TCBI, whose main function was to counter this issue. At 
first the TBCI became the voice of the British community in Tientsin, illustrating 
the situation in China and its position in Tientsin, and then it became part of their 
weapon to protect British business interests in Tientsin. 
Memoranda 27 and 28 demonstrate the TBCI's strong opposition to the 
surrender of extraterritoriality up to the time of the Thorburn case. Memorandum 
32 illustrated the group's return to a milder attitude, but it still explicitly rejected 
abrogation of extraterritoriality totally. The memorandum began with praise for 
the China's contribution to the Western countries. Tientsin, for example, had 
grown into a great city and had become an international trade centre. 80 But it went 
on to condemn the Nationalists' decision to uphold Chinese sovereignty when the 
KMT was as they saw it, incapable of ruling the country. The group then became 
apologetic towards China and the Chinese, blaming British foreign policy as 
insensitive to what had happened in China and unconcerned with China's future. 
The mistaken decision not to support the KMT had created a chaotic situation in 
China which unleashed anti-imperialist feeling and brought `tumult, disorder, 
confusion and mob-law'. 
8' The memorandum concluded that at this time it would 
not be wise to relinquish extraterritorial rights. If the decision to abrogate the 
80 SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, `Memorandum No. 32, The 
Average Foreigner Looks at China', P3" 
a' Ibid. 
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status became reality, they believed that the prosperity and peace of Tientsin would 
be at the mercy of the chaotic events in China. 82 
The above does not mean that the TBCI had abandoned its struggle to 
protect its rights. It tried to get the support of others in the British community in 
Tientsin to unite to strive for the same goal: to uphold their privileges in Tientsin in 
particular and in China in general. As the British community worded its response 
to British policy: 
The actual terms of statement of British policy in 1927 
did not envisage a land slide in the sense of overwhelming, or 
perhaps more correctly overweening, demands. In face of these 
the harmonisation of the general liberal policy of the British 
Government with the realities of the situation became 
impossible-33 
This statement pointed out that even though the British in Tientsin had seemed 
willing to compromise on the rendition issue a few years earlier and had tried to 
make all compromise with the Chinese in the municipality, as with their 
counterparts in Shanghai they were still not eager to renounce all British privileges. 
What they meant by "the realities of the situation became impossible" was that for 
years after the Manchurian crisis erupted there had been hostility between China 
and Japan. Owing to this crisis they believed that the abrogation of exhatettitorial 
rights and other matters related to foreign privileges should not be discussed at that 
time. This matter is addressed in the following section. 
82 Ibid. 
83 SPAS, MS 186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, `Manornndum No. 33, British 
Policy in China', Tientsin, January 27,1932, p. 3. 
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Owing to the limited power of the BMC compared with the SMC, the 
moderate group had to be pragmatic in order to avoid putting their interests at risk. 
What was important was that the progress of their business should not be gambled 
in negotiations with the Chinese. The British community in Tientsin hoped that 
any discussion relating to their interests such as the Tariff Treaty would protect the 
British community and its property. Regarding the rendition of the British 
concessions, the British community still felt that all the important British 
concessions, such as Shanghai, Tientsin and Canton, should be defended, and that 
British interests in Hankow should also be made secure. In relation to the British 
government's willingness to continue its liberal policy, the British in Tientsin 
agreed to accept the surrender of small British concessions which they felt were of 
no real importance. S4 In short, the moderate British were largely those of the 
business community, who were not overly concerned with their prestige or 
preserving the British concession. What was important was that their business 
interests should be protected. Therefore they were willing to let go of smaller, less 
important British interests in China in order to maintain the more important ones. 
This tactic had been practiced some years before and succeeded in retaining British 
prominence in Tientsin. 
The moderates in Tientsin's British community represented the importance 
of British business circles in Tientsin (especially the KMA), and adopted this 
policy in an effort to avoid repercussions from the Chinese if they continually 
fought against any alteration in their position. They would lose everything if they 
did not follow the changes in China. They knew that British interests had been 
" Ibid. 
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long established and had dominated the Chinese economy since the existence of 
the British concession in Tientsin, and that their opposition would get them thrown 
them out of Chinese business dealings. Their competitors, such as the Americans, 
Japanese and Germans, were waiting to replace them in the domination of Chinese 
business 85 In Tientsin, the emergence of Japanese business in north China would 
push British businessmen out of north China. The KMA was a case in point, as 
discussed below. In Tientsin and the surrounding areas, not only did the British 
not want to lose business but they were prepared to fight together with other British 
communities for their interests. They wanted their government to be very cautious 
about showing willingness to follow the Chinese demands, and questioned China's 
integrity, as stated below: - 
To rake over the ashes of the past and to apply to them the eye 
of cold reason, is at the best of times an ungracious task. Yet 
how otherwise emphasise the corrupt methods and the disregard 
of obligations and existing rights practised by every Chinese 
Government which in recent years has assumed office? How 
bring to notice the danger of further modification of treaty rights 
until a government has been established which can exercise 
effective control and establish the rule of law throughout the 
country? How demonstrate that the remaining foreign 
concessions represent the only areas of security throughout the 
country and constitute the foundation on which the vast 
economic fabric is reared? 
The moderate British community in Tientsin was attempting to show the British 
government that the Chinese nationalist government was still weak and not ready 
to rule China. It depended on foreign concessions building up their interests in 
China In short, the British community wanted stability in China with proper law 
u Osterhammel, `British Business in China, 1860s-1950s', p. 200. 
56 SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, `Memorandum No. 33, British 
Policy in China', Tientsin, 27 January 1932, p. 3. 
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enforcement and a justice system free from any inference, which would create a 
good environment for business and the maintenance of free trade in China. 
The second group was against any changes to British privileges. H. G. W. 
Woodhead, one of this diehard group, who was unwilling to entertain any 
bargaining about the abrogation of extraterritorial rights, did his utmost to resolve 
this issue. He had opposed the move since the issue was raised. Continuously in 
his writing from 1929 onwards, Woodhead laid down his strong view of the 
weakness of the Chinese legal system as a reason to avoid any abrogation of 
extraterritoriality. He claimed that the Chinese did not have a complete legal 
system that could deal with all aspects of daily life including insurance, business 
and public safety. 87 The diehard group continued to attack Chinese law as a `dead 
letter' because its enforcement was insufficient and ignored by other Chinese 
provinces. Woodhead claimed that the law was promulgated merely to protect the 
Kuomintang's interests -88 He further commented that the Judicial Administration 
in China was not functioning-89 His comments illustrate how some of the British 
Tientsiners, similar to the British Shanghailanders, were keen to oppose change 
and willing to cite any reason for attacking Chinese law and order. 
After Woodhead moved to Shanghai in 1930, the diehard group continued 
to thrive in Tientsin, fighting for its core concern: its survival in China. The 
revocation of extraterritoriality threatened to expose the group to the Chinese 
r H. G. W. Woodhead, `Extraterritoriality in China: The Case against Abolition', reprinted in 
Ramon H. Myers, A Garland Serks: the Modern Chinese Economy (New York: Garland 
Publishing, tic, 1980), p. 12. 
a Woodhead, `Extraterritoriality in China', p. 13. 
89 Ibid., p. 14. 
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system of law and order, which they felt would be unable to protect them. The 
United Services (Great War) Association released their resolution as stated below: 
This meeting of British ex-servicemen and women resident in 
Tientsin views with indignation and alarm the prospect of the 
relinquishment, or partial relinquishment, of safe-guards hitherto 
accorded His Majesty's subjects in China, despite the proved 
inability of the Chinese Government to afford to foreign 
residents the ordinary protection given by any civilised State, or 
to enforce respect for the laws of the country amongst their own 
officials, as exemplified in the Nakamura, Thorburn, and many 
other cases-90 
The existence of this association fiu*cr illustrates how the diehards tried to 
channel their views to the British government, repeating their opinion that 
extraterritoriality should be protected and that the Chinese should not be trusted. 
The diehards tried to inciting that the relinquishment of extraterritoriality 
would put the British interests in danger. This is highlighted by another part of the 
resolution, "[a]ny relinquishment of existing safe-guards will not only result in 
further injury to British trade and interests in this country but will definitely 
endanger the lives and property of His Majesty's subjects" 91 In this passage the 
diehard group underlines two important points: fast, that British interests not only 
consisted of the British traders and their property but also included the settlers and 
missionaries who lived and worked in Tientsin. Therefore the British government 
must not think of protecting only the traders. The other British groups also had 
their interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands. The diehard group still believed that 
extraterritoriality could protect their interests in China. The second point that they 
90 PRO F0371/15464 Letter from the Honorary Secretary of United Services (Groat War) 
Association to the Secretary of British Legion, Tientsin, 5 October 1931. Captain Nakamura was a Japanese officer who had been murdered in western Manchuria. His murder had infuriated the 
Japanese military and the Japanese had blamed Chinese soldiers for his death. 91 [bid. 
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emphasised was that British subjects were under threat in China, and needed 
protection. In other word the diehards endlessly attempted to alert the British 
people and the British government to the bad consequences the British community 
in Tientsin would face under the Chinese rule. 
Another reason for the diehards' resistance was their desire to continue to 
uphold the prestige and image of the British in the eyes of the world. British 
concessions such as in Tientsin had sentimental value to them. Bickers mentions 
that "... [u]pholding prestige involved practicalities. These included the physical 
structures of the British establishment in China: the gunboats, control of Customs, 
and the large Legation in Beijing". 92 The concession was also part of the prestige 
which the British in Tientsin wished to retain. Since the early 1860s the British 
community had transformed a brackish, waterlogged and swampy area at Tzu Chu 
Lin into an important trading port and a small, modern European-style city, 93 and 
had built modern, memorable buildings associated with heroes such as Colonel 
Gordon % They named the roads and streets after British people pioneers in the 
opening up of China to trade: for example Elgin Avenue, Parkes Road and Napier 
Road. 95 
`Fighting' Weapons 
The British in Tientsin were not alone in fighting to keep their position in 
China. They were not a loose group fighting apart from other British communities 
92 Bickers, `History, Legend and Treaty Port Ideology, 1925-1931', p. 88. 
93 W. V. Pennell, Tientsin North China: the Poo% Its History, Trade, Indkshy and ContmnwJty Lf, 
(7itatsia: the Tientsin Press, 1934), P. 22. 
Robert A. Bickers, 'History, Legend and Treaty Port Ideology, 1925-1931', p. 83. 
95 Hashaser, The Workers of T VyIj% 1900-1949, p. 19. 
236 
in China. The communication between themselves and other British nationals, 
especially in Shanghai, was carried out through individuals or organisations such 
as the China Association and the British Chamber of Commerce. British 
businessmen in Tientsin such as Nathan and Young from the KMA, journalists 
such as Woodhead, and prominent individuals such as P. H. B. Kent often went to 
Shanghai and other treaty ports, forming a network which united them in fighting 
for their common goal. The China Association and the British Chamber of 
Commerce had long established a network with other British communities in China 
and in England. For example, the China Association consisted of about 60 firms 
and 250 members. Letters and news were posted between these groups in order 
to supply the metropole with direct news of the reality of the situation in China as 
they saw it and the British community's situation in Tientsin particularly and in 
China generally. In Tientsin, the TBCI collected all the news from Shanghai, 
Hankow, Canton and other parts in China. 
Nathan urged the British community in Tientsin to take proactive action, 
that: 
One other thing I think we can do, and believe me it is on public 
opinion in treat Britain that we must ultimately rely for help. 
This is a particularly good moment.... All of you have friends 
and relatives in England All of you therefore can reach British 
public opinion, and I hope everyone will realise that it is his or 
her duty to write to your friends and relatives and tell them what 
is the true position in China; what is the danger we are facing; 
and what they can do to help us. We shall then reach a bigger 
public than we have reached in the past and if at this juncture 
British public opinion can be made to realize that what we are 
doing in China is of great importance in restoring British 
% Stephen Lyon Endicott, Diplomacy andEA*rprise, p. 31. 
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prestige and British prosperity then there is some hope our fate 
may be averted 97 
His argument demonstrates that the British community in Tientsin was very serious 
and strong in opposing, the abrogation of extraterritorial rights, preferring its 
situation and problems in China to be channelled to the British parliament and 
public. Only in this way could the British community in Tientsin gather support 
from Britain. To cry for help to the British Legation seemed to than useless, and 
only by bypassing the Legation could their fate become known to their fellow 
countrymen 98 This was one of the ways in which the British community in 
Tientsin pressured the British government and Legation to avoid further 
negotiations on extraterritoriality rights. 
The formation by the British in Shanghai of the British Residents' 
Association (BRA) in 1931 did not isolate the British in Tientsin. Support for a 
united British community in China pushed the BRA to fight not only for 
Shanghailanders. This association was one more vehicle used by the British in 
Tientsin to further their common interests with other British communities in China 
and to express their feelings and opposition towards treaty negotiations. 99 But the 
British community only joined this association when the BRA changed its name 
from Shanghai British Residents' Association to British Residents' Association of 
China. 10° 
97 SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Information, 
`Memorandum No. 31, The Tientsin Resolution', pp. 6-7. 
" PRO F0371/15464 Letter from the Honorary Secretary of the United Service (Great War) 
Association to the Secretary of the British Legion, Tientsin, 5 October 1931. 
" Robert A. Bickers, `Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler 
Community in Shanghai 1843-1937', Past and Present, No. 159 (May 1998), p. 207. 
100 Shai#ai B itish Resides' Association, Annual Report, 1931, p. 3. 
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In conclusion, the feeling against the abrogation of extraterritorial rights 
was as strong in Tientsin as it was in Shanghai. Although some of the opposition 
adopted a moderate, and some an aggressive tone, the aim was the same: to oppose 
the Chinese government's demand for the surrender of extraterritoriality. The 
moderate groups were willing to compromise if the decision of the British 
government was a fait accompli. The second group held tightly to its belief that 
extraterritoriality should not be abolished. The different approaches of these were 
due to differing interests and positions. The moderate group were from the business 
sector, whose progress depended on good relations between the British and the 
Chinese. Therefore they agreed to accept changes which did not jeopardise their 
business interests. Their contact with the Chinese people, Chinese authorities and 
government had made it clear that their future lay in goodwill between themselves 
and the Chinese. Some of these moderates, such as the KMA, depended on their 
Chinese partners to settle problems with the Chinese government in order to run 
their mining industries in north China. These Chinese became prominent leaders in 
Tientsin and members of the British Municipal Council. However, the moderates 
would not agree to changes that did not benefit their businesses, and tried in every 
way possible to protect their future position in China. The previous chapter 
illustrated how they managed to avoid the Chinese taking over the concession by 
making several compromises. 
The more aggressive group, which was eager to avoid any compromise that 
would affect their future, had its own reasons for opposing the abrogation of 
extraterritoriality. The group consisted mainly of settlers who had been in Tientsin 
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for many years and who had children and grandchildren there. These people 
considered Tientsin their home, 1°' and found it hard to relinquish their privileges. 
As with the Shanghailanders, the group's priority was its community in Tientsin 
rather than the home country. 102 Woodhead, for example, even though not born in 
Tientsin or even in China, had arrived in China in 1902, lived and worked there as 
a journalist and was a member of the Tientsin Volunteers and the Tientsin Club. 
Tientsin was embedded in the lives of this group. Woodhead was more concerned 
about what would happen to them in the future if the Chinese abrogated 
extraterritoriality and took over the British concession. Their only hope was to 
defend the concession for their future, and they would have felt helpless if their 
privileges had been removed without any guarantee. 103 They feared that if the 
Chinese took over the extraterritoriality it would destroy the foundation which they 
had built there. They were afraid that their situation in China would be degraded 
and they would become like the White Russians; stateless. Furthermore, part of 
their diehard mentality considered the Chinese an `inferior race', and they feared 
that to be under the Chinese would downgrade their status as white men. 
At this point they believed that the Chinese could not manage the 
administration of western-style justice, nor could they avoid political interference 
or the corruption of their officers. 104 They believed that the Thorburn case was an 
example of cruelty against foreigners in Chinese law. If extraterritoriality was 
abrogated, they did not believe that the Chinese would be able to protect them in 
'o' Hetshaüer, The Workers of Tim firn 1900-1949, p. 20. 
102 Bickers, `Shanghailanders', p. 178. 
103 Ibid., p. 207. 
'a Edmund S. K. Fung, `The Sino-British Rapprochement, 1927-1931', Modern Asiat Stwdks, 
Vol. 17, No. 1(1983), p. 100. 
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their daily life, and therefore they saw no reason for the British government to 
concede the rights. They enjoyed the status quo in Tientsin, where the British and 
Chinese got along - in their eyes - and development was maintained. 
The Manchurian Crisi4 1931 
A new chapter in Chinese history began in 1931, when the Manchurian 
Crisis focused Chinese nationalism on the Japanese. The crisis began on 18 
September 1931 when a small explosion destroyed the South Manchurian Railway 
tracks at Mukden. The Japanese army used the incident as a pretext to seize 
control of Mukden and advance along the north of the Great Wall. 10S Chiang Kai- 
shek's non-resistance policy allowed the Japanese troops to control all the areas 
north of the Great Wall easily. 106 After this success they proclaimed a new nation, 
Manchukuo. This event led the Chinese students to demonstrate with a parade 
urging the Chinese to boycott Japanese goods. 107 Fighting between the Japanese 
and the Chinese continued into the area south of the Great Wall and also erupted in 
Shanghai in early 1932.108 Both parties agreed to a ceasefire by signing the Tangku 
Truce in 1933. 
1° Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaks, The Making of Jgpmtu Manchuria, 1904-1932 (Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), p. 383. 
106 hitter, The Manclamian Myth, p. 73. 
107Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Stadent Protests in Twentieth-Century China: Tile View fron, Std 
(Stanford Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 171. 
10t Donald A. Jordan, Chinas Md by Fine (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 2001), 
pp. 73-9, Christian Henriak Sha gl* 1927-1937. " Afavricipmf Power, Locaiify and Modernisation 
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British missionaries saw this situation as acute. Some expected a clash 
between the Chinese and Japanese to occur at any time. 109 When the crisis erupted, 
the British in Tientsin showed that they felt the invasion of Manchuria by the 
Japanese army was justified. This was a price which they believed China should 
pay after the disappearance of Thorburn, the killing of a Japanese soldier, Captain 
Nakamura Shintaro (27 June 1931), and other incidents linked to foreigners before 
that. Nakamura was ordered by the General Staff Office in Tokyo to explore and 
map the Hsingen range, but was murdered in Suokungfu. 10 The Japanese military 
leaders in Manchuria demanded that the Chinese authorities settle the problem. 
However, the investigation carried out by the Chinese authorities did not satisfy the 
Japanese military, and the incident inflamed Sino-Japanese relations. "' 
The British community in Tientsin agreed that the murder of Nakamura was 
another sign of the `incompetence' of the Chinese government when it came to 
settling foreign issues. Therefore in common with other British communities in 
China it supported the Japanese action, 112 and the Chinese were blamed for what 
had happened in Manchuria. The editor of The Peking and Tientsin Times claimed, 
, the fact is that the Chinese, by a policy of utter irresponsibility and all-round 
aggravation, brought this upon themselves. They literally goaded the Japanese 
rvtilitarists into action. ' 113 
109 SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 30,1932-1933 ii, Lettar from A. P. 
Cullen to Mr. Hawkins, February 11,1932. 
"o diel B. Ramsdell, `The Nakamura Incident and the Japanese Foreign Office', The Journal gf 
Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, (Nov., 1965), pp. 53-4. 
111 Ibid., pp. 64S. 
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The view was that continued Chinese agitation towards foreigners had 
created this crisis. The editor referred to the problem as similar to what had 
happened to the British in the May Thirtieth Incident, continuing that the Nanking 
government had not cultivated good relations between the Chinese and the 
foreigners. It had failed to counter Chinese problems such as the continuing civil 
war and banditry in China. Several Chinese organisations and some Chinese 
individuals wrote to The China Critic that such a widely held foreign view had 
further damaged relations between the Chinese and foreigners. 114 
Furthermore, the British community in Tientsin felt that the Chinese should 
not blame other Powers for their problems. China, to them, had internal problems 
which had to be settled to create peace and order in China. Law and order were not 
the only problems the Chinese faced; there were also problems at the Chinese 
treasury and the anti-imperialist feeling which had engulfed the Chinese public. 
Some of the British community believed that if China could clear up all these 
problems, peace and prosperity would emerge. These were among the Chinese 
problems that the British community in Tientsin believed had led to the failure of 
Chinese relations with other countries, creating conflicts such as the Manchurian 
crisis, ' 15 which became a further justification for foreign countries not surrendering 
extraterritoriality or other privileges. 
1 14 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
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As the real impact of this crisis approached, the British community in 
Tientsin hoped that it would not affect its interests in Tientsin particularly and 
China generally. They were happy with the British government's attempts to 
mediate the situation. They also wanted protection for its people and property in 
Tientsin and China. "6 This was a challenge to the British, as relations with the 
Chinese had become more serious when the Japanese became part of the problem, 
especially where the KMA was concerned. In the concession itself life was normal 
and people were not much concerned about what was happening between the 
Chinese and the Japanese. But on 8 and 30 November 1931, Tientsin residents 
were shocked by street fighting between Chinese and Japanese soldiers. 1 17 The 
Japanese military wanted to extend the war in Manchuria beyond the Great Wall. 
Using the Japanese concession in Tientsin as an operational base, the Japanese 
military had employed Chinese hooligans together with some Japanese in plain 
clothes to make trouble in the Chinese city. ' 18 
The fighting began when a large group of Chinese started a riot, attacking 
the Chinese police in the Chinese city in Tientsin on the night of 8 November 
1931. This led to the Chinese authorities tightening security, which worried the 
Japanese who demanded that the Chinese police withdraw to 300 metres from the 
Japanese concession. ' 19 Meanwhile, `plain-clothes men' were pouring in from the 
Japanese concession to create a disturbance in the city. Fighting between them and 
the Chinese police resulted in some being shot dead and others arrested. The 
116 SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Af3'airs, Box 7, 'Menxxwdurn No. 33, 
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arrested plain clothes men (Chinese hired by the Japanese) informed the Chinese 
authorities that they were supported by the Japanese, and that the Japanese had 
given them weapons and money to stage a riot in the Chinese city-120 At the same 
time, Japanese troops moved from the Japanese concession towards the Chinese 
city with machine guns and armoured cars. 12' This fighting did not have much 
impact on the British community. The Chinese and Japanese did not disturb the 
peace and harmony of the British concession, as the British authorities kept tight 
control of the area to avoid fighting spreading to there. This control also played an 
important part in managing the vast numbers of Chinese refuges pouring into the 
concession. 122 British business circles such as the KMA did not see this fighting as 
a threat to their business, which was unaffected. 123 
The fighting between the Chinese and Japanese happened over a short 
period only, but anti-Japanese feeling had flourished in China at several events 
such as the Twenty-one Demands (1915), the May Fourth Incident (1919) and 
Tsinan (1928). Amongst the organisations against the Japanese imperialists was 
the `Blue Shirt Society', a Chinese underground organisation formed in 1932. This 
organisation was secretly under Chiang Kai-shek's guidance and had caused much 
damage to Japanese interests. 124 Another group tried to act independently of 
government control, ignoring government instructions not to strike, advocating war 
110 Chinese Affairs, November 13,1931, No. 152-153, pp. 571,572 and 573. 
121 The Tientsin Incident, p. 5. 
122 SOAS, MS186361, Royal institute of International Affairs, Box 7, 'Memorandum No. 33, 
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and forming patriotic associations. 'u This student group also organised the 
movement in Tientsin, 'Th although information about this is elusive. The only 
information which can be associated with the anti-Japanese movement concerns a 
bomb incident directed against the Japanese and their collaborators. In Tientsin, 
this group was named `The Blood and Iron Group', and its main purpose was the 
destruction of Japanese interests! " There were several cases of bombs thrown by 
unidentified persons exploding in the Japanese concession-128 The group wanted to 
damage Japanese interests, and threatened to attack any Chinese or foreigners who 
dealt with the Japanese, an attack which was also intended to create a boycott of 
Japanese goods. '2' The French concession had been threatened when a young 
Chinese man had thrown a bomb at a shop there. The British concession suffered 
only one bomb incident which focused on the Japanese Consul-General's residence 
and did little damage. The British authorities, it seemed, had succeeded in 
controlling the situation, and took every precaution to avoid any Chinese attacks. 
Therefore from 1931 to 1933 Chinese resistance attacks did not seriously frighten 
British residents. 130 
As mentioned earlier, the Manchurian incident did not seem to create much 
of a problem for the British community in Tientsin, since the community's 
relations with both the Chinese and the Japanese were felt to be cordial. For this 
reason, the British community was not unduly worried about the possible impact of 
1 25 Wasserstrom, Sts km Protests fü Twcenaeth-Centwy China pp. 178-179. 
1'1bid., p. 161. 
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the crisis. As long it maintained good relations with both parties and neutrality in 
this incident, it was safe from harassment or attack. Outside the concession, 
however, it was a different story. Without British authority in the area surrounding 
Tientsin, the British government and the BMC were powerless, as were the KMA 
in north China. The KMA operated in the Tongshan area. When the Manchurian 
crisis occurred the KMA was worried about the outcome of the war. Firstly, the 
Japanese troops might gain control of the KMA's mines and the port at 
Chinwangtao after the Tangku Truce. 131 Secondly, defeated Chinese troops might 
turn to banditry and threaten the KMA's mines and Chinwangtao port. 132 
However, neither of these possibilities really disturbed the KMA. The Japanese 
did not interfere with the enterprise, 133 but they used their Chinese collaborators to 
establish the Japanese influence in north China. '34 A group called the National 
Salvation Army under General Li Chi Chun was among these. This group 
proclaimed that its task was to function as the new government for the Tongshan 
area and demanded taxes from the KMA. 135 This worried the KMA, who wanted 
the British government to intervene on their behalf. 
The following statement shows the concern of the General Manager of 
KMA, E. J. Nathan, who wanted the British Legation to protect the company's 
t31 The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, February 4,1932, 
15. ý32 
The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter fmm Mr. E. J. Nathan to the Consul-0enaral, Tientsin, January 
7,1933, Parks M. Coble, Facing Jage: Chinese Politics and Japanese 1mpeHa1Jsm, 1931-193 7 
(Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991), p. 94 and Millet, The 
Manchurian MydL p. 193. 
'33 Tim Wright, Coal Afmwig in CA im Ecana ny and Socisty, 1895-1937, p. 125. 
'34 Coble, Facing Japan, p. 112. 
135 The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to the Consul-General, Tientsin, June 8, 
1933. 
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mines to avoid unnecessary demands by unlawful elements from both the Chinese 
irregular army and the Japanese collaborators. 
I propose at the appropriate moment to submit through 
you to H. B. M. Government a claim for any monies so 
extorted, together with a claim for the loss of business suffered 
by the Administration consequent on the interruption to traffic 
between the Mines and the shipping ports, and any other losses 
that have been or may be suffered by the Administration in the 
future which can be considered to have been caused by 
circumstances arising out of military operations which have 
taken place between Tientsin and the Mines Area and the Mines 
Area and Chinwangtao or at points between them. ' 36 
However, the British government reacted passively to helping the KMA to deal 
with General Li because it did not want to involve itself more deeply in the Sino- 
Japanese crisis by taking unilateral action. 137 It needed the support of the other 
Powers to settle the crisis. 138 Therefore the weakness of the British in this case left 
the KMA to do its best to settle the problem alone, and it succeeded in avoiding 
military confrontation. 139 From this point onwards the KMA had to face the reality 
that its government would not help it directly, and so it utilised various means of 
negotiation, including its links with its Japanese and Chinese counterparts to 
employ bribery. '40 However, the fighting between the Chinese and the Japanese 
took hold when the Tangku Truce was signed on 31 May 1933. On the one hand 
this brought the KMA relief, but on the other, as a consequence of the truce, the 
Japanese used the creation of the demilitarised zone as a base for its Kwantung 
' The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to the Consul-General, Tientsin, June 
19,1933. 
137 The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, 25 June 1933. 
139 Louis, Britain Strategy in the Far Ea* 1919-1939, p. 188-9. 
'39 Osterhammel, `Imperialism in Transition', p. 278. 
'40 Osterhammel, `China', p. 655 and Wright, Coal Mining in Chin Economy and Society, 1893- 
1937, p. 133. 
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Army, and in later years as a place to hide smuggled goods to be supplied to north 
China, 14' as discussed in the following chapter. 
In conclusion, the British community had its own views as to the cause of 
the Manchurian crisis. The British reaction was highly condemnatory of the 
Chinese, blaming them as a result of the nationalist diplomacy of the Nationalist 
Government. The British in Tientsin used the crisis to claim that the Chinese were 
not yet capable of handling their own country, and still harboured `anti-foreign' 
feelings. Furthermore, the time was not yet right to relinquish extraterritoriality, 
because China was still disunited and embroiled. Therefore the British community 
used the Manchurian crisis as a reason to undermine the Chinese. If 
extraterritoriality were to be relinquished the position of the British in China would 
be in jeopardy due to the disorder in China at the time. The British community 
pointed out that in Tientsin, for example, when fighting broke out between the 
Chinese and the Japanese on 8 November 1931, if the British government had 
surrendered the concession in Tientsin at the time the danger from the disorder 
would have been unfavourable to British interests. The British were satisfied that 
with the British authority still in control of the concession their security was 
safeguarded. 
The impact of the Manchurian crisis was twofold. First, the British 
community in the concession was not unduly worried about the Sino-Japanese 
hostilities. Although the fighting continued at Tientsin, the BMC took great care 
141 Taksfusa Nakamura, `The Yen Bloc', p. 174 cited from Minami M=A u bataudo kabushiki 
kaisha, Tenshin shitsu, chosabu, Kilo chlkii no both gaikyo to kanzei j jo, Febmaay 1936, and Kilo 
tokuclm boeki noflLiuJo, June 1936. 
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that it did not spill over into the concession. Life in the concession seemed 
peaceful, although the Chinese tried to attack Japanese interests in Tientsin. The 
Grammar School was running as usual and the community was unperturbed by 
Chinese sabotage activities. The BMC's police had to deal with six robberies and 
four murder cases that year, and the Electricity Department reported that demand 
for electricity had increased. 142 The development of the concession was also 
unhampered by the disturbance in China. Several new buildings and facilities such 
as a new fire station were planned, and others, such as a new market and the Kung 
Hsueh School's building, were already under construction. 143 Second, this was not 
the case for the KMA, which was far from Tientsin and where British power was 
not overt. The British government seemed weak in maintaining peace and order in 
north China, although British interests were threatened. '« The British Legation 
took very little action and avoided intervening in the disturbance caused by the 
Japanese collaborators. Only the Tangku Truce between the Chinese and the 
Japanese brought the KMA relief concerning its fate in north China. This 
illustrates how the British government had limited power to deal with the two 
hostile parties. Its power rested upon legal administration, such as in the 
concession in Tientsin. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed extraterritoriality under three main headings: the 
seizure of the customs house in Tientsin; negotiation of extraterritoriality (plus the 
142 Shanghai Municipal Archives, BMC. 77er sin, Report of the Council for the year 1933 (Tientsin: 
Tientsin Press, Limited), pp. 32 and 46. 
143 The North China Herald 13 May 1933, p. 170. 
144 Trotter, Britain and East Asia 1933-1937, pp. 2 and 3. 
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Thorburn issue); and the Manchurian crisis. All three demonstrate that the main 
concern for the British was simply how to protect British trade interests. The 
seizure of the Tientsin customs house was an indication of the confusion that 
Anglo-Chinese relations were in. As in the mid-1920s when British interests were 
under attack, the British were at a crossroad with the civil war in China. The crisis 
threatened British trade interests. The community was very concerned about the 
impact on the progress of their trade in North China. But the British traders played 
neutral and wanted the crisis settled in order to avoid any repercussions from the 
civil war. They were wise enough not to support any group. Therefore the British 
trade interests survived the crisis. But the crisis also had a strong effect on Anglo- 
Chinese relations, which were affected by the involvement of the British national, 
Simpson. The Chinese government was unhappy with the British government's 
failure to punish Simpson. But Lampson was a good mediator who did not show 
any bias towards either side in the civil war. 
Though extraterritoriality was very fragile, some of the British community 
still held this privilege sacred. Therefore the British community in Tientsin joined 
other Britons in China to fight against relinquishing it when negotiations were held 
in 1930. The British in Tientsin opposed the negotiation of this privilege because 
they still underestimated the ability of the Chinese authorities to rule over 
foreigners. They were afraid that their future in the concession would be uncertain 
due to the unstable situation in China. But the Chinese saw these accusations as a 
tool to tighten British imperialist control. 14S The moderates and diehards seemed to 
take the same stand concerning extraterritoriality. The disappearance of Thorburn 
145 popsld, Hygienic Modernity, p. 247. 
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exacerbated matters, sparking their phobia about the Chinese. The formation of the 
TBCI in the mid-1920s became the British community's tool by which to bypass 
the British Legation and convey their message to England. The moderates were 
more flexible in dealing with this issue than the diehards, due to the difference in 
interests between the groups. The British traders, who operated not only in the 
concession but also outside it, had to think about their future. Their continued 
opposition to the Chinese was bad for business interests. It was up to the British 
traders themselves to protect their interests from the Chinese demands. So the 
British traders, who were mostly moderates, had to sacrifice a few of their small 
privileges to retain their larger interests in China. 
But the British community, especially the diehards, used every means 
possible to stop the extraterritoriality negotiations. When the Manchurian crisis 
broke out they saw it as caused by the Chinese prolonging anti-imperialist feeling 
and making the Japanese furious in Manchuria. The British community considered 
that this crisis justified their accusation that the Chinese could not be trusted to rule 
foreigners. The British concession became a fortress in which the British felt safe 
from the Sino-Japanese war. Both parties respected the British concession, but this 
crisis illustrates the fragility of the informal British empire outside the concession. 
The dilemma of the KMA is a case in point. At this point the KMA began to feel 
the heat of the war. Nathan had always warned in his letters that this new threat 
was coming. This threat was no longer from the Chinese but from the Japanese, 
and is discussed in the following chapter. 
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Despite these crises and excitements, throughout the years 1930 to 1933 the 
British concession again became a place of peace and safety for the British 
community. The seizure of the Chinese customs house in Tientsin and the 
Manchurian crisis did not interfere with normal life in the concession. The British 
community (apart from the British Indians) increased by 92 percent from 1929 to 
1934 (see Table 2.2 in Chapter 1). The total population of the British concession 
increased in the same period by 20 percent. Such growth was an indication of the 
prosperity of trade in the British concession. Also in 1930 the British improved 
their relations with the Chinese through the appointment of J. S. Chwang as Vice- 
Chairman of the BMC. The murder of Simpson had not become as big an issue as 
the disappearance of Thorburn; the BMC's police had investigated Simpson's 
death but had failed to find the murderer. 146 In the long run, nobody seemed to 
mind. 
` BMC, 1"ientsij Report of the Council for the year 1930, p. 36. 
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Chapter Five 
The Making of the Enemy: British-Chinese-Japanese Relations 
(1934-1937) 
Introduction 
The outbreak of the Manchurian crisis gradually caused growing difficulties 
for the British communities in North China. The Tangku Truce became a turning 
point by which their military spread the Japanese influence in the area through 
three ways. Firstly, they tried to force the Chinese in North China to proclaim their 
autonomy from Nanking. ' The Chinese East Hopei Anti-Communist Council 
(EHACC) on 24 November 1935, and Hopei-Chahar Political Council (HCPC) 
established on 18 December 1935 were puppet administrations? Then the 
Japanese tried to divert North China's customs revenue to the EHACC 3 Secondly, 
the Japanese tried to use the demilitarised zone to encourage the smuggling of 
goods into China. Thirdly, Japanese troops were dispatched to the zone to suppress 
anti-Japanese elements. These three tactics indirectly disturbed the position of the 
British in North China, including in Tientsin and its hinterlands. 
This chapter explores the impact of the Japanese military presence on the 
British community. It considers three important points. Firstly, it takes an in-depth 
look at the British response to Japanese smuggling activities. This illegal activity 
confused the British attitude towards the Japanese, who were apparently not eager 
to help to eradicate the smuggling. While this chapter covers the period from 1934 
1 Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan P. M. 
2 Marjorie Dryburgh, North China and JaPMren Expansion 1933-1937 (Richmond: Clurmn Presa 
2000), p. 79. 
3 BOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Leta from Mr. E. M. Gall to H. M. Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. 5 February, 1936. 
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to 1937, it also covers events in the early 1930s, since the smuggling activities 
began as early as 1931. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the Japanese intended to 
create North China as territory geo-politically separate from the Nanking 
government. This impacted on British interests, especially in the demilitarised 
zone. The KMA became a test case. As mentioned earlier the Manchurian crisis 
affected the KMA. This section discusses how the KMA maintained its position in 
North China on the eve of the Japanese expansion in North China. Lastly, the 
chapter examines the British community and government response to the Marco 
Polo Bridge Incident (Lukouchiao Incident) on and after 7 July 1937. The onset of 
the Sino-Japanese War (1937) changed the position of the British in and around 
Tientsin. These events foreshadowed the disputes which arose between the British 
and Japanese before war broke out in December 1941. Although three of these 
points affected Anglo-Japanese relations, Anglo-Chinese relations were not 
unaffected. As the Nanking government had lost control of North China, the 
discussion deals with the pro-Japanese Chinese and the Japanese themselves. 
Smuggling 
To understand smuggling activities in North China it is essential to set out 
the background of why, by whom and how these activities began and flourished. 
As mentioned above, in 1931 smugglers were unloading their goods at points on 
the North China coast and moving them by truck to railway stations for distribution 
in North China, including in Tientsin 4 The Japanese concession in Tientsin 
4 SHAC, 679(1), 20385, Letter from Mr. L. de Luca to Mr. Frederick Maze, Tientsin, 22 August, 
1931. 
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became the distribution centre for illegal narcotics for the whole of North Chinas 
Smuggling became more overt after the creation of the demilitarised zone .6 
Smugglers' activities increased considerably in August and September 1935, when 
the Japanese garrison commander at Chinwangtao disarmed all Chinese Maritime 
Customs Preventive Service guards along the Great Wall and the Japanese garrison 
ordered all armed cruisers belonging to the service to withdraw along the coast 
between Chinwangtao and Lutai to a distance of 150 miles. ' The zone became a 
haven in which the smugglers, who were mostly Korean and Japanese, with only a 
small proportion of Chinese, were able to offload their goods and freely use any 
facilities on the railways, roads and waterways to distribute their goods in China° 
The smuggled goods were of three types; firstly household goods such as 
spirits, rayon, kerosene, sugar, cigarette, cotton cloth and artificial silk; secondly 
drugs; and thirdly silver. The first and second categories were imported from 
Dairen, Manchukuo and other Japanese territory. 9 The third category, silver, was 
smuggled out of China to Manchukuo. The silver smugglers' impact was mainly 
SMarcus Mervine, `Japanese Concession in Tientsin and the Narcotic trade', I*armation Brdlsdn, 
Vol. III, No. 4 February 11,1937, pp. 83-84 and The China Critic, May 20,1937, VoI. XVII, No. 8, 
P. 173- 
Tu demilitarised zone was among the conditions agreed by Chinese and Japanese in Tangku 
Truce. 
1 Haldor+e Hansa, `Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', Poc lc . s, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Dec. 1936), 
547. P" 
The smugglers were mostly Korean and the Japanese, who were immune to Chinese law as 
Japanase subjects who enjoyed extraterritorial rights in China. They were often armed and operated 
in groups of 100 - 200 to avoid opposition from the Chinese authorities, on whom they did not 
hesitate to use violence if they felt threatened, or if their goods were seized. See SHAC, 679(1), 
28031, Enclosure II: "Notes on the Causes of the Raint Increase of Smuggling in the Tientsin 
District", The North China Herald, 18 September 1935, p. 458, Barbera J. Brookes, Japan's 
Imperial Diplomacy, pp. 112-3 and Donna Brutzero, Britain's Il%wrtul Cornerstone to Chin, p. 151. 9 Sheehan, Trust in Troubled Tires, pp. 167-8 and Haltet Abend, My Te rs in China 1926.1941 
(John Lane The Bodley Head: London, 1944), p. 208. 
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on the Chinese rather than on the British community in Tientsin, 1° thus this chapter 
focuses on smuggled household goods and drugs. 
Map 6.1: The Peiping-Tientsin Area, showing the line marked by the Tangku 
Truce 
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Sources: T. A. Bisson, Japan in China (West Port Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1973), 
p. 5. 
The Chinese Maritime Customs felt handicapped in their efforts to prevent 
smuggling in the demilitarised zone. " When smuggling vessels were caught, 
protests from the Japanese authorities in North China would usually result. 12 Some 
of the smugglers even flew the Japanese flag in order to prevent customs officials 
from searching their goods. 13 In other cases, smugglers captured by the Chinese 
authorities sought support from the Japanese authorities in North China to have 
10 Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia 1933-1937, p. 132. 
11 SHAC, 679(1), 28031, Enclosure 11: "Notes on the Causes of the Recent Increase of Smuggling in 
the Tientsin District" [ 1935). 
12 The North China Herald 13 May 1936, p. 270. 
13 SHAC, 679(1), 28031, Letter from Mr. Y. Akatani to Sir Frederick Mare, Tientsin, 24 August 
1936. 
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their goods released or to bargain for a reduced fine. 14 The Japanese authorities 
were willing to help these smugglers to settle their cases with the Chinese, and 
blamed the Customs for seizing or hurting any of them. '5 This was part of the 
Japanese military's plan to undermine Chinese authority in North China. 
Effects of Smuggling on the British Community 
In light of the above developments the British Kaders' concerns in 
China and Tientsin were two-fold. Firstly, they were anxious that the impact of the 
smuggling would reduce customs revenues and thus affect the ability of the 
Chinese government to pay back its loans. The British community in Tientsin 
expressed its concern that the smuggling would affect Chinese revenue in this 
Way. 16 As a 1936 cartoon in the North China Herald alleged, smuggling seriously 
and blatantly breached China's Customs defences. (See Figure 6.1). 
14 SHAC, 679(1), 28031, Letter from Mr. Frederick Maze to Mr. Loy Chang, 7 April 1936 and The 
North China Herald 22 April 1936, p. 141. 
is SHAC, 679(1), 20843 Copy of Despatch No. 2/c from Mr. A. Tajiri, Acting Consul-General to 
Tientsin Commissioner, Tientsin, September 8 1936; the Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. 
Pryor to W. F. Turner, 19 September 1935, and O *nkd 4 fairs, July, 1934, p. 34. In addition, in the 
demilitarised zone these smuggling activities were protected by collaborationist Special Police 
supported by Japanese troops, who would not hesitate to confront the local authority in order to 
prevent any effort to disturb the distribution of the smuggled goods. See SHAC, 679(1), 28128 
Report on Smuggling for February 1934,679(1), 28030 Copy of Memorandum from Mr. Sung Ko 
Cheng, i" Assistant A to Commissioner, Tientsin, 20 May, 1934, and The China CH8k, December 
26,1935, Vol. )(l, No. 13, p-293- 
16 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Letter from Mr. H. F. Dycxt, Chairman of China Association, London, to 
the Chairman, British Chamber of Comm rce, Shanghai, Tientsin, May 11,1936. 
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Figure 6.1: Breaking the Dam 
Source: The Norih China Herald, 13 May 1936, p. 261. 
The Chinese authorities estimated that Tientsin customs' revenue lost on 
average more than $10,000 a month in 1936.1' The China Association pointed out 
that the indirect impact of this problem fell on the British. The Japanese authorities 
were blamed as being behind all this activity. 
17 The China Critic, April 23,1936. 
259 














Tientsin 39,100,174.78 41,809,156.86 41,154,742.04 41,089,011.55 35,518,115.75 33,389,158.52 
Chinwangtoo 1,946,090.32 1,463,307.24 1,759,463.98 1,428,311.59 1,235,971.79 1,608,821.03 
Chefpo 1,531,028.09 2,388,061.53 3,574,932.83 3,356,194.49 3,023,237.87 2,502,186.65 
Iamgkow 586,484.86 1,264,233.91 1,322,991.11 1,462,720.68 1,069,672.76 845,252.60 
weihaiwei 359,018.94 499,655.93 516,287.82 588,505.20 515,187.81 387,396.36 
Source: The Chinese Year Book 1938-39 Prepared from Official Sources by the Council of 
International Affairs Changking (The Commercial Press, Ltd.: China, 1939), p. 398. 
Table 6.1 illustrates either a dwindling of or a fluctuation in Customs 
revenues of all the Chinese ports in the Gulf of Pohai after 1934. Figures for 
Tientsin show that the smuggling activities injured Customs revenues, with 
collection decreasing steadily until the outbreak of war in North China. Tientsin's 
tax customs revenues dropped by 1.6% in 1934 and 0.2% in 1935. The biggest 
annual decrease was in 1936, at 13.6%; in 1937 revenues were down by 10%. 
Though these decreases are not great they illustrate the consistent impact of the 
smuggling activities on Chinese customs revenue up to the point when the Sino- 
Japanese war started in 1937. Only Chinwangtao showed resurgence in customs 
revenue by 1937 but it is lower than 1934 
Furthermore, the formation of the EHACC, according to the British traders 
in Tientsin, jeopardised the ability of the Chinese government to repay its foreign 
loans. This collaborationist regime permitted smuggling and gained considerable 
revenue from taxing smuggled goods at a lower rate than the tax imposed by the 
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Chinese government. At this point the British traders blamed the Japanese for all 
these problems and sympathised with the Chinese government's inability to stop 
the smugglers and its loss of tax revenue. They understood that its inability to take 
action against the collaboration regime because of Japanese support. ' 8 As the 
British Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin pointed out: 
It does not appear to this Committee that the Nanking 
Government can deal with the present serious situation except by 
considerable concessions to the Japanese or else by allowing matters 
to drift until the effect on the Customs revenues is such as to call for 
intervention by the Foreign Powers. My Committee is, however, 
very definitely of the opinion that no effective measures can be 
taken by the Local Authorities to adopt preventive measures through 
the Customs or Railway Authorities unless they can come to terms 
with the Ja9panese on questions which are entirely political and 
economic. 1 
This passage reflects the concerns of this committee about the seriousness of the 
crisis and the inability of the Chinese government to stop it. The British 
community stressed this to highlight the problem in North China to the British 
government. In fact the loan repayments by the Chinese government were never 
interrupted, nor did they become a big issue at the international level. The real 
issue in China at this time was the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and Jehol; 
this was what the British community was really concerned about. In short the 
Japanese occupation in both these areas would affect North China. 
The second impact on British interests was that smuggling depressed the 
prices of many goods in Tientsin. 
20 Smuggled goods had a big impact on Chinese 
Is SOAac, CHAS/MCP/41 Letter ßom Mr. H. F. Dyott to the Chairman, British Chamber of 
Comm er ce, Shanghai, Tientsin, 1 
th I May, 1936. 
19 Ibid. 
20 The impact of the smugglers' activities not only injured British and Chinese trade interests, but 
also other foreign traders. For example, Italian traders were angered that the smugglers were not 
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manufacturers and retailers, but British traders in Tientsin found that they also 
were gradually being affected? ' This led the British Chamber of Commerce to 
bring the issue up with the Chinese Customs, where the Chairman of the British 
Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin, P. D. MacFeat, wrote: 
I feel sure that the Maritime Customs are already taking all 
possible steps to deal with the situation that has arisen as I believe 
that there has very recently been some improvement in the situation; 
the situation is, however, so grave from the point of view of the 
business of importers who are Members of this Chamber that I 
venture to bring the [matter] officially to your notice . 
22 
The British traders' concern about smuggling steadily increased between 1935 and 
1937, during which time smuggled goods jeopardised their profits. Members of the 
British Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin felt that the activity threatened their 
interests? This five and open smuggling in Tientsin had made the British trading 
community more sympathetic towards the Chinese authorities. Some of the British 
leaders in Tientsin, such as P. H. B. Kent, also believed that the smuggling was a 
Japanese method of undermining Chinese Customs authority, which it was. 24 His 
view represented that of the majority of traders, who, from this sympathetic stance 
towards the Chinese, condemned the Japanese. 
The inability of the Chinese authorities to stop the smuggling led the 
Chamber to dispatch protest letters to its Senior Consul. 25 British kerosene and 
only in competition with diem but also falsely labelled their goods 'Made in Italy'. See SHAC, 
679(1), 28030 Letter from Mr. L. de Luca to Mr. A. C. E. Braud, Tientsln. 17 February 1933. 
21 Hanson, `Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', p. 552. 
I SHAC, 679(1), 20385 Letter from Mr. P. D. MacFeat to Commissioner, Tientsin, 11 July, 1932. 
p Trotter, Britain and East Asia 1933-1937, p. 163. 
24 Kent, The Twentieth Centwy in the Fis Fast, pp. 287-8. 
21 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/40 Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, 8 November 1935. 
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sugar were the two items that suffered most, as highlighted in one piece of 
contemporary reporting: 
Between May 1 and August 15 [1936] the Japanese smuggled 
1,370,000 gallons of kerosene and 170,000 gallons of gasoline, 
causing the North China business of the British and American 
firms to drop 40 percent.... The British sugar sales in North 
China ordinarily run over Ch. $20,000,000 a year, but for eleven 
months between October 1935 and August 1936 not one pound of 
legal sugar was sold. On September 1, the smugglers were still 
holding 300,000 bags of sugar in Tientsin, enough to supply North 
China for six months. 
The British community in Tientsin felt that the smugglers were playing games with 
them, and the stakes were high, especially for the British. The Tientsin Chamber 
of Commerce pointed out the serious impact of their activities. In March 1936 J. 
C. Taylor, the new chairman of the Chamber, stated that the British were 
concerned that the smugglers were hampering their legitimate business. British 
sugar traders in Tientsin could not compete with the smuggled sugar. 2 Another 
British good affected was kerosene. A report by the British Chamber of 
Commerce illustrates the anxiety and frustration of the British and other traders: 
Most of the oil agencies I visited stated that they were unable to 
compete against these smuggled kerosenes. They stood that the 
quality of the Japanese Kerosene was not so good as the other 
foreign kerosenes, but when the smugglers were bringing these 
foreign kerosenes as well they had no chance of competing. 
Taylor added, "... [i]t is deplorable to watch the complete breakdown of 
responsible authority in the face of the stronger forces". " His its 
explicitly blamed the Japanese, who did not respect Chinese Customs' utmost 
26 Hanson, 'Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', p. 352. 
27 1bid, pp. 552-3. 
I The North China Herald 4 March 1936, p. 392. 
29 BOAS, CHAS/MCP/41, 'Smuggling in North China: Report from the British Chamber of 
Commerce, Tientsin, 24 April, 1936'. 
30 The North China Herald 4 March 1936, p392. 
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efforts to stop the smuggling activities. In addition Taylor said "... this illegal 
traffic can be stopped immediately if it is sincerely desired, "31 highlighting the 
suspicions of the British traders that while the Japanese authorities tried to show 
that they were concerned about stopping the smuggling, in reality they were not 
serious. Although the British were disappointed in the Japanese, they wanted to 
maintain cordial relations with them32 and thus avoid creating British-Japanese 
tension that would further affect their interests. 
British traders in Tientsin were supported by the British Residents' 
Association (BRA), and the China Association, both of which condemned the 
Japanese for their irresponsibility in allowing these activities. At a meeting of the 
China Association in mid-1936, the Chairman of the Association, D. G. M. 
Bernard, expressed his strongly-held views on the smuggling activities: 
We neither underrate nor do we lack appreciation of the 
difficulties out of which Japan's policy in China to [a] small extent 
arises. But her policy and the method which she employs to further 
it we have to condemn, partly because it provides no solution for 
these difficulties and partly because it is creating fresh problems of 
a grave and dangerous character both for China and for ourselves 33 
This comment condemns Japanese policy towards China, which was also creating 
difficulties for other foreign traders. In other comments, Bernard expressed his 
sympathetic view of the Chinese Customs' difficulty in solving the problem amid 
the insincerity of the Japanese authorities towards the issue of helping the Chinese 
Customs. Bernard pointed out that: 
The Japanese authorities claim that they are not responsible 
for the smuggling: the fact remains that the Chinese Maritime 
31 1b1d. 
'2 Bruncro, Britain's IWCP a/ Cornrrslone In Ching p. 149. 
33 The North China Hera14 20 May 1936, p. 313. 
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Customs authorities in Tientsin are greatly handicapped in dealing 
with the smugglers by the attitude of the Japanese authorities 
towards the Customs Administration 
However, the smuggling did not have much impact on the British 
concession itself. Business there decreased slightly only in some years, especially 
in the first half of 1935,35 and the daily lives of the residents continued as normal. 
Although in some parts of Tientsin the Blue Shirt Society arranged the 
assassination of several alleged collaborators, the British concession continued as 
normal 36 According to police reports the British concession was under control, 
with only three murder cases reported between 1934 and 1937.37 The BMC had 
only domestic problems to contend with, such as the continuing issue of river 
pollution. 38 The pressure of the smuggling activities had not really impacted to any 
great extent on the concession itself, although individual firms had their concerns 
about the effects on their business activities, both in Tientsin and in the areas 
around it. 
The BMC took preventive action to prevent the dumping of smuggled 
goods in the British concession. The municipal police inspected and raided every 
shop involved in selling smuggled goods. For example, in a raid on 25 July 1936 
the British authorities discovered and seized 500 sacks of sugar with unpaid duty. 39 
In another case in 1937, the BMC allowed the Chinese Customs, with the 
cooperation of the British municipal police, to inspect a Russian shop, financed by 
34 Ibid. 
35 BMC, Tientsin, Report of the Councillor the year 1935 (Tientsin Press, Limited), p. 29. 
36 Frederic Wakeman Jr., Spy aster: IMl Li and the Chinese Secret Service (University of 
California Press: Berkeley, 2003), P-174- 
37 BMC, Tienesi? t Report of the Council for the year 1936 (Tientsin Press, Limited), p. 6 1. 
38 Ibid., p. 43. 
39 Hanson 'Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', p. 550. 
265 
Italian traders which they suspected of being involved with smuggled goods. 
Police and customs staff examined account books, invoices and shop 
correspondence and found that it was indeed engaged in selling smuggled goods. 
Eventually the shop was closed down. 40 This case shows that the BMC was 
serious enough about the problem to be willing to help Chinese Customs to 
suppress the smuggling activities on their own territory. This was now not only a 
Chinese problem; the dumping of smuggled goods in Tientsin was also causing 
British traders to suffer. But the British concession could only control smuggling 
activities within the concession, not outside it. British interests were very fragile 
where the Japanese were concerned. 
The willingness of the BMC to cooperate with Chinese Customs was 
stressed as early as January 1935 by the BMC's Chairman, E. C. Peters, who 
stated; "I have no doubt that my Council will be prepared to take every possible 
step in their power to assist the Customs in the prevention of smuggling, and to 
facilitate Customs examination of all cargo passing our Bund... ", 41 This is another 
example of the willingness of the British authorities in the BMC to help the 
Chinese Customs by giving them permission to build checkpoints in the British 
bund in order to control the smuggling activities. The sincerity of the British 
authorities in the BMC in helping Chinese Customs led to the formation of a close 
relationship between them. 
4° SHAG, 679(1), 28237 Letter fmm Mr. W. R. Myers to Mr. E. A. Pritchard, Tientsin, January 29, 
1937 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.5, letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, Tientsin, 
February 8,1937. 
41 SHAG, 679(1), 28030 Copy of letter from Chairman of the BMC to Commissioner, Tientsin, 
January 17,1933. 
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With the continuation of the smuggling activities the British traders in 
Tientsin urged their government to intervene to bring pressure upon the smugglers. 
The British Members of Parliament were also concerned about the increase in 
smuggling activity and the inability of the Chinese to counter the problem. In 
addition the British government had grave concerns about the smuggling activities 
and urged its embassies in China and Japan to monitor these activities. In Nanking 
the British embassy dispatched the following letter to Sung Che-yuan (Chairman of 
HCPC); 
I have the honour to invite Your Excellency's attention to 
the continued prevalence of smuggling in Hopei and Chahar. Such 
smuggling not only has a serious effect on the trade of British and 
other merchants both foreign and Chinese who are engaged in 
legitimate business, but, by reason of evasion of import customs 
duties on a large scale, has even more serious indirect effects on 
trade in general and the economic situation by undermining the 
credit of the Chinese Government in London and other financial 
centres of the world and thus seriously affecting the wider economic 
relations between China and the United Kingdom. 42 
The British government took the initiative of raising this problem at the diplomatic 
level. For example, in Tokyo on 2 May 1936, the British Ambassador Sir Robert 
Clive was ordered to meet the Japanese Foreign Office to obtain clarification 
regarding the smuggling activities, but met with denials of any involvement 
through the EHACC 43 The Japanese ostensibly stressed that they could do nothing 
to counter the smuggling owing to the high Chinese tariff and the weakness of the 
Chinese government. In response to this the British government expressed its 
disappointment, ''' but was powerless to persuade the Japanese to stop the 
smuggling. 
'2 PRO F0371/20944, Letter D. J. Cowan to Sung Che-yawn, Peking, January 16,1937. 
43 The North China Herald June 3,1936, p. 402. 
 PRO F0371/20944, Parliamentary Question, May 24,1937. 
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British missionaries had a different view of the smuggling activities. 
Although, like the rest of the British community in North China, they opposed it, 
they were more concerned about the moral impact of the narcotics smuggling on 
the Chinese people. This opinion was elucidated by Arnold Bryson, who stated: 
The scandal of the iniquitous drug traffic throughout this 
Province, carried on by Japanese and Korea traders under their 
Government's protection, has been developing of late to an 
unprecedented degree. I have seen many examples in the District of 
the utter demoralization of the people, young and old of both sexes, 
who find no difficulty in obtaining supplies of heroin 45 
Bryson added that "[a]lthough, officially, Japan denies any responsibility for this 
state of affairs, her protestations of innocence are hypocritical in the extreme. "' 
There was of course nothing they could do to stop such activities in North China, 
apart from voicing their concerns to the LMS in an effo t to gather support from 
home. The LMS aimed to help the Chinese people educationally and morally, and 
felt handicapped in their effort to ameliorate the Chinese addiction to drugs. 
This view was conveyed by Anna Christiansen, who had a sympathetic 
view of the Chinese government and its inability to eradicate the smuggling: 
The drug traffic still continues to flourish; many folk are of the 
opinion that it is growing instead of diminishing, despite all the 
efforts the Government is making for its eradication. The 
Government has opened free clinics in some centres to help the 
people to break off the habit; numbers are cured, but alas! , fall back 
again. We hear that several shops for the sale of opium, morphia 
as SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report, from Arnold, 
Station Tsangchow, February 26,1936. 
46 SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report, from A. O. Bryson, 
Tsangchow, March 1937 for 1936. 
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and heroin have recently been opened in our city of Tsangchow by 
Koreans and Japanese. 4 
From this passage it is clear that the smuggling activities were out of control. 
British missionaries wem frustrated by the ugly situation created by the smugglers, 
who had no fear of law and order. 48 
In conclusion, explicitly the smuggling activities in North China 
jeopardised the future of the British position and interests and hampered many 
foreign and Chinese traders. '49 But the incapability of Chinese customs officials 
and the frustration of the British trader community over this problem stemmed 
from the division of authority in Tientsin. The Chinese were handicapped 
regarding launching more active preventive measures against the smugglers. 
Though the BMC supported the Chinese in this matter the British only had power 
within their own concession. 
The Japanese influence 
After successfully occupying Manchuria (1931) and Jehol (1933), the 
Japanese Kwantung Army engaged with their next strategy; to spread Japanese 
influence in North China. 3° The demilitarised zone offered them a great 
opportunity to sweep the KMT and the influence of the Nanking government out of 
North China. The Japanese military used the failure of the Chinese authorities to 
47 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report from Anna 
Christiansen, Tsangchow, February 1936. 
4' Frank Dikatter, Lars Laamann and Mon Xun, Nrcodc Colima: A ! Eistory of Drugs in China 
(London: Hurst & Company, 2004), P. 168. 
49 SHAC, 679(1)28031 Copy of letter from Belgian Consul-General Acting Swdor Consul of 
Consular Body to Commissioner, Tientsin, October 31,1935. 
30 Marjorie Dryburgh, `Regional Office and the National Iah Song Zheyuan in North China, 
1933', in David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu (eds. ), Chinese Collaboration w&)# Japan, 1932-1945: 
the Limits ofAccommOdatIw, (Stanford c ity Pte: Stanford, 2001), p. 39. 
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suppress banditry in North China as justification for encouraging the area to 
become autonomous. " In addition, the killing of two Chinese pro-Japanese 
journalists in 1935 gave the Japanese Huther grounds for their demand for the 
elimination of Chinese governmental powers in North China. 52 
Eventually the Ho-Umezu Agreement was signed in 1935, giving Japanese 
troops a free hand in the demilitarised zone. 53 Japan's next move was to urge 
Chinese leaders in North China to declare the region autonomous from the 
Nanking government with the ostensible aim of defeating the communist activities 
there. Tientsin became the centre of Japanese activity to influence Chinese leaders 
to help create the autonomous region. The Japanese also encouraged 
collaborationist Chinese to launch a campaign to damage the image of the Nanking 
government and oppose its new currency reform' Japanese efforts to create larger 
autonomous regions (including Shantung, Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan and Shansi) 
failed, but it succeeded in establishing EHACC, with its capital at Tungchow, 
around twelve miles from Peiping (Peking). 55 The chairman of this council was 
Yin Ju-keng, who in his statement on the establishment of EHACC claimed that 
the council was formed to counter the communist movement in North China. -16 
This was followed by the creation of the HCPC under Sung Che-yuan s7 Although 
the Nanking government appointed the members of this council, most were 
s' Ibid., p. 43. 
52 The North China Herold May 8,1935, p. 215 and The Japan Weekly Chronicle, 6 June 1935, 
735. g' 
See detail of this agreement in China Today, May 1936, p. 150. 
54 The Times, November 25,1935, p. 11. 
55 ale, Facing Japan, p. 272. 
56 The Tinees, November 25,1935, p. 11. 
57 Dryburgh, North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-193 7, p. 87. 
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suggested by the Japanese Kwantung Army and Tientsin Garrison 58 Moreover, 
Japan put considerable pressure on Sung Che-yuan to concede to several demands 
such as the pacification of communist activities in North China and economic 
cooperation, and it also opposed the Nationalist government's financial reforms in 
193559 
Using the Boxer Protocol the Japanese military increased its power and 
influence in China. For example, in early 1936 the Japanese troops were 
supplemented by around 8,000 men, and additional army barracks and an 
aerodrome were built near Tientsin 60 This situation demonstrated the Japanese 
military's powers in North China. 
The Japanese Motive 
Several reasons can be found to explain the motivation behind the 
smuggling activities and the creation of the autonomous regime in North China. 
Firstly, there was the political motive of pressuring the Chinese government to 
recognise Manchukuo. This was one of the Japanese Kwantung army's aims in its 
effort to gain recognition from the Chinese. Secondly, the Japanese wanted the 
Chinese government to reduce duty rates on imported Japanese goods 6' Ironically, 
S6 Coble, Facing Japan p. 274. 
Dryburgh, `Regional office and the National Interest', pp. 49. SO, Dryburgh, MArjoria 'Parallel 
Lives', p. 13 and Sheehan, Th st in Troubled Tinte pp. 169-70. 
60 77w Times, May 15,1936, p. 15. 
61 Hanson, `Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', pp. 553 and 554, and The Japan Weekly Chronicle, 7 
November, 1935, p. 571. 
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the smuggling activities injured not only Chinese and Western firms but also small 
Japanese traders in Tientsin, whose businesses were seriously threatened 62 
Therefore the main motives behind the smuggling were political and 
economic, mostly benefiting the big Japanese firms. At this point, Hanson made a 
significant conclusion: 
In 1935 the Kuantung [Kwantung] Army, inheritor of the 
old continental policy, found in the smuggling scheme a method of 
destroying the native industries of North China, undermining 
China's national revenues and at the same time crippling Western 
trade in China. 63 
The Japanese tried to launch their scheme to eradicate the western Powers in Asia. 
Tientsin was not excepted. Furthermore, it was one of the centres from which the 
Japanese promoted their scheme in North China. The Japanese army, on the other 
hand, became a tool to pressure the HCPC to agree to cooperate in economic 
development. 64 The big Japanese agencies in China such as the South Manchurian 
Railway (SMR) were willing to sponsor and realise this scheme, which can be 
described as a cooperative economic bloc to include Japan, North China and 
Manchukuo 65 The scheme could be linked to the Amau Statement, delivered on 
17 April 1934 and summarised as "white hands off China", which opposed the 
open-door policy in China. 
" The policy was part of the Japanese effort to create an 
autarkic bloc in East Asia 
67 
62 The North China Herald March 18 1936, p. 470 and SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 11 
1932-1936, LMS Annual Report, from A. G. Bryson, Tsengchow, March 1937 for 1936. 
6' Hanson, `Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', p. 556. 
64 Dryburgh, `Parallel Lives', p. 11. 
65 Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937, p. 162. 
Endicott, Diplomacy and EnterprLw p. 66 and Anthony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: 
Avoiding War in East A$ia. 1936-41 (London: Routle(Ige, 1995), p. 9. 
67 Anthony Best, `The Road to AP910- panese Confrontation, 1931-41', p. 29. 
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The main actor in this scheme was not the Japanese government in Tokyo 
but the Kwantung Army, which had a powerful influence on Japanese foreign 
policy in China. Without them, negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese 
seemed useless. " In light of the Japanese objective of furthering its interests in 
North China, Tientsin witnessed a flood of Japanese economic missions. Despite a 
cold response from the Chinese, they made several successful deals with the 
Chinese authorities and with Chinese businessmen ý' But to what extent this 
cooperation succeeded and how willing the Japanese firms were to join is 
arguable. 0 
But this development implicitly showed that British interests were among 
the Japanese targets for removal from North China. The Japanese motive of 
undermining the British could be seen in the smuggling activities and the creation 
of the autonomous regime. The impact of the smuggling on British interests has 
been discussed, while the impact on the British community in Tientsin and its 
hinterland of the creation of the autonomous regime is discussed in the next 
section. 
The British Response 
In the area surrounding Tientsin the Japanese penetration of North China 
affected the KMA's position, as E. J. Nathan noted in 1934: 
68 Hanson, `Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', p. 555. 
69 Oriental Affairs, Vol. VI, No. 4, October, 1936, p. 195. 
70 Marjorie Dryburgh argued that the Japanese firms were not willing to join the Japanese army's 
economic plan in North China. See Diyburgh, `Parallel Lives', pp. 13.14. 
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It is, however, pertinent to point out that it is highly probable 
that in the very near future we shall be forced into a position where 
the Japanese will protect us whether we like it or no.... the higher 
authorities in Peking are equally either puppets of the Japanese or in 
secret collusion with than [the Japanese] to ensure complete control 
by the Japanese of the whole area from the Great Wall to at least the 
near boundary of the demilitarised zone. It would not surprise me to 
know that Japanese influence is even paramount in Tientsin and 
Peking. 
Nathan saw that the KMA had to be pragmatic by accepted the reality in North 
China. The encroachment of Japanese troops in North China was a sign of the 
gradual growth of Japanese influence in North China. M The new rulers would 
adjust the KMA's position so that it no longer relied on the Chinese. It is not 
certain how far the Nationalist power was influencing the Chinese authorities in the 
north at this point. But it can be assumed that the Japanese influence gradually 
increased and the Chinese authorities in north China, Tientsin included, became 
puppets of the Japanese. This is illustrated by the Japanese attempt to use the 
Chinese as a tool to undermine British interests, as discussed below. 
The effort to eradicate Western, and especially British interests was 
tangible when the Japanese military tried to undermine the KMA's interests in 
Tongshan in 1934. Some of the Japanese military in Tientsin encouraged the 
Chinese workers to strike in 1934, as Nathan wrote to W. F. Turner 
It was inevitable that reports should get about that the Japanese were 
at the back of the trouble at Tongshan and even that the 
Administration considered them in some way responsible. Needless 
to say such a suggestion never emanated officially from me or any 
other responsible person in the Administration's employ. 
Nevertheless the Japanese Military in Tientsin, under whose orders 
11 Täe Bodleian Library, Modern Paper Room, NP, Letter r W. E. J. Nathan W W. F. Turner, 
March 24,1934. 
'2 Wright, Coal Mining in China &OIW ry and Society, 1895-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), p. 127. 
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the detachment at Tongshan operates, professed to be hurt by the 
suggestion that the Administration considered them in any way 
connected with the trouble. 73 
The KMA's complaints about the Japanese military's attempt to encourage the 
workers to strike continued in 1935, with them pointing out that certain Japanese 
military officers were involved in this intrigue. 74 The Japanese military's support 
of these strikes reinforces the point, that the Japanese not only had an influence in 
the Chinese territories but also that they were gradually trying to remove British 
interests. 
The British at this juncture realised that their problem was no longer with 
the Chinese but with the new threat from the Japanese and Japanese puppets. 
However, the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands, including the 
KMA, adopted a careful approach to this problem, unlike the way in which they 
had handled Chinese resentment against them in the mid-1920s. The powerful 
Japanese position in North China could not be directly attacked, as with the 
Chinese. There was no memorandum or direct criticism concerning the Japanese. 
Nathan stated that although the KMA knew that the Japanese were trying to 
interfere in their interests, "... I have done my best to remove any cause for ill 
feeling and believe that our traditional friendly relations with the Japanese Military 
are not impaired" demonstrating that the KMA knew that their future was in the 
hands of the Japanese military. 75 
73 The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, April 27,1934. 
7 The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. Pryor to W. F. Turner, June 20,1935 and Modern 
Papers, Bodleian, NP, Letter from Mr. E. Pryor to W. F. Turner, June 22,1935. 
75 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 242 and The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan 
to W. F. Turner, 27 April 1934. On the eve of the World War II in Asia-Pacific, Nathan continued 
his pledge to continue to fully cooperate with Japan. The KMA collaboration with the Japanese 
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The Japanese military, according to Nathan, created hostility in Chinese- 
Japanese relations when they tried to undermine Chiang Kai-shek and his 
government by supporting the anti-Chiang groups and installing a puppet 
government76 However, in this position the KMA was also helpless and could not 
take serious action against the Japanese military. Because of this situation in the 
KMA's mining area, the KMA was only concerned with the progress of its 
business and its only concern was to avoid confrontation with the Japanese. 
Nathan went on to comment: 
As far as our area is concerned there does not appear to be any 
evidence of any activity above the surface, but undoubtedly 
Japanese influence in this area is on the increase and our relations 
with local officials and the amount of support we can get from 
them are all dependent upon the attitude likely to be adopted by 
their real masters. This necessitates our playing a certain amount 
of politics, much as we dislike doing so. " 
All the KMA could do was to express its frustration with the Japanese military, 
which was acting unchecked. Nathan's expressed his attitude thus: 
I think we all here feel that Japan is challenging, or is about 
to challenge, the world in support of her intention to become the 
dominant Power in the Far East. Is the rest of the world going to 
allow her to take the position unchallenged? 78 
However, the KMA's greatest concern was the Japanese military's 
intention to remove the British interests from North China. In addition, the 
Japanese military used Chinese workers to create havoc in the KMA mines, and 
tried to get support from Chinese collaborators to cover up their action to achieve 
was maintained in the war. See Bernard Wasserstein, Secret Wier in Shanghai (Boston: Houghton 
N i1 lin Company, 1999), pp. 166-169. 
16 TU Bodleian Library, NP, Leila from W. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, June 30,1934. 
" Ibid. 
73 The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, December 28,1934. 
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their goal of overthrowing the KMA in North China. Previous to Nathan's 
comments, W. Pryor showed his concern that: 
... at the 
Dairen Conference in 1933, at which Yin Tung was 
present, the Japanese remarked that the British influence in this area 
was undesirable and suggested that, if Yin Tung could make the 
Kailan Mines inoperative through the withdrawal of traffic facilities, 
the South Manchuria Railway would recompense the P. N. R. for any 
losses in freight-79 
The continuation of the Japanese military intrigue in KMA interests caused the 
KMA to make every effort to avoid the demise of its position in North China. The 
KMA, which operated in a demilitarised zone under Japanese military influence, 
could not afford to lose its position in North China. In order to avoid interference 
or disturbance by the Japanese military, whether direct or indirect, the KMA had to 
play safe by not provoking the Japanese military. 
The KMA was continually challenged by Japanese military intrigue. The 
EHACC was the tool it used to indirectly disrupt KMA operations. The KMA, on 
the other hand, understood that the Japanese were employing the Chinese as their 
agents against them 80 Fortunately the KMA had the support of the British 
Legation (later the British Embassy), which allowed British interests to continue to 
operate. However, it took great precautions in dealing with the Japanese by not 
interfering with any of their expansion schemes, including not denouncing their 
drug trafficking, as KMA areas were one of the centres of the drug trade 8' 
" The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. W. Pryor to W. F. T urnor, May 3,1935. 
80 The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter f om Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, February 14,1936, 
sI Oriental Affairs, October, 1934, p. 155. 
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The British disappointment with the Japanese military continued when the 
Japanese tried to give the autonomous regimes in North China legitimate control of 
the Chinese Customs and helped the Manchukuo government take over several 
customs houses in Manchuria in 1932-33.112 The north-eastern provinces 
contributed important tax revenues to the Chinese government, and the British 
were worried that the Japanese were trying to hamper foreign interests in North 
China83 Furthermore, the British were afraid that the formation of the autonomous 
region was diverting Chinese revenue from China. The Japanese had demanded 
that all customs houses in North China be rendered to these autonomous regions. " 
This point was made by E. M. Gull, the Secretary of the China Association, who 
stated: 
As to the position of bondholders, it is unnecessary for me 
to say more than that the loans secured on the Salt and Customs 
revenues are largely held by British subjects and other persons 
paying income tax in the United Kingdom. 5 
Explicitly this quotation illustrates the British trader's concern; that the impact of 
the rendition of Chinese customs stations and revenue would injure the interests of 
British bondholders, as the bulk of Chinese loans were borrowed from British 
subjects. 36 As the biggest loan sponsors in China British enterprises and banks in 
Great Britain tried to protect their business in terms of interest on government 
loans and dividends on investments in China. " However implicitly, the quotation 
above was a reason to bolster the China Association's demands to get sympathy 
82 Brunero, Britain's Imperial Cornerstone In Chimt pp 134-40 
53 Ibid., p. 136. 
84 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Letter from Mr. E. M. Gull to the H. M. Under Sea+ctary of State for 
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from their government to help them in dealing with the Japanese influence in North 
China. 
However, this was not the only reason that the British community in 
Tientsin was disappointed by the Japanese. British cotton industries had faced 
tough Japanese competition in the early 1930s. ss Japanese textiles had spread 
across China and the British Empire, which had an impact on the Lancashire cotton 
industries. 8' In addition, prices of other products such as electric lamps, concrete, 
bicycles, hair combs and rubber footwear were also affected by the low price of the 
Japanese goods 90 In North China and Tientsin, the British traders faced the same 
problem. Using the political power they had gained after the Manchurian Incident, 
the Japanese steadily began to conquer the cotton market in North China, 
challenging the British cotton industry. In addition the British began to notice the 
decline of their metals imports to North China due to Japanese competition 91 F. H. 
Pentycross, Manager of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in Tientsin, described 
the situation in Tientsin: 
Generally speaking, as far as Tientsin is concerned, import 
dealers have not done well this year [1934), and at the present time 
are showing little, if any, interest at all. 
As stressed in my letter of 12 months ago, Japanese 
exporters continue to gain ground in North China at the expense of 
British interests -92 
°t Ishii Osamu, 'Markets and Diplomacy: the Anglo-Japanese Rivalries over Cotton Goods Markets, 
1930-36', p. 59. 
89 Best, ß, *al, , Japan and 
Pearl Harbor, p. 12. 
90 Best, The Road to Anglo-Japanese Confrontation, 1931-41', p. 32. 
91 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 1125 Letter from Mr. F. H. Pentycross to Mr. W. C. Cassels, 
TjMsm, December 19,1934 and HSBC Group Archives, SHO II 25 LAW from Mr. F. H. 
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Pentycross highlighted the gradual decline of British economic interests in North 
China. 
British missionaries in the area surrounding Tientsin also had a poor view 
of the Japanese effort to exert influence on North China. The creation of the so- 
called autonomous council in East Hopei made the missionaries suspicious. They 
saw the Japanese military in this situation as the aggressor towards the Chinese 
territory and the autonomous council as merely a puppet of the Japanese military, 93 
understanding the movement as part of the Japanese scheme to achieve further 
control over North China and undermine the Chinese government. % 
There was, then, strong ill-feeling concerning the influence of the Japanese 
military in North China. However, not all the British community saw the Japanese 
military as menacing their interests. Politically conservative Britons were 
confused. At first they were in favour, seeing the Japanese military's influence in 
North China as good for China in that it was helping to prevent the spread of 
communism there 9S The diehards felt unsafe with North China under Chinese 
control as they were unable to forget what had happened to British interests fron 
the May Thirtieth Movement to the Thorburn case. However, the real interest of 
this diehard community was to retain the British concession in Tientsin and avoid 
any Chinese attacks or demands to relinquish it. Therefore their hopes of retaining 
all the British interests rested with the Japanese military. 
93 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report from Anna 
Christiansen, Tsangchow, February 1936. 
9' Dryburgh, North China and Japanese &panclorr 1933-1937. p. 63. 
" The China Critic, December 12,1935, p. 244. 
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The diehards in Tientsin used popular printed media such as magazines and 
newspapers to air their ideas and views on the situation. One of these was Oriental 
Affairs, a magazine edited by H. G. W. Woodhead, with W. V. Pennell and 
Maurice D'Alton as North China journalists. Regarding the above issue Pennell 
wrote a heavily condemnatory letter to the Chinese government in Nanking. He 
seemed happy with what had happened in North China, which was far from the 
influence of the Chinese government, adding that: 
It is probably true to say that the masses in the North, if they look 
at all, regard the struggle which has begun in the South with an 
almost bovine calm. There is much discontent in the cities, and 
many emissaries of disgruntled political factions are blowing their 
slogans upon it. But they find agitation hard work in the North, 
which smoulders rather than burns, reluctantly and mostly slowly. 
That is one of the reasons why, in the end, stability can come 
neither from Canton nor the great Yangtze centres, but only from 
the North ? 
From this statement it is clear that the diehards in North China still felt 
uncomfortable with the Chinese government in Nanking, which after six years they 
still did not believe could rule China efficiently. The reason they did not trust the 
Chinese government was that it was still unstable, with factions in government and 
separatist activity in several Chinese provinces. 
So like the Shanghailanders, the diehards in Tientsin were anti-Chinese and 
pro-Japanese? Pennell, who was supportive of Japanese intervention in North 
China said that "[t]he atmosphere has improved greatly, however, and the feeling is 
that while the Japanese are prepared to leave us alone the North should mind its p's 
% Oriental Affairs, Voll, Not, January, 1934, p. 37. 
97 Trotter, Britain and East Asi4 1933-1937, pp26.7. 
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and q's and be quiet". 98 In addition, Pennell felt that the Chinese could not muster 
a unified effort sufficient to challenge the Japanese. Almost all the Chinese leaders 
had their own interests and could not participate in unified resistance towards the 
Japanese. Pennell supported the anti-Chinese government in North China. He 
knew that the Japanese were behind the agitation but believed that their sincere 
motive was to demand better Chinese government. " Unlike the KMA, the British 
diehards considered that the trouble in the KMA mines was caused purely by anti- 
British Chinese elements trying to cause havoc. They were pleased to see that the 
Japanese were trying to settle the trouble. At this point the diehards pointed out 
that the Chinese police were not accepting this help. 100 Moreover, the diehard 
group claimed that the Chinese government's spying machinery, such as the Iron 
and Blood Corps, was nothing more than an anti-modem terrorist gangster group, 
out of the control of the local authority and creating violence in Tientsin. 1°' 
The diehard group denounced the Chinese volunteer groups' resistance 
movement towards the Japanese as 'merely a group of bandits? '. 102 They wanted 
this group to keep away from North China, and saw the existence of the Japanese 
military as important in controlling this so-called `bandit element' in the 
demilitarised zone which had "become a nuisance to everybody". 103 To the 
diehard group, this bandit element overshadowed the Japanese effort to create a 
rapprochement with the Chinese, and that Japanese efforts towards economic 
rapprochement with the Chinese, represented a positive approach to the Chinese' 
Oriental Affairs, Vol. 1, No-2, January, 1934, p37. 
Ibid 
100 Oriental Affairs, Vol. I, No. 4, March 1934, p. 41. 
101 Orienta/Affairs, Vol. I, No. 6, May, 1934, p. 34 and Vol. II, No. 13, December, 1934, p. 255. 102 Oriental Affairs, Vol. III, No. 19, June, 1935, p. 286. 
103 Oriental Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 4, October, 1935, p. 193. 
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weakness. The Westerners would also benefit from such cooperation, which could 
prevent the Chinese returning to their old policy of seeking aid from the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 104 
The smuggling activities, on the other hand, were another issue of which 
the diehard community was aware. Unlike the British traders in Tientsin, the 
diehard community did not directly blame the Japanese for this. They claimed that 
the blame fell on the autonomous Chinese regime, especially the EHACC, which 
was involved in the smuggling. The diehard group supported the Japanese 
suggestion to reduce the tariff as a remedy for the smuggling activities. They felt 
that "the exorbitantly high tariff" on several imported goods brought the traders 
hardship. 10S In addition, the diehard group did not consider that the Japanese 
would damage foreign interests significantly. The Japanese influence was 
important to the diehards as a way of reducing the existence of Chinese 
communists. The main point in the diehard policy in North China was that their 
fear of increased communism was greater than that of increased Japanese influence 
in North China. 106 The German Japanese and-Communist pact added to their relief 
as they were concerned that the Soviet Union would interfere in Chinese affairs. 107 
However, the diehards gradually began to accept the fact that the Japanese 
posed a new threat in the north China (such as smuggling activities) and saw that 
this was problematic for British Japanese relations. Moreover several Japanese 
104 O ienld Affairs, Vol. I, No. 7, June, 1934, pp39-8. 
105 Oriental Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 5, Novanber, 1935, p. 241; Vol. V. No. 2, February, 1936, p. 94; 
Vol. V, No. 5, May, 1936, p. 263 and Vol. VI, No. 4, October, 1936, P. M. 
106 oriented Affairs Vol. VI, No. 4, October, 1936, p. 194. 
t°ß Oriental Affairs, Vol. VI, No. 6, December, 1936, pp. 297-8. 
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newspapers began to attack the British effort to help the Chinese government to 
reform its economy, which had created a great opportunity for British investment 
in China. British involvement in the Chinese economy became more overt when 
the Leith-Ross Mission made a visit to China in 1935, which, to a great extent, 
involved helping the Chinese108 to undermine the Japanese effort to exert their 
influence in China. 109 For example, British businessmen were accused by the 
Japanese of pursuing the goal of colonising North China by offering the Hopei- 
Chahar authorities a loan. ' 10 There were two more reasons for Japanese anti- 
British feeling. Firstly the Japanese military saw the British as a hypothetical 
enemy (in 1936). Secondly, the rise of the Pan-Asianists among the Japanese, who 
were frustrated by the unjust Western attitude of not practicing equal status 
between the Japanese and westerners after World War 1.111 
In addition, Japanese support for the smugglers began to annoy the 
diehards. They were sympathetic to the Chinese Customs, which was helpless 
against the armed Korean smugglers, and suggested that Customs enforcement 
officers should carry firearms. The diehards also urged the other foreign Powers to 
intervene to stop the smuggling in North China. l12 The diehards were implicitly 
against the autonomous movements under Japanese support. 113 According to this 
group, the movement threatened North China's peace and stability. Even the 
106 Sheehan, must in Troubled Tbaes, p. 168. 
109 Kibeta Yoichi, `Anglo-Japanese Relations from the Manchurian Incident to Pearl Harbor 
Missed Opport mity? ', pp. 10-1. 
1° Oriental Affairs, Vo1. VII, No. 5, May, 1937, p. 265. 
Yoshio Aizawa, `The Path Towards an "A itj-British" Sfr t gy by the Japanese Navy between 
the wars,, in Ian Grow and Yolchi Hire na with John Chapman (eds. ), YU History of AMfo- 
Jupe vU Rdrttions, 1600-2000 Volume Ill: The Hillary Distension (London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 2000), p. 143; and Naoko Shimazu, Japan; Race and Equality, pp. 170 and 180.1. 
12 oKeNd AfaJrs, Vo1. VII, No. 6, June, 1937, p. 329. 
113 prlenta/AfauT, Vol. VI, No. I. July, 1936, p. 41. 
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Peking and Tientsin Times, in 1935, criticised the Japanese aim of encouraging 
independence as a pretext for gaining control of North China. 114 
In conclusion, the encroachment of the Japanese influence on North China 
again reflected the weakness of the British informal empire. British interests in the 
hinterlands of Tientsin appeared to be open to attack. The Japanese military 
became a new threat. Furthermore the different interests of the British community 
created differences of opinion about the Japanese. The hiders recognised the 
reality of conditions in North China and responded pragmatically. The diehards 
still considered that the Chinese were causing problems for foreigners, but slowly 
accepted the new situation in North China and recognised that British interests 
faced a strong challenge from the Japanese military. However, the situation in the 
British concession prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war seemed to be 
normal. The BMC adopted a `mind your own business' approach in the concession, 
thereby avoiding the suspicions of the Chinese or the Japanese. In 1935 the 
municipality decided to organise a celebration of King George V's jubilee, 
including the decoration and illumination of the council buildings and parks. This 
celebration provided another opportunity for the British community to 
symbolically mend its relations with the Chinese with the decision to give one of 
the King George V Jubilee Memorial Scholarships to a Chinese student at the 
Kung Hsueh School. ' 15 
114 Kent, The Twentieth Centwy in the Far Fast, p286. 
115 BBC Tientsin Report of the Coanc}l for the year 1934 (Tientsin Press, Limited), p. 4. 
285 
The Sino-Japanese War 
The tense relations between the Chinese and Japanese gradually escalated 
into war. The trigger was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937. Tientsin 
did not escape the fighting; both parties continued to bomb each other and the roar 
of gunfire continued between the border of the Chinese city and the Japanese 
concession. Japanese planes created havoc for inhabitants of the city and damaged 
the Chinese commercial section! 16 Eventually Chinese troops had to retreat from 
Tientsin because of the continued bombardment, although the British concession 
was spared. This raised the concern and pity of the British community for the 
Chinese civilians' destitution and homelessness. Fortunately the foreign 
concessions were able to offer them some relief from the menace of war. British 
missionaries were busy attending to Chinese refugees, who came to the British 
concession from every corner of Tientsin. ' 17 In addition other Britons in Tientsin 
joined in. The community called for more aid for the Chinese refines from home, 
who had increased to around 40,000 in number by early August. 11s However, there 
were limits to the amount of help the BMC could offer them. The hospital in the 
concession was full of Chinese casualties. Before long the BMC had to erect 
barriers the concession and only Chinese with a pass from the municipality could 
enter. 119 
116 Tbt China Review. September, 1937, pp. 2-3. 
117 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 12,1937-1939, LMS Annual Report. from W. F. 
Dawson, Tientsin, December 31,1937. 
11s SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Copy Cable Received 2.8.37 from P. Kent, Chairmen, Chios 
Association, Tientsin Branch. 
19 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 12,1937-1939, Mackenzie Memorial Hospital, 
1-entsin, Report for 1937. 
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At this point the Tientsin British community's concern about the 
repercussions of the war in North China was threefold. Firstly, there was war 
damage to British interests in Tientsin and North China. In Tientsin only one 
British national's residence was hit by a Japanese bomb. 120 The Asiatic Petroleum 
Company's tanks were also damaged, having come under fire, and a protest was 
sent to the Japanese military. 121 In the area around Tientsin the British missionaries 
were greatly alarmed by the war. As their mission stations were not protected by 
British troops, anxieties about the war loomed large in Tsangchow and Siaochang. 
They feared for their lives and properties from Chinese and Japanese gunfire and 
looting by deserting Chinese troops. Fortunately they were unharmed and their 
properties left alone. 122 
The second concern of the British community in Tientsin was the intention 
of the Japanese military to control Chinese Customs in Tientsin in order to stop the 
Chinese government using its revenue to support Chinese resistance against the 
Japanese-123 The Japanese military's action had shocked British traders in Tientsin. 
The community was also unhappy with the Japanese authorities' threat to take over 
the customs at Chinwangtao. When the war broke the British community quickly 
protested against the Japanese takeover of Tientsin Customs. They felt it would be 
dangerous if the Japanese tried to separate the Customs in Tientsin (and elsewhere 
in North China) from the Chinese government, as `interference' (in their eyes) in 
1Z0 SHAC, 679(1), 14864 British Residences Shaken: Three Bombs in Garden. 
12' SOAS, JSS, From Per Pro Butterfield & Swire to John Swire and Sons Ltd., Shanghai, July 3Q 
1937. 
122 SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 12,1937-1939, Report for the year 1937 from A. H. 
Jowett Murray, Tsangchow, December 31,1937, and SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 12, 
1937-1939, Report for the year 1937 from W. F. Rowlands, Siaochang. 
123 Brunero, Britain's imperial Cornerstone in China, p. 152. 
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Chinese Customs administration, which would create confusion around the 
repayment of foreign loans. '24 This was the worst part of the Japanese activities in 
North China for the British community in Tientsin. Japan's intention to control 
customs signalled danger to the British. The customs house in Tientsin controlled 
the flow of the trade there; Japanese control of this customs house would control 
the progress of trade in Tientsin, endangering British trade interests. Kent's 
telegram below illustrates this concern: 
... [the] China 
Association have made representations Ambassador 
as follows no move made yet against Customs but anxious 
re garding sudden demand might leave no time (for) International 
action (stop) China association respectfully urges understanding be 
negotiated with Japan and China that in such event Commissioner 
be instructed hold all customs collections as earmarked for external 
and internal loan services and to make no remittance pending 
settlement between Tokyo and Nanking thus maintaining China's 
credit (stop) Gravest danger would result if Japanese established 
separate customs or interfered with present administration (stop)'25 
Kent's telegram was a call for help from his counterparts in London to avoid 
Japanese military interference indirectly affecting the interests of Britain as the 
biggest lenders to the Chinese government. The China Association in London's 
response to this telegram was very apprehensive and brought the matter directly to 
the Foreign Office. 126 At this point the British community used `loan repayment' as 
the reason to highlight the problem in China to the British government, although its 
real worry was how the Japanese were gradually trying to control track in North 
China. 
124 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Copy of cable received from the China Association at Tientsin August 
14,1937. 
'25 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41/China Association: General Committee Papers Nov 1935 - Mar 1938, 
copy I Cable Received firne t(=A=::, 4,1937. 
'26 SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41/CGene al Committee Papas Nov 1935 - Mar 1938, 
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Owing to the seriousness of the situation, the British community's leaders 
in Tientsin took proactive measures to prevent the Japanese military from 
separating the Tientsin and Chinwangtao Customs, as described by Kent at the 
China Association's meeting in Tientsin. The British community and the British 
Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin gave their support to the Customs 
Commissioner, W. R. Myers to settle the problem. 127 In order to achieve this, the 
British Chamber of Commerce urged the British government to back Myers to 
enable him to continue his work as Commissioner and protect the integrity of the 
Customs Service in Tientsin. 128 The British community and the Foreign office 
were very active in mediating negotiations between the Chinese and the Japanese. 
The solution, reached with the help of the British, was to retain the Tientsin and 
Chinwangtao Customs function of repaying foreign loans. All import, export and 
inter-port duties and all surtaxes would be remitted to Japanese bank. This 
compromise reduced British interests, as before this almost all the import and 
export duty was remitted to British bankS. 129 This was the price that the British 
had to pay to avoid further damage to their influence, and it demonstrated that the 
British in North China, and especially in Tientsin, were so vulnerable that they had 
to bow to the Japanese military's demand to put the Tientsin and Chinwangtao 
Customs under Japanese influence. 13° 
" SOAS, JSS, Letter from R. K. Rodger to Fisher, Tientsin, 7 October 1937. 
12' SOAS, JSS, Minutes of a meeting of the Gen ral Committee of the Tientsin British Chamber of 
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Thirdly, the British community in Tientsin began to experience the first 
direct impact of the Japanese military's interference in their concession. This was 
the beginning of the tension between the British and Japanese. For example, the 
fighting between the Chinese and Japanese at Tientsin had put pressure on the 
BMC. Japanese troops coming from Taku had asked permission to use the British 
concession as their route to the Japanese concession to the northwest, creating a 
dilemma for the British authority in the concession. At this point the British 
authorities had to grant the Japanese request because the BMC did not have the 
power to reject it. However, this permission still created tension between the 
British and Japanese. Nathan recorded the situation: 
The British Authorities have to date accepted the position as being 
one of necessity, while during the first few days the fiction was 
maintained that the Japanese asked permission for each lot of 
troops before they came through, and actually the British 
Authorities provided police escorts. After a few days, however, 
the situation got completely out of hand and [the] route from the 
Taku Road to the Japanese Concession is now a Japanese highway 
with continuous processions of troops, stores and lorries, both 
loaded and empty, proceeding in both directions. As might have 
been expected, an incident was bound to occur between the 
Japanese troops and the local inhabitants, and such a one has taken 
place only an hour or so ago. ' 31 
Nathan's statement demonstrates the early ill-feeling of the British towards the 
Japanese, whose soldiers had attacked two BMC constables and a British 
resident. 132 The BMA downplayed these incidents, recognising that the Japanese 
troops should not be provoked. Owing to this, the BMA took several measures to 
suppress any attempts by the Chinese to promote anti-Japanese feeling in the 
concession. 133 At the same time the British community was very concerned about 
131 The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, 29 August 1937. 
132 OrieN /Afairs, Vo1. VIII, No. 4, October, 1937, p. 227. 
133 Swann, The Tientsin Incident (1939), pp. 26-7. 
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its government's proposed decision to withdraw a battalion of British troops fron 
North China. ' 34 However the decision was never implemented, perhaps because the 
British government was beginning to recognise the emergence of the Japanese 
military expansion in North China and saw the need to protect their nationals in 
North China. The existence of the British battalion would be used as a deterrent 
measure to avoid Japanese military action against British interests. 
Nathan concluded that this situation meant that the Japanese military would 
dare to interfere in the British concession, stating: 
The point of all this is, however, that the sanctity of the Foreign 
Concessions has gone and with it the fundamental cause of their 
prosperity during all those troubled years through which China has 
been passing. Gone with it, or fast going, is the prestige of the 
foreigner, by which I mean the Americans and Europeans, in the 
eyes of both Chinese and Japanese. The seriousness of this aspect 
of the situation cannot, I feel, be exaggerated, and serious notice 
must be taken of it by you and your colleagues as it is certain to 
affect the position of the K. M. A. in the future. 135 
Nathan's statement highlights the important point that British interests were not 
being respected by the Japanese military. Before this, the British concession had 
been isolated from interference or disturbance from foreigners. Therefore the 
Japanese military, which did not obey the rules and order of the British concession, 
turned the British against them. Nathan's statement above shows his anger towards 
both the Chinese and Japanese. The fighting between than, according to Nathan, 
had created havoc regarding the foreign position in the International Settlement. 136 
'34 PRO W0106/116, "China: Garrisons and Accommodation at Shanghai Conf renne wk h Foreign 
Office. Conclusions reached at preliminary Meeting of War Office representatives on J ay 28, 
1937". 
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The British traders at this point felt very frustrated about the crisis which had 
disturbed the progress of trade in China. 
Apart from this incident, the British community and other nationals living 
in the concession mostly experienced little or no impact on their daily lives and 
were able to continue with their own business. This contrasts with the International 
Settlement in Shanghai, where residents experienced first hand the conflict 
between Chinese and the Japanese troops within the settlement and in Chapei. 
There were heavy casualties in the settlement. 137 People were enjoying their lives 
in the clubs and parks, at sporting events and several public occasions. However 
due to the war, this concession's population increased by 36 percent (mostly the 
Chinese refugees) from 1934 to 1938 (see Appendix 5). However, the British 
population declined slightly by around 5.4 percent (79 persons) during this period, 
a fall which might reflect the slowly growing difficulties facing business in China. 
On the other hand the war did have an impact on the Chinese population in the 
concession; refugees increased it drastically by around 68%. Other nationals also 
increased in number by around 29 percent. 138 This growth can also be linked to the 
impact of war as refugees of other nationalities sought shelter fron the dangers of 
war. 
The grammar school was f nctioning as usual, although the number of 
students attending was slightly reduced. Interestingly, there were no kidneping, or 
murders in the British concession 1937. The Fire Brigade continued its daily work 
137 Christian Henrict, `Shanghai Industries under Japanese Occupation. Bombs, Boom, and Bust 
(1937-1943)", in Christian Hannon and Wen-Hain Yoh (eds. ), In the shadow of the rising sm: 
Sbargbai raider Japanese occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Props, 2003), pp. 20-S. 
138 Rogaski, Hygienic Moderniry, p. 270. 
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of ensuring the safety of the residents. The Electricity Department reported that 
hostilities in July 1937 between the Chinese and the Japanese had reduced the 
consumption of electricity, as several factories had temporarily had to stop their 
operations. The Waterworks Department, on the other hand, seemed to ignore the 
war in Tientsin and continued to provide a full service to residents while 
continuing their work of finding more wells to improve the water Supply. 139 
Even the BMC's meeting in 1937 tried to avoid any discussion of the war 
between the Chinese and Japanese. This was part of their attempt to take a neutral 
position between the two sides, and does not mean that there was no anxiety. 
Some of the British members of the BMC, lead by Nathan (1936), were intending 
to alter the makeup of the council to put the British in the majority, changing the 
ratio from five members each to six British and four Chinese. The motive for this 
proposal was the British community's fear that increased Japanese domination in 
Tientsin would also lead to its domination in the BMC via the Chinese councillors. 
However, the proposal was opposed by some British councillors as unwise. HO 
The grievance of the British community, mirrored in the above proposal, 
shows that although they were leading a normal life in the concession, the British 
nevertheless felt that the Japanese threat to their interests in the concession was 
waiting to be exposed. Furthermore they were shocked by several incidents that 
had happened elsewhere in China such as the attack on the British Ambassador, Sir 
Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen on 26"' August 1937, and another incident in which 
r9 BMC, Tkntsin, Report of hie CoWcll far the wr 1937 (Tientsin Press, Limited), pp. 38 and A 
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the British gunboats Ladybird and Bee at Wuhu and the Cricket and Scarab new 
Nanking were fired on by the Japanese., a' The USS Panay, an American gunboat, 
also fell victim to Japanese attack. These incidents raised the apprehension of the 
British communities in China and Britain and were among the reasons that Anglo- 
Japanese relations ceased to be amicable. 142 In late August 1937 E. J. Nathan 
pointed this out as a great challenge to British interests: 
We are all much relieved that the latest reports of his condition are 
so satisfactory, and it would seem that he [Sir Knatchbull- 
Hugessen] is now out of danger.... It must not be forgotten, 
however, that prior to this incident British lives have already been 
lost in the fighting between the Chinese and Japanese, and immense 
damage has been done to British property, 143 
Although the British community in Tientsin was angry with the Japanese, it 
remained anxious not to of end them. The Japanese success in controlling North 
China, including Tientsin and the British community, meant that the British had to 
keep up good relations with them and with their collaborators. Nathan considered 
this position important in order to avoid Japanese disruption of British operations 
in North China. In October he wrote: 
I am naturally apprehensive of the outcome of the cry being raised 
in certain quarters throughout the British Empire for a boycott 
against Japan. I do not believe that our Government will give it any 
official support, but were it to become at all wide-spread the 
repercussions would undoubtedly be felt here, and our position 
might easily become a much more difficult one than it has been up 
to date... . 
Given the KMA's position in North China and the Japanese military domination of 
that area, Nathan saw that anti-Japanese action by the British would be unwise. 
141 M Japan weekly CMontch Daxmba 23,1937, p. 825. 
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Nathan was under intense pressure to preserve the neutrality of the British, 
believing that an anti-Japanese approach would undermine his efforts to preserve 
the KMA's business interests. 
At this point British firms such as the KMA in Tientsin found themselves in 
a dilemma. Nathan's October 1937 letter continued; 
While we must continue as far as we possibly can to maintain a 
neutral attitude, we must not forget that we are a semi-Chinese 
organization and that the centre of our operations is being carried 
on in what is virtually occupied territory. We cannot afford to 
displease the Japanese, nor can we risk hurting the feeling of our 
Chinese Partners. '45 
This statement, importantly, shows that the British firms in North China put their 
own business interests first rather than following the anti-Japanese feeling of the 
British in both China and Britain. The destruction, especially of British life and 
properties, caused by the war between the Chinese and Japanese, provoked the 
anger of British expatriates allover China. 146 However, this anger was not overt 
among the British community in Tientsin in particular and in North China 
generally. The Japanese military control of North China meant that they had to 
react differently. 147 British firms in North China were hard put to balance their 
attitudes between the Japanese and the Chinese. The KMA in particular, a Sino- 
British firm, had to do its best to work alongside the hostile parties. However the 
British - due to Japanese control of Tientsin - were more inclined not to provoke 
the Chinese, in line with their government's policy of not encouraging anti- 
145 Ibid. 
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Japanese feeling. '48 This attitude was adopted by the British traders, who hoped to 
keep up their businesses free from interference from any powers in China. '49 
The British missions in the area surrounding Tientsin, especially the LMS, 
were not greatly affected by the Japanese penetration of North China in the 1930s. 
F. W. Dawson commented on the situation, saying: 
Here in North China we are living amidst change and uncertainty, 
in fact we hardly know whether we belong to China or to Japan. 
Fortunately all these troubles and unsettled conditions have 
interfered very very little with Christian work but they have been a 
constant source of anxiety and of fear to the ordinary Chinese 
people. 15° 
However, Dawson saw that the encroachment of the Japanese military in North 
China added to the Chinese government's problems. The missionaries pitied the 
Chinese efforts to recover from after the effects of the long civil war and their 
problems with foreign imperialism: the influence of the Japanese military in North 
China made progress in China hard to achieve. ' 51 
However, the Japanese military's interference in the British missions' 
activities became apparent after July 1937. In Tientsin the British missionaries 
complained that the Japanese were affecting their church in the Chinese city: 
... the Japanese occupation of the Tientsin city ... stopped all 
church activity and progress for several weeks. With the exception 
of perhaps one Sunday the Sunday worship was carried on all 
through those troublous days, but for the first few weeks very few 
people attended the services. They felt it was too dangerous to do 
14' Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise, p. 156. 
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so. This applies especially to the women. Gradually they have 
been returning but congregations are still unusually small, and, 
strange to say, more than half of those now attending are women. 
Since July the services have been held in the small hall behind the 
church. At one time it was feared that Japanese soldiers would 
occupy the premises, but fortunately this did not actually 
hapPen ls2 
Clearly, the full range British interests in Tientsin had become affected by the 
Japanese military encroachment. 
This made the British mission apprehensive about its future. Dawson 
expressed the apprehension of the British missionaries, pointing out: 
Unfortunately the Japanese occupation of many parts of China is 
rendering this new arrangement abortive. Not only in this matter 
but in many other ways it is probable that we shall have to face 
new conditions in connection with our missionary work as a result 
of the events of the last few months. It is too early as yet to form 
any definite conclusions. '53 
Although the above points out the uncertain future of the British missions as an 
outcome of the new Japanese military rule in North China, it could apply to all 
British interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands under the Japanese military regime. 
In short, the onset of war in China in 1937 endangered the British 
position, 154 affecting the British community's attitude towards the Japanese, both 
in Tientsin and in its surrounding districts. The British community here was highly 
apprehensive of the Japanese military, which controlled not only Tientsin but 
almost all of North China. They were facing a new era in which they - including 
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British Decline (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1973), p. 16. 
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the British firms - could no longer rely on the Chinese but had to look to the 
Japanese military. This was indicated by the steady change in British firms' 
attitudes towards China from 1933 onward. Before 1933 they had had to follow 
the Chinese government's rule and order, but after 1933, as Japanese power spread 
across North China, this gradually changed'55 British power which had protected 
the British against Chinese attack was impotent against the Japanese. The British 
position in Tientsin and its hinterlands had to depend on its good relations with the 
Japanese, particularly after the outbreak of war. '56 
Conclusion 
Between 1933 and 1937 Anglo-Chinese relations shifted due to changes in 
the political scenario in North China. The Nationalist government had lost power 
there and the Chinese in North China were represented by two autonomous bodies 
under the influence of the Japanese. This meant that Anglo-Chinese relations in 
North China were more overshadowed by the Japanese than by the Chinese, who 
now played a minor role in North China. In other words the Japanese controlled 
the political scenario in Tientsin and its hinterlands. 
Japan's activities in North China exposed the limits of informal empire. 
The British could not use their extraterritorial status to defend themselves. The 
new threat from Japsen paralysed their British privileges. Big British firms such as 
the KMA maintained a pragmatic stance, knowing that they could not rely much on 
Iss See Jürgen Ostbammel, `imperialism In Transition', p. 283. Ost nmel argued Nah the 
British firms had became more pragmatic In order to protect their infests by give their support to 
the Nationalist government since 1928. This also happened in North China but the British firms 
had also to recognise the Japanese Influence in North Chins. 
'ss Osterhammel, 'China', p. 661. 
298 
British power to help them against the Japanese military. Even in the British 
concession found itself in a dilemma in the face of this new threat. The BMC 
recognised the new situation and avoided provoking the Japanese. However, 
pmaure from the Japanese was unavoidable; allowing then army to cross the 
British concession was a case in point. The BMC had to view the situation 
realistically. The Japanese posed a far greater threat than the Chinese. At this 
point the British community gave priority to British interests rather then to 
maintaining good Anglo-Chinese relations. 
Smuggling also illustrated how the existing differences between the 
authorities in Tientsin were part of the problem with suppressing this activity. Is7 
The BMC, with approval from the British consul general, agreed to support the 
Chinese in this matter. However, this support did not suffice to suppress the 
smuggling activities because the Chinese could not also obtain the support of the 
Japanese concession, and the smuggling continued to hamper the interests of the 
trader community. The cry for help by the British trader for their government was 
futile because the British government, pie-occupied with the European problem, 
was unable to help much. '" The Chinese, on the other hand, were helpless in this 
matter. In these circumstances the British community had accepted the reality and 
played neutral to avoid their interests under threat. Even the diehard group 
gradually realised that the Japanese military was a now threat to the British. The 
Missionary also took neutral stand to evade the Japanese military interference in 
their activities. 
: 57 Rossski, HYBienk Modernity. p. 266. 
ýM Yang, `British Policy and Strategy in the Tientsin Crisis, 1939', pp. 66 and 176. 
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The Japanese attempt to seize the Tientsin Custom House was another 
example of the threat to British interests. If this had succeeded Japanese would 
have gained the power to administer not only the customs but also business 
interests in Tientsin. This was a nightmare for British traders, and for this reason 
they made strenuous efforts to avoid it happening. The British traders became the 
middle-men in this dispute between the Chinese and the Japanese. In order to 
avoid Japanese control of the Chinese Customs in Tientsin, the British agreed to 
allow customs revenues to be remitted to Japanese banks, which illustrates how it 
was in British traders' interests that their businesses in Tientsin be protected from 
the Japanese threat. So the British traders pragmatically agreed to this proposal by 
informally recognising the Japanese demands. This point illustrates that the British 
informal Empire in Tientsin was hard to maintain in the face of emerging Japanese 
military pressure. The blockade of the British concession in 1938 demonstrated 
finally that the British position became more `weak' in China before the outbreak 




This thesis has examined and discussed the impact and response of the 
British community in Tientsin to events in China from 1925 to 1937. For twelve 
years the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland succeeded in 
maintaining its position, despite several demands from the Chinese for the recovery 
of their sovereignty, and Japan's attempts to spread its influence in north China. 
The nationalist movement of the early twentieth century gradually developed and 
became a serious threat to the British in the 1920s, including the British 
community in Tientsin, whose concern escalated in early 1927 to fear, after the 
seizure of the British concession in Hankow and the Nanking incident. 
The establishment of a moderate KMT government in Nanking, which 
adopted a mild policy towards the treaties, did not case these worries. The 
demands of the Nanking government for the abolition of extraterritorial rights 
challenged the British to fight once more for their survival in Tientsin. The British 
government, in principle, agreed to negotiate about the future of their concession in 
Tientsin with the Chinese but had met with opposition from the British community. 
However, these concerns were all managed, but early in 1931 further problems 
stemming from the Sino-Japanese war in Manchuria led to unease in north China, 
The Japanese military was eager to overthrow the KMT in north China and exerted 
its influence to undermine not only the Chinese but also the other foreign powers in 
the area, especially the British. This created feelings of enmity in the British in 
Tientsin and its hinterlands towards the Japanese. However, before 1937 the 
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Japanese threat to British interests was indirect, involving, for instance, smuggling, 
and support for the Chinese separatist movement 
In order to begin this discussion, this chapter is divided into three parts. 
First, it examines the significance of the British concession in Tientsin with regard 
to Anglo-Chinese relations: second, it addresses the nature of the British 
community in Tientsin in connection with the changes that occurred there between 
1925 and 1937. The last part presents a study of the British concession in Tientsin 
as a model for studying other British concessions in China and the informal British 
empire in Latin America. 
Tientsin and Angto-Chinese Relations 
This study has demonstrated how the British concession in Tientsin 
played a significant part in Anglo-Chinese relations. There was no May Thirtieth 
Incident, or crisis akin to Shanghai's which faced Communist uprisings and 
Nationalist encirclement in 1927, but throughout the 1920s and 1930s this 
concession met several challenges from racial tension, civil war, the nationalist 
movement, strikes, crises, smuggling and assassination. All of this supports the 
assertion of this thesis that Tientsin was not insignificant; the British concession 
there played a significant role and highlighted Anglo-Chinese relations. The 
significance of the British concession in Tientsin for Anglo-Chinese relations was 
fourfold. 
Firstly, as part of the informal British Empire, the British concession in 
Tientsin was used as a bargaining piece by the British government in its attempt to 
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restore good relations with China in the face of the anti-British movement Britain 
agreed in principal to return this concession to the Chinese. The Northern 
government, on odor hand, used this opportunity to demand fall control of the 
concession as part of its effort to show its nationalist spirit. In this way it could 
win Chinese support against the threat from the KMT. This circumstance 
demonstrated that the British concession was not only important to the British 
liberal policy, but that it also became a place where rival Chinese groups and 
leaders competed for the support of the Chinese people! This situation 
demonstrates that the British concession in Tientsin was one of the important 
concessions used as `bait' by both the British government and the Chinese rival 
groups to win over the Chinese. 
Secondly, the British government's power was more overt in the Tientsin 
concession than it was in the Shanghai settlement. This caused the difference 
between the British concession in Tientsin and the international settlement in 
Shanghai. The British government found the concession in Tientsin much easier to 
manage and control then the International Settlement. The power vested in the 
British Consul General in the British concession in Tientsin was extensive, 
meaning that the concession had to follow any changes in British policy, which 
made it less controversial than the International Settlement in Shanghai. The 
international settlement in Shanghai was controlled by the British and other foreign 
communities, which were responsible to their electors. Therefore the 
Shanghailanders, with their imperialist agenda, tried to defend their British image 
1 Arthur Waldron, From war to +w'fonalL p265. 
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and prestige and to control the Chinese in the settlement? This created problems 
for the British/Chinese relationship. For example, in Shanghai the Siming Gungsuo 
Riots of 1874 and 1898 over huiguan (burial land),; "the Wheelbarrow Riot (1897) 
over an increase in license fees, [and] the Mixed Court Riot (1905) over SMC 
interference with the cowt"4 illustrate the problems between the British and 
Chinese them? Then followed the May Thirtieth incident in 1925. However, in 
Tientsin the British concession did not experience a clash with the Chinese. As 
mentioned, the British Consul General managed to avoid tension in the concession 
by exercise his powers over the concession and council. 
Thirdly, owing to the control of the British Consul General, the concession 
in Tientsin fostered a good relationship between the British and the Chinese. For 
example, after the concession had been in existence for almost 15 years the first 
Chinese person was elected to the BMC, something which now happened in 
Shanghai. Then the BMEC elected a Chinese councilor to its council. When the 
BMC and BMEC (including the British Extension Area and the American 
concession) amalgamated, the Chinese councilor was retained and the number of 
Chinese on the BMC council increased from one in 1919 to two in 1926 and three 
in 1927. In 1926 the BMC also took proactive measures by opening its parks to all 
residents without discrimination, and a Chinese was elected to a high post in the 
BMC administration! This shows that the BMC was further advanced in 
reforming the concession than the SMC was in Shanghai. All this progress was 
2 Bickers, Britain in Chia, pp. 127-128. 
3 Bryn& Goodman, Nadae P/a", Clty, and Nation: Reglonai Networb k*ndMss In S6 
1853-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Pmas, 1995), pp. 138.69. 
4 Bickers, Britain in Cküw, p. 128. 
5 See also Tuna Helena Airabinen, Love Your Country on Na{jing Road the British and 11* May 
Fourth Movement In Shanghai (Helsinki: Renvall Institute Publication 19,2005), pp 168-179. 
6 Bickers, Britain in China, p. 138. 
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also the result of the British traders' readiness to adopt a liberal policy in Tientsin. 
In other words this concession showed that not all British concessions or 
settlements suffered poor Anglo-Chinese relations. Even the Nationalist 
government recognised the reforms carried out in Tientsin in 1929. Therefore the 
Tientsin concession was very different to the Shanghai settlement. 
Another significant facet of Tientsin and its hinterlands is that it seems to 
be free from any big disturbances when the Manchurian crisis began. Though 
there was some street fighting in the Chinese city (November 1931), this had little 
effect on the British community. Lampson seemed to be unconcerned about this 
short burst of fighting, 7 and the British community in Tientsin was not harmed by 
it. In contrast on 18 January, 1932 Shanghai faced a Japanese attack on the 
Chinese. It seemed that Tientsin was away from the real Sino-Japanese crisis, but 
Japanese support for smuggling activities and the puppet government in North 
China brought Tientsin into the bigger picture of the Sino-Japanese crisis. The 
British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands felt insecure with the increasing 
Japanese military power in North China. It could do little to counter this Japanese 
influence, and its best option was not to provoke them. The BMC remained 
nonaligned in the tension between the Chinese and Japanese. As mentioned in 
Chapter 5. British traders did not want to create tension by appearing to support 
either the Japanese or the Chinese. The BMC understood that the Japanese must be 
respected and that the British community's relationship with the Chinese should be 
fostered. For example, the British community continued to support the inclusion of 
Chinese in the BMC, though there was also an effort to decrease the Chinese 
' St. Anthony College, Lampoon Diaries, 9 November 1931, the Klllearn Papers. 
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members in the BMC fear that they would be Japanese Puppets (See Chapter 5). 
The British community never showed their animosity towards the Japanese effort 
to supersede their interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands. In this way it avoided 
confrontation between the Chinese and Japanese. By remaining neutral from 1931- 
1937, the British prevented the Sino-Japanese conflict from causing problems in 
British community. But in 1937 the Japanese pressured the British community 
very hard, and the BMC allowed them to use a route through the British concession 
to attack the Chinese city in 1937. 
The British community 
The nature of the British community in Tientsin was more moderate and 
pragmatic than that of its counterpart in Shanghai. This was due to the British 
Consul General's control of the British concession in Tientsin, which made the 
BMC behave more moderately towards the Chinese. Tientsin's British consul 
general created a friendly relationship between the concession and the Chinese. 
Even though some members of the British community there were diehards and 
very reluctant to adapt the change in China, the Consul General managed to avoid 
the diehard group from making much trouble in Tientsin. But the diehard group 
continued to fight to retain the status quo of British rights in Tientsin with 
propaganda to undermine the Chinese effort to regain sovereignty. This group 
could not accept the Chinese nationalists' demand for Chinese sovereignty. They 
regarded Chinese nationalism as an anti-foreign movement as in the Boxer 
Uprising, rather than China's effort to regain sovereignty. This mentality of the 
diehard group was a continuation of the ninetieth century British view which 
regarded the concession in Tientsin as owned by the British. The community saw 
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the Chinese nationalists as the same people who had taken part in the Boxer 
Uprising, now led by Russian communists. 8 
However, this group was not as powerful as the Shanghailanders and its 
opposition had little influence on the British community in Tientsin and its 
hinterland. The majority of the British community, especially the traders, 
remained loyal to the British government because the British traders recognized 
that the government's decision could not be challenged and that Chinese 
nationalism was the aspiration of the Chinese people to regain their sovereignty. 
Therefore the British traders, who controlled the BMC, led the British community 
in taking a more moderate stance in response to British liberal policy and Chinese 
nationalism. 
For example the British government's decision was to render the British 
concession in Tientsin. Although there was opposition from the diehard group, the 
Consul General and the British Minister in Peking continued to negotiate with the 
Chinese regarding the future of the British concession. The firn decision made by 
the British government to render the British concession to the Chinese was obeyed 
by the British community in Tientsin. Therefore the British community agreed to 
send its delegation with the British Consul General to negotiate with the Chinese 
delegation regarding the future of the concession. The diehards demanded that the 
negotiations were stopped, citing several reasons, such as the Nanking Incident, but 
the British Minister and Consul General ignored their grievance. Although 
rendition never happened in the end, the British community accepted the need to 
$ The North China Her+dd 8 August 1925, p. 148. 
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create a good environment with the Chinese and several changes were effected by 
the BMC to eliminate discrimination against the Chinese, such as allowing the 
Chinese enter Victoria Park without a pass. 
This led to the argument that the British concession in Tientsin had a 
friendlier environment than that of the SMC. In the International Settlement it took 
several years of reforms in SMC to be implemented. The British members of the 
SMC seemed reluctant to implement reforms in the settlements Again this 
indicates that the British General Council's control on the British concession made 
the British community to be moderate. The British community in Tientsin agreed 
to increase the number of Chinese in the BMC, while in the same year the British 
traders in the SMC rejected a proposal to increase Chinese representation on its 
council. '0 
However, the power of the British Consul General continued to be 
challenged by the diehard group in the early 1930s. The abolition of 
extraterritoriality was a case in point. The diehards tried to undermine Chinese law 
by representing it as a dead letter and emphasising the brutality of the Chinese 
police against their prisoners, but their opposition could not stop the British 
government's negotiations with the Chinese on extraterritoriality. The moderate 
group, under the traders, continued to support British liberal policy and to mend its 
relationship with the Chinese by publishing the BMC's annual report in Chinese as 
well as English in the late 1920s, and awarding scholarships to Chinese students In 
the early 1930s. 
9Ciifford, Spoilt ChIlden of Emp6+e, p. 150 and Bickers, Britain In CMMa, p. 132. 
10 Bieleau, `Changing ShwNOW's "Wird"", p. 12. 
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The moderate nature of the British community continued when Japanese 
influence increasingly grew in North China in the early 1930s. The British traders 
were aware that their new challenge - the Japanese - should be handled carefully 
without provocation. Therefore the British activities in Tientsin and its hinterland 
did not meet much trouble with the Japanese. Even though the Japanese tried to 
create problems in North China such as by supporting the strikers in the KMA coal 
mines and the smuggling activities, British interests were little affected because the 
British community was making an effort to maintain good relations with the 
Japanese. The most important thing for the British community was to remain 
where it was, retaining its business interests in North China. In short the moderate 
nature of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland created a stable, 
peaceful situation in the concession, as illustrated by the fact that the British 
government faced few problems there. 
In conclusion, most of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland 
displayed a moderate attitude towards the British's liberal policy and managed to 
meet all the challenges described above. Although some amongst the community 
there were resisted to the changes in Tientsin, the power vested in the Consul 
General led to the failure of the diehard group's efforts to oppose British liberal 
policy. The British community succeeded in nurturing a friendship with the 
Chinese which brought about a stable environment in the British concession in 
Tientsin. 
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Suggestions for further research 
This study has opened up and explored another area of the role of the 
British community in China This matter has been taken up by several scholars 
who have made new discoveries. Bickers and Osterhammel thoroughly studied the 
role played by this community in Shanghai, and found that the British community 
was not homogenous but rather fractured according to their interests. This study 
has also shown that the British community in Tientsin was divided into traders, 
missionaries and settlers. This difference in interests created division between the 
moderate group (more liberal) and the diehard (more parochial). 
Before the study by Bickers and Osterhammel, the British community had 
always been branded as insular in attitude. This was a generalised statement 
regarding the British community in China. This study has illustrated that it was not 
strictly true. It cannot be denied that the some of the British community in Tientsin 
had a diehard attitude - this group had good reason to oppose any changes that 
would affect their interests, and was worried that these would affect their lives, 
which relied on the concession. The concession had developed since in the early 
1860s. Besides the emergence of the separate administration, the British image 
and identity were also apparent in the concession in the form of its architecture, 
English-style gardens and parks, bunds, schools and hospitals. With these 
conditions the British community felt that the concession was not a Chinese city 
but was owned by the British. Therefore it became a haven for the British 
community, in which they confined themselves with their own culture and 
language, isolated from the rest of China, with the result that the majority of the 
British there knew little about China as they were uninterested in exploring the 
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country further inland. The news they received about China came through British 
travelers and English language newspapers, and always portrayed China as a wild, 
uncivilised, disorganised country full of bandits and corrupt officials, adding to the 
general view of its backwardness. 
In short the British community had arrived in China and settled in the 
concession not to learn the Chinese culture or language but to look for 
opportunities and work. 'Their main aim was to amass wealth. Other settlers in 
China worked with port service industries or in municipal councils in foreign 
concessions. " Even the missionaries, whose work was to propagate Christianity 
and provide education and a health service, did not accept that the Chinese were 
socially equal to them. 12 This situation created difficulty for Britain's fostering of 
good relations with China at the international level. The British community's 
mindset and ideas in China conflicted with the will of the Chinese nationalists. 
The Chinese saw the British community in China as problematic regarding 
regaining Chinese sovereignty. The British community in Shanghai was targeted 
by the Chinese media as a stumbling block against the Chinese effort to retake the 
international settlement in Shanghai. 13 However the diehard attitude of the British 
community in Tientsin never became a big problem for the Chinese. This 
community was less problematic, and the British General Consul's control of the 
BMC and the pragmatic attitude of the British community created a good 
environment in which it established cordial relations with the Chinese. The 
I See Bickers, B+ *abt in Glows, pp. 69.76. 
12 See Robert A. Bickers, "To save and not to rule': B ish Protestant Missionaries and CM=n 
Nationalism, 1928-1931', in Rabat A. Bickers and Ro. em y Seton, (eds. ), MLtslon y 
E, owwrs: Sowces and Issues. Su rey: Curzon Pro% 1996. 
" The Chinese Otte, April 24,1930, p. 394. 
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Chinese government was happy with the BMC's effort to eliminate discrimination 
in the concession. 
As this study only covers 1925 to 1937, it would be useful to explore this 
study on the behaviour of the British community from the earliest establishment of 
this concession. The earlier history of Tientsin is fascinating. In these early years 
the British community was struggling to develop the swampy area of its concession 
and deal with Chinese animosity towards the foreigners such as was expressed in 
the Boxer Uprising. It also worth studying this concession after the Second World 
War, and its formal retrocession in 1943, as there was dissatisfaction on the part of 
the British community about losing the concession. For example, John Emmett 
Woodall, headmaster of the Tientsin Grammar School, conveyed his frustration of 
not able to obtain compensation which he and his colleagues demanded from the 
British goverment. 14 
It is interesting to oxamine not only the trader community but also the other 
British communities, especially the role played by the missions. This study has 
shown that the missions had problems with the Chinese, and this pressure nude 
them more liberal in their activities in China. Bickers found that the British 
community in Shanghai was divided by social status - the Shanghailaaders at the 
top and - at the very bottom - 'Distressed British Subjects' ready for shipping 
home. '5 The British seamen, for example, had a low quality of life and there was, 
'4 SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papors, 1919-1990, ? 1re 11tX&aM Graau aw &bOgl qrr "PWar 
Ha'bow". 
15 Robe t Bickers, `Who were the Shari Mnnidpel Police, and why were they there? ", p. 173. 
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according to P. D. Coates, much murder among them. 16 Further research, extending 
to the community's marginalised stateless people, such as Russian Jews, would 
enrich the study of the British community in China. Though this group did not 
have diplomatic protection, the Jewish community had succeeded maintaining their 
interest in the BMC. In the British concession the Jewish community had its own 
school, synagogue, association and shop. " 
This study also exemplifies Tientsin as one of the treaty ports under the 
greatest tension. As Rogaski mentions, Tientsin had been controlled by eight 
foreign powers (before 1915) and one Chinese authority. This division of power 
had made it a very tense city, beginning with the effort to suppress the Boxer 
uprising-18 Therefore it would be interesting to study about other concessions such 
as the French, which had as long a history as the British concession, although we 
know little of its history. But Tientsin's history illustrates that this concession was 
a more contested site. The concession experienced massacre (1870), bombardment 
(1900) and racial tension (1919). The Japanese concession in Tientsin developed 
significantly. In 1930s it became the centre from which the Japanese planned their 
strategy to expand their influence in North China, and it was the also centre of 
smuggling activities and drug trafficking. The study of the power and control, 
community, tension and everyday life of these other concessions should not be 
neglected, in seeking a complete picture of the pattern of foreign imperialists In 
China. 
16 P. D. Coates, The Chirac Consuls: British Comular Officers 1843-1943 (Hun Kong Oxford 
University Press, 1988), p. 47. 
11 Hershatter, The Workers of 77my , 1900-1949, p. 23 cite fron Interview with Israel Epetdn, Dec. 
7 1980. I1 Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity, p. 170. 
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Other Concessions 
This study has illustrated that the British community in Tientsin gives us 
important information about nature and processes of informal empire. The presence 
of the British community, the BMC and its business interests and troops illustrates 
the existence of the informal British Empire in Tientsin. This study has opened up 
and explored the informal empire in China by investigating the British presence as 
one of six British concessions and two British-dominated international settlements 
in China. The British also had one British Crown Colony and two leased 
territories, and were present in the form of communities in other treaty ports where 
they did not have concessions. 19 It would be worth studying the British 
communities and presence in other parts of China, to generate a full picture of the 
British Informal Empire in China and to discover what proportion of the British 
presence was diehards. 
My thesis' methodology could be used as a model by which to expand the 
study of the British presence in other parts of China. Using this methodology, we 
could learn about the roles, attitudes and responses of the British community in 
China. For example, we know little about the British communities in Hankow and 
Canton. Both had a long history but neither have been thoroughly researched; 
particularly the response of the Hankow community to the seizure of the 
concession. So far we know about the negotiations over rendition from David 
Wilson, William James Megginson, Harold Edwin Kane and Lee En-han. But none 
of these provide an in-depth study of the British community's response. It would 
also be very interesting to study the British community in Hankow after the 
19 Robert Bickem BHtafi in Chlno, p. 10. 
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concession was handed over to the Chinese. A 1928 report by the China 
Association suggests that the British community in Hankow were not satisfied with 
the Chinese administration-20 Canton was another hotspot in the 1920s; the British 
and French communities there experienced a bloody clash with the Chinese in 
1925. We know little of the British community's response when Canton was very 
briefly under communist control in December 1927 (the Canton Commune). 
Studying both of these concessions would show how British informal empire 
operated in small but significant China outposts. 
Beside these two big concessions we do not know much about the 
responses of the British communities in Kiukiang, Amoy (International Settlement) 
and Chinkiang when the British government handed over these concessions. 
Owing to the insignificance of these treaty ports in terms of the amount of trade 
going through them and their small size, the British government decided to 
sacrifice these concessions and international settlements, and the British 
communities seemed to obey this decision without a fight. It seems that it was 
easy for the British government to return than to the Chinese government. Did the 
British community in these treaty ports have a liberal attitude? 
A study of the British communities' responses in these concessions and 
international settlements would reveal a wider picture of their behaviour and 
attitudes. Tientsin exemplifies a case where the British consul and traders had 
considerable power to eliminate the opposition of the diehard group, providing a 
20 See SOAS Library, Association of British Chambers of Commerce Chin, Associations and 
China Communitoe In China and Hongkong, Conferance, March 6 and 7,1928. 
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good starting point from which to explore behaviour and responses of the British in 
other treaty ports to British policy in the mid-1920s. 
It would also be interesting to extend this study to the period of the 
Japanese penetration of China in the 1930s. Tientsin was an example of the British 
trader community's problem with the coming of the Japanese to North China. The 
puppet government and smuggling activities created an awkward position for the 
British in their relations with the Chinese and Japanese. At this point it would be 
interesting to see the British position in Harbin when the Manchukuo government 
emerged. The British community there had faced a strong challenge with the 
Japanese imposition of several restrictions on their businesses. 21 
Other Contribution 
This study is also a reflection on the study of Informal Empire in other parts 
of the world, especially perhaps the role played by the British community in Latin 
America, 22 for example Argentina, which had gained independence in 1810 and 
which faced problems in term of labour and finance. In order to resolve these, 
foreign nationals were invited to help to develop Argentina, and this led to a British 
community of migrants settling there which formed a division between itself and 
native culture. The British preserved their own culture and maintained all their 
connections with Britain, with an English newspaper, a Protestant church to serve 
the British community and a Catholic church for the Irish, and English became 
21 Wu Dongsheng, hang Hsozhi, and Yu Wh 'A Brief Int on to the Bfvjimg Products 
British Impost and Exposit Co q Ltd. - flu Chid= and Duck Congmy (Excerpts)'. Satin 
Chu. and Stig Thogaseo. The Mang GO Chinese City : History and Hlstorlo y In Harbin 
(Armonk: M. E. Sherpe, 1995), p. 64. 
22 Anthony Webstet, AwL baat on 8a Rise of the Brk k EW#m (Manche*r: M drohtet 
University Press, 2006), pp. 71-2. 
23 David Rock, `The British Community In Argentine 1806-1960' ( ublished paper, c. 2006)+ p. 3. 
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necessities to all the British, cricket, rugby and football were introduced, a hospital 
for British patients and school for British children were built. u All these insulated 
the British community from the native environment The community's relationship 
with Britain was close, as shown by its support for the British in two world wars. 
This situation was similar to that in Tientsin, where the British had created a 
division between themselves and the Chinese people and maintained strong 
connections with Britain. To show their loyalty to Britain their celebrated the 
King's birthday and supported Britain during both world wars. There were, 
however, no British-controlled concessions, and there was no extrate ritoriality. 
To that extent the British in Argentina were eventually in a much weaker position 
than those in China. 
This study of Tientsin has shown that the British community had to be 
pragmatic about the changes in China. Therefore the British traders had 
cooperated with the local elite to maintain the favour of the Chinese government u 
The KMA, for example, showed its willingness to collaborate with the Chinese in 
order to maintain their interests. This collaborative approach was also important in 
Latin America, owing to the weaker position of the British. Therefore the British 
hoped that by indirectly controlling Uruguay by collaborating with the local people 
would turn the Plata Basin in Uruguay as their dom . So, comparative 
research on how the British community upheld its interests in Latin America and 
China could provide a way of exploring the reality and limits of informal empire. 
24 Ibid., pp. 7,10,11,12,14 and 15. 
25 Jürgen Oaterireannd. `Semi-Colonialism and Informal Eaaph e in -C*rAU y Chins: 
Towards a Framework of Analysis', in Wolfes J. Momma and Jörgen Oatesb (eda. ), 
ImperidLain andA, JeerandD sch (London: German Historical InsdCute, 1%S), P. M. 
1* Pda Winn, `British Informal Empire in Unsay In the Ninetea & Cent y', Paßt AW Pnwaq 
No. 73, (Nov., 1976), p. 103. 
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Apart from this, this study of Tientsin has showed how the British 
community tried to counter the rise of Chinese nationalism with reform. This local 
resistance could have created a problem for the informal empire. 27 In the case of 
Tientsin the British community had to give up many of its privileges in order to 
retain its interests in Tientsin. From this point the rise of nationalism in Argentina 
and Uruguay made it difficult for the British to maintain their position there. The 
emergence of the nationalist movement, led by the Argentine leader Juan Manuel 
de Rosas in the mid-nineteenth century, was dangerous to the British and other 
European influences in Argentina and Uruguay's economies? " In Argentina the 
emerging nationalist era under Juan Perlin in 1943-1955 was another challenge to 
the British community? At this point we would like to know the British 
community's response to the local resistance in Argentina and Uruguay. Were the 
patterns of response of the British communities in these countries similar to those 
in Tientsin? 
2' Robin A. Winks, `On Decolonization and Informal Empire', The Amerkot Msicrkd Review. 
Vol. 81, No. 3, (Jun. 1976), pp. 551-2. 
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Prominent British Businesses in Tientsin (and North China) 1860 -1937 
Company Production/Service Other Information 
Anglo-Chinese Collecting, cleaning Bought by Liddells. Mainly dealing 
Wool Co. and packing wools with wool business of W. O. 
Oelbermann Co., Philadelphia. ' 
Arnhold & Co. Not specific Registered at Shanghai and 
Ltd controlled by E. D. Sassoon & Co., 
Ltd. 2 Supplied goods to Peking 
Chinese Electric Light & Power Co. 
and Chinese railways - Tientsin - 
Pukow Railway and Tientsin- 
Mukden Railway. ; Also export of 
Chinese goods such as bristles and 
wool 4 
Asiatic Petroleum Oil - 
Company (North 
China), Ltd. 
British American Cigarettes Large business in North China and 
Tobacco Co. Large factory in Tientsin. Also 
known in China as Yee Tsoong 
Tobacco Distributors Ltd. Head 
office in Shanghai. " 
Capstick & Co. Import and export Export mainly of walnuts and 
peanuts. 
Importers of provisions from 
Australia b 
Chandless & Co. Export Mainly export Chinese sheep wool 
Ltd. and camel wools. ' 
Collins & Co. Wool cleaning and - 
Cornabe, Eckford Import and export Established Tientsin branch 1 $64. 
' HSBC Group Arohives, SHG 1147 Letter änm C. R. Rice to C1. Cookes, Tientsin, June 13 1930. 2 HSBC Gp Arives, SHO 11510.4 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Managers, the Shen" 
Commercial & Savings Bank Ltd., Tientsin, February 21,1935. 
3 HSBC Group Archives, SHO 1128 Volume 2, Letter f om D. Forbes to H. B. Rot, Tiermaie, 
December 7,1925. 
4HSBC Group Archives, SHG 1128 Volume 2, Letter from D. Farben to H. B. Roe, Tientsin, 
December 7,1925, p. 2, and SHG 115 103 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, Banque Belo 
pour I'Ettanger, 1 ientsin, March 24,1932. 
3HSBC Group Archives, SHO 11510.41 etter from E. T. Barnes to the Mposers, Blue de 1'Indo 
Chine, Tientsin, January 15,1935. 
6 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.4 Letter from Nt. B. Matthew to the Manager, the Royal Bank 
of Canada, Havana, Tientsin, December, 1,1933. 7 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to H. B. M. Vioo. Conaul, T$orAdn, 
June 25,1932. 
8 HSBC Group Archivas, SHO 11510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackone to the Mmugex, the Chartered 
Bank of India, Australia & China, Timrtsin, November 25,1929 and HSBC Group AroWva , SHO 
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& Winning 
E. C. Peters & Co. Import and export Established in 1926. Joint venture 
with the Chinese compradore 9 and 
agent for the Union Oil Company of 
San Francisco. '° 
Fairchild & Co. Export Dealing with collecting and buyin 
' Chinese goods mostly in bristles. 
Hatch, Carter & Export Mainly wool, carpets and animal 
Co. skins. 2 
Hong Kong and Banking First branch opened in Tientsin in 
Shanghai Banking 1881. 
Imperial Chemical Importers of alkalies, This firm also known as Bremner, 




metals, and sundry 
products 
Jardine, Matheson Involved in different Operated with several agents such as 
and Co. businesses in Indo-China, s . N. Co. Ltd., P. & O. Steam Navigation Co., Canadian 
Pacific Ocean Services, Ltd., Kelvin 
Marine Motors and Bombay, Burmah 
Tradin Co T., Ltd. 14 
Kent & Mounsey Solicitor firm 
Liddell Bros. & Gathering animal fur, Not only in north China but through 
Co. Ltd. skins and cotton agent, D. E. Hramzoff, in Urga. 's 
Mackenzie & Co., Wool cleaning and 
Ltd. press-packing 
factories 
North China Exports Backed by Wilson & Co. 
Finance Co., 
Tientsin 
11510.3 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Bank of California, Seattle, Washington, 
Tientsin, February 31, 
9 HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 28 Vol. 2, Letter from R. C. Allee to H. B. Roe, Tientsin, 
December 15,1926. 
10 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 1147 Letter fron C. R. Rice to C. I. Cookes, Tientsin, 9 September, 
1930. 
" HSBC Group Ar hives, SHG II 510.1 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Meng , The Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., Tientsin, 6 December, 1926. 
'2 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Agent, New York, Tientsin, 
September 29,1932. 
13 China Hong List 1934 (the North-China Daily News & Herald, Ltd., ), p. 694. 14 Macmillan, Seaports of the For East, p. 126. 
Js HSBC Group Archives, SHG 1129 Volume 2 Letter from D. Forbes to H. B. Roe, Tientsin, 10 
May 1925. 
16 HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Managers, London, 
Tientsin, December 29,1936. 
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North China Wool Packing and export One of Perrin Coo7per & Co. Ltd. 's 
' Co. Ltd wool subsidiary firms. 
Perrin, Cooper & Import and export Owned J. J. A. Russell of Kuala 
Co. Lum 
Rendall & Co. Exporters Dealing in exporting chiefly carpets, 
lacquer work and sundries. 19 
Robert Smith Co. Wool, skins and fiu Head office in Tientsin and branches 
Ltd. established in North China such as 
Kalgan, Harbin and Paotou. 20 
Taku Tug and Dockyards, - Lighter Co. Ltd. Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Works 
Butterfield and involved in various Established headquarters in Tientsin 
Swire Co. businesses agents for in the mid-1880s. ' 
China Negation 
Company, insurance, 
Taikoo sugar, Blue 
Funnel and etc. 
The Chartered Banking Established in 1895. 
Bank of India, 
Australia, and 
China. 
The Haiho Trading Export and Import Founded by Mr. A. J. Andrew. 
Co. 
The International Export Located in the Belgian concession 
Export Company with branch elsewhere in North 
Limited China such as in Manchuria, Chihli 
and Shantung. 
The Kailan Mining Mining KMA was originated from merger 
Administration between the Chinese Engineering 
(KMA) and Mining Company (British) and 
the Lanchow Mining Co., (Chinese) 
in 1912. Also supplied stones, lime, 
ballast and sand for building. Brick 
factory at Machiaokow known to 
produce the best fire-bricks in China 
The North China Export Owned by W. R. Loxley a Co. 
Wool Co. Ltd. Managed by Perrin Cooper dt Co. 
Export of wool to America. 23 
" HSBC Group Archives, SHO 11510.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, Banque de I'Indo 
Chine, Tientsin, March 2,1937. 
'a HSBC Group Archives, SHO 11510.2 Letter, from Agents of Hongkong And ShmqtW Bank to 
The Manager, Banque de I'1ndo, Tientsin, 11 August 1928. 
19 HSBC Group Archives, SHO II 510.2 Letter from Lyot. madbmde to the , Nfav"le Bank of India, Limited, Shanghai, Tientsin, December 3,1929. 
2D HSBC Group Archives, SHO H 310.1 Latta from Lyon Mackenzie to the tamer, 11 
Equitable Trust Co, of New Yak, Tientsin, August 29,1927. 
s ' SOAS Library, the SCRR, John Swim & Sons's Papers, Letter, Shanghai, 15 June 1883, JSSI 
2/17 Box 1176B, p. 1. 
22 HSBC Group Archives, SHO 11695.2 Letter from E. P. Carrington to E. Barnes, Tientsin, Z8 
October, 1935. 
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The Stanley Co. Import and Export Established by Rev. Stanley P. Smith. 
Owing to lack of business experience 
this comany was managed by 
Chinese. 
Tientsin Anlee Export Registered in Hong Kong in October 
Export Co. Ltd. 1935.51% of its share owned by 
Arnold Trading Co., Ltd. 25 
Tientsin Lighter Dockyards, Used The Butterfield & Swire as its 
Co. Ltd., Shipbuilding and agent 
En ' Works 
Tipper & Co. Life, Fire and Marine - Insurance Agents 
William Forbes Import and Export Among the earliest British firms in 
and Co. Tientsin (1864) Processing, 
packaging and exporting Chinese 
goods. Had big interests in providing 
the Chinese railways with several 
train facilities such as car and rolling 
stock. Suffered from inability of 
Chinese government to settle all its 
debts to this firm. 27 
Wilson & Co. Collecting, cleaning Co. cm pradore gathered wools in 
and packing wools 2 Kai 
Yao Hua Glass On of the KMA's subsidiary 
Mechanical Glass companies,, situated in 
Co. Ltd. Chinwanafto. 29 
Sources: Allister Macmillan, Seaports of the Far East: Historical and Descriptive Commercial and Industrial Facts, F791 "s, & Resowres Second Edition (W. H. & L. Collingridge, 148 & 149: 
London, 1925); List of the Principal Foreign and Chinese Industrial EA*rp, Hses in China and Hoag Kong (Revised to December 31,1917), compiled by H. M. Commercial Attache, a c., 
Shanghai January 1", 1918; Lord Charles Beresford, The Break-Up of China: 67th an Account of7ts 
Present Commerce Currency, Waterways Armies Railways, Politics and Fv Prroapects (Harper 
& Brothers Publishers, New York and London, 1899), p. 16; Twentieth Century In pressiona of 
Hongkong Sh nghai, and other Treaty Ports of China, p. 734 and HSBC Group Archives. 
2' HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, the Yokohama 
Specie Bank Ltd., Tientsin, March 27,1933 and HSBC Group Archiven, SHG 11510.4 Leaer from 
F. H. Pentycross to the Manager, the Chase Bank, Tientsin, January 30 , 1934 . 2" HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter fron Lyon-Mackenzie to the Matte, the 
Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, April 29,1930. 
a HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5 Letter from E. D. Black to the Mae , Shanghai, 'I ientsin, April 29,1936 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the 
Agent, Netherlands Trading Society, Shanghai, Tientsin, October 14,1936. 
26 China ! Yang List 1934 (the North-China Daily News & Herald, Lid., ), p. 7I S. 27 HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager the Far 
Eastern Bank of Harbin, Tientsin, December 13th, 1928. 
2" HSBC Group Archives, SHG 1129 Vol. 2, Letter from D. Forbes to V. M. Grayburn, Tientsin, 
266 May 1926. 
29 HSBC Group Archives, SHO 11 510.3 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the 
Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 290,1930. 
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Appendix 3 
Other British firms in Tientsin 
CAMP"y Production/Service Other Information 
Vii, E. Bulling & Manufacturer - 
Co., 
1%tsin 
A. Mackie & Co. Aerated Water Established 1910 by A. Mackie. 
MMU&Cturers2 
Ä. S. Watson & Co. Chemists Sole ietor A. E. Keen. 
Adair Graham & Dockyards, - Co,, Tientsin. Shipbuilding and 
Works 
$c rows & Co. Ltd. Marine Surveyors Capital to Tls. 40,000 
C ldbeck Wine, spirits and Head office in Hong Kong and branches 
pAacgregor & Co. mineral water in Tientsin, Shanghai and the Straits 
Ltd. Settlement. 5 
Trading Co. - Registered as the British Company. 
Ltd. 
d ihli Motors Motorcars One of the Arnhold 
China Booksellers - - 
Ltd. B 
Jana Foreign - Established around 1929 under the Hong 
Corporation Kong Ordinance. 9 
Ckina Import and Lumber Headquarters at Shanghai. 
Export Lumber Co. 
Ltd. 
C Ltd Distilleri Established 1905 
HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Agent, New York August 20,1937. 
2 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11310.2 Letter from Lyon-Maclcenzie to the Maher, the Chartered Bank 
of India, Australia a China, Tientsin, December 17,1929. 
3 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11310.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Book 
of India, Australia a China, 'tiausin, November 27,1929. 
4 HS13C Group Archives, SHG 11 510.2, Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Man n, the Chartered Bank 
of India, Amelia & Chico, Tientsin, October29,1929. 
s HSHC Group Archives, SHG lI 310.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Astaura Coand, American 
, Consuigtg, General, Tom, June 2,1936. 
6 gSHC Group Archives, SHG 1147 Lotter fron C. R Rice to C. I. Coolwa, Tieolsin, November 26 1930. 
7HSBC Group Archives, SHG 1 15103 Loner f om E. T. Barnes to the Mme, The National City Bank 
of New York, Tientsin, May 5,1932. 
s HSBC Group Archives, SHG H 510.2 Latta from Lyon-Mec IC to the Manager, the Chartered Bank 
of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, November 2,1929. 
9 HSBC Group Archives, SHO H 5102 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the b(anW, Equitable Eutern 
Banking Corporation, Tiepin, August 9,1929. 
to }SßC Group Archives, SH011510.1 Letter from Lyon bbdwnzie to the Manager, Chartered Hook of 





oney 8t Co. Exchanýe and Share - 
Brokers 2 
DGlop Rubber Manufacture rubber Opened branch in Tientsin 1915. 
Company goods Development and sale of tyres to 
- 
motorists, incl rickshaw drivers. 
9. Pennell & Co. Wine and Spirit Purchased by E. W. Pennell, son of the 
owners, in 1934. Firm name changed to 
E. W. Pennell & Co. 13 
Esstern Dockyards, Established in 1923. 
Engineering Works Shipbuilding and 
(James Turner) Engineering Works 
Eckford Motor Motorcars Established in 1930. A subsidiary of 
Cornabe, Eckford & Co. to 
Edward Evans & StationeryPrinters - 
Sons Ltd. 
Hall & Holtz, Ltd Shopping complex Another respectable British storekeeper. 
and furniture 
factories 
Hemmings & Architects - 
Parkin 
I. Pecker Tailor, furrier and - 
outfitter's 
J. Twyford & Co. Engineering firm and Established in 1913 by J. Twyford. 
im rt and ex rt19 
Jardine Engineering and Subsidiary of and sponsored by Jardine 
it HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, National City Bank of 
New York, Tientsin, April 4,1932, p. 644 and HSBC Group Archives, SHO 115 10.5 Letter from E. T. 
Barnes to the American Consul, American Consulate General Tientsin, September 25,1936. 
'2 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, The Chas Bank, Tiontsin, 
April 9,1932. 
13 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.4 Letter from E. T. Burners to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of 
India, Australia & China, Tientsin, May 22,1933 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.4 Lette from 
E. T. Warners to the Manna, London, Tientsin, December 13,1934. 
14 HSBC Group Archives, SHG U 5103 Letter from Lyon-MacCcnzjo to the , Nativ City Bank 
of New York, Tientsin, September 17,1930. 
is HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.2 Lester from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank 
of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 4,1929. 
16 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.2 Lr from Lyon Mme to the Manage, the Chartered Bank 
of India, Amelia & China, Tientsin, December 9,1929. 
'7 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.4 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, the Chase Bank, Tientob, 
November 23,1934. 
is China Hong List 1934 (the North-tuna Daily News & Herald, Ltd, ), p. 706. 
19 HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bak 
of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 2,1929. 
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Corp. Ltd. Contractors, Matheson & Co. Ltd. 
Importers of 
machirr cretc. 
Keen & Co. Mineral water - 
manufacturers21 
Mackie it Co., A., Distilleries, breweries - 
Tientsin. and aerated water 
factories 
Moutrie & Co. Ltd. Musical - Instruments22 
Moyler Powell & Dressmakers, First established in 1916 
Co. milliners and general 
outfitters 
Mustard & Co. Imposts Subsidiary of the British American 
Tobacco Co. 24 
ATarth China Butter Margarine and butter Located in British concession and sold 
Co. goods in Tientsin and Pe ' 25 
North China Printing - 
Printing and 
' Co. Ltd. 
Ralph Harper & Import Mainly dealing in imported metals, piece 
Co. goods and sundries. 
Robinson Piano Piano and Musical - 
Co., Ltd. Instrument dealers27 
Sims & Co. Furniture factories Also provided other services to office 
facilities such as installing sun blinds. 23 
The British Engineering Formed to undertake various works such 
Engineering Works as boiler making, ship repairs, heating 
and "ni; Wy installations and general 
20 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11 510.5 Letter from W. H. Steward to the Manager, Banque de 1'Indo 
Chim, Tientsin, May 6,1936. 
21 HSBC Group Archives. SHG 11510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank 
of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 13,1929. 
22 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank 
of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, April 8,1930. 
2s HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, Banque Frenco. Chinoise, 
Tientsin, December 29,1931, HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11 310.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the 
imager, The Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, September 17,1932 and HSBC Group 
Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, London Tientsin, April 10,1935. 
z& HSBC Group Archives, SHG 115102 Letter from Lyon-Mwkende to the Manget, the CIMUWW Bank 
of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, April 9,1930. 
u HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11695.1 Memorandum to Hongkoft and Shen& Banking CorporaWk 
Tientsin, 30 December 1933. 
26 HSBC Group Archives, SHG Il 5102 Letter from Agents of Hongkong and Shenglial Bank to HBM 
Consul-General, Tientsin, 26 July 1928. 
27 China Hong List 1934 (the North-Chins Daily News & Herald, Ltd., ), p. 708. 
2s HSBC Group Archives, SHG 115103 Letter from Lyon-Mamie to Mess. Dom of Silence, Inc., 
New York, Tientsin, October 8.1930. 
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mechanics. 
The Tientsin Press Printing One of the important newsagents in 
Tientsin Printed the newspaper and also 
had a bookshop. 
Tientsin Gas and Electric Light Works - 
Electric Light Co. 
Ltd: Tientsin. 
Tientsin Native Waterworks - 
City Waterworks 
Co. Ltd. 
Tientsin Waterworks - 
Waterworks Co., 
Ltd. 
T ord China Ltd. Sanitary Engineers - 
White Star Aerated Distilleries, - 
Water Factory, Breweries and 
Tientsin Aerated Water 
Factories 
Woollen Vosy & Chemists A private limited company and registered 
Co. Ltd. in Ho Ko 30 
Yang Tsun Cement - 
Brickworks, 
Yan un 
HSBC Group Archives, SHG ll 5102 Letter from Lyon-Mack it to the Menage., the Chartered Bank 
of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 9,1929. 
30 HSBC Group Archives, SHG 11510.2 Utter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chattered Bank 
of India, Australia A China, Tientsin, November 25th, 1929. 
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Appendix 4 
]Tumber of the BMC employees in each department by nationality in 1934,1938 and 
1939. 
Departments/Offices; Number of Staffs 
1926 1934 1938 1939 
B C T B C T 8 C T B C T 
Secretariat 3 0 3 3 3 6 3 2 5 3 2 S 
Account Department 4 0 4 3 5 8 3 6 9 3 6 9 
Public Works 
Department 
6 0 6 5 4 9 6 5 11 4 8 12 
Electric Department 3 0 3 2 2 4 2 4 6 3 3 6 
Waterworks 
Department 
2 0 2 1 3 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 
Police Department 4 0 4 6 6 1 
2 
8 9 17 8 9 17 
Fire Bridgade na na an 2 0 2 2 2 4 2 0 2 
Wharfage Dues Office 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Health Office 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 
Hospital staff 6 0 6 6 2 8 7 4 11 7 4 11 
TOTAL 31 0 31 30 26 S 
6 




na - Not available 
wes: The Directory and Chro e China Japes, Coreq ... 1926, p. 603, China Haag Litt 1934, p. 702, China Hong List 1939, pp. 717-718 and China Hang List 1939, p. 700. 
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Appendix 5 
Table 2.2: The Population of the British Concession in Tientsin 
Nationality 1913 1925 1929 1934 1938 
American 72 294 273 252 185 
Armenian - - 15 3 10 
Australian 5 - 7 10 6 
Belgian 12 4 8 24 26 
Brazilian - - - 5 2 
British 388 682 755 1,451 1,372 
British Indians 48 35 25 52 18 
Canadian - - - I - 
Chinese 15,946 33,172 36,029 42,764 72,087 
Czechoslovakian - - 5 4 4 
Danish 4 11 4 10 4 
Dutch - - - 5 3 
Estonian - - - 9 5 
French 15 22 30 55 69 
Georgian - - 6 - 
German 141 25 90 85 111 
Greek 21 - 11 14 28 
Hungarian - - - 3 7 
Itai an 11 18 13 21 32 
342 
Japanese 84 107 160 89 294 
Jewish - - 24 232 - 
Korean 3 3 - 1 - 
Latvian - 7 13 20 10 
Lithuanian - - 4 16 22 
Norwegian - 8 - 2 1 
Persian - - - 3 6 
Peruvian - - 1 - - 
Filipino - 70 24 15 19 
Polish - 21 75 48 77 
Portuguese 2 2 10 7 21 
Romanian - 1 6 8 3 
Russian 43 731 1,527 1,448 2,323 
Serbian - - - 6 
Spanish - 4 - 4 4 
Swedish - - 3 2 6 
Swiss 8 - 14 10 22 
Tartar - - - 11 - 
Turkish - - 20 13 12 
Ukrainian - - - 7 - 
Yugoslavian - - 6 
Total 16,803 35,217 39,146 46,809 76,815 
Source: Itrsttsn mwnclPar c, ouncu, ntemstn, Reports of Council for the year ended December, 31,193$ 
and Budget for the year ended December 31,1939, (Tientsin press Limited, Tiffin, 1939), p. 9. 
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Appendix 6 
The Populations of Foreign Concessions in Tientsin. 










192-6 Foreign 2,045 1,450 na 470 5,104 
Chinese 33,172 35,000 2,000 7,000 21,347 
1929 Foreign 3,117 1,300 - 375 4,000 
Chinese 36,029 51,500 - 7,000 30,000 
930 Foreign na 980 - 375 4,000 
Chinese na 49,610 - 7,000 30,000 
1931 Foreign na 980 - 360 5,800 
Chinese na 49,610 - 6,000 27,000 
1932 Foreign na 980 - 360 6,700 
Chinese na 49,610 6,000 25,000 
1933 Foreign na 980 - 360 7,100 
Chinese na 49,610 - 6,000 27,400 
1934 Foreign 3,954 980 - 375 6,535 
Chinese 42,764 49,610 - 7,258 27,057 
1935 Foreign 4,045 915 - 375 7,835 
Chinese 42,764 69,996 - 7,238 27,159 
1937 Foreign 4,045 915 373 10,153 
Chinese 42,764 69,996 - 6,447 26,360 
1938 Foreign 4,728 1,800 - 739 19,252 
Chinese 772,097 120,0m 1, 10,444 
na - Not available 
Note 
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*The Belgian Concession was returned to China in 1929. 
The foreign population in 1938 in the British concession is slightly different from the figure in. 
Sourms: H. G. W. Woodhead (ed. ), The China Year Book 1926-7 (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, Ltd. ), pp. 603- 
605, The China Year Book 1929-30, pp. 99-100, The China Year book 1931 (Shanghai: North-China Daily 
News & Herald, Ltd. ), pp. 73-74, The China Year Book 1932, pp. 147, The China Year Book 1933, p. 105, 
The China Year Book 1934, pp. 655-656,7 he China Year Book 1935, pp. 347-348, The China Year Book 
1936, pp. 382, The China Year Book 1938, pp. 350 and The China Year Book 1939, pp. 158.159. 
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Appendix 7 










1861 5,475,644 5,014,071 461,573 - 
441,162 
1881 21,606,231 19,105,554 2,500,777 382,540 
1891 37,245,515 26,546,064 4,700,451 590,455 
1900 31,920,658 23,847,274 8,073,384 516,707 
1901 49,411,423 39,257,317 10,154,106 764,514 
1911 116,536,648 77,241,699 39,294,949 3,421,543 
1921 224,779,202 181,160,071 83,818,531 6,878,496 
1924 251,695,599 164,128,861 87,566,738 6,922,577 
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